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Democratization and Dilemmas for Africa’s Security Forces
Democratization and Dilemmas for Africa’s Security Forces
The security forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been busy since incumbent President Joseph Kabila was declared winner of disputed elections on December 9, 2011. Members of the Republican Guard (a presidential security detail of 12,000 soldiers), the police, and other security forces have fired on crowds of protesters killing at least 24 people and probably many more, according to Human Rights Watch. The police and armed forces have also been actively patrolling the streets in opposition strongholds in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, arresting pro-democracy organizers. Heavy tanks and artillery blocked routes leading to Kinshasa’s Martyrs Stadium where an opposition rally was planned for December 23. Leading opposition candidate Etienne Tshisekedi remains under house arrest.
In short, despite allegations of widespread electoral fraud, including the “losing” of 1.6 million ballots, the Congolese security forces have sided with the regime in power. The pattern echoes one seen in a number of other African countries in recent years, including Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Rwanda, among others. In Côte d’Ivoire, the military was instrumental in keeping Laurent Gbagbo in place during his 5-month standoff following presidential elections that he was deemed to have lost. By the time Gbagbo was arrested, (and his forces largely routed), more than 3,000 people were estimated to have been killed.
These cases indicate that despite noteworthy democratic progress over the past two decades, some African military leaders continue to be locked into a mindset that their primary responsibility is regime protection – rather than basic precepts of professional militaries such as maintaining neutrality, upholding the constitution, and protecting citizens. This mindset is no doubt an outgrowth of established political norms in much of the continent where “big men” make the rules and are in power for life – affording a reliable source of support for militaries that toe the line. And, indeed, this has been a logical calculation for much of the post-colonial period.
What these security sector leaders fail to appreciate, however, is the degree to which these rules are changing. Today, only a dozen of Africa’s 54 governments can expect to stay in power without at least some popular support. This is a dramatic reversal from 1990 when nearly every African country was a one-party state.
Moreover, citizen and international expectations are changing. As a recent ACSS report, Africa and the Arab Spring: A New Era of Democratic Expectations, shows, African citizens are increasingly expecting their governments to operate within the rule of law – or face resistance. Parliaments have grown more independent and are demanding more accountability from Africa’s security sector. The same holds for the courts which are increasingly likely to cooperate with the regionally-based African Court of Justice and Human Rights and the International Criminal Court (ICC), now headed by a Gambian, Fatou Bensouda.
Expectations of competitive elections are likewise becoming increasingly common – and increasingly well monitored – making blunt attempts by politicians to falsify results increasingly ineffective. Not coincidentally, the average tenure of African heads of state is steadily declining.
Reinforcing all of these changes is the explosion in use of cell phones in Africa. As noted in the ACSS report, nearly 1 in 2 African adults now have access to a cell phone. This has logarithmatically expanded the number of cameras available to capture episodes of corruption and human rights violations – enforcing higher levels of accountability on public officials. Such standards are, in turn, upheld by an increasingly well-established and organized civil society – another change from years past.
Just as African citizen expectations are rising, so too are regional and international standards. Sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union, and international partners, are simply less likely to accept trumped up results. This has been evident in the DRC where Robert Mugabe was the only head of state to attend Joseph Kabila’s inauguration ceremony on December 20, and the EU, the IMF, and other international donors may suspend funding support. In other words, the governance goal posts are shifting.
Owing to these changes, the calculus of Africa’s military leaders must also change. They can no longer blindly support an incumbent leader without taking on considerably greater risk to themselves – including imprisonment and prosecution by the International Criminal Court. By siding with a Gbagbo or Kabila, military leaders also forego any role they might play once a democratic transition occurs. They’ve put all their eggs in one basket. Autocrats tend to be quite capricious leaders as well. Security sector officials are among the first to be reshuffled, sacked, or blamed when these leaders face pressure for reform. From an institutional perspective, by allowing the military to be politicized, officers badly tarnish the credibility of the entire armed services. This severely compromises the viability of what are often long-established security institutions under the new democratic dispensation. Rather, as transitions in South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, and Latin America have shown, the interests of the military are better served when military leaders embrace the reform process rather than wait for more restrictive regulations to be forced upon them.
Principles of being apolitical and maintaining neutrality are not just right from the perspective of military professionalism – they’re also increasingly the smart thing to do in Africa.
[1] ACSS Director of Research
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About This Author
Dr. Joseph Siegle is the Director of Research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.