

Foreign Relations

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The U.S-China Conflict and Korea's Relations with the Neighboring Countries

*Park Ihn-hwi**

I. Introduction

One of the most paramount attributes of global politics is that it is driven by “*power politics*”. The contemporary international political order could best be understood in terms of the U.S.-China relations. Some are critical of this view, insisting that the gap of national power between the U.S. and China is significant, especially when it comes to the standards pertinent. However, at this point, we can notice that diverse modern global phenomena in the world originated from the U.S.-China conflict. In particular, it is of agreement of many that the consequences exert larger influences on the East Asian level, rather than on the global level.

The most representative characteristic of South Korea is that it is a “*a Northeast Asian nation*”. It is assumed that there are approximately eight countries within Northeast Asia; nevertheless, neither China nor Japan is referred to as a “*Northeast Asian country*”.¹ Most of the neighboring

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countries would pursue “*Northeast Asian national interests*” as “*Northeast Asian stakeholders*,” but they do not define themselves as Northeast Asian countries. To illustrate, the U.S., who is located across the Pacific Ocean, China, which sees itself as an independent regional power and Japan, which emphasizes itself in the midst of Pacific state’s status do not define their national identities as one from Northeast Asian region.

In contrast, South Korea has taken a distinct path from them. Speaking from the perspective of national interest, nothing can better depict Korea than as “*a Northeast Asian country*.” Therefore, the efforts to secure the stability within the Northeast Asian region is one of the top priorities in its national strategies. Despite slight variations in approaches and goals, Kim Dae-Jung administration’s “*East Asia Vision Group*”, Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s “*Northeast Asia as Central Country*”, Lee Myung-Bak administration’s “*New ASEAN diplomacy*” and Park Geun-Hye administration’s “*The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative*” were all the fruits of deep contemplation on how to create the Northeast Asian environment which would be more favorable to South Korea’s national interests.

In the midst of the international order in Northeast Asia, the structural conflict between the U.S. and China is at its core. As a matter of fact, the outlook of the relations is not as bright. Rather, it is more appropriate to say that they are deteriorating. Taking account of the nature of power politics, the U.S.-China relations have become a global norm which would standardize the international principle of running the entire international political system. Currently both the U.S. and China are key actors in Northeast Asian regional politics. Plus, the specific battle line of the conflict is not confined to traditional arenas such as political or economic aspects

1. Peter Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

but has trespassed on to other areas as well. In the meantime, diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan have entered a page-turning phase.

Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to pinpoint the maintenance of stable diplomatic relations with South Korea's key neighbors, including the U.S., China and Japan, as the most important task for future Korea's national fate. Especially it is the case, considering that currently South Korea has become the 10th largest economy in the world also, in terms of comprehensive national power, South Korea has become a crucial actor which was invited to the "G7 Conference".

II. The U.S.-China Conflict and South Korea's Relations with Neighboring Countries

1. The U.S.-China Conflict and Changes in Global Diplomatic Environment

The transformations in the U.S.-China relations that have unfolded since the detente in the 1970s were incomparable to those of other nations. The U.S.-China relationship until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s could be briefly summarized as the "*trilateral conflict*", with the former Soviet Union included. In the later years, "*Chinese threat theory*" was raised. Initially the U.S. embraced China in the hope that China would eventually accept global standards by itself. According to many experts' viewpoints, the meaningful milestone that marks the beginning of the U.S.-China relations from the modern perspective is passing of the *Trade Relations Act (TRA)* by the U.S. Congress in 2000. It was this event that helped China participate in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the following

year, 2001. However, the dramatic shift in bilateral power relations, which the U.S. and China have experienced over the past 20 years, has served as the most prominent element in the change in the diplomatic and security environment both on the global level and on Northeast Asian level. To add, the initiation of a “2+2 meeting” between the U.S. and China in the second half of Bush administration, Obama administration’s endeavors to transfer diplomatic and security resources back to Asia in the name of “*Asian rebalancing*” and the deterioration of the U.S.-China relations which Trump administration’s extreme linkage between domestic politics and foreign policies targeting China caused, all clearly illustrate the large impacts on the international community brought about by the U.S.-China relations.

What is intriguing about the U.S.-China conflict is that it has gone through three distinct phases. If we assume that competition or even conflict began in the year of 2000, the first phase was so called “*issue-driven*” conflicts. Examples were as follows: issues pertinent to Tibetan religious leader, Dalai Lama’s entry into the U.S., China’s violations of intellectual property rights and anti-human rights practices imposed on political dissidents in China. As such, the conflicts revolved around certain issues or cases. Following these events, the U.S.-China conflict has made its presence in the “*second phase*”, by launching the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, establishing Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015, founding the New Development Bank (NDB) and sponsoring the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2014. These moves all marked the transition from “*issue-driven conflicts to institution conflicts*”. China’s such strategies lay in the belief that it would not be possible for China to maximize national interests without changing the existing international order itself. In this process, it is evident that the 2008 global financial crisis became a decisive momentum for changes in power relations between the U.S. and China.²

In recent years, the world sees the “*global standard-driven*” competitions being intensified. That is, the Huawei case and “*the pressures on TikTok and WeChat*” are intense wars over who gains the upper hand in controlling the standards of global networks and communication between the U.S. and China.

As discussed, the nature of conflicts between the U.S. and China has changed, following the time and the nature of power. In this context, a fundamental question has to be asked whether past South Korean governments have been skillful in coping with “*such changes with U.S. or China-specific diplomatic strategies*”. Hence, the question as to whether South Korea has hidden under the pretext of the North Korean issue and presented the “*strategic ambiguity*”, a policy that South Korea itself cannot even define, or whether South Korea has made its diplomatic decisions expediently in dealing with each case without consistent principles between the U.S. and China, or whether each administration of South Korea has handled relations with the U.S. or China rather impulsively without considering its objective national interest must be addressed. In the meantime, South Korea should reflect upon whether it has lost its balance in the relations with Japan and abandoned the pragmatism which it has pursued for a long time.

2. The U.S.-China Conflict and the Northeast Asian Regional Security

Then, what is the exclusivity that the U.S.-China conflict possesses on the level of the Northeast Asian regional security?³ The salient attributes

2. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “American and Chinese Power After Financial Crisis,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4(2010); Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 6(2010).

would be the coexistence of the “*alliance system*” in the area of the security relations and the “*mutual dependence*” in the area of socio-economic relations among Northeast Asian countries. Alternatively, depending on different observers, this coexistence could be perceived as the gap or dissonance between “*regional security alliance system*” and “*regional economic community system*”. Drawing from the point of alliance, an “*multi-layered*” alliance structure was built in Northeast Asia right before and after the outbreak of the Korean War. In a nutshell, the U.S.-led bilateral alliances refer to the process in which the U.S. entered the security alliances with countries within the bloc (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan) and excluded the other nations not belonging to the bloc (China, North Korea, former Soviet Union) from the regional order during the Cold War. In comparison with Europe, another sphere of outpost of the Cold War, there are a number of explanations as to why the United States preferred bilateral alliances over collective security systems like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁴

Compared to the evident changes that the security environment outside Northeast Asia have gone through from the post-Cold War until now, the U.S.-centered bilateral alliance system is still solidly being retained up until now. The alliance system is the deed of sharing respective national military and security capabilities against the constant and potential “*foes*”.⁵

3. In academia, East Asia and Northeast Asia are not conceptually interchangeable. Nonetheless, at least, more recently, the regional interdependence among East Asian countries has strengthened. Such an ideological shift made the distinction between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia quite insignificant, especially when it comes to policy implementation. As the South Korean government emphasized ‘*New Southern Policy*’ by highlighting Southeast Asian nations as amicable stakeholders, the tendency has become more conspicuous.

4. Park Ihn-hwi, “Alliance Theory and Northeast Asia: Challenges of the 60th Anniversary of the Korea-US Alliance,” *Korea Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. 25, No. 3(2013), pp. 317-31.

It is indisputable that the Northeast Asian alliance system with the U.S. as the hub protected security in the region after the Korean War and eliminated the possibility of war, which eventually resulted in the region being signified as the symbol of the world's dynamic growth. Theoretically, however, the Northeast Asian alliance system itself continuously justifies the existence of "enemy" despite the changing environment of the global security condition. In short, the exacerbating U.S.-China conflict is creating a type of dilemma as it is interlocked with characteristics of Northeast Asia's security structure.

The reason why this dilemma has become more salient is that the Korean Peninsula issue is at the very center of the U.S.-China conflict. For reference, North Korea abused the Northeast Asian alliance system to present nuclear development as the rationale behind its survival, transforming the Korean peninsula, where the U.S.-South Korea alliance and China-North Korea alliance system are in a sharp contrast to each other. Once the North Korean "nuclear game" combined to the U.S.-China conflict, solving the security problem between the North and South Korea has turned out a complicated "international security game" in which solutions to address a complete denuclearization of North Korea is very hard to achieve. Considering that North Korea's nuclear weapons development began in the early 1990s, shortly after the end of the Cold War, North Korea's nuclear development, which put forward the "survival" logic, was a kind of consequence of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the diplomatic relations between South Korea and China.

The dilemma of the North Korean logic of "survival" could be attributed to the "internal balance" between the two Koreas and the "external balance"

5. Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 1(1991), pp. 121-142.

between the ROK-U.S. alliance system and alliance systems between North Korea and China and North Korea and the former Soviet Union. This maintained a tight balance in terms of the security status on the Korean Peninsula. Yet, the “*external balance*” collapsed at once, following the end of the Cold War order.⁶ Unlike other divided countries like Germany and Vietnam which experienced their divisions due to international political factors in the post-war order, the Korean Peninsula, was characterized by the “*internal balance*” due to the internal confrontation and the “*external balance*” by foreign powers on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s provocations are basically inconsistent with its own rationale of “*self-reliance (Juche) and independence*” that North Korea has consistently promoted; North Korea’s moves are survival strategies that fundamentally only maximizes the negative aspects of the internationality embodied within the security structure of the Korean peninsula, that has existed since the Korean War. Therefore, South Korea is burdened with the diplomatic responsibility for countries in Northeast Asia. In this context, greater wisdom has become necessary for the establishment of relevant strategies.

3. The Traits and Changes of Korean Neighboring Nations

One of the lasting features of Korean diplomacy has been “*great powers-centered diplomacy*”. During the Cold War, the focus was on “*double-hegemon diplomacy*” represented by the relations with the United States and Japan. Following the success of *Nordpolitik (northern policy)* and the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the relations with the U.S. and China served as the centerpiece of South Korea’s diplomacy.

6. Samuel S. Kim, *International Relations of Northeast Asia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

It is well known to many that there are practical reasons for such a tendency. Due to the fact that South Korea is surrounded by the superpowers without sufficient resources allocated to diplomatic policies, it is natural that South Korea have to direct all its diplomatic capabilities to nations that exert huge influence in terms of security and economy. We call it “*total(all out) diplomacy*”. Plus, North Korea is the underlying variable for South Korea’s security and diplomatic policies; ergo, South Korea has to put all the diplomatic efforts upon the global actors who exercise large influences on North Korea.

In retrospectively, South Korea did pursue various diplomatic policies by breaking itself from “*great powers-oriented diplomacy*”, as seen in the efforts of Roh Tae-Woo administration’s northern policy, the Kim Young-Sam administration’s *diplomatic diversification and multilateral diplomacy*’ and Kim Dae-Jung administration’s “*Asia-oriented policy*”. Still, diplomatic-wise, the resources are centered around the relations with the U.S. and China. It is highly probable that it is difficult to depart from the foreign diplomatic policy revolving around the major powers, considering the function of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or “*agenda setting*” for foreign policies.

In particular, South Korea-China relations, which was once shaken by the THAAD crisis, have not been back on track. There are no signs of improvement in South Korea-Japan relations, which have repeated its ups and downs without any solid principles. Speaking of Russia, whose reputation as a global superpower was maintained during the Cold War, but it would not be an exaggeration to point out that relations with the U.S., China and Japan in Korean diplomacy became the Alpha and Omega since the US’ skillful diplomacy strategy to tie Russia to Europe was successful. It is also true that promotion of the “*New Southern Policy*” under the current

government led to the emergence of India and Southeast Asian countries as substantial diplomatic partners of South Korea. However, to the disappointment of South Korea, it is still in the process of just seeking an economic breakthrough to secure the engines for economic growth from them.

Within this backdrop, significant phenomena have recently appeared in the world. Firstly, as many experts have pointed out, the controversy over whether the “*liberal international order*”, which has brought about the stability and growth of the international community since 1945, is disappearing.⁷ Regarding the important questions raised in this paper, the U.S.-China conflict clearly plays a role in catalyzing the fragmentation of liberal international order. National interests-driven tendency of major powers, in which the U.S. is not an exception, and the pressure that Biden administration exercises on China is good demonstrations. The U.S.-China also exacerbated the fracture in liberal international order by making Japan pursue a “*normal state*” more actively.

Secondly, China’s all-round offensive attitude in taking advantage of the currently withering international liberal order has resulted in the followings: adoption of Hong Kong national security law, oppression of human rights of the minorities, foray into the Indian Ocean, extreme conflicts with India and the justification of its dominance over South China Sea. Currently, it is very interesting to see the international anti-Chinese sentiment becoming more rampant among Asian countries. 14 countries are bordered with China by the land and 6 countries are bordered by the sea. The total number amounts to a total of 20 countries, which is the tenth of all the countries. Considering such situation, it is expected

7. G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 192018).

that China may have the skill of being allies with neighboring countries and securing amicable states. However, to everyone's surprise, the hostility toward China is growing as international liberalism has lost its ground. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to predict that such phenomena will be temporary or enduring in nature. However, at least, the "anti-Chinese sentiment" found in many Asian countries is a vital element to be considered, since South Korea is endeavoring to strengthen its diplomatic bonds with neighboring countries.

III. "New Foreign Policy" and South Korea's Relations with the U.S., China and Japan

In the global diplomatic environment of U.S.-China relations, which is deteriorating at an unexpected speed and level, South Korea has a unique national identity as a Northeast Asian nation. In this context, what efforts should South Korea make for the promotion of the successful diplomatic relations with the U.S., China and Japan? The explanation will be provided from two dimensions respectively. It seems highly necessary for the government to pursue policy options, like that of the "New Foreign Policy" declaration, which will help it depart from the diplomatic inertia of the past. Hence, the latter half of the paper would address the components of the "New Foreign Policy", in addition to the future directions and the gist of diplomatic relations with the U.S., Japan and China.

1. *The Necessity of the “New Foreign Policy”*

Roughly speaking, under the “*modern international order*” that was established around the end of the 17th century, almost all countries set two national goals for themselves. The first goal was the industrialization, in other words, economic growth. All modern nations have done their best to accumulate national wealth and improve people’s standard of living. The other aim was political democratization, which basically meant democracy. Having a reliable and desirable political system was one of the goals that all countries set. As these two goals have been achieved by approximately 20% of the countries in the world, the next goal they have pursued was “*a country with enhanced diplomatic capacity*”. The term, “*a country with enhanced diplomatic capacity*” may seem rough but it could be comprehended in the global community as “a country with the abilities to set and lead the international agendas.” And the definition applies to South Korea. Since South Korea attained industrialization through authoritarianism (more specifically, soft authoritarianism) and democratization through Korean way of bloodless revolution, it is imperative for South Korea to set its next goal as becoming “*a diplomatically competent power*”.

South Korea already embarked on its “*a diplomatically competent power*” project through gaining the membership of OECD, UN security council, DAC, making its presence in diverse international organizations and hosting summit talks on the nuclear issue. Nevertheless, unfortunately South Korea’s “*diplomatic capacity*” has not yet caught up with the level of ‘industrialization and democratization’ for several reasons including the North Korean issue (Korea discount). In view of this background and currently escalating U.S.-China conflict, the declaration of the “*New Foreign Policy*”, which must be different from the past, is necessary.

For further elaboration, the past practice of the “strategic ambiguity” which applied to the relations with U.S. and China is no longer valid. South Korea’s “national goals” and “diplomatic principles” that will better reflect its national identity should be formulated as soon as possible. In light of South Korea’s unique position as a “divided country”, it should not repeat the same mistakes as it did in the past, in which security and peace were viewed as conflicting goals. Rather, national goals pinpointing “security”, “economy”, “peace”, “unification”, “peace” should be set. Given South Korea’s geographical location, situation of economic resources, industrial structure, cultural background and North Korean issue, it is near impossible to choose the U.S. over China and vice versa. As this dilemma deepens, it is more necessary for South Korea’s diplomacy to refine its goal with “value-oriented” principles such as democracy, human rights, new security, peace, prosperity, justice, and climate change.

Formulating principles might unintentionally hinder the pursuit of national interests in certain sectors. However, South Korea’s firm stance of promoting principle-oriented diplomacy will contribute to its international leverage in the long-term not only between the U.S. and China but also in the international community as a whole. For example, regarding the “*South China Sea dispute*” or “*India-Pacific strategy*”, Korea has to express its hope that these cases should be resolved for the benefit of the region’s peace and prosperity. The time has come for South Korea to forsake the “*balance of distance*” but to embrace the “*center of values*” and “*balance of interests*”. In this context, South Korea needs to adopt a “New Foreign Principle” which will take better account for the recent conflict with the U.S. and China and rapid changes in the international security environment.

2. South Korea's New Relations with the U.S., China and Japan

Firstly, the vision of the South-Korea-U.S. alliance which guarantees self-executable peace and legitimacy of universal morality is required. If it wants to maintain permanent peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula, South Korea should take the initiative by showing itself as being self-executable. It must prove to the world that it is capable of providing peaceful solutions to domestic problems. Furthermore, it has to actively participate in the effort to solve the international agendas which remains to be tackled. Only when such conditions are met, South Korea's stance on the peace of the Korean peninsula could attract the support of international community including the U.S. and China. Also, South Korea is well known as one of the most advanced democratic countries among the East Asian countries. During the short period of time in modern history, South Korea has achieved democratization and social diversification successfully mainly due to the South-Korea-U.S. alliance. And it is desirable that such traditions will continue. Through the strategic alliance across comprehensive policy arenas between South Korea and the U.S., the two countries have to realize universal human values such as human rights, democracy and pluralism. These practices of the alliance will allow South Korea to realize more progressive social values compared with neighboring countries like China and Japan. As a result, this could also work as a theoretical foundation where the South Korea-U.S. alliance could play a more critical role within the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.

Secondly, South Korea's diplomacy towards China should be carried out strictly on the basis of the global standards, although this might cause hardships to the relations of the two countries in the short time. It is still too early to conclude whether China would be willing to adopt political

pluralism or not like most of countries which achieved economic success. Thus, China's domestic affairs should be left for China to decide. However, understanding relatively rough and coarse nature of Chinese diplomacy as just unique feature of China would be of no benefit to both China and South Korea and to the international community as a whole. In the meantime, South Korea has to identify various mutual interests among the complex aspects of the relations with China. However, South Korea should be aware that these interests are maximized only when its relations with China are based upon the universal rules of international community.

Thirdly, South Korea's relations with the U.S., China and Japan have to be maintained lest they should be swayed by particular leaderships in charge of their own political interests. The diplomatic and security sector has been largely influenced by the specific governments in charge, compared to any other policy areas. Going back to history of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the South Korea-China relations in the post-Cold War era, it is clear that South Korea's relations with the U.S. and China have vacillated according to the visions and preferences of particular leaders of the respective nations. In 1965, when the normalization of diplomatic relations between the South Korea and Japan was established, their diplomacy has not deviated much from this tendency. Nevertheless, in the future the diplomacy with these three nations should neither be modified nor adjusted by particular leaderships or political groups so that we can pursue future-oriented and executable balanced diplomacy in the 21st century. The practices of a particular leadership's defining national interests arbitrarily in the past must be reformed as soon as possible.

Fourthly, 'Korean diplomacy towards the U.S. and China' itself must be an autonomous policy arena by its own. For this, nurturing 'experts on relations with the U.S. and China' is necessary and there should be

continued recruitment of diplomatic resources which will be invested in pertinent policies. Above all, in order to secure better and stable “diplomatic relations with the U.S. and China”, one of the most urgent tasks is to train a group of “experts on such relations”. Although there are experts on the U.S. and China respectively in South Korea, South Korea is now facing the lack of professionals who have comprehensively grasp of the U.S.-China relations by focusing on each country’s national interests and strategies simultaneously. Certainly, these professional groups will not be created over night. Hence, at least for the time being, it is desirable that the U.S. and China expert groups should share their information and insights through various network connections between them which will be sponsored by the government and private think tanks. The effort to reciprocally share the expertise of these groups looks better as of now.

Due to the fact that South Korea has to confront neighbors who have far richer diplomatic resources, it is necessary that South Korea develop specialized policy assets to quantitatively and qualitatively secure “diplomatic assets” whenever possible. One of the most typical assets would be human resources (utilization of diplomats). To add, effective and strong national leadership and knowledge-information infrastructure is a plus, as well as relatively state-centered resources. It is also vital to focus on the aspects which have not attracted attention relatively, for example, professional and active global networks (including NGOs), private actors in civil society, cultural resources (namely Hanryu, K-culture), national reputation and brand management. These resources and methods must be taken advantage of to expand the diplomatic and security assets of South Korea in the future.

Fifthly, regarding “diplomatic relations with Japan”, the “principle of pragmatic diplomacy” should be restored in the near future. The group

which led the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan in 1965 was the conservative ones.⁸ Several variables may have been involved behind the normalization. Still, the value that penetrated the minds of conservatives was a “pragmatic diplomacy”. Since then, although South Korea’s relations with Japan has gone through twists and turns, it is apparent that “pragmatic diplomacy” was the underlying factor where both nations have gained reciprocal interests. In theory, a “pragmatic diplomacy” neither inherently belongs to conservative nor progressive camp. The current government’s diplomacy with Japan, founded upon values and principles, should pick up the advantages that it has brought about. A “pragmatic diplomacy” is the only viable solution to the recent relationship between South Korea and Japan, which has been inextricably complicated.

IV. Conclusion

To end, some critical questions must be addressed. What is the competitive edge of South Korea’s national power compared to the United States, China, and Japan? What are the policy resources which South Korea can exploit to exclusively invest in the process of conducting a foreign policy compared to these countries? Could the Korean Peninsula-related interests already established by the United States, China, and Japan from their respective perspectives be revised by South Korea’s own intentions and will? Would South Korea even be able to surpass these countries in national wealth and national power in the distant future, whether it takes 100 or 200 years?

As the majority of the specialists would agree, the answers to the questions

8. (in Korean) Kwon, Yong-lip, *Conservatism* (Seoul: Sowha, 2015).

raised above will be mostly negative. Despite this, the relative gap in the national power between South Korea and these countries could continue to be reduced, with our own efforts. To illustrate, since 2013, North Korea, during Kim Jong-Un administration, has executed “speed march for the completion of nuclear weapons” through the rationale and methods, which were difficult for us to accept. Its moves could be considered to have the intention of using the unstable security environment, which was brought about by the escalating U.S.-China conflict. In the same sense, South Korea should be responsive and attentive to the diplomatic space that arises from the U.S.-China conflict. The value-based “New Foreign Policy” declaration must be examined thoroughly. On the basis of this fresh measure, the third goal of a modern nation-state, being a “diplomatically competent power”, could be reached.

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the Korean Peninsula

- From a Nuclear Quagmire to a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone? -

*Han In-taek**

As the backbone of the global non-proliferation regime, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (henceforth NPT) has played an important role in preventing nuclear proliferation worldwide. Contrary to President Kennedy's prediction that the number of nuclear weapon states would reach 15 to 20, the actual number of nuclear weapon states today is in the single digit. The NPT has played a key role in keeping the number low. The permanent extension of the NPT in 1995 through the consensus of the NPT Parties is evidence of the recognition of the important role of the NPT not only among nuclear weapon states but also non-nuclear states.

Although the contribution of the NPT as the backbone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime cannot be underestimated, it is difficult to deny that the NPT has been only partially effective on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has been pursuing nuclear weapons program within and outside the NPT, and now it seems to have developed nuclear missiles

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that can threaten not only the Korean Peninsula but also the U.S. continent. To put differently, the Korean Peninsula has been a “proliferation quagmire” within the NPT regime. This essay examines the relationship between the NPT and the Korean Peninsula, and examines the possibility and limitations of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula to prevent the Korean Peninsula from being a proliferation quagmire. A nuclear weapon-free zone, which completely bans nuclear weapons within a specific region, is recognized as important in reinforcing the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and Article 7 of the NPT explicitly stipulates member states’ right to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone.

I. Incomplete Incorporation into the Non-proliferation Regime

The NPT was adopted on July 1, 1968, and took effect on March 5, 1970. The Korean Peninsula was only belatedly and incompletely incorporated into the NPT regime.

1. North Korea, a “Rogue State” that Abused the NPT

North Korea signed the NPT on December 12, 1985 under Soviet pressure. After delaying the ratification of the NPT for seven years, it completed the ratification process only in April 1992 and officially joined the NPT. Less than a year later, on March 12, 1993, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT on the grounds that the IAEA inspection team demanded special inspections of unreported facilities (the first announcement of NPT withdrawal). The NPT recognizes the right to

withdraw if a country deems “best interests of the country are at stake,” and stipulates that all Contracting States and the UN Security Council should be notified three months before withdrawal. Withdrawal takes effect after three months have elapsed from the announcement of withdrawal. Taking advantage of this stipulation, North Korea declared that it would withhold its withdrawal in June 1993, before three months had elapsed from the first withdrawal announcement, and stayed within the NPT.

However, North Korea continued to develop nuclear weapons, and on October 4, 2002, admitted the existence of a nuclear weapons program, and in January 2003 again announced its withdrawal from the NPT (the second announcement of NPT withdrawal) In its withdrawal announcement in 2003, North Korea officially stated that it would withdraw from the NPT automatically and immediately, and informed the UN Security Council that it would withdraw its decision to withhold its withdrawal from the NPT announced in 1993. Accordingly, it can be said that North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT took effect in 2003. Afterwards, North Korea promised to return to the NPT through the September 19, 2005 joint statement, but did not return in the end, and rather conducted a series of nuclear tests. In sum, North Korea belatedly joined the NPT, announced withdrawal less than a year after joining, and reversed it, 10 years later, in 2003, it announced withdrawal, and conducted nuclear tests repeatedly, though it promised to return to the NPT in 2005. It showed an unprecedented behavior in the history of the NPT. In this process, the authority and reputation of the NPT was also greatly damaged.

In the end, the NPT failed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. Rather, North Korea accelerated the development of nuclear weapons during the ten years while it was within the NPT system, from its accession in April 1992 to its withdrawal in January 2003. The

NPT may have unintentionally given North Korea more than a decade of time to develop nuclear weapons while allowing it to maintain the appearance of being a member of the NPT.

2. South Korea, a Mistrusted Model Non-proliferator

The Republic of Korea (henceforth South Korea) was also reluctant to join the NPT; it also continued its nuclear weapons development program after joining the NPT. South Korea signed the NPT on July 1, 1968, but the National Assembly ratified it belatedly on March 19, 1975. So, similar to North Korea or perhaps because of it, South Korea took 7 years from signing to ratification. The reason for the delay in ratification is that South Korea was also interested in developing nuclear weapons, probably because North Korea was also interested in developing nuclear weapons. While South Korea is known to have decided to develop nuclear weapons in 1972, the construction of Korea's first nuclear power plant (Gori-1 Unit) began in March 1971, and President Park Chung-hee showed interest in nuclear power 10 years before that, shortly after he came to power. President Park Chung-hee's will to develop nuclear weapons was old and strong. Therefore, it is not surprising that the ratification of the NPT had been delayed.

The main reason that South Korea eventually ratified the NPT despite President Park's will to develop nuclear weapons was not its respect for the NPT or pressure from the US. The main reason was that Canada insisted South Korea's ratification of the NPT as a condition for selling its heavy water reactors to the South. Canada conditioned South Korea's NPT ratification on the sale of its heavy water reactors because Canada tried to fulfill its obligations as an NPT member. One can say that the NPT

contributed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula in that South Korea ratified the NPT after hesitation and eventually gave up the development of nuclear weapons due to Canada's demands as an NPT member.

At that time, South Korea's nuclear weapons program was pursued in a very different domestic political situation and international environment. In the 1970s' South Korea, the military led by President Park Chung-hee was in power, and internationally, it was the Cold War era when the communist and free blocs confronted. The United States, which protected South Korea from North Korea, was trying to pull out from Asia after losing the Vietnam War, and there was a possibility that the U.S. troops in South Korea would actually withdraw. At a time when, internally, the authoritarian government was in power and externally, security instability was intensifying, South Korea had interest in developing nuclear weapons but nevertheless joined the NPT after much hesitation.

Today's situation, when South Korea was democratized and the Cold War ended, is very different from the 1970s, when Korea intended to develop nuclear weapons. South Korea held a Nuclear Security Summit (in 2012) and is proud of itself as an exemplary NPT member. However, the history of South Korea's nuclear program in the 1970s is still remembered. South Korea does not currently possess nuclear weapons but it is considered a "threshold nuclear state" with the technological capability to arm itself with nuclear weapons in a short period of time. Some in the international community continue to suspect that being a threshold nuclear state, South Korea will eventually develop nuclear weapons for self-defense purposes if North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons. In particular, when an enriched uranium separation experiment was conducted by some scientists in 2000, and a belated report of the experiment was made in

2004, the international community began to suspect that South Korea was secretly developing nuclear weapons. In addition, as public opinion polls conducted after North Korea's nuclear and missile tests repeatedly show that the majority of the South Korean people support its own nuclear armament, the international society's doubts about South Korea's commitments to non-proliferation are not easily dispelled.

II. The NPT's Limits and North Korea's Nuclear Program

The NPT aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries other than the existing nuclear states. To this end, nuclear weapon states were obligated to prohibit the transfer, development, and support of nuclear weapons and explosive devices to non-nuclear countries (Article 1); The manufacture, acquisition, and the pursuit of aid of nuclear weapons were prohibited for non-nuclear countries (Article 2). While the exchange of equipment, materials and technical information for the peaceful use of nuclear power is permitted (Article 4), it is conditional for non-nuclear states to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA (Article 3). These provisions represent the NPT's basic approach to non-proliferation: The NPT believes that nuclear proliferation can be prevented by regulating the transfer and trade of nuclear weapons and materials and equipment related to the production of nuclear weapons.

1. *The Limits of the NPT*

This approach has been generally effective, and as mentioned earlier,

it has contributed to keeping the number of nuclear powers in the world within single digits, contrary to President Kennedy's prediction. However, the approach has limitations, which are clearly exposed on the Korean Peninsula.

The NPT prohibits NPT member states, including nuclear weapons states, from providing nuclear weapons or hardware and software related to the manufacture of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states unless safeguards are taken. In other words, the NPT controls the "supply" of hardware and software related to the possession or development of nuclear weapons. This approach has important limitations in at least two aspects.

First, in addition to the nuclear-weapon states recognized by the NPT, there are nuclear-weapon states that exist outside the NPT, such as India, Pakistan, and Israel. Non-proliferation obligations under the NPT Treaty do not apply to them. And their dealings with non-nuclear states that seek to develop nuclear weapons are difficult to detect let alone regulate. A great example is the trafficking of nuclear technology and nuclear materials led by Dr. Khan of Pakistan. The trafficking network established by Dr. Khan contributed significantly to the nuclear programs of Libya, Iran, and North Korea. And, as we saw with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, when NPT member states cease to function normally in the midst of upheaval, the trafficking of nuclear technology or nuclear materials may occur. In fact, some argue that former Soviet scientists and equipment were of great help to North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and missiles.

If it is difficult for the NPT to effectively regulate the "supply" of hardware or software related to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, it would be helpful to control the "demand" of non-nuclear countries for nuclear weapons instead. In other words, if the NPT can help make non-nuclear

states neither need nor want nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation can be prevented even if regulations on “supply” fail. The limitation of the NPT system is that the NPT provisions or guidelines related to the NPT do not include measures to consider or control the “demand” of non-nuclear states for nuclear weapons. The most basic measure can be said to be the passive security guarantee of non-nuclear states by the nuclear weapons states but no such guarantee exist in the NPT treaty. There are also no global international treaties that guarantee safety for non-nuclear states yet.

2. Why North Korea Has Developed Nuclear Weapons: An Empirical Analysis

In order to achieve non-proliferation by controlling the “demand” of non-nuclear states for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to first understand why the demand for nuclear weapons arises in the first place. In other words, it is necessary to accurately understand the motives of nuclear armament. North Korea claims to have been armed with nuclear weapons for security reasons, specifically to deter US aggression. However, if one looks closely, one will find puzzles that cannot be solved by such logic.

In the early 1990s, when the first North Korean nuclear crisis occurred, it can be seen that North Korea pushed for a nuclear development program at a time when the risk of a U.S. nuclear attack on the Korean Peninsula was at its lowest level. In the early 1990s, the Cold War ended and the two Koreas agreed to denuclearize, and there were no nuclear weapons in South Korea, including US tactical nuclear weapons. But this was exactly the period when North Korea pushed for nuclear development. If the history of the 1990s is any guide, it is difficult to conclude that North Korea’s

motivation for nuclear weapons is to deter the U.S. nuclear attack.

Some argue that North Korea's nuclear weapons are a response to President Bush's declaration of North Korea in January 2002 as the "axis of evil" along with Iran and Iraq and his decision to invade Iraq in 2003. In other words, North Korea's nuclear weapons were developed to deter another Bush's invasion on the Korean peninsula. This theory is inconsistent with Russian President Putin or Dr. Khan's memory. When President Putin stopped over North Korea on his way to Japan in 2001, he recalled that he had learned that North Korea had nuclear weapons. Dr. Khan of Pakistan also visited North Korea dozens of times in the late 1990s, and he had already seen several nuclear devices. In other words, in time North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons preceded President Bush's speech on the axis of evil or the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

In addition, it should not be overlooked that the reason for the US invasion of Iraq was not because Iraq lacked nuclear weapons, but, on the contrary, because the US suspected that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction. If North Korea can learn a lesson from the US invasion of Iraq, it would be that the development of weapons of mass destruction does not deter US attacks, but rather induces US attacks. Considering that the first summit was held between the two Koreas in 2000, it is also difficult to conclude that North Korea's nuclear development was due to worsening inter-Korean relations. To sum up, it can be concluded that North Korea's nuclear development took place before Bush's "axis of evil" remarks, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and when inter-Korean relations were the most amicable in history.

North Korea's nuclear and missile tests have been conducted in earnest since the Obama administration, and the basis of the U.S. policy toward North Korea at that time was "strategic patience." Strategic patience is a

passive policy that waits for the collapse of North Korea while applying only economic pressure without responding with force despite North Korea's nuclear or missile tests. Given that North Korea's nuclear warhead development and missile development began in earnest when the U.S. took a strategic patience policy, it is doubtful whether North Korea's nuclear development was really a choice to deter the U.S. military threat. Rather, it may be accurate to say that the U.S. has unintentionally helped the North to accelerate the development of nuclear and missile with peace of mind by not threatening North Korea militarily under its "strategic patience" policy.

All in all, in empirical analysis as opposed to North Korea's claim, the US nuclear threat was not the main driver of North Korea's nuclear development.

3. Alternative Explanation: Diversionary Proliferation

South Africa is the only known case which developed and then scrapped nuclear weapons on its own. Nuclear weapons were developed during the reign of its all-white government that maintained power by suppressing non-white South Africans, who were the numerical majority. Nuclear weapons were abolished just before the apartheid government transferred power to the African National Congress.

The case of South Africa has many implications that can help us to understand North Korea's motivation for nuclear arms. If nuclear weapons are framed as a symbol of power and glory, they can contribute to the control of power by the regime, and the pressure from other countries that block nuclear development may give rise to support for the regime through the rally "round the flag" effect. Just like in apartheid South Africa, North Korea's nuclear weapons can have a diversionary effect that disperses

the economic and political dissatisfaction of the North Korean people, creates a rallying effect to support the regime, and contributes to the control of power by the North Korean government.

III. The Korean Peninsula Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: Prospects and Limits

If North Korea's nuclear program is diversionary in its purpose, it is difficult to achieve denuclearization by security guarantee. However, the diversionary effect is not permanent and cannot genuinely relieve economic and political dissatisfaction at their cause. The diversionary effect is short-term and will ultimately be offset by the hardships of its people's life caused by international sanctions. It is then likely that the North Korean regime will give up nuclear weapons at some point when the effect of diversion is falling, and instead try to find new ways to maintain the regime. At that point, there will be a possibility that North Korea will negotiate denuclearization on the condition of security guarantees.

However, security guarantees can be just empty words. For example, the Ukrainian crisis showed that neither passive nor active security guarantees by great powers had any effect on preserving Ukraine's territory or sovereignty. Russia did not launch a nuclear attack on Ukraine, but violated Ukraine's territory and sovereignty. Instead of protecting Ukraine when Russia annexed Crimea, China just stood by. If the Ukraine crisis has a lesson for North Korea, it will be that security guarantees can be empty.

Therefore, in order for North Korea to denuclearize in exchange for security guarantees, the promise of security guarantees must not be in vain.

To do this, first, the promise of security guarantees must be “comprehensive” and “binding”. It is not enough for China and Russia to “promise” North Korea to provide passive and active security guarantees. China and Russia should actually “fulfill” such pledges. More importantly, the United States should promise and actually implement passive security guarantees if active security guarantees for North Korea is not feasible.

In short, the US, China, and Russia should all participate in the security guarantee for North Korea (comprehensiveness), and the promise of security guarantee should be binding (credibility). In order to do so, the promise of security guarantee should be stipulated in a legally binding treaty, not in the form of a memorandum or declaration. In particular, the United States’ security promise to North Korea should be of a very high level of binding force and credibility. To this end, a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty on the Korean Peninsula ratified by the U.S., China, and Russia could be a good instrument.

Put simply, a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty is a legally binding agreement among countries to establish an area free of nuclear weapons. The specific details of the nuclear weapon-free zone defined in each nuclear weapon-free zone treaty may be slightly different, but the most basic characteristic is the absence of nuclear weapons. Article 7 of the NPT recognizes the right to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone, and at the 5th NPT review conference in 1995, a resolution was adopted to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The idea of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia had been proposed multiple times in the past, but it has not received support from the US, China, and Russia. If a nuclear weapon-free zone is geographically limited to the Korean Peninsula, however, China and Russia are more likely to accept it because China and Russia are exempted. Since

China has an alliance with North Korea and the United States, with South Korea, there is a challenge of reconciling the alliance treaties and the nuclear weapon-free treaty, which is a difficult problem. But I don't think reconciling is necessarily impossible. It may be possible, for instance, to recognize the other's alliance in the nuclear weapon-free zone treaty in exchange for recognition of one's own alliance. One can also imagine a more unconventional solution. The important thing is to have continuous dialogue and negotiations to find the content and form of a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty that North Korea can accept and the US, China, Russia and South Korea can also agree on.

IV. Conclusion

Since economic sanctions are still not producing denuclearization and military measures are too costly, it is necessary to continue to pay attention to the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula as an alternative despite its limitations. It may now be more desirable to discuss North Korea's denuclearization, security guarantees, and inspection systems to confirm North Korea's fulfillment of promises multilaterally as a package within the framework of a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty rather than dealing each issue separately and bilaterally.

The question is whether it is possible to create a nuclear weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula in today's reality. In particular, North Korea is thought to be willing to agree on denuclearization only when it is guaranteed the security of the political regime as well as military security. If so, it is necessary to discuss whether it is possible for other countries to guarantee the security of the North Korean regime and even if it were

possible, whether it is desirable. After denuclearization, North Koreans would be exposed to the outside world and their economy would get integrated into the world economy; as a result, their income, thinking, and expectations could change rapidly. It is necessary then to ask whether it is possible to guarantee the security of the North Korean regime when almost everything changes and even if it were possible, whether it is desirable to provide such a guarantee. Answering these questions require a lot of thoughts.

This article does not disagree on the fact that it will be difficult to create a nuclear weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula. However, since North Korea's denuclearization has not been achieved in other ways so far, and the Korean Peninsula is at greater risk of a nuclear war than any other region due to North Korea's increased nuclear capacity, I don't think the idea of denuclearizing North Korea through a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty should be abandoned.

In fact, if we study the history of existing non-nuclear zone treaties, none of them were easy to start at first. However, in the process of negotiating nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, difficulties were solved one by one, and nuclear weapon-free zones were born. As a result, five nuclear weapon-free zone treaties were signed and entered into force within the human habitation area, with a total of 116 countries and 33% of the world's population belonging to the nuclear weapon-free zones. Regionally, nuclear weapon-free zone treaties are in effect in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa. Therefore, we should not hastily ignore the possibility of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula. If it is difficult for the government to discuss the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula right away, it is desirable to start the discussion at the private level first and form a consensus.

The United Nations Command on Wartime OPCON Transition

*Kim Byoung-gi**

I. Introduction

Discussions and debates on the transition of wartime operational control (henceforth Wartime OPCON) between the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and the United States, which began in 2005, have changed significantly in the way to transfer Wartime OPCON including an agreement on postponing the timing of the transition. In 2006 the two countries agreed to dismantle the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (henceforth CFC) by 2012 and to establish separate command systems respectively in which the two militaries have a cooperative relationship. And in 2010, the two countries decided to postpone the timing of the transition from 2012 to 2015. In 2014, the two sides agreed on the timing of the transition to be decided, based on “conditions”. In 2018, the two countries decided to create a “Future Combined Forces Command”, which would become a single command system on the premise that a South Korean four-star general would be the commander. In addition, they even conducted a combined

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exercise based on a diagnosis of the initial operational capability of the “Future CFC” in 2019. As North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats have become more serious, the “conditions” for the OPCON transition have not been met due to the lack of combined exercises during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a consequence, it seems to be inevitable to postpone the transition for the time being.

The creation of the “Future CFC” and the transition of wartime OPCON will entail significant changes in the military command relations between South Korea and the United States. Among them, the problem related to the role of the United Nations Command (henceforth the UNC) is not as simple as expected. This is because it is a critical issue that will have a significant impact on not only the UNC’s leading armistice management, but the ROK-US alliance. Furthermore, the UNC can play an important role in the transition to a peace regime linked to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Therefore it is very important and necessary to understand the legal status and role of the UNC on the Korean Peninsula from its foundation to the present day. Such an important interpretation of the legal status of UNC, however, differs depending on scholars, and there seems to be insufficient consensus forming between South Korea and the U.S. due to the political and ideological approach.

In addition, media and some political circles are raising the suspicions that the UNC is trying to become the supreme command of war on the Korean Peninsula because the U.S. is recently reinforcing its staff organization and personnel as part of the UNC’s “Revitalization program” in preparation for the transition of wartime OPCON. This is based on a highly subjective or ideological tendency rather than on an essential understanding of the status and role of the UNC, which can undermine the spirit of the ROK-US alliance and negatively affect national security

of the ROK.

This article aims to analyze the status of the UNC in an objective and reasonable way, to present opinions on changes in the status and role of the UNC in the process of wartime OPCON transition, and to dispel suspicions surrounding the revitalization of the UNC.

II. Legal Status and Political Implications of the UNC

1. Legal Status and Role of the UNC

A. The Establishment of the UNC and Its Legal Status during the Korean War

In the event of the surprise attack by North Korea in the early morning of June 25, 1950, the United Nations (henceforth UN) Security Council called for “the immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel” and requested the United Nations Commission on Korea (henceforth UNCOK) “to observe the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel and to communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation” pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution (henceforth UNSCR) 82. Subsequently, it adopted UNSCR 83 on June 27 to affirm UNSCR 82 and “recommend that the Members of the UN furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area”. As North Korea continued to attack despite the above resolution, UNSCR 84 on July 7 created a “unified command’ led by the United Nations to command the UN forces,” and requested U.S. to designate the Commander

of the UN forces, and especially authorized the “unified command” at its discretion to use the UN flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces. Thus 16 UN forces launched a war under the UN flag to restore peace on the Korean Peninsula marking the first case in the history of the UN.

The UNC Commander’s operational command of the South Korean military started from a letter from President Syngman Rhee on July 14, 1950 and a reply by General MacArthur. In this way, the UNC played a decisive role in the Korean War, which caused a total of 160,000 casualties including 50,000 dead of UN forces and led the Korean War, relieving the Republic of Korea from the communist aggression by defeating the North Korean and Chinese invasions until the Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953.

By the way, along with differences in views on whether the UNSCR is a legitimate military action by the UN’s compulsory measures, controversy over the international legal status of the UNC has continued on whether it is an organization of the UN because of delegating the establishment and operation of UNC to the United States without the formation of a military staff committee under the UN Security Council by Article 47 of Chapter 7 in the UN Charter. In other words, there are conflicting views that the participation of UN forces in the Korean War is an exercise of collective self-defense, that the UNC is not an affiliate or subsidiary of the UN, and that the UN forces fought in accordance with the UNSCRs and the UNC was the first to realize military enforcement action under the UN Charter as a subsidiary organ or substitute agency of UN. This conflict is due to differences in legal interpretations of the nature of UN military action. In some cases, it can be said that it depends on fragmentary grounds or reflects the subjective position. Therefore, it is necessary to

analyze the nature of UN military action and the legal status of the UNC by a comparative analysis of the UN Charter and the UNSCRs including the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council Resolutions regarding the participation of the UN forces and the creation of the UNC during the Korean War.

First of all, the three UNSCRs 82, 83, and 84, are exactly in line with the Purposes of the UN, Article 1 of Chapter 1 in the UN Charter by stating “maintain international peace and security, and to that end, take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.” Moreover, those resolutions coincide with Article 39 and 40 of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.; In addition, the UN military participation is based on Article 42 of the Charter, which stipulates compulsory measures by the UN Security Council “to take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The UNC was established as a subsidiary organ to the UN Security Council under Chapter 3 Articles 7 and 29 because it “requested and delegated authority” to U.S. to command the UN forces considering an imminent situation.

The UNSCR’s request to the UNCOK to identify the situation and to observe and disseminate the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions through UNSCR 82 and UNSCR 83 stems from the UN Security Council’s responsibility and authority. Likewise it authorized the UNC to use the UN flag at its discretion in Resolution 84. The UN Security Council exclusively exercised its responsibility and authority for military enforcement action from an active and leading standpoint according to the UN Charter.

In addition, it is not convincing or persuasive to argue that the participation of the UN forces and the creation of the UNC was not a

compulsory measure by the UN and only a collective exercise of self-defense since there was no military staff committee stipulated by the Security Council according to the UN Charter and the creation of the UNC was led by the U.S.. In implementing compulsory measures by the Security Council, it was impossible to form a military staff committee under the Security Council due to Soviet interference at the time. This is especially so because the establishment of the UNC was the most realistic and appropriate measure, considering the principle of military command and unification. In addition, through the UNSCR 85, it can be confirmed that it is a compulsory measure by the UN by allowing the UNC to oversee the relief and support activities of the civilian population of Korea on behalf of the UN Security Council.

It became difficult to adopt a resolution for the “Korean Question” since the Soviet representative returned to the Security Council on August 1, 1950. Therefore a total of 14 resolutions were made at the General Assembly, not at the Security Council until the Armistice Agreement was signed, of which many were important grounds for interpreting the legal status of UNC. First, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) was established by UN General Assembly Resolution 376 on October 7 1950, allowing UNCURK to “represent the UN in establishing a unified and independent democratic government and establish an extraordinary committee in Korea to consult with the UN.” Since then, the General Assembly continued to make resolutions related to UNCURK, the United Nations Foundation for Korean Reconstruction (UNKRA), and the UNC, and continued to provide guidance to the UNC and receive reports. In addition, eight resolutions by the UN Economic and Social Council supported relief and revival for Korea and Koreans, especially in UN Resolution 323, as it provided aid at the request of the UNC. So the representative agencies of the UN, its General Assembly,

Security Council, and Economic and Social Council systematically supported the UNC, which underpin the nature of the UN forces and the legal status of the UNC.

Therefore, when comprehensively analyzing international legal grounds centered on the UN Charter, UN Security Council, General Assembly, and Economic and Social Council resolutions, the participation of UN forces and the creation of the UNC are only examples of military enforcement of Chapter 7 on the UN Charter. And this means that the UNC holds the status as an auxiliary organ of the UN and the supreme command of war which was established as a substitute agency of the UN Security Council during the Korean War.

B. Changes in the Status and Role of the UNC since the Signing of the Armistice Agreement

(1) Resolution of the UN General Assembly and the Status of the UNC

The UNC, which had kept its legal status as an auxiliary agency to the UN during the Korean War, maintained its legal status by continuously adopting resolutions related to the “Korean Question” and the UNC at the UN General Assembly even after the signing of the armistice agreement. On August 28, 1953, shortly after the signing of the Armistice Agreement, General Assembly Resolution 711 recommended member states to inform UN about the result of following the Political Conference. Through Resolution 712 on the same day, “the first success in defeating armed invasion by collective military action requested by the UN, and effective demonstration of collective security based on the UN Charter” were confirmed. In addition, resolutions related to the UNC continued at the

General Assembly, especially General Assembly Resolution 977 (1955.12.15) specified “to set up and maintain the UN cemetery in Busan as a UN Memorial Cemetery in Korea” and requested the Secretary-General “to arrange the negotiation for an agreement with the Republic of Korea and fund allocation” from the UN’s position. This is an obvious example of exercising the administrative responsibility of the UN for the management of UN forces and its subsidiary organ, the UNC. And the General Assembly reaffirmed “the objectives of the UN are to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area” and emphasized “under the Charter, the UN fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security in Korea,” and noted “parts of UN forces are being withdrawn and the remaining forces are prepared to withdraw when the conditions for UN’s objectives are fulfilled in Korea” regarding the “Korean Question” from 1957 to 1970.

By the way, in the early 1970s, when the East-West confrontation intensified within the General Assembly due to the increase in the number of non-aligned countries in the United Nations, the issue of the dissolution of the UNC was raised in General Assembly Resolution 3333 (1974), and regarding the dissolution of the UNC, the General Assembly Resolution 3390 (A) submitted by the democratic camp and the 3390 (B) submitted by the communist camp were adopted simultaneously in 1975. However, after 1975, the dissolution of the UNC was put on hold indefinitely as the resolution of the General Assembly itself to “substitute the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement” was not implemented by the parties. But this is not a reason for disqualifying the UNC status under international law.

(2) Changes in Military Command Relations between the ROK and U.S. and the Role of the UNC

After the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the UNC took responsibility and authority for managing the armistice on the Korean Peninsula and exercised operational control over the remaining UN forces to deter and prepare against North Korean provocations until the early 1970s when the UN forces withdrew. In addition, the UNC, which exercised “operational command” over the Korean military during the Korean War, continued to “Retain Republic of Korea forces under the ‘operational control’ of the UNC while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea” according to the Agreed Minutes on November 17, 1954 until the establishment of the ROK-US Combined Forces (henceforth CFC) on November 7, 1978.

The establishment of the CFC resulted in a significant change in the role of the UNC. The UNC’s responsibility for the defense of Korea and operational control over the Korean military were transferred to the CFC, and the relationship between the UNC and the CFC became a support and cooperation relationship. The ROK and the U.S. made it clear that all the responsibility and authority of the UNC, as a party to the Armistice Agreement, for armistice management is maintained as long as the Armistice Regime on the Korean Peninsula is maintained, and that the commander of the CFC who has operational control over combat units responds to the UNC commander’s instructions for armistice management.

After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. sought a change from a leading role to a supportive role for the defense of the Korea, considering the improvement of the ROK military’s capabilities. Thus the Armistice OPCON was transferred from the CFC to the ROK Joint Chief of Staffs (henceforth

JCS). However, the Combined Delegated Authority (CODA) required for war-fighting missions was granted to the commander of the CFC. So the commander of the CFC still responds to the UNC commander's instructions for armistice management.

(3) The Current Legal Status and Role of the UNC

Based on the reviews of the legal status of the UNC above and the changes in the command relationship between the ROK military-UNC-CFC, the mission and role of the current UNC are as follows:

First of all, as a signing party to the armistice agreement, the UNC clearly maintains its responsibility and authority to implement it. The mission to repel North Korea's armed attacks, which had been maintained under UN Security Council Resolutions during the Korean War, was transferred to the CFC, when it was established, and the role of the war-fighting command no longer exists.

Second, it can serve as a force provider to support the CFC's war-fighting through controlling the UN combatant nations' forces that will re-enter the war on the Korean Peninsula. On the day of the signing of the Armistice Agreement, 16 UN combatant nations adopted the Washington Declaration and decided to "unite again for world peace and immediately counter the invasion if there's a war on the Korean Peninsula again." This clearly allows the UNC to guarantee its role as a force provider to the CFC.

Third, it is possible to ensure the improvement of wartime sustainability through the deployment of U.S. reinforcements and UN combatant nations' forces using the rear base of the UNC in Japan and continuous support for military supplies. With the signing of the "Achison-Yoshida Exchange Official Letter" on September 8, 1951 and the "SOFA" between UNC and

Japan on February 19, 1954, the operation of the UNC rear command post and seven rear bases is strictly binding and effective international law.

2. Status of the UNC and Political Implications

By analyzing and comparing the political implications related to the UNC along with the above legal review, the status of the UNC can be interpreted in a balanced and in-depth manner, and the direction of future changes in the status and role of the UNC can be predicted.

First, the change in the nature of the United Nations, which started as a world peace organization, caused a difference in interpretation of the legal status of the UNC. At the time of the establishment of the UN, it started as a global peace guarantor centered on the Allies responding to the Axis powers, but the Cold War ensuing shortly the World War II practically changed the UN's identity to a half-organization of the original UN only to represent the democratic camp against the Soviet Union-centered communist camp. In General Assembly Resolution No. 498 on February 1, 1951, it was clearly specified in the article that "The forces of the Peoples of Republic of China causes hostilities to the UN and the UN forces in Korea." This was confirmed by the repeated adoptions of the article "requesting the Communist authorities to accept the UN's purpose" in General Assembly Resolutions from 1957 to early 1970's. Therefore, the claim that the UNC is not a substitute organ of the UN Security Council can be seen as not taking into account these political implications. It should be considered that the UN Security Council's creation of the US-led UNC without forming a military staff committee based on the UN Charter was inevitable due to the Soviet Union's interference. The remark in 1994 by

UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghalli, saying that the UNC was not an agency of the UN, is also related to this political implication.

The second is the decline of interest in the UNC due to the prolonged armistice regime. No individual or country retains its perception of the UNC at the time of the Korean War or the signing of the Armistice Agreement as the armistice regime was maintained without being able to switch to a peace regime for 68 years long after the signing of the Armistice Agreement. The two Koreas and the U.S., which are currently directly affected by the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula, recognize the current status of UNC. But the Soviet Union has been disbanded, and Russia has no ambition to “communize the Korean Peninsula.” Also China has not been affected by the armistice system since the withdrawal of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) in 1994. The same goes for the 15 combatant nations, and the UN has no longer deal with the “Korean question” since 1975. It is believed that the various interpretations on the legal status of the UNC today are due to this influence, and the U.S. and Korea are the decisive agents in determining the status of the UNC.

The following can be the influence of the relevant parties. First of all, there is no disagreement that the U.S. is a key country that has decisive impact on the existence and status of the UNC for managing the Armistice Agreement. Since the 1954 Geneva Conference, North Korea has constantly insisted on the dismantling of the UNC, calling the withdrawal of the UNC as a fundamental premise of the Armistice Agreement, which will have an important impact on the status and role of UNC in future consultations, including resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and a peace regime. Although China has little interest in the Armistice Regime and UNC, it has traditionally taken a position to support North Korea in order to check the United States on the Korean Peninsula.

Therefore, it is necessary for a balanced interpretation of the UNC to consider the political implications such as a UN identity change, prolonged armistice system, and the current international political situation.

It is reasonable to view the issue of dismantling the UNC as being determined by the U.S.' policy judgment and consultation between the ROK and the U.S. to maintain the Armistice Regime considering the security of the Korean Peninsula and to prevent a recurrence of war.

III. The Transition of the Wartime OPCON and the Change of the Role of the UNC

1. Meaning of the Wartime OPCON

According to the current ROK-U.S. combined operation system, the ROK JCS exercises operation command through its subordinate operations command in peacetime. In case of an emergency, when DEFCON-III is issued under the approval of ROK-U.S. national command authority, the designated Korean military will be transferred to CFC's operational control and U.S. forces will be transferred to the CFC on order when they are deployed to the Korean Peninsula and ready to fight.

According to the agreement at the 50th SCM in 2018, regarding the transfer of the Wartime OPCON, the "Future Combined Forces Command (henceforth Future CFC)," which is same as the current single combined command structure, will be established and a Korean four-star general will be the commander while a U.S. four-stars general will be a vice commander. Under this structure, combined policy and strategic decision-making bodies such as the SCM and the Korea-U.S. Military Committee (MC) will be maintained.

It is known that the size of the staff of the ROK and US forces, which will form this new single theater command, is similar to the current CFC. The ROK and the U.S. are in talks on specific arrangements and detailed missions like staffs organization which consist of the chief of staff / vice chief of staff, assistant chiefs of staffs / deputy assistant chiefs of staffs and action officials as ROK-US counterparts. This means the continuation of the current ROK-U.S. combined defense system. By maintaining this single command system for the defense of Korea, the possibility of U.S. military engagement and reinforcement in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula can be improved, and it can be a very strong message to North Korea to deter reckless provocations, especially nuclear and missile threats.

2. The Status and Role of the UNC Related to the Transfer of the Wartime OPCON

The transition of the Wartime OPCON changes the command relationship between the ROK and the US military from the current CFC to the “Future CFC,” not the legal status of the UNC. Therefore, the transition of the Wartime OPCON and the existence of the UNC are completely separate matters. The UNC is an auxiliary agency of the United Nations established under United Nations SCR in 1950, 28 years before the beginning of the ROK-U.S. combined operation system, and its legal status has not changed even after the establishment of the CFC in 1978 and the Armistice OPCON transfer in 1994. In addition, as long as the UNC exists, it is natural to provide the role of a force provider and war-fighting sustainability in case of an emergence, and it is essential for the security of the Korean Peninsula.

In addition, as a signing party to the Armistice Agreement, the UNC has exclusive authority and responsibility for armistice management. However, the current armistice management of the UNC, which is carried out through the CODA of the CFC, should be reviewed on how to ensure the authority and responsibility for armistice management of the UNC when the CFC is disbanded and a new “Future CFC” is established. Because it is an important amendment to the Armistice Agreement, a new agreement is needed between the parties to the Armistice Agreement, and a new agreement to replace the Armistice Agreement must be premised. Consultations should be made between the ROK and the U.S. as well as with the UN combatant nations.

3. Revitalization of the UNC and the Transition of the Wartime OPCON

Suspicious have been raised that “after the disbandment of the CFC, the UNC could again become a war-fighting supreme command on the Korean Peninsula.” as the UNC’s “Revitalization” program began in 2014. This program includes the appointment of a UN combatant nations general as deputy commander and the UNC’s chief of staff from a concurrent position to an exclusive position, and the expansion of numbers of UNC staffs. However, these suspicions seem to have originated from a lack of understanding of the realities such as the role and organization of the UNC, or from ideological bias in sympathy with North Korea’s argument.

The revitalization of the UNC is literally “reactivation,” not “expansion.” Currently, the UNC maintains its mission performance system through the formation of a concurrent position with CFC staff, and it aims to have the basic organization and operational capabilities necessary for mission

performance after the disbandment of the CFC. Currently, only two-digit number of UNC staffs including the command element and chief of staffs / deputy and few staff officers, concurrently serve as CFC staff members, and there are only a few separate UN staff members, far short of the current CFC staffs. In addition, the UNC does not have its own operational plan or combined exercise. In this way, it is absolutely impossible to function as a war-fighting headquarters with an insufficient number of staffs and without an operational plan or exercise. This fact is supported by the fact that the “U.S. asked the ROK to hold 20 of the 99 positions of the UNC earlier this year” according to a media report on July 7, 2019. Therefore, revitalization of the UNC is an activity to ensure the basic functions of the UNC in preparation for the transition of the Wartime OPCON, and is only part of self-rescue measures for armistice management and the performance of the UNC duties as a force provider.

For the ROK, it is necessary to avoid a political judgment and actively support the “revitalization program” of the UNC promoted by the U.S. military necessity. In order for the UNC to act as the armistice manager and force provider even after the transfer of the Wartime OPCON, advices from the ROK staffs with a high understanding of the Korean Peninsula situation will be needed above all else, especially ROK-U.S. conversation window if the CFC is dismantled.

IV. Conclusion

The UNC has a legal and international political status as a subsidiary organ or substitute agency of the UN, established under the UN Security Council resolutions during the Korean War, contributing decisively to

keeping Korea from the communization threat, expediting the beginning of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula by deterrence from North Korea's provocation for 66 years of the armistice. It is, indubitably, a valuable asset that has contributed to the growth of today's prosperous Republic of Korea. And the transition of the Wartime OPCON and the existence of the UNC are completely separate matters.

Therefore, it is not desirable to change or underestimate the role of the UNC in the wake of the shift in military command structure between the ROK and the U.S., especially considering that the North Korean nuclear issue, which threatens peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, is the reason for existence of the UNC. For the security and national interest of Korea, it is reasonable to maintain its status until a complete peace regime is established.

Fortunately, even in the process of discussions on transferring wartime OPCON to the ROK, the two sides are repeatedly emphasizing the importance of the UNC for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula apart from the transfer of wartime OPCON through the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).

The "revitalization program" of the UNC is purely being carried forward at the military-level for the UNC to ensure the capability for armistice management and force provider. So it is desirable to actively cooperate and increase the number of UNC staffs with U.S. and UN combatant nations officers as well as ROK officers in order to maintain an organic cooperation system between the UNC and the "Future CFC".

Iran-Iraq War from the Perspective of the Limited War

*Chung Kee-jong**

I. Introduction

The Iran-Iraq war broke out on September 22, 1980, following a surprise invasion by Iraq. The Iraqi forces advanced approximately 40 kilometers to the Khuzestan province in Iran, then another 10 kilometers to the Mehran region, capturing several islands in the Shat al Arab river area. Six days into the war, on September 28th, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq suggested a negotiation with Iran. The strategy of the Iraqi military followed the concept of a limited war, but Iran refused negotiations and went into an all-out war. And the war, which was expected to have ended in a short period of time, lasted much longer than expected—until August 20, 1988.¹

The war was a national struggle between the Arab peoples of Iraq and the Aryan peoples of Iran, as well as a conflict between Shiite and Sunni sects of the two Islamic countries. The traditional borderline issue and

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1. F. E. W. Fursdon, *Iraq-Iran War, Military History Year Books, 1981-1982*, JANE, 1982, Translated by Institute for Military History, Ministry of National Defence, Seoul, R.O.K., 1983.

hegemony struggle within the region were also catalysts of the war. In the aftermath of the war, it was claimed that both countries lacked the ability to manage the war properly.

There are several factors behind why the war did not stop as a limited war like Saddam Hussein initially intended. Firstly, Saddam Hussein misjudged Iran and its international environment. This war displayed how the military's ability to conduct war can be easily distorted in undemocratic countries under dictatorship. Secondly, Iran's massive counterattack to protect the Islamic Revolution created the Iranian People's Unity. Thirdly, the Arab world was left disorganized following Egypt's ousting from the Arab League. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait supported the Sunni regime in Iraq, while Syria supported Iran's Shiite Revolutionary government. There is also the reason that the United States and the Soviet Union, under the Cold War, did not want a collapse of the regional order due to the victory of either country. And, the United States and Israel played major roles in the transition of the war. The two countries' arms supply to Iran effectively stopped the Iraqi offensive and rather helped to strengthen the Iranian military capability.

This article is a study to find the implications of the Iran-Iraq War in the following ways. Firstly, how the war started and developed. Secondly, why the war did not move as Saddam Hussein intended. Thirdly, why and how the supporters of Iraq and Iran intervened in the war. And finally, a brief comparative view of the Iran-Iraq War to the Korean War to note some comparable meanings between the two wars.

II. Background of the Iran-Iraq War

The background of this war can be looked at in a few ways.

Firstly, after Egypt's membership was suspended by the Arab League in 1979, a struggle for leadership in the Arab world emerged.² Iraq took the chance and attempted to take hegemony in the Arab World. Secondly, Arab countries were concerned about the possible spread of Iran's Islamic Revolution in December 1979. Most of the Sunni Arab countries are afraid of Iran's expansionism, which calls itself a Shiite leading country, and Iran gradually strengthened its power as it continued to make a Shiite belt linking Lebanon and Syria. Thirdly, there had been disputes between Iraq and Iran over waterways in the Gulf across history. Therefore, Saddam Hussein's ambition to become the Middle East's most powerful leader pushed him to this preemptive strike on Iran. Hussein aimed to win by pressing Iran's weakened military power shortly after the Islamic Revolution. Fourthly, Saddam Hussein's intention to divert political attention from anti-government forces and Kurds in Iraq to the war also worked. Furthermore, Iraq had to cut off Iran's influence over Shiites in Iraq, which account for more than half of its population. Lastly, in November 1979, Iranian demonstrators occupied the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and captured U.S. diplomats as hostages. Due to this incident, Saddam Hussein had expected to receive assistance from the U.S. government. The biggest issue between Iran and Iraq was the sovereignty of the Shat al Arab river along the border between the two countries. The river, which is about 200 kilometers long and about 4 meters deep, flows between Iraq and Iran into the Gulf.

2. Arab League Headquarters to Return to Cairo - The New York Times (nytimes.com) <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/12/world/arab-league-headquarters-to-return-to-cairo.html>

Iran used international law to claim the Thalweg, the deepest bottom of the river, as its border line. But Iran's claim failed due to Britain's support of Iraq. Iraq claimed the eastern coast of the river as its border. This was based on the Treaty of Erzurum signed between Ottoman Turkey and Persia in 1823 and 1847. When British troops withdrew from the area in 1968, the issue re-emerged. On April 15, 1969, the Iraqi government declared to Iran that it would ban entrance to the river of any Iranian warships and civilian vessels that raised the Iranian flag. Iran, however, warned that it would not accept such Iraq's declaration and this caused armed conflict. On April 22, Iran sailed ships that hoisted the Iranian flags under armed escorts by naval vessels and air force planes. Eventually, Iraq had to acquiesce and lost face over the incident.

Driving the momentum, in 1971 Iran occupied three strategic islands in the middle of the Gulf, i.e. Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which were in territorial dispute with the United Arab Emirates. Despite strong protests from Iraq and the United Arab Emirates, Iran moved its naval headquarter to Bandar Abbas near the Strait of Hormuz in 1972, taking control of the entrance of the Gulf. Under such circumstances in the region, Saddam Hussein prepared for a blow to Iran. Small-scale battles continuously ensued at the border line and in the winter of 1973, a massive battle involving tanks, heavy artilleries, and fighter jets took place along the Iraqi, Kurdish, and Iranian borders. The ceasefire was reached in March 1974 and the waterway issue was concluded by the Algerian Agreement on March 6, 1975.³ The two sides took different positions in claiming which side started the war. Iraq claimed Iran started the war on September 4, 1980, the day that Iran began its blockade of its airspace, mobilization, and deployment of troops at the border. And Iran claimed that the war

3. Korea Military Academy, *World War History*, BongMyoung, 2001, p. 625.

began on September 22 when Iraqi forces crossed the border and launched the first attack.

III. Outbreak and Development of the War

On September 22, 1980, Iraqi forces launched a surprise attack. They advanced approximately 40 kilometers to Qasr Shirin in Khuzestan and another 10 kilometers inside the Mehran region. They then occupied some islands at the entrance of the Shat al Arab river. With this, Iraq had achieved its goal for the war in a week of starting the war. And on September 28, President Saddam Hussein expressed that he was willing to negotiate with Iran to end the war. At that time, Iraq had 200,000 regular troops and Iran had 150,000 regular troops. The Iranian troops had been reduced from 285,000 to 150,000 following the discharge of soldiers who were loyal to the former Pahlavi dynasty in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution. And the number of tanks and fighter jets are as follows; Iraq had 2,750 tanks, 332 fighter jets and Iran had 1,735 tanks, 445 fighter jets. Iran also had a fair share of experienced officers and soldiers that had newly retired. However, when the war broke out, the Iranian army was filled with patriotism and became mentally strong. Officers who were previously forced to retire voluntarily returned to the army. Iraq had underestimated the spirit of Iran's people and army.

On October 5, 1980, Iran rejected Iraq's ceasefire offer and stepped up its counterattack. The main battlefield expanded into the Khuzestan region, the plain of southern Iran. Iraqi forces faced strong resistance from Iranian forces. On October 24, Kohramsar was captured by Iraqi forces after a battle so fierce that Iran called it "the Blood Street". However, the

desperate efforts of Iranian soldiers and citizens led to a successful defense of the oil refinery city of Abadan. Iraqi forces had made the mistake of entering the city without sufficient tank defense equipment nor infantry cover, leading to the destruction of hundreds of Iraqi tanks by Iranian anti-tank weapons and conventional firebombs. Iraqi forces failed to occupy the city despite much bloodshed. Iran had poured out every available human resource—of men and women across all ages—from the city into the battlefield. The 20 month defense battle of Abadan was similar to that of Stalingrad or Leningrad during World War II.

In December 1980, the Iranian army, which had been regrouping its battle lines, switched to an offensive position and launched a counterattack operation. On January 5, 1981, the Iranian army organized an offensive force with one armoured division, two infantry divisions, and two revolutionary guards in an attempt to crush the Iraqi forces. On January 10th took place the largest tank battle since the start of the war. The Iranian army was led by British-made Chieftain tanks, known as the best tanks in the West, while the Iraqi army was led by Soviet-made T62 tanks. About 250 tanks were deployed to battle on each side. In the earlier long-range artillery battles, Iran's Chieftains, equipped with 120 millimeters cannons and thick armor plates, dominated the battle field. However, the heavyweight tank's movements were hampered by the muddy terrain during the rainy season. On the other hand, the Iraqi T62 tanks, equipped with lightweight and wide caterpillars, used its superior mobility to lead the battle. The Iranian Armoured Division was defeated by Iraqi forces but continued its offensive and finally recaptured the region in May.

In May 1982, Iraqi forces were defeated in the battle and began their retreat across the border. The Iranian military's success was not due to the improved operations or command capabilities, but rather due to the

sacrifice of young soldiers belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. They rushed out to the enemy shouting “Allahu Akhbar (God is Great)” disregarding the fields filled with landmine. Iraqi forces were terrified of these deadly tactics and brought upon them psychological panic, which led to the collapse of the front line. Iraq had narrowed its operational scope to the concept of a limited war. Iran, on the contrary, had fought an all-out war. In fact, in the early days of the war, Iraq had limited its operational zone to only some parts of the Shat al Arab river and the Khuzestan region. And only five divisions, which comprise half the size of the full Iraqi Army, were deployed to the front lines. Iraqi forces had refrained from attacking urban and industrial facilities as well as equipment facilities in addition to the Counter Value Target. And they attacked only the Counter Force Target, which was the core military target. However, Iran took on the concept of an all-out war and actively attacked strategic targets in Iraq’s rear regions, leading to the expansion of the war. And in November 1980, the war stalled beyond Saddam Hussein’s original plans.

From July 1982 to January 1983, Iran broke through the Iraqi border with a strong offensive, expanding the end goal of the war to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. Iran instigated Shiite Muslims in Iraq to occupy the holy places of Karbala and Najaf, and to march on to Jerusalem, leading to disorders inside Iraq. And, Iran launched the Ramadan operation which targeted Basra, the second largest port city in southern Iraq after Baghdad. The operation was supported by elite Iranian troops. Iraqi forces fought desperately to defend the city, fortifying a defense line 20 kilometers north of Basra. In front of the Iraqi defence line, a 20-meter-wide waterway was dug to draw water from the Shat al Arab river and set up a moat. Iraq, like the descendants of Mesopotamian civilization, had excellent civil engineering capabilities to control the two rivers of Tigris and Euphrates.

On the defense line outside Basra City, a killing zone was built to shoot down enemy troops. Iraqi forces deployed machine guns and tanks at each *tochka* of the two-meter-deep underground fortress to form a dense fire network. Both ends of the fortress were covered by wetlands. The two sides' forces were similar in size at seven divisions, including the armoured division. Iran attempted a total of five attacks from July 15 to 28, 1982, in the month of Ramadan, an Islamic Feast, but all attacks failed. Iranian tanks had no choice but to approach closer to the Iraqi lines and attack directly. But the decision to approach closer left the tanks exposed and thus easier to target, as opposed to the Iraqi forces who were hidden away within the fortress with superior fire power. Moreover, Iran had no experience in modern tank warfare. At the Battle of Ramadan, Iran lost about half of its tanks and the operation ended in failure. Iraqi troops risked their lives to stop Iranian troops from using toxic gas at the Battle of Ramadan. As Iranian troops began to cross the border, Iraq attempted to block Iran's ports to stop the oil trade. Iraqi fighter jets continuously bombed crude oil factories and storage facilities.

In August 1982, Iraq declared the northern waters of the Gulf as a "No-Sailing Zone". This was aimed at drawing attention from the international community to press for an end to the war. The indiscriminate attacks by Iraqi and Iranian air forces on the oil carriers entering and exiting ports continued and threatened the global energy economy. The war was becoming a war of exhaustion. On March 11, 1985, Iran launched Operation Badr to take an initiative of the war. It was a well-planned military operation by seasoned troops. Iran mobilized 15 divisions of elite units, and Iraqi forces also mobilized five divisions and six brigades for the battle. It was the largest battle on both sides since the beginning of the war. Finally, on March 13, Iranian troops succeeded in crossing the Tigris River.

When the Iraqi line of defense was breached by Iranian forces, President Saddam Hussein went to the front line to bring morale to the troops and Iraqi forces launched a desperate assault. The Iraqi fighter jets made 536 sorties and the helicopter gunships made 435 sorties in a day mobilizing Iraq's air force to full capacity. Eventually, the Iranian military's floating Bridges were destroyed and the landing boats were sunk, isolating the Iranian troops from the west coast of the Tigris River. The Iraqi Armored Division then successfully attacked Iranian forces thanks to the support of its air forces. In the operation, 27,200 Iranian troops were killed, and much broken equipment was left behind. Iran and Iraq clashed again in April 1987 by the Iranian initiative of the Operation Karbala. And from May 1987 to August 1988, the front lines stalled and there were no major battles between the two sides. Instead, the war turned into an exchange of missile attacks. Iran attacked Iraq's major oil city of Kirkuk and Baghdad by missiles in March 1988. Iraq also fired missiles to Tehran across the border.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy fleets began to convoy U.S. ships which sail in the Gulf under missile threats by the two countries. And, on September 21, 1987, a skirmish broke out between the Iranian Navy and the U.S. Navy that was sailing the area. To make matters worse, on July 3, 1988, a U.S. Navy ship, Vincennes, shot down an Iranian commercial airliner IRA 655 and killed its 290 passengers, having mistaken it for a military aircraft. Amid these sensitive times, international pressure had grown, with the U.S. and the Soviet Union actively seeking to achieve peace. On July 18, 1988, the U.N. Security Council adopted the Resolution No. 598. And, Iran finally accepted the U.N. Security Council's Resolution and agreed to end the war on August 20, 1988. The damage of the war was massive as follows; The death toll in Iraq was 100,000, the wounded 50,000, the war damage was \$251.6 billion, and the economic loss was \$170 billion.

And Iran was left with 250,000 people dead, 500,000 wounded, \$503.2 billion in war damage, and \$91.8 billion in economic losses.⁴

IV. Intervention of the United States and Israel

The United States and Israel played a large role in Iran's quick recovery from the defeat of the first phase of the war. Information on the U.S. secret operations that lasted from August 1985 to March 1987 were disclosed in the testimony of Major Oliver North, who appeared at a U.S. Congressional hearing in January 1987. The operation, known as Iran-Contra Affairs, was a secret operation by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency against the anti-government Contra forces in Nicaragua and the Islamic Revolutionary government in Iran. The plan was to support pro-U.S. rebels in Nicaragua with a budget that was funded by arms sales to Iran. The United States had secretly supplied Iran with weapons since August 1985 to free American hostages held in Lebanon by Iran-backed Hizbullah. And the TOW anti-tank missiles and Hawk surface-to-air missiles obtained from the United States greatly strengthened Iranian forces. Iraqi forces, on the other hand, used Silkworm missiles imported from China. Meanwhile, a U.S. special forces' operation to rescue U.S. Embassy hostages held in Theran failed, and president Carter was criticized for it, eventually leading to an unsuccessful re-election in 1980. Fifty-two hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Iran, who had been detained after the Islamic Revolution since November 4, 1979, were all released on January 20, 1981, after 444 days according to the U.S.-Iranian agreement in Algeria.⁵

4. Korea Military Academy, *World War History*, BongMyoung, 2001, p. 616.

5. Gregory E. Fehlings, *America's First Limited War*, Naval War College Review, Vol. 53,

Israel feared that Iraq's victory would inspire the Arab unity and pose a threat to Israel's security. The day after the Iran-Iraq War broke out, Israeli Defense Minister Mordechai Zippori publicly declared his support for Iran. In a press conference in Vienna, Moshe Dayan urged the United States to forget the past and support Iran. On September 28, 1980, Israeli Foreign Ministry proposed to the U.S. Congress that Iran should be supplied with weapons. This was at the peak of the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Iran. And on June 7, 1981, Israeli Air Force F16s and F15s succeeded in the bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq. The continuation of the Iran- Iraq War left Israel-Arab conflict temporarily forgotten, and the Arab world's financial and military aid target headed from Palestine to Iraq.⁶

In March 1982, the New York Times reported that Israel had sold at least \$100 million worth of weapons to Iran over the past 18 months. European media also reported that Israel sold 45,000 Uzi machine guns, anti-tank missiles self-propelled artillery aircraft parts, and many items captured by the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) during the 1982 Lebanon War were also provided to Iran. Israel signed \$135,842,000 worth of arms sales contract with Iran's Defense Ministry which included Lance missiles, Copperhead shells and Hawk missiles. Israel's aviation industry and defense companies sold 150 M-40 anti-tank guns and 24,000 shells per each gun. It included spare parts of tanks and airplanes and 106 mm, 130 mm, 203 mm and 175 mm shells and TOW anti-tank missiles. These items were first transported by Argentine Airlines, and then moved again by European vessels such as Armenia. According to the University of Tel Aviv's Strategic Research Institute, sales of weapons and bombs amounted

No. 3 (SUMMER 2000), p. 102.

6. Trita Parsi, *Israel-Iranian Relations Assessed: Strategic Competition from the Power Cycle Perspective*, Iranian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June, 2005), pp. 255-256. Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of International Society of Iranian Studies.

to \$500 million during 1981 and 1983. Most of them were supplied to Israel by payment of Iranian oil.

V. Conclusion

The Iran-Iraq War is considered one of the biggest failed wars of the 20th century, with no victory on either side but only loss of lives and war expenses. A limited war strategy is possible for nuclear superpowers or between countries with overwhelming power differences. In a war between countries with similar levels of war capabilities, neither country will not readily accept negotiations unless the interests at stake are very significant.

Saddam Hussein's initial plan was to quickly bring Iran to the negotiation table, but Iran had not complied. The war rather boosted Iranian people's patriotism and strengthened the Islamic Revolutionary government. Iran used this war as an opportunity to solidify national unity and expand its ideology. Iraq established an irrational war strategy and went to the wrong path of war.

In the end, however, the two countries lacked the ability to carry out the war properly. This was an example that the judgment of a nation's leader is the most important factor in management of a war, especially in undemocratic countries.⁷ And, it is worth mentioning that in a war between two countries of similar military power, it is impossible to achieve the war goal as long as there are strong supporting forces behind the war.

7. Crowl, A Philip, *The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers*, USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture #20, 1977, p. 3, "The answer, I am afraid, is simply that the Kaiser and his entourage and especially his military advisors were stupid. They lacked the intelligence to analyze the costs and benefits of the war on which they so blithely embarked. They neglected seriously to ask the fundamental question: What is the objective, and is it worth it?"

Finding comparable points between the Iran-Iraq War and the Korean War can be meaningful. Kim Il-sung and Saddam Hussein both wanted to finish the war in a short period. North Korea invaded South Korea to make the Korean peninsula into a communist country. But in reality, the war drew out into years and the limited war left miserable damages. The reason that North Korea's failure in the war was attributable to South Korean people's strong morale, the U.N.'s intervention, and other countries supporting the war from behind the scenes was similar to the situation in the Iran-Iraq War. From this point of view, I try to look at the comparable meanings of the two wars.

Firstly, there were skirmishes near the border before the war. This provided North Korea an excuse to shift the blame for the outbreak of war to South Korea. However, it is a historical fact that North Korea invaded South Korea at 04:00 a.m. on Sunday 25 June 1950 without a declaration of war. Secondly, both Iraq and North Korea were countries with the characteristics of dictatorships lacking democracy. As a result, the miscalculation of the leaders, Saddam Hussein and Kim Il-sung, failed to achieve their end goals and led to a lengthened period of war of attrition. Thirdly, there were variables such as the United States and Israel in the Iran-Iraq War, and the variables such as the U.N., the United States, China and the Soviet Union in the Korean war. These variables gave decisive effects on the transition of the two wars. Fourthly, Like the Iran-Iraq War became a long war, the Korean War also became a war of exhaustion and continued for approximately three years along with truce negotiations accompanied by long tedious fightings near the 38th parallel. Both wars were the results of overlooking the position and willpower of the enemy countries and the big powers behind them.⁸

8. Lee Sun-Ho, *The Korean War as a Limited War*, Military History (24), Center for Military History Record, Ministry of Defense, 1992.6, pp. 185-225.

Demography as a National Security Issue

*Kim Jae-bum**

I. Introduction

1. National Security Threats

A vast majority of people in the Republic of Korea (ROK) appear to perceive that the most presently pressing threats to their national security are (1) pandemics like COVID-19, (2) provocations from North Korea including weapons of mass destruction and cyberattacks, and (3) natural disasters originated from climate change. In contrast and reality, public awareness of the seriousness of a megatrend for low birth rates and aging, which are far more fundamentally and critically threatening factors to the ROK's national security, is yet to be raised.

Whereas the first three are threats originated mainly from the outside, low birth rates, and aging, derive from the inside of the country, rapidly slipping toward a suicidal implosion. It may be fair to describe this situation that frogs in a pot do not recognize the water temperature gradually rising. Low birth rates and aging seriously distort the demographics to the extent that economically active population and military manpower plummet every

* *Vice Chairman, Korea-America Association*

year, drastically contract the national economic power and defense capability, and eventually lead to a situation that the very existence of the state itself is placed in danger.

In other words, this phenomenon constitutes a direct threat to the existential base of a nation. There is no room for diplomacy to intervene to redress this humongous challenge. On the contrary, only after population increases and demographics are improved, economic power and defense capability could accordingly be strengthened. And based on soft power added to them, diplomatic prowess can be enhanced at last. Massive population and young demographics, therefore, lay a foundation for powerful foreign policy and diplomatic maneuvering.

2. *Elements of a State*

The citizenry, territory, and sovereignty are often referred to as the three principal elements of a state. The ethnic minority groups who once occupied vast territories and built great empires on the Chinese continent did not sustain their dynasties long enough but ended up being absorbed and/or assimilated to the Han Chinese. The reason for such a phenomenon was that the increase in their number of citizens lagged far behind that of the Han Chinese. This explains well that population is more important than territory, and like a saying, “accumulation of quantity leads to a transformation of quality,” the scale of population matters first and more than its quality or composition, and the rate of its increase is more important than other elements. As early as 1975, Ray S. Cline also specified that the population is the most critical source of national power.¹

1. Cline, R. (1975). *World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift*.

If a territory is larger in comparison with the population therein, i.e. its density is low, endeavors for economic development and national defense cannot but be proportionately overburdened. While efficiently managing and utilizing even a limited territory, a state can expand its economic territories—or platforms—by concluding free trade agreements (FTAs) or comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPAs) with a range of foreign countries. For this reason, the population is more important than territory and comes ahead of sovereignty, which derives from the citizenry, which in turn, is originated from the population.

3. Citizens' Rights and Obligations

As Joseph S. Nye wrote in 2004, the population is traditionally a source of labor, armed forces, and taxation.² On top of these, population begets ballots in democratic countries and purchasing power in the capitalist world. In case a global unitary government is born, the Chinese and Indians would constitute a majority therein.

It is generally understood that all the citizens have four basic obligations for their state: labor, taxpaying, military service, and education. Yet there are certain distinctions among those obligations as to the subject involved and their scope. While labor, taxpaying, and education are universal, military service is limited to male citizens in the ROK. Whereas taxpaying is individual citizens' duty, the other three obligations are rights as well at the same time. Unlike the others that are responsibilities of each citizen, education involves the individual's parents and local as well as central governments.

In some countries, certain disfavours are imposed on the citizens who

2. Nye, J. S. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Hachette UK (published 2009).

miss voting. This can extrapolate an imagination that the ROK government would have to treat differently those citizens who relinquish their rights to be married and/or have children. To cope with the impending demographic crisis, it is natural to assume that granting extraordinary incentives to those with multiple children could be far more effective than exercising such a punitive extrapolation. The present article purports to corroborate this point among others in the chapters following this introduction.

II. Dwindling Communities

1. *A Global Trend*

Decreases in the population of course are nowadays not a problem limited only to the ROK but are a global trend. This phenomenon began in West Europe, passed on to Japan, proliferated to entire East Asia, and then even extended throughout Latin America. Sara Harper specifically repeats pinpointing the four former Asian dragons, i.e. the ROK, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, where their populations decline dramatically.³

The sole region where the population is still growing is known to be Africa.⁴ Population contraction forecasts a future world where fewer and older people produce and consume less. This means capitalism may fray or even break down completely.⁵ In 2011, Nye was also apt at predicting today's population decline, especially in the East Asian countries.⁶

3. Harper, S. (2016). *How population change will transform our world*. 46. 49. 91, 96.

4. Harper, S. (2016). *Ibid.* vii.

5. Karabell, Z. (2019). The Population Bust: Demographic Decline and the End of Capitalism as We Know It, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October.

Nicholas Eberstadt reminds us that the United States' population in 2019 was close to 330 million, larger than that of the UK, German, French, Italian, and Dutch combined whereas it was only 23 million in 1850 when that of France alone was 36 million.⁷ Eberstadt also alerts that China would face a great national crisis from a rapid drop in the workforce and purchasing power owing to low fertility rates and aging whereas the United States would maintain a stout demographic position in comparison with its competitors for the coming decades.⁸ He and Verdery further warn that China would have much less wherewithal at its disposal for influencing events abroad through economic diplomacy and defense policy if it requires building a huge social welfare state for the waning of families.⁹

While the prediction that India will become the world's most populous country surpassing China in 2025 has long been widely known, it is said that Nigeria will emerge as the world's third-largest populous nation surpassing the United States before 2050. The gravity of the problem, however, is that the trend of population decreases is the most phenomenal in the ROK among all the countries around the world.

The Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs at the United Nations prepares every other year its official estimates and projections of global, regional, and national population size and growth, and demographic indicators. The estimates are based on the medium-fertility scenario which assumes that the world population will grow from 9.4 billion people in 2050 to 10.4 billion in 2100 and 10.8 billion by 2150, and then

6. Nye, J. S. (2011). *The Future of Power*. 161, 165, 170, 181–182, 189.

7. Eberstadt, N. (2019). With Great Demographics Comes Great Power: Why Population Will Drive Geopolitics. *Foreign Affairs July/August*.

8. Eberstadt, N. (2019). *Ibid.*

9. Eberstadt, N. & Verdery, A. (2021). China's Shrinking Families: The Demographic Trend That Could Curtail Beijing's Ambitions, *Foreign Affairs*, April 7.

will stabilize at slightly under 11 billion around 2200.¹⁰ This infers that the ROK would need to continue increasing its population until 2200 and to maintain its size thereafter.

2. “Population Cliff” and “Age Quake”

Young Koreans today shun getting married, bear no babies even after they are married, or have only one infant if they do have. To make the situation even worse, soaring suicide rates contribute to faster decreases in population. It has been long since babies’ crying voices disappeared in rural areas. It has also been long since schools of each level began closing, colleges and universities were unable to fill their freshmen quotas, and vacant houses increased not merely in rural villages but also in urban areas. Harper singles out the ROK as a typical country suffering this phenomenon.¹¹

Per the United Nations Population Fund, the ROK’s total fertility rate—the average number of children born per woman in her life between the ages of 15 and 49—fell from 1.17 to 1.1 just before the incumbent administration’s inauguration on May 10, 2017, the lowest since 1970 and already the lowest among 198 countries surveyed.¹² It further went down to 0.84 in the second quarter of 2021, the lowest among the 38 member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and still the lowest worldwide for two years in a row.¹³ It is shocking but not unexpected to mark the third straight year that the rate was below one percent.

10. Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations (1998). *World Population Projections to 2050*.

11. Harper, S. (2016). *Op cit.* 105–106, 142–143.

12. *World Population Dashboard*. <https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard>

13. Statistics Korea (2021). *Population and Housing Census (Register-based Census)*.

According to the data compiled by Statistics Korea, the number of households with children under 18 fell to 4.87 million in 2019, below 5 million for the first time from the previous year's 5.04 million.¹⁴ Such households made up 23.3 percent of the total 20.9 million in 2019, down 1.3 percent from 2018. As of November 1, 2019, the number of people below 18 reached 7.82 million, down from 8.07 million of the previous year. It accounted for 15.1 percent of the total population of 51.8 million in 2019. Of such households, 50.8 percent had one child, followed by two children with 41.7 percent and three with 6.9 percent. Surprisingly enough, the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior and Safety as of October 2021 shows that single-member households are 9,400,907 or 40.15 percent of the total 23,415,533 nationwide.

The number of births was maintained above 400,000 from 2012–16, thanks to a bump from the baby boomers who were born between 1955 and 1963, but plummeted to 362,867 in 2017, to 334,115 in 2018, and 308,697 in 2019. As a result, the total population peaked at 51,849,861 in November 2019 but recorded the first natural decline or “dead cross” in December of that year and then decreased to 51,829,023 by 20,838 with 275,815 newborn babies, by 32,882 (10.65 percent) and less than 307,764 deaths, and by 31,949 as of December 31, 2020. This must represent “a country that the ROK has never experienced.”

There were 272,300 babies born in 2020, a ten percent decrease on-year and again the lowest out of the 38 OECD member states as well as worldwide, even far behind its neighboring countries that are also plagued with demographic decreases: more than twelve million in China and about 840,000 in Japan. In the second quarter of 2021, the number of newborns reached an all-time low of 66,398, down 2.7 percent from the same quarter of

14. Statistics Korea. (2020). <http://kostat.go.kr/wnsearchEng/search.jsp?query=population>

the previous year. In the same period, the total fertility rate stood at 0.82, down from 0.85 on-year and the lowest for any second quarter.

According to the household and population data Statistics Korea released on November 24, 2021, the number of newborns further dropped to a record low in September of the year in the latest sign that underscores the country's gloomy demographic situation with chronically low birth rates. The data shows that the number of live births was 21,920 in September 2021, falling by 6.7 percent on-year. The number of deaths was 25,566, rising by 5.0 percent on-year. The number of marriages was 13,733, dropping by 10.4 percent on-year. The natural increase (live births minus deaths) was marked minus 3,646.¹⁵ This resulted in the country's population marking the 23rd consecutive month of decline, the lowest for any September since 1981 when the statistics agency began compiling related data. The number of deaths rose for the seventh straight month. The data Statistics Korea released on December 9, 2021, shows that the population in the ROK is estimated at 51.75 million, down from the previous year's 51.83 million.

The data Statistics Korea released on February 23, 2022, showed that the total fertility rate fell from 0.84 in 2020 to the lowest-ever 0.81 in 2021, about a half of the OECD average of 1.61 in 2019. According to the United Nations population statistics, the ROK is the only country in the world where the birthrate is below 1.0. Decreases in birth rates have continued over the last six years since 2016. The number of new births dropped to 260,500 in 2021 from 272,300 by 4.3%, less than a half of 559,934 in 2001, in the latest sign that underscores the country's gloomy demographic situation with chronically low birth rates.¹⁶ The number of

15. Statistics Korea (2021). Statistics Korea (kostat.go.kr)

16. Statistics Korea (2022). http://kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/kor_nw/1/1/index.board?bmode=read&aSeq=416487

deaths was 317,800, under which the annual population decline came to an all-time high of 57,300 as deaths continued outnumbering births.

According to statistics unveiled by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, the nation's population recorded 51.63 million at the end of 2021, a similar level posted in July 2016, compared with 51.82 million at the end of 2020. The same data showed that the yearly tally for marriages also fell sharply from 302,828 in 2015 to 213,502 in 2020 and 182,509 in 2021, under 200,000 for the first time in history amid steady declines for the last six years. The number of people getting married shrank by 9.4 percent to 14,753 in January 2022, compared with a 10.7 percent drop in December 2021.

According to the data Statistics Korea disclosed on March 23, 2022, a total of 24,598 babies were born in January of the year, down 1.2 percent from a year earlier and the lowest tally for the month.¹⁷ January 2022 also marked the 74th consecutive month of year-on-year decline. The number of deaths, meanwhile, rose for the 11th straight month in January. The number of deaths came to 29,686 in the month, up 9 percent from a year earlier. The year-on-year growth rate was down from a 17.7 percent surge in December. Accordingly, the country's population decreased by 5,088 in January, marking the 27th consecutive month of decline.

At the same time, the ROK has been gradually morphing into an aging society. In 2018, the country officially became an aging society as the proportion of elderly, or senior citizens aged 65 and older, exceeded 14 percent. The number rose to 8.21 million as of November 2020, accounting for 16.4 percent of the total population. The elderly people made up 8.53 million or 16.5 percent in 2021, highlighting concerns that the fast-aging demographic transition could pose a drag on the country's economy. The ROK is expected to become a super-aged society in 2025, in which the

17. 보도자료 전체 | 통계청 (kostat.go.kr)

proportion of the elderly will account for 20 percent of the whole population. Policymakers warn the country may face an “age quake” starting in 2030 with 12.98 million senior citizens, an earthquake-like demographic shock from a fall in population and aging.

3. Negative Economic Growth Projected

The ROK’s fertility rate fell to half of the worldwide average while its suicide rate is at the top, double the average rate of the OECD members. As these two rankings have almost become fixtures, the burden of increased payrolls in the public sector will be transferred to younger generations. Those in their 20s and 30s suffer job losses as the increase in the total number of waged jobs is at a slowing pace.

Decreases in population will result in reduced consumption and weakening economic vitality. Most worrisome is that the nation’s working population, aged between 15 and 64, will likely decrease by 20 million within 50 years. The warning from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is that the ROK’s potential growth in GDP per capita will decline to 0.8 percent during the 2030–60 period, owing mainly to the low birth rates and population decline.

The nation’s working population amounted to 72.1 percent in 2020, the highest among the 38 OECD member states. Yet, it is estimated to drop to the lowest 46.1 percent in 2070. Senior citizens will account for 46.4 percent in 2070, which means 100 working people will have to care for 117, again the highest in the OECD. The changing labor market affected by the nation’s declining birth rates and aging is likely to further drag down the growth potential. Population decreases adversely affect the country’s labor supply, dampen domestic demand, and discourage

investments while throwing the economy into a slump.

According to the data Statistics Korea released on December 15, 2021, the economically active population marked about 28,528,000 in November of the year. The labor force participation rate stood at 63.1 percent. The number of employed persons totaled 27,795,000. The employment to population ratio recorded 61.5 percent. The number of unemployed persons totaled 734,000. The unemployment rate marked 2.6 percent. The economically inactive population totaled 16,653,000.¹⁸

The ROK's potential growth rate—possible rate an economy can grow without triggering inflation—per working-age population fell to 2.1 percent in the 2010s from 3.8 percent in the 2000s, 5.3 percent in the 1990s, and 7.6 percent in the 1980s, according to the 2020 Annual Report from the Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI), the research arm of the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI).¹⁹ The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the ROK's potential growth rate at 2.5 percent in the 2020s and 2 percent in the 2030s. The Hyundai Research Institute (HRI) is more pessimistic while predicting that the rate will drop to 1.9 percent between 2026 and 2030 after posting 2.1 percent between 2021 and 2025.²⁰

On February 3, 2022, the Ministry of Employment and Labor disclosed prospects for mid-and-long-term supply and demand of workforce, which forecast that the increase in labor supply would diminish by about 1/3 or 3,202,000 people between 2020 and 2030 compared with that of the last ten years. The economically active people are expected to peak in 2024, and the employed to culminate at 27,995,000 in 2025.

18. Statistics Korea (kostat.go.kr)

19. 시장경제연구백서 - 한국경제연구원 (keri.org) 2020.pdf

20. 지역 인구 현황과 시사점 (hri.co.kr)

4. *Schools, Universities, and Cities to Disappear*

Population extinction is calculated by dividing the number of fertile women in a population aged 20–39 by that over the age of 65. If the number is between 0.2 and 0.5, the local population is considered at risk of extinction. When the number is below 0.2, the population is categorized as at high risk of extinction. Overall, the population in the ROK is expected to plummet from 51.36 million in 2027 to 36.89 million in 2067, and 15.10 million in 2117.

As the birth rate started dipping severely in the early 2000s, it is not surprising that the number of school-age children began dropping sharply in the late 2000s, and then more recent years see fewer and fewer students in college. The crisis of universities is not limited to academia but it has effects on the local and national economy. In 2021, 162 four-year universities nationwide failed to meet their student quotas and extended enrollment periods in an attempt to fill 26,129 vacancies—2.7 times higher than the previous year and the largest number in 16 years. The average acceptance rate for universities outside of Seoul plunged to 2.7:1 in 2021, the first time it has fallen below 3:1.

According to the “Low Fertility Rate and Aging Society Audit” released by the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) on August 13, 2021, 96.5 percent of South Korean cities and districts will likely be extinct by 2117.²¹ Seoul is expected to retain only 2.62 million inhabitants in that year, a whopping 73 percent decrease from its current population. In Seoul, two or three districts have the risk of extinction by 2047. By 2067, 15 districts will face a high risk of extinction, and by 2117, only four districts will

21. Board of Audit and Inspection (2021). 분야별 감사결과 | 감사결과 | 감사원(THE BOARD OF AUDIT AND INSPECTION OF KOREA) (bai.go.kr) 공개문_전문.pdf

likely remain.

All other parts than the greater capital area are considered to be at high risk of extinction by 2117 except only one district each in Busan, Gwangju, and Daejeon. Only some centers of research, development, industry, work, and education that can attract young people are foreseen to survive the centennial. Population declines in rural areas are expected to be even steeper.

While this audit report seemed already shocking, the actual status could be far worse because the results were drawn from relatively conservative estimates. In sum, the shrinking and aging population will have severely detrimental impacts on social, political, and economic purviews, but the current perception of the problem is still naïve. The BAI confirmed this gloomy prospect in its later audit report on November 23, 2021.²²

5. GNI per Capita and Population

The ROK joined the OECD in 1996 and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009. In only six years from 2012 when it became the seventh member nation in the so-called 20/50 Club with over 20 thousand U.S. dollars of gross national income (GNI) per capita and more than 50 million of population, the ROK came to belong to the 30/50 Club. The IMF has predicted that it would become a member of the 40/50 Club before 2025. In 2020, the organization selected the ROK as one of the ten advanced nations of the world. The United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) moved the status of the ROK from a developing nation to a developed one on July 2, 2021. All these are

22. Board of Audit and Inspection (2021). *Mid-and Long-Term Fiscal Management II. Audit Reports | Audit Activities | BAI (The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea)*

delightful news heralding the apex of the ROK's national power, but they also mean at the same time that there are only downward roads ahead.

The fact that the ROK is now in the golden age is not limited to its economic and defense powers. Its cultural influence that continues to be showcased by Psy, BTS, *Parasites*, *Minari*, *Squid Game*, *Hellbound*, and *All of Us Are Dead* has already proved in effect a cultural powerhouse that Baekbeom Kim Koo dreamt of under the Japanese colonial rule. This simultaneously portends an apprehension that perhaps a global status of the ROK in the next century may be dwarfed to that of the countries like Singapore, for example, where the whole population is highly motivated and well-disciplined socially, but the unique ethnic mirth and entertaining talents would be so diluted that the nation's images may be portrayed rather dry and sullen than full of charming tastes and flavors in life.

Even if the current trend allows the ROK population to shrink by a conservative average of only 8,150 annually, it will become below 50 million in 2041 at the latest. This will not simply affect the ROK's economic and socio-cultural status but also defense capability to a serious degree. As Eberstadt states, the number of young men aged 15–24, the group from which military manpower is typically drawn, is projected to fall by almost 40 percent in the ROK.²³

All these portend that the ROK could be eliminated from the 40/50 Club soon after 2040. It means that the ROK's heyday is for 23 years from 2018–40 when it is a member of the 30/50 or 40/50 Club. Should Korea be unified anytime soon by any chance, it would still be out of the 30/50 Club with GNI per capita far below US\$30,000. With its population of 77 million then, it would take decades to reenter the 40/50 Club. In addition, North Korea is suffering from low birth rates as well. Therefore,

23. Eberstadt, N. (2019). *Ibid.*

future generations will record in history that the period in which the ROK would have attended the G7 meetings as a member of the 30/50 or 40/50 Club was the sole time when its national power culminated.

III. No Remedies?

1. An Internal Issue Affecting Foreign Relations

As mentioned in Chapter I, the shrinking population is *prima facie* an internal issue that needs to be addressed by domestic policies, strategies, and measures. Nevertheless, this trend forecasts far-reaching consequences in terms of national security, prestige, and identity, which in turn limit external relations and diplomacy. By implication, this is barely a foreign affairs issue but certainly a national security issue. As the survival of a nation counts on economic and military strengths, each state pursues building a prosperous country with a powerful military (富國強兵).

In the case of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Ye Liu suggests the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) should take four basic steps to resolve the dilemma of demanding Chinese women to “have it all” of becoming good citizens at the same time.²⁴ Although these steps seldom sound feasible to be applied to the ROK's realities, they at least evince some clues that only trying to get out of the imminent difficulties by increasing budgetary spending would not help address fundamentally structural problems.

24. Ye. L. (2021). The Sexism Behind China's Population Crisis: How the CCP Fails Working Women. *Foreign Affairs*. August 10: (1) make a concerted effort to put women in party leadership positions, (2) make childcare more affordable, (3) root out workplace discrimination against women of childbearing and child-caring age, and (4) raise the age at which people can claim publically funded positions.

While citing the “population cliff” as a great catastrophe, the successive administrations of the ROK government have set up and implemented basic plans to cope with low fertility and aging society in four five-year plans from 2006 through 2025, but the results have been in effect extremely frustrating. The enormous budgets of about 380.2 trillion won (\$325 billion) were squandered in implementing the first three five-year plans.

The current fourth basic plan, into which about 196 trillion won is being poured, focuses on building a sound and active aging society by (1) guaranteeing stable retirement income, (2) expanding preventive health and medical services, (3) caring comprehensively for continuous dwelling in communities, (4) creating a residential and urban environment-friendly atmosphere to the aged, and (5) supporting dignified termination of life. The budget for countering low birth rates and aging in 2021 accounts for over 46 trillion won, almost ten percent of the whole government’s annual spending. It, however, is extremely disappointing that the plans lack epoch-making contents to reverse the trend of sharp decreases in population as if the birthrate bust were accepted as a *force majeure*.

On September 2, 2021, the BAI stated that high private educational costs, runaway housing prices, and high jobless rates had pulled down young peoples’ desire to have children. Private tutoring costs have jumped 25 percent because of the inconsistent college entrance system. The real estate policies have pushed home prices up 86 percent in Seoul over the past four years. The excessively rapid minimum wage increases have brought down the annual net growth of jobs to the 5,000-mark. All in all, the government has failed in creating a socio-economic environment to encourage people to have kids.

2. Economic Reforms

According to Statistics Korea's future population estimate, the productive population between 15 and 64 is to decrease from 37 million in 2021 to 27.5 million in 2040 and 22.6 million in 2050. This means the number of people who can engage in economic activities and contribute to production falls by 500,000 a year on average. To fill this gap, the total fertility rate should be boosted to 2 and then to 3, but that is unrealistic. Even though the government came up with some clever ways to raise the fertility rate for 2022, those babies need to be at least 20 or 30 years of age before they can contribute to the production and pay tax. There is no way to avoid the gap of 20 to 30 years as the production population drops and the economy falls.

As a work-and-life balance, gender equality, and quality of life are the main factors that affect fertility rates, paternity leave and female employment rates are important. The U.S. Treasury Department in its semi-annual report to Congress on macroeconomic and foreign exchange policies of major trading partners pointed out that the ROK government should do more to provide economic opportunities for the young.²⁵ The ROK was the only country among major U.S. trading partners in the review that received such a disapproving mention on jobs.

3. Jobs and Housing

Both the problem and solution lie in the labor market. To curb unemployment rates of the economically active population, the government

25. U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2021). <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/macroeconomic-and-foreign-exchange-policies-of-major-trading-partners-of-the-united-states>

should take appropriate steps to regain the vitality of the economy by encouraging the business sector to create a greater number of productive workplaces through market-friendly policies, innovating regulations, and bolstering entrepreneurship.

A persistent fall in the number of decent jobs makes it difficult for young people to purchase their own houses. Combined with a growing tax burden, youngsters find it harder to marry and have children. Thus, financial support cannot on its own do the trick to boost birth rates unless the government offers younger generations plausible hopes for the future. It is imperative to find fundamental solutions by providing young adults with more decent jobs, affordable homes, and educational opportunities. Given the housing crisis in recent years, priorities must be given to multi-children families for financial assistance for their dwellings. This policy would kill two birds with one stone by easing housing difficulties and raising birth rates simultaneously.

4. Revitalizing Local Communities

On October 18, 2021, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety announced that it designated 89 cities, counties, and districts across the country as depopulation areas to provide intensive administrative and financial support to help the concerned areas escape from their crisis of extinction. It is the first time for the nation to declare specific regions in danger of becoming extinct from population decline. The designation of depopulation areas came after the Special Act on Balanced National Development was revised in late 2020 and its enforcement decree was amended in June 2021.

The ministry stated that it will help the depopulation areas establish and implement customized policies to escape their population crisis. In

addition, the government's Local Extinction Response Fund set at one trillion won (US\$845 million) annually for 10 years will be intensively extended to the depopulation areas to help them create more jobs, induce young people, and increase their living population.

5. Educational Reform

Starting 2022, the Ministry of Education plans to examine the financial state of colleges and provide funding and consulting to help resuscitate them. If the colleges do not cooperate, the ministry may issue a directive to shut them down. On top of colleges, the government is called for supporting individual students and their parents. Close attention must be paid to lower educational institutions, students, and parents, too. The government is required to exponentially expand support for educational costs from nursery through college according to the number of children of each household.

To liberate parents from the burden of private education, which is one of the major reasons for low birth rates, the government should devise appropriate measures to dramatically enhance the level and quality of public education. Furthermore, the whole county must concentrate on instilling children with traditional, not necessarily Confucian, values such as the sense of loyalty and filial piety from home education onwards.

6. Military Reform

The worst choice would be attempting to supplement the rapidly diminishing military human resources for enlisted personnel by conscripting women, who assume decisive roles in childbearing and childrearing.

Whatever choices that run counter to the enhancement of combat capabilities such as switching to a voluntary military system or shortening terms of military duties should never be considered.

The focus should be placed on securing the maximum number of combat forces while entrusting to artificial intelligence, drones, and robots, adapting to the fourth industrial revolution, and outsourcing noncombatant chores to the private sector wherever possible. While upholding combatant elitism in the long run, the defense system should steadily enhance the mobilization capacity of about 2,750,000 homeland reserve forces composed of men under the age of 35. In this context, it is encouraging to note that the government has recently decided to implement a long-term part-time reserve forces system to serve a maximum of 180 days for 150,000 won per day.

Until the 1980s, those who had undergone vasectomy were exempt from homeland reserve force drills to encourage family planning. Now, the government has to exempt from the drills those who have three or more children to allow them to concentrate more on childbearing and child caring. In addition, the civil defense personnel, who are under the age of 50, also need to be mobilized as quasi-homeland reserve forces to keep abreast of the national trend of aging.

In the report *Demographics and the Future of South Korea*, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) published on June 29, 2021, Seoul National University Professor Chung Min Lee and Kathryn Botto stated that comprehensive responding abilities to demographic changes in the ROK will exercise influence on social safety, national image, and defense forces even after unification. While claiming that a fundamental and bipartisan innovation is required for strong defense preparedness with limited forces, they proposed to solve the problem of decreased labor and productivity by fortifying industry and utilizing advanced technology.²⁶

7. *Unification and Collective Security*

The ROK must concentrate its national power on diplomacy to realize unification going forward because it will be able to focus on economic recovery if peaceful unification comes true while delaying the “population cliff” phenomenon as mentioned in Chapter III. It should exercise its diplomatic prowess, together with the United States that has already promulgated its intention to support unification, to have the countries around the world including those neighbors such as China feel the conveniences they could get from Korean unification.

Eberstadt advised the U.S. policymakers to forge new alliances with such countries as India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, where the population will continue to grow, to strengthen the international order for decades to come.²⁷ This is a point for the ROK to take into consideration in readjusting its New Southern Policy 2.0 for collective security in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, it is necessary to benchmark rare success stories of delaying low birth rates in very few countries like Israel and France.

8. *Immigration or Emigration?*

Some suggest an idea to accept as many immigrants as possible to transform the ROK into a multiracial country. Nothing may be more desirable than to make the ROK a good place to live and do business, thereby attracting immigrants to foment multicultural families who would

26. Lee, J. M., & Botto, K. (2021). *Demographics and the Future of South Korea*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

27. Eberstadt, N. (2019). With Great Demographics Comes Great Power. *Foreign Affairs*, July/August.

further enhance the Korean language and literature as well as would properly preserve the laudable mores and customs that have been handed down from generation to generation. The naturalized Korean Chinese and prospective Ukrainian refugees may be such options. There, however, are no ways and means to compensate the loss of population by admitting a larger number of immigrants into the ROK where over 60,000 people decrease each year.

Even in the United States, the population of which is still on the rise, immigration is a thorny national agenda. For the ROK, difficulties of cultural assimilation on the part of immigrants, distortion of demographic composition, and qualitative degradation of demography would be formidable challenges if it considers immigration as a policy alternative. Instead of alluring immigrants, the ROK government is recommended to attract more North Korean defectors to comfortably settle in the South. They are called “advance unification” and now compensate 35,000-odd population losses.

Contrary to immigration, it could be far more desirable for the ROK to make itself a childbirth powerhouse, to emigrate overseas as many people as possible, and to have them disseminate Korean culture globally, make significant contributions to developing foreign countries, and immediately return to their fatherland in the event of an emergency.

IV. Next Administration’s Priority Task

1. Beyond One-off Cash Benefits

In a plan announced in December 2020, the ROK government provides higher cash benefits for babies born in 2022 and thereafter. A 300,000-won

(US\$256) payment is disbursed every month for infants less than 24 months old. The current package provides 200,000 won per month for kids aged 11 months and less and 150,000 won for those aged between 12 and 23 months. An additional 2-million-won cash bonus is granted to parents when they give birth to a baby, starting 2022.

Direct cash bonuses for births, however, may be barely effective going forward because the decision of whether to have children is more complicated than being influenced by cash-based support. Over the recent years, housing problems, private education for children, employment situations, and gender conflicts have been rapidly rising as major challenges. The government's response, however, remains unchanged from being busy practicing symptomatic therapies and offering more subsidies for having more children.

2. Novel Ideas Urged

Some revolutionary policy measures are needed to create a social system in which people can bear and raise infants despite financial difficulties. First, the central government must devise an extraordinary plan to support childbearing and childrearing. It is also desirable to encourage the local governments to emulate the best practices of their peers like Yeonggwang-gun. In addition, the health insurance should cover the entire amount of medical costs for infertility treatments, artificial inseminations, gynecological as well as pediatric prognoses and diagnoses.

To secure financial resources to sustain these measures, the government has to suspend all the extravagant and luxurious policies in other purviews such as increasing public debts, free welfare, and nuclear-free measures. The government eventually has to make use of tipping effects from a “pot-grit phenomenon” of the general public to arouse a baby boom as a collective

wish in a national consensus.

Then some may reveal their apprehension over a possibility to return to the nightmarish population explosion the ROK experienced in the 1960s and 1970s in the event of success in realizing a baby boom. The evasion from childbirth, however, has so firmly established as a megatrend of this century as a result of rigorous “family planning” in those two decades that there is no worry about having so many children as Thomas Robert Malthus argued, “population increases exponentially while food production does only arithmetically.”²⁸

Another possible but not probable fallout either might be that campaigns for a baby boom could have such phenomenal success by any chance that families with three or more children would be favored far better than those with two or less to a degree that a privileged group would emerge as a ruling social class that would directly violate the draft “anti-discrimination law.” This may be a price that today’s ROK has to be more than happy to pay with “screaming for joy.”

These two apprehensions notwithstanding, it is no exaggeration to say that the situation is so dire that extremely desperate remedies are inevitable if the ROK hopes for its national survival in the decades and centuries ahead. Both the ROK government and people must get braced for paying any price and running any risk to fulfill their foremost national objective as a wise Korean proverb says, “one must not refrain from fermenting soy while being afraid of maggots.”

28. Malthus, T. R. (1798). *An Essay on Population*. T. R. Malthus *An Essay on Population in two volumes – volume two*, introduction by Michel P. Fogarty, M.A. (1914).

3. Full-time Homemakers and Noblesse Oblige

The reality in Korean society is so grim and regrettable that there are women who protest, “Are we baby bearing machines?” Some women in their 20s and 30s of the MZ generation are so disgruntled with the anti-feminist commitments of the incoming administration that they pledge even a childbirth boycott or zero childbearing.

While each citizen has a right to choose a profession, and there is no such thing as a high or low job, the most urgent task of vital importance today is to make full-time homemaking the most coveted profession. It must be a national agenda to stage a campaign to establish the right view of vocations. If citizenry, territory, and sovereignty are the principal elements of a state, faithful soldiers, dedicated workers including brain laborers, and full-time homemakers are the main components of the citizenry. In this context, the feudal hierarchical strata of scholars (士), farmers (農), craftsmen (工), and merchants (商) must be rearranged into a future-oriented horizontal framework of soldiers (軍), workers (勞), homemakers (婦), and businessmen (營).

The recruitment of the leading elite should be reorganized socially, systematically, and legally to the effect that those with three or more children are given better opportunities to be elected or appointed to leadership positions. Vice versa, it is necessary to promote a trend that those who are in leading posts tend to have three or more children. This would make a “21st Century noblesse oblige.”

4. Reinstating Family Values

Advocacies for the creation of a “childbirth powerhouse” are too

unpopular to emerge as a major issue leading up to the presidential election on March 9, 2022. It is a national tragedy of the day that the population cliff is such a general tendency out of control that it has to be admitted as a fate with no cure at all. Massive nationwide campaigns are required to buy hearts and minds of youngsters to get married and give birth to as many babies as they can. The success of such campaigns must result in convincing them of a Korean traditional value determining that simply larger families are happier.

When it comes to traditional values, three conflicting proverbs have coexisted: “Children are born with what to eat,” “Love of children is an eternal encumbrance,” and “Filial children are born from poor families.” While each of these proverbs makes certain senses, all three underline the importance of human resources over material ones. The ephemeral catchphrase of the 1980s “Population is national power” must be restored.

Anyhow, it is a human tragedy that the more affluent a family is the fewer children it gets while complaining that it cannot afford to have one, two, or three. By the same token, the more economically advanced a country is, the lower its childbirth rate. For the survival of the country, therefore, firm determinations to build a childbirth powerhouse should be deeply rooted as a zeitgeist and esprit of the times that getting children is prioritized ahead of the time when conditions are ripe.

Every citizen needs to cast off individualism and regain family values. While an individual’s lifecycle is traditionally described as being born (生), aging (老), getting sick (病), and dying (死), this description has to be advanced to a familial lifecycle as getting married (婚), bearing infants (産), rearing them (育), and educating them (教). This private life has become an important matter of the state.

All the people have been born, raised, and educated at the sacrifices

and services of their parents. So they are recalled to return to the traditional value that bearing, rearing, and educating children are the utmost and foremost expressions of filial piety. It pays to be liberated from the selfish and myopic pursuit of individual life, to resuscitate family values, and to live a more altruistic life in contribution to the future of the nation. Additionally, earlier marriages are recommended as medical doctors assert that healthy babies are born and raised by mothers in their twenties when their health is in the best shape. The average age of Korean mothers to give birth to their babies in 2021 was 33.4 as compared with the OECD average of 28.3 in 2019. The age when Korean mothers bear their first baby is the oldest in the world.

V. Conclusion

1. Quantity before Quality

As seen above, it is worth reiterating that human resources matter more than material ones for a nation to survive. The ROK that used to lack natural and financial resources had to rely only on human resources and zeal for education to build the nation of the day. Low birth rates, therefore, are sources of all illnesses for economic prosperity, military capability, and national security of a state. The ROK cannot as well as must not give up its mission to prepare for an exit strategy from a crisis of ethnic extinction, which is the most urgent and critical challenge of the day.

The decrease in population means the decrease in manpower to protect citizens, territory, and sovereignty of a state. At the same time, it also means the decrease in the number of people to be protected, leading to

eventual demise of the state. The composition and quality of the population also matter but only after the quantity is fulfilled with a high rate of increase in population. To simply put, the more the better. It may not be an exaggeration to say that democracy derives from demography. So childbirth promotion is the first step to take before conditions are met for child-raising and education.

2. Overhaul of the Presidential Committee

The Presidential Committee on Aging Society and Population Policy, as its name reveals, focuses its function on aging society far more than on population growth. As its name in Korean “Committee on Low Birth Rates and Aging Society” is even worse, it should be renamed into something more positive like “Committee for Childbirth Promotion and Healthy Longevity.” More than 80 percent of the committee’s personnel, budget, and projects as concentrated on supporting aged society should be switched to those for childbirth promotion.

3. Cultural and Psychological Campaigns

As the government’s policy responses have been fragmented and largely cash-based, the huge amount of money spent has yielded scarce effects. Future childbirth campaigns, therefore, have to take more cultural, philosophical, and psychological approaches. People need to recognize the fact that happiness comes more from traditional family values than material affluence. Therefore, marriages and childbirths must happen even before they are prepared well enough.

Nationwide campaigns should be unfolded with emphasis on the

examples of happy families with a large number of children and the value of full-time homemakers. For example, the government is recommended to confer with an Order of Civil Merit and grant special subsidies to the couple who were broadcast in OBS,²⁹ KTV,³⁰ and SBS³¹ TV programs in 2014 and 2020 while saying they were all too happy living with their twelve children on a modest income.

There are other people worth being conferred with decoration who take care of baby boxes because each and every infant born on Korean soil is a national treasure. The government and local communities ought to help raise and educate deserted babies well enough to make them talented additions to the nation. The first baby box was installed in December 2009, but it was not until August 6, 2021, that a baby was adopted to an entrusted home while all the other 112 babies deserted in 2021 were sent to nurseries. There are only two places operating baby boxes nationwide, one in Seoul and the other in Gunpo, Gyeonggi-do. The government needs to encourage local communities to install more baby boxes while building more protection facilities for deserted babies and recruiting more personnel who would operate the shelters. Among 1,312 infants left in baby boxes between 2015 and 2021, only 139 or 10.6 percent were adopted to private homes while 980 or 74.7 percent are raised in orphanages.

4. Hopes for the New Administration

It does not seem possible for the government to reverse the trend of population decline with the countermeasures as exemplified in Chapter

29. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ff4t0BbGvbE>

30. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t0iEra8B53E>

31. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hjAFI8Ry4RI>, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h-bCbgwmPEk>

IV but only to slow it down at best for the time being. It, therefore, is earnestly hoped that an administration to be inaugurated on May 10, 2022, could take fundamental, extraordinary, and epoch-making measures to engineer a baby boom and drastically curtail suicide rates however unpopular they may be so that powerful foreign policies and diplomatic maneuvering could be possible in the generations to come.

The History, Current Situation, and Challenge in the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in the Republic of Korea

*Lee Whie-jin**

I. Introduction

Methods of warfare have advanced with the development of science and technology. And accordingly, the scope of human fatalities has expanded, as new forms of weapons are more likely to have difficulties in distinguishing between combatants and civilians.

International humanitarian law (hereinafter “IHL”), i.e. *jus in bello*, embraces the basic principles requiring the compliance of minimum moral obligations as human beings. IHL presupposes that the method of warfare is not unlimited in suppressing and subjugating the adversaries. That is to say, even in the case of using weapons, both the military necessity and the principle of humanity should be taken into consideration. Based upon these two basic principles of war, more concrete principles in warfare, such as the principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality, need

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to be respected. The principle of distinction requires the distinction between combatants and civilians, and the prohibition of the use of weapons against civilians. The principle of proportionality requires the state party not to inflict unnecessary agony in fighting.

It was reported, and unconfirmed evidence has suggested, that chemical weapons were used in the Syrian civil war, killing civilians.¹ Controversy around this arose internationally, as such acts are not in compliance with the basic principles of IHL by resorting to every possible means to win conflicts and war.

On the other hand, state party conferences of existing humanitarian treaties have been held to regulate the method of warfare and undertake measures relating to the protection of civilians and war casualties. In the last few decades, relevant treaties have been concluded—Convention banning Anti-Personnel Mine, the Third Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, followed by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.

This article looks into the history and background of the Republic of Korea (hereinafter “ROK”) acceding to the Geneva Conventions and issues derived from the Korean war in light of the Geneva Conventions. It examines the domestic measures that have been taken to implement the treaties to which the ROK acceded, especially in implementing legislations. The challenge including the necessity for acceding to other treaties will be also considered.

1. “Syria used chemical weapons on civilians in 2018: OPCW”, <https://www.dw.com/en/syria-used-chemical-weapons-on-civilians-in-2018-opcw/a-57168683>

II. The Korean War and Geneva Conventions

1. Accession to Geneva Conventions

A telegram message of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was delivered at the beginning of the Korean war, suggesting the provision of its humanitarian service based upon its non-political policy. The UN military command announced the observance of the Geneva Convention on July 4, 1950, which was soon followed by the declaration of the Syngman Rhee administration. The Geneva Convention mentioned here by both the UN Command and the ROK government was limited to the Geneva Convention III concerned with the protection of the prisoners of war (POWs).² The character of the ROK government's announcement is a political commitment to observe the Convention with no legally-binding force in the strict sense of the word, which is therefore different from the obligation that a state party bears to the Convention following the accession.

The most controversial issue throughout the negotiations during the Korean war was concerned with the treatment and repatriation of POWs. The Geneva Convention III, Article 118³ stipulated for the prompt release of POWs following the cessation of hostilities. The ROK government insisted

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2. The UN military command announced the treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention III of "personnel of the armed forces of North Korea and other persons of North Korea who are taken into custody or fall into the hands of armed forces now under my operational control".
 3. Article 118 of the Geneva Convention III: "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Parties to the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph....."

upon the non-repatriation of North Korean POWs who expressed their unwillingness to return, and North Korea strongly objected to such position. Ultimately, it was agreed that the POWs' wills be considered.

The ROK deposited the instrument of accession to the 1949 Geneva Conventions with the Swiss Federal Government on August 16, 1966, with the reservation⁴ of the Geneva Convention III, Article 118. The ROK signed the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions on December 7, 1978 and ratified them on January 15, 1982 with the reservation⁵ of the 1st Additional Protocol, Article 85, paragraph 4(b). In July 1999 on the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC requested the withdrawal of the reservation on Article 118 in order to secure the universality of the interpretation and application of the Conventions. The ROK government confirmed in the general meeting of the ICRC in October 1999 that it would withdraw the reservation of the clause, but this has not eventuated. The repatriation of POWs was controversial. Following the experience of World War I and II, the 1907 Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,⁶ and the 1929 Geneva Convention,⁷ the Geneva Convention III, Article 118 provided

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4. The reservation of the ROK is follows: "The Republic of Korea interprets the provisions of Article 118, paragraph 1, as not binding upon a Power detaining prisoners of war to forcibly repatriate its prisoners against their openly and freely expressed will."
 5. The reservation of the ROK is as follows: "In relation to paragraph 4(b) of Article 85 of Protocol I, a party detaining prisoners of war may not repatriate its prisoners agreeably to their openly and freely expressed will, which shall not be regarded as unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war constituting a grave breach of this Protocol."
 6. The 1907 Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 20 provides: "After the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoner of war shall be carried out as quickly as possible."
 7. The 1929 Geneva Convention, Article 75 provides: "When belligerents conclude an armistice convention, they shall normally cause to be included therein provisions concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war, If it has not been possible to inset in that Convention such stipulation, the belligerents shall, nevertheless, enter into

that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. In light of the literal letters of the Geneva Convention, the withdrawal of reservation would obligate or pressure the ROK government to repatriate the POWs who have refused their repatriation. The ROK government held the opinion that the forcible repatriation of POWs contravenes basic tenet of international human rights law, which is compatible with IHL.

2. Korean War and the Legacy of IHL

Despite the announcement made by the United Nations and the ROK government about the compliance of the Geneva Conventions at the beginning of the Korean war, the prisoners of war (POW) and protection of civilians respectively provided for in the Geneva Convention III and IV remain outstanding. The pending issues of the non-repatriation of POWs, as well as the whereabouts of and communication with displaced families need to be resolved as soon as possible in the humanitarian perspective. The Geneva Conventions in part have not been implemented following the Korean war in the midst of tense military confrontation and regime competition on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea has tenaciously persisted in its position that no POWs exist in their territory, though the ROK raised the issue of POWs non-repatriation since the army second lieutenant Cho Changho defected from North Korea in 1994. It is reasonable and natural that displaced family issues should be dealt with from a humanitarian perspective, but North Korea approaches the issue of displaced families politically. Meetings of

communication with each other on the question as soon as possible. In any case, the repatriation of prisoners shall be effected as soon as possible after the conclusion of peace...”

family reunions numbering merely hundreds of people have been arranged intermittently, only during times when South and North Korean relations turn amicable, and is dependent on North Korean politics. It is desirable to regularize family reunion meetings and allow free communication for displaced people in a humanitarian perspective.

III. The Accession to International Humanitarian Law and Its Implementation

1. The ROK's Accession to IHL

The ROK acceded to or ratified most of IHL treaties including Geneva Conventions. Besides treaties, it announced its position of respecting and complying with IHL customs and principles. However, it has not acceded to several recent treaties in consideration of the division and confrontation within the Korean peninsula.

The history of IHL accession dates back to the end of Chosun dynasty, when in 1903 it acceded to the 1864 Geneva Convention on the Improvement of Conditions of War Wounded—the very first treaty that the dynasty joined. It was quite significant for the dynasty to enhance its international status by acceding to a multilateral treaty at the stage in which it, as a modern state regime, strived to play a role as a sovereign state in the international community while concluding a series of bilateral treaties with western powers. By setting up the Korean Red Cross in 1905 to execute main functions of IHL, the dynasty expressed its willingness to implement IHL. However, having been deprived of its diplomatic sovereignty by reason of the Eulsa Protectorate Treaty soon thereafter, in heated competition

among foreign powers over the sphere of influence on the Korean peninsula, it lost its foundation to realize its will.

With the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 as mentioned above, the ROK government proclaimed the observance of the Geneva Convention in July of that same year. Later in 1966, the ROK acceded to the Geneva Conventions formally with reservation.

The IHL system is classified into two categories: one category of law concerned with the regulation of warfare methods and the other category relating to the protection of war casualties. The former is typified by the Hague Conventions and the latter represented by the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. The Hague Conventions have evolved into customary law and secure the status of international norms necessary to be complied with by all nations of the world in light of the character of universal customs. The ROK accepts the Hague Conventions as international customary law, though they have not formally acceded to them.

Two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions were concluded in 1977. The ROK acceded to the Additional Protocols in 1982, but has not yet joined the Third Additional Protocol which was concluded in 2005. It joined the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) which regulates the method of warfare and its three protocols, as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.

In addition, having joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),⁸ the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),⁹ Convention on Certain

8. The original title is: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.

Conventional Weapons (CCW),¹⁰ CCW Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments, CCW Protocol II on Mines and Booby Traps, CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War and the Arms Trade Treaty, the ROK announced its position on the production, sales, use, etc. of chemical and biological weapons. It also became a state party to the Statute of International Criminal Court (ICC), thus allowing the prosecution and punishment through the ICC of those who committed grave international crimes such as the crime against humanity, war crime, genocide, and act of aggression. Article 8 of the Statute provides for the violations of existing IHL as war crimes: grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Article 8, paragraph 2(a)); other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict within the established framework of international law (Article 8, paragraph 2(b); in the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Article 8, paragraph 2(c); and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character (Article 8, paragraph 2(e). It joins the undertaking to regulate arms trade through the Arms Trade Treaty.

2. Implementation of IHL

A. Domestic Legislation

The accession to a treaty implies that the state party implements the treaty domestically and internationally. The Geneva Conventions and the

9. The original title is: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

10. The original title is: Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

Additional Protocols impose the obligation of domestic implementation and dissemination of IHL on the state parties.¹¹ The same conditions apply for the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.¹² Its domestic implementation requires legal, administrative, and other measures as necessary. As the case may be, the legislation of domestic implementation of the law should be considered, depending upon the contents of the treaty. In the ROK, which is a monist state, international law, once accepted, acquires domestic status in accordance with the Constitution, Article 6, paragraph 1 of which provides that treaties concluded under the constitution and generally accepted international law shall have effect identical to domestic law. As a result,

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11. Some of the concerned articles include the Geneva Convention I, Article 47 and the Geneva Convention II, Article 48. reading commonly “The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire population, in particular to the armed fighting forces, the medical personnel and the chaplains.”, The Geneva Convention III, Article 127 reads, “The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to all their armed forces and to the entire population. Any military or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of prisoners of war, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions.” Besides, the texts of the Geneva Convention IV, Article 99 and the First Additional Protocol, Articles 6 and 82 are omitted.
 12. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 42: “States Parties undertake to make the principles and provisions of the Convention widely known, by appropriate and active means, to adults and children alike.”
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Article 6(2): “States Parties undertake to make the principles and provisions of the present Protocol widely known and promoted by appropriate means, to adults and children alike.”

a treaty, without domestic-implementing legislation, takes effect and is applicable, implying the recognition of its self-executing effect. In case of a treaty, whose contents are not concrete enough and expect more detailed provisions through domestic law, domestic legislation is necessary for the accession of treaties. Currently, three implementing laws have been legislated with regard to the accession to IHL treaties: the act on the control of the manufacture, export, and import of specific chemical substances and biological agents for the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons; the act on the regulation of the use and transfer of certain conventional weapons including mines; and the act on punishment, etc., of crimes under jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The CWC and BWC respectively prohibit the production and use, etc., of chemical and biological weapons and obligate the state party to punish violators. In pursuance of the provisions, the act concerned was legislated to ensure the domestic implementation of the CWC and BWC. To implement the 2nd Protocol to CCW the act on the regulation of certain conventional weapons was legislated.

The Geneva Conventions and other IHL treaties provide for the obligation of suppression to prevent and suspend all acts of violation.¹³ As is the

13. The Geneva Convention I, Article 49; Geneva Convention II, Article 50; Geneva Convention III, Article 129, and Geneva Convention IV, Article 146 commonly: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article. Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case. Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following

characteristics of treaties, the punishment of the violators is to be left with the sovereignty of the state party. Pursuant to these provisions of the Conventions, the state parties are required to take legislative measures for the punishment of those who committed grave acts of violation and to prosecute or commit to trial any offenders or suspects of grave acts of violation.

The implementing legislation of the ROK government especially with regard to the exercise of the ICC named the act on punishment, etc., of crimes under jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court includes the clause on universal jurisdiction (Article 3, paragraph 5), non-applicability of statute of limitations (Article 6), offenses against administration of justice (Article 16), exclusion from application of crime subject to prosecution on complaint and crime not punishable against victim's will (Article 17), and the cooperation with ICC (Chapter III).

B. Role of IHL Research Institute

The IHL Research Institute was inaugurated in 1976 under the ROK National Red Cross. The activities and functions of the Institute comprise the holding of seminars on IHL, making of relevant explanatory documents and audio-visual materials to be distributed to libraries and schools, the education in and dissemination of IHL for the public, and publication of academic journals called "The Korean Journal of Humanitarian Law". In

Article. In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949."

The Geneva Convention II, Article 45: "The High Contracting Parties shall, if their legislation is not already adequate, take the measures necessary for the prevention and repression, at all times, of any abuse of the distinctive signs provided for under Article 43."

this manner the Institute has played a very important role in educating on and disseminating IHL domestically. The Consultative Committee is hosted by the Institute to discuss relevant issues in general and suggest the way forward. The Committee comprises officials from such ministries as foreign affairs, defense, justice, education, academics, and National Human Rights Commission, etc.

C. Education in the Military

The basic act on the status and service of soldiers, in Article 34, provides for the obligation to comply with the treaties to which the ROK acceded to and generally recognized international law among all international law involved in armed conflicts as well as for the education on the law of war to soldiers by the ministry of defense. Considering the importance and necessity of education and practice in the armed forces, the ministry of defense directive No. 391 on May 18, 1985 enacted “the code on the assurance of the compliance of IHL”, providing for the obligation to educate soldiers.

D. IHL National Committee

The Governmental IHL National Committee Meetings have been held once a year since 2002, whereby officials from ministries such as foreign affairs, defense, education, culture and sports, IHL institute of the Red Cross, and academics participate to discuss the issues relating to accession and implementation of IHL and legislation of domestic acts.¹⁴

14. The Governmental IHL National Committee was established pursuant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regulation no. 159 in 2010 to enhance the understanding of the public on IHL and provide advice to the minister on its domestic implementation. https://mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_3828

IV. Challenge and Task Concerning Accession to IHL Treaties

The most typical IHL not yet acceded to by the ROK includes the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the so-called “Ottawa Convention”) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). The issue of landmines had been partly provided for in the CCW, but by the strength of public opinion toward inhumane nature of landmines, a comprehensive prohibition on the use of landmines was further created by the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention. The ROK has not acceded to the Convention in consideration of the effectiveness of mines around the de-militarized zone (DMZ) in deterring infiltration and the tense military confrontation with North Korea.¹⁵ The ROK government is of the opinion that using landmines primarily around the DMZ causes little to no harm to civilians. But in fact, accidents that result in bodily harm occur occasionally due to landmines, from which its defense effectiveness can be doubted. Conscious of international pressure, the government has been demining over the past decades. Newly-planted landmines of M4 plastic type are easier to detect.

Cluster munitions have been denounced for their inhumane nature causing widespread human suffering. The criticism led to the conclusion of CCM. It is unlikely for the ROK to accede to the CCM in its military confrontation with North Korea. In this regard, the ROK military needs

15. The ROK delegation abstained from the resolution of the UN General Assembly in October 2007, urging the implementation of the Ottawa Convention and explained its position as follows: “... the ROK fully sympathizes with the spirit and objectives of the Ottawa Convention. ... However, due to the unique security situation on the Korean peninsula, we are committed to give priority to our security concerns, and unable to accede to the Convention at this point.”

to strengthen the education of its soldiers, focusing upon the military necessity of the cluster munitions.

Among CCW supplementary protocols, the ROK has not acceded to protocol III (incendiary weapons), and protocol IV (blinding laser weapons) in consideration of possible situations concerning security breaches on the Korean peninsula. The ROK is well-advised to give serious consideration to their accession.

It seems that the ROK government has not joined the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts and its Protocol in fear of limitations regarding military operations. In considering that the act on jurisdiction of ICC, Article 13, stipulates the act of attacking historic relics as war crime, and the First Additional Protocol provides for the protection of cultural property, the ROK government has been urged to also accede to the treaty.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted by the United Nations on July 7, 2017, and came into force on January 22, 2021. The treaty includes a comprehensive set of prohibitions on participating in any nuclear weapon activities. These include undertakings against the development, testing, production, acquirement, possession, stockpiling, use of, or threatening the use of nuclear weapons. The Treaty also prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory and the provision of assistance to any state in the conduct of prohibited activities. The ROK, under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S., has not joined the TPNW.

V. Conclusion

It seems that public awareness of IHL in the ROK is not considered to be very high despite accession to most of IHL treaties. Some even doubt and raise the necessity of IHL in warfare. With the nation having gone through and suffered from war, it goes without saying that it is necessary to raise the level of understanding and compliance of IHL.

More support and attention should be provided to the activities of the Korean Red Cross IHL committee and IHL Research Institute. Additional IHL education time needs to be allocated in the military to enhance the understanding of the importance of IHL in actual implementation in warfare. It is not sufficient for the government to only convene the national IHL committee meeting once a year. Serious consideration should be given to the accession of some treaties such as the Convention on Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of War and CCW Protocols III & IV.

Without legislative actions, treaties to which the ROK has acceded take effect domestically in pursuance of the constitution. A desirable change would be to make domestic implementing acts for the practical enforcement of the treaty, as the treaty and domestic implementing act are treated differently by the court of law and other domestic governmental agencies. In this regard, some of the other IHL treaties need to be incorporated into domestic implementing legislation to make sure that treaties are to be implemented in the same manner that domestic acts are applied and implemented.

Above all, it is necessary to reduce and even get rid of any sarcasm and doubt about the effectiveness of IHL in armed conflicts. The object of war is in subjugating and winning by whatever means obtainable. In the midst of warfare, the spirit of and the letters of IHL tend to be disregarded

and not complied with. This type of violation easily escalates into the total neglect of IHL. Such behaviour and mindset can be constrained through education about the importance of and the necessity for the Geneva Conventions and other IHL treaties.

Geneva Conventions and other existing IHL system have been challenged by the emergence of new, unpredictable situations arising from long-drawn civil wars, the increase of asymmetric warfare, non-state armed groups, and the ambiguity of war zones. Specific situations of modern warfare that are not exactly regulated by IHL makes the compliance and implementation of IHL more difficult.

The gap between current IHL treaties and newly-emerging situations could be filled by the continuous effort toward IHL treaty-making and resorting to customary law. Besides these legal methods, substantive education on and dissemination of IHL, complemented by the implementation through domestic legislation of treaties and effective operation of punishment for breach of treaties, etc., are required.

How National Emotions Affect International Politics

- The Case of South Korea-Japan Relations -

*Lee Jae-hyeok**

I. Introduction

On July 1st, 2019, Japan announced the restrictions on its exports of critical materials for semiconductors to the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred to as South Korea), one of the leading semiconductor producers of the world, effective from July 4th. Japanese government claimed that the South Korean government was suspicious of illegally exporting strategic items to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter referred to as North Korea), hence violating the UN sanctions against it.¹ Japan defended that the restrictions were only logical decision, condemning South Korea's failure to manage its exports. However, the media and experts in South Korea suspected, or were almost certain, that such actions were

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1. Mina Pollman, "What's Driving Japan's Trade Restrictions on South Korea?" *The Diplomat*, July 29, 2019. <https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/whats-driving-japans-trade-restrictions-on-south-korea/>.

motivated by the South Korean Supreme Court's rule over the victims of the Korean forced laborers against Nippon Steel (日本製鉄株式会社).²

South Korea responded to Japan's decision by announcing that it could end General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan as of August 22nd.³ It was a political expression that South Korea would not consider Japan as a security partner as well, if Japan should suspect South Korea's capability and will of preserving the ties. In addition, the South Korean government motioned a bill to the World Trade Organization (WTO) against Japan, claiming that it had violated the principle of free trade, which prevents hostile economic retributions for political reasons.⁴

Interesting fact is that the Korean public responded to Japan's export restrictions much prior to the government's reactions. Ever since the

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2. The plaintiffs (South Korean forced laborers and victims) sued against Nippon Steel for compensations, claiming that they were illegally abused during the Japanese occupational period, including the Pacific War. While the Japanese corporate and government severely countered that the rightful compensations were made in national level via diplomatic normalization in 1965, and as international law and agreement stand above the domestic law and trials, Japan has no obligation to 'additionally' compensate the victims of the occupational period. However, on October 2018, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea announced that the diplomatic agreement between the two countries is not equivalent to civil agreement, as well as irrelevant to individuals' motions of civil lawsuits. The court sentenced Nippon Steel to compensate one hundred million Korean Won (app. ten million Japanese Yen; about eighty thousand U.S. Dollars) to each victim; for more information regarding the lawsuits and the trials, refer to: Yong-In Shin, "Korea-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement of 1965 and Claims for damage of the Korean Victims of Forced Labour," *Kookmin Law Review*, Vol. 32 No. 2 (2019): 279-315.
 3. Hwi-rak Park, "An Analysis on Controversies over the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between South Korea and Japan: International Factors versus Domestic Factors," *Journal of Parliamentary Research*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2020): 293-315.
 4. World Trade Organization, "Japan — Measures Related to the Exportation of Products and Technology to Korea," *Dispute Settlement* (DS590), Consultant Requested on September 11, 2019. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds590_e.htm.

announcement was made, The Korean public boycotted consuming Japanese products—either fully or partially produced—which was soon to be called as the “No Japan” movement. The movement was quite an intriguing response, as it was a civil reaction against a foreign government, which is not an equivalent unit. Normally, a diplomatic action against one country entails equal or stronger diplomatic reaction in reverse. Such interactions can be witnessed in multiple historical or political cases such as the U.S.-USSR’s nuclear arms race during the Cold War or the so-called trade war between the U.S. and China under Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. The emotions from the people were often expressed via media or protests, and their messages were mainly toward their own government, demanding for definitive actions. However, the South Korean people conceived the export restrictions as an emotional act toward themselves—not political action of a government to another—and equated Japan, the state (not public), as an object of quarrel.

It is natural to sense country’s emotions implied beneath political actions; after all, the politics is a projection of people’s will in collective manners within each country’s own system. Interesting point in the South Korea-Japan case, however, is that the sentiments of the Korean people bypassed political protocols and were directly expressed to Japan. As the conflict evolved, it was not the governments nor the Nippon Steel, the corporate directly involved in the lawsuit against the Korean plaintiffs, but it was Uniqlo, a Japanese fashion brand, that was affected the most by the movement.⁵

5. Uniqlo was not among the Japanese corporates involved in the history issue of Japanese occupation. However, it has been known to Koreans that the CFO of Uniqlo depreciated the No Japan movement in Korea, saying that it “will not last long.” After his quote has been spread out by the media, Uniqlo’s sales in Korea plummeted, which gave a huge impact on its business in Korea and to reduce its markets in the following year.; refer to: Han-joo Kim, “Uniqlo Apologizes for Remarks that Angered S. Korean Consumers,” *Yonhap News Agency*, July 22, 2019. <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN201907>

The South Korea-Japan relations in 2019 shows how fragile the diplomatic ties are between the two countries, shivered by continuous emotional antagonism against each other. Until today, there are voices in South Korea demanding Japan for sincere apologies and compensations on the history of occupation; and equally strong voices against Korean people do exist in Japan as well. These are the aspects that neither government can neglect, and each country conveys such emotions at some level through foreign policies.

South Korea and Japan are both highly important countries for the U.S. not just in terms of security policy against China or North Korea, but also in terms of sharing the values of democracy and free market system. However, such potentials are frequently questioned whenever political ruptures come up in between. Both states tend to deal with their biggest and strongest ally, the U.S., with rational mindset, but such attitudes are not to be found when it comes to the South Korea-Japan bilateral relations. Unlike many TV shows or soap operas delivering the lessons of “love trumps hate”, the case of two East Asian states seems to reveal the cold reality of human nature that “hate trumps rationality”.

II. History of South Korea-Japan Relations

1. 1592 *Imjin War* (壬辰倭亂) & Joseon-Japan Relations *During the Edo Period*

The significance of *Imjin War*, or the Japanese Invasion of Joseon in 1592, is that it was Japan’s first international military aggression outside

of its domain, with a desire to become a new hegemon over the Chinese empire of Ming. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the shogun who finally unified the warring states of Japan, had a strong desire to advance into the continent. Not to mention his ambitious (or some would argue rather reckless) desire of conquering the mainland of China, his intentions were also to divert his former enemies' wraths to overseas and control the whole militia under the cause of wartime situation.⁶

Although Japan's challenge toward Joseon and Ming to upset the conventional regional order eventually failed, it did change the landscape of the dynamics of East Asia. Joseon, which once had been one of the most loyal tributary state of Ming, was defeated by the Manchurians of the North, later becoming a new empire of Qing, and forced to accept them as its new overlord in 1637; and Ming, the central empire founded by the Han (漢) Chinese was also fallen by the newly risen empire in 1644. In the meantime, Japan too went through a vortex of power struggle before a new era. Tokugawa Ieyasu, who had been one of the most powerful daimyos (Japanese warlords), took over the shogunate after Toyotomi's death. He moved the capital from Kyoto to Edo (modern day Tokyo) and began the Edo period, which is regarded as the most glorious era in Japanese history.

One of the achievements of Tokugawa during his regime in terms of foreign policy was that he restored diplomatic relations with Joseon. He persuaded the Joseon court that he had nothing to do with his predecessor Toyotomi and expressed his will to resume bilateral trade as a sovereign nation. In 1607, less than ten years after the *Imjin War* had ended, Joseon sent its delegations, known as *Tongsinsa*, to Japan, officially recognized

6. Moon-Ja Kim, "Subjects of Study in Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592: Reexamination on the Cause of Outbreaks of Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592 and Japanese Reinvasion of Korea in 1597," *The Korea-Japan Historical Review*, No. 67 (2020): 139-75.

Japan as a sovereign state and reestablished diplomatic relations.⁷ And for about three centuries, Joseon and Japan maintained diplomatic and commercial ties, until the new phase of history from the West waved into the East in the late 19th century.

2. 1868 Meiji Restoration (明治維新) & Japanese Colonial Occupation over Joseon

Unlike Qing (China) and Joseon (Korea), Japan actively embraced the Western influence and strived to transform itself from medieval feudal state to westernized modern nation. The *Meiji Restoration* in 1868 was an important transition not only for Japan, as it modernized the country and reformed its political structure by ending the shogunate regime and starting a nationalist empire, but also for East Asia, as Japan emerged as a new regional power in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries.⁸ The Japanese empire defeated Qing in 1895 (the *First Sino-Japanese War*)⁹ and the Russian empire in 1905 (the *Russo-Japanese War*),¹⁰ and became a new hegemon of the region. Japan was recognized as a major power of East Asia and took part in colonizing China along with the Western imperialists. And within its pathway toward expansion, there was Joseon—the first victim of Japan’s colonialism.

To some extent, Japan’s annexation of Joseon and colonization of a

7. Seung-Chul Son, “A Study on the Historic Meaning of Chosun Tongsinsa - An essay for Coexistence, Co-ownership, and Co-prosperity,” *World Politics*, Vol. 12 (2010): 149-82.

8. Robert Hellyer and Herald Fuess, *The Meiji Restoration: Japan as a Global Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2020.

9. S.C.M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 2006.

10. Geoffrey Jukes, *The Russo-Japanese War: 1904-1905* (Oxford, England; New York, New York: Osprey Publishing), 2002.

part of China, including the establishment of its puppet state Manchukuo, could be viewed as the realization of Toyotomi's lifelong dream about three centuries after his death. His grandiose dream of advancing into the continent and conquering the heart of Ming empire via Joseon might have been a delusion by then, but it became a reality as the pre-modern period of 19th century faded away. Joseon (later Korea) was forced to give in its sovereignty as a kingdom, annexed in 1910, and had been under Japanese occupation until 1945.

3. End of WWII, Korean War, and Today

After the drops of two atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan proclaimed unconditional surrender to the U.S. and its allies, and gave away all the territories it occupied during the colonial period. The day the World War II and the Pacific War ended became the day of liberation for Korea. Although Korea was then divided into two by ideological conflict of the Cold War, the hate against Japan remained throughout the whole Peninsula.

Ironically, however, it was Korea that provided Japan a silver lining from the devastation of the WWII. Japan was under a severe burden of war reparations and depression of defeatism, along with unforgettable trauma of the atomic bombs. Although Japan had been an enemy that bombarded Pearl Harbor and brought U.S. into the Pacific War, the U.S. tried to keep this former fascist enemy within its bloc as it prepared for another upcoming war—this time, against communism. The U.S. troops advanced into the Korean peninsula and tried to control Korea through trusteeship, at least partially, and Japan was the 'Maginot line' of preventing the spread of communism in East Asia.¹¹

And the Korean war broke out. In June 1950, North Korea invaded the South and occupied Seoul in only three days. South Korea, unprepared for the attack, was pushed down to Busan facing the dawn of fall. However, the U.S. did not give up on South Korea, and prepared for a counterattack, led by the United Nations Commander General Douglas MacArthur. At this point, Japan became the crucial middle point where the U.S. would send soldiers, war supplies and other necessary resources. Thanks to the U.S.'s continuous supply, Japan was able to revive not only economically, but also politically and socially.¹² What has been memorialized as the most tragic history for Koreans turned out to be a turning point for Korea's archenemy. The Korean War was the first event that connected the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, which later became the background of vague trilateral relations or alliance.

And in 1965, a little more than a decade after the Korean War ended by the ceasefire agreement, the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and Japan was officially re-established. President Park Chung-Hee, a former major general who grasped the power via military coup, needed financial support from abroad for economic development, and called Japan for an aid. On November 1961, Park himself visited Japan and made an oral agreement with Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda on re-establishing the diplomatic relations, and the official agreement of the "Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea" was signed on June 22nd, 1965.¹³

11. Kanji Akagi, "The Korean War and Japan," *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies*, Vol. 24 No. 1 (2011): 175-84.

12. Jin Sung Chung, "The Special Procurement of Japan in the 1950s and the Cold War," *Korean Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 22 (2020): 74-111.

13. "Japan and Republic of Korea: Treaty on Basic Relations," *United Nations Treaty Series*, No. 8471, June 22, 1965. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20583/volume-583-I-8471-English.pdf>.

Today, South Korea and Japan are crucial members of the East Asian region, sharing common values of free market system and democracy, promoting regional stability over North Korea's nuclear threat, and leveraging balance between the U.S.-China conflict. However, the history of annexation and occupation in the early 20th century and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations led by a military dictator remain as unresolved issues between the two countries, affecting emotional animosity against each other until today. Nevertheless, the stream of history between South Korea and Japan proves that the two states cannot be disconnected, either by their own will or by outer influences.

III. Differences between Koreans & Japanese

1. Anthropological Analysis

Among many terms and words that describe the emotions of Korean people, *han* (恨) would be the most typical word that can explain complex feelings within the Korean minds. *Han*, which represents deep resentment or regret toward someone or something in English, cannot be fully translated as it comprehends various sentiments, such as anger or detest, sorrow or sadness, grievance or hatred, and sometimes, even love.¹⁴ Within the spectrums of East Asian history and international (or regional) relations, the *han* of a nation can be viewed as a deep resentment and animosity against another nation—either the state itself, the people in general, or specific group of decision makers. Traditionally, the concept of *han* was

14. “Han (恨; 恨),” *Encyclopedia of Korean Culture* (The Academy of Korean Studies). <http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0060943>.

rather an individual subject that varies depending on a person who bears it and his or her object. However, after the history of Japanese occupation, it grew into a collective emotion of Korean people, and later developed into a strong and long-lasting hatred against Japan.¹⁵ Koreans regarded themselves as a victim of colonialism, the WWII, the Korean War, and the Cold War—as they all derived from the Western imperialism, not from themselves.

Meanwhile, the Japanese people have the nature of *wa* (和), meaning peace and harmony. For Koreans, Japan was an aggressor of expansionism and the one who first attacked the Pearl Harbor and began the Pacific War, hence it has no say in claiming for their own loss from the War. However, from Japanese perspective, they were the only victim of the atomic bombs in the history. After its defeat and surrender, Japan promised that it would never assemble forces for militaristic purposes in foreign land (under the article 9 of the Peace Constitution).¹⁶ Until today, Japan has its trauma of the devastation of atomic bombs, and further developed its *wa* nature, avoiding conflicts and honoring peace.¹⁷

The problems of two emotions are that they do not tend to meet and collaborate. Koreans' *han* is something that cannot be simply resolved with a pretended apologetic gesture, and it would not be eased by diplomatic agreements, especially if they were made by a dictator neglecting the public voice. For Japanese, the trauma of atomic bombs and the obsession of *wa* is so great that they overlook the emotions of Koreans toward themselves. Both emotions reflect complicated irony: the Koreans bear a deep resentment

15. Sandra So Hee Chi Kim, "Korean Han and the Postcolonial Afterlives of "The Beauty of Sorrow"," *Korean Studies* (University of Hawai'i Press), Vol. 41 No. 1 (2017): 253–79.

16. "Article 9," *The Peace Constitution of Japan* (Chapter II: Renunciation of War), 1946.

17. Keiko Hirata and Mark Warschauer, *Japan: the Paradox of Harmony* (New Haven: Yale University Press), 2014: 7-21.

and anger that will not or cannot be cured; and the Japanese who pursue peace and harmony out of their own pain fail to recognize the pain of the others.¹⁸

2. Comparative Analysis: Emotions and Diplomacy between Korea-Japan

The difference between South Korea and Japan can also be seen in political structures. The policy and political regimes of South Korea are highly public oriented, mostly driven by collective emotions. Although it seems to be obvious for a democratic state, it is something South Korea arduously achieved after the turmoil of post-war dictatorships and two major democratic movements against them—one in 1980, and the other in 1987.¹⁹ The struggle for democracy even continued in 2017, during the presidential impeachment of Park Geun-Hye, who is also known as the daughter of Park Chung-Hee.²⁰ Moreover, public protests against the ROK-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 2006 and the import of U.S. beef amid

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18. Hyung-Joon Park, “Jaeil-gyopo Kang Sang-Joong Gyosu Ilji-wa Inteobu “Hanguk-eun Yeoksa-e Gusokdwaetgo Ilbon-eun Yeoksa Neomu Molla” (재일교포 강상중 교수 日紙와 인터뷰 “한국은 역사에 구속됐고, 일본은 역사 너무 몰라”); Zainichi Professor Kang Sang-Joong interviewed, “Korea is Isolated in History, Japan is too Ignorant of It,” *Dong-A Daily*, November 9, 2019. <https://www.donga.com/news/Inter/article/all/20191109/98282263/1>.
 19. For more information about the Gwangju Uprising in 1980, refer to: Jung-woon Choi, *The Gwangju Uprising: The Pivotal Democratic Movement That Changed the History of Modern Korea*, trans. Youngan Yu (Paramus, NJ: Homa & Sekey Books), 2006; For more information about the June Democratic Struggle in 1987 and the fall of the 5th Republic, refer to: Won Kim, *Palsipchilnyeon Yuwol Hangaeng (87년 6월 항쟁, June Uprising in 1987)*; Seoul: Chaeksang, 2009.
 20. “Daetongryeong (Park Geun-Hye) Tanhaek Gyeoljeongmun (대통령(박근혜) 탄핵 결정문; Full Script of the Decision on President Park Geun-Hye’s Impeachment),” *Bonjil-gwa Hyeonsang (본질과 현상, Essence and Phenomenon)*; Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea), Vol. 48 No. 1 (2017): 44-137.

the mad cow disease crisis in 2008 clearly show how actively and deeply the South Korean public sentiment is embedded in Korean government's decision-making process.²¹ The national sentiment (국민정서, 國民情緒) is a core motif of Korean politics, and among them, the anti-Japanese emotion (반일감정, 反日感情) is one of the most crucial elements that politicians must not neglect.²²

While South Korea's policy making process shows the 'bottom-to-top' structure, that of Japan is rather 'top-to-bottom', which is more elitist-based, bureaucratic, and hierarchical.²³ While Japan's long reign of Liberal Democratic Party and bureaucratic hierarchy can provide political consistency and systemic efficacy, it entails a risk of lacking public participation. It implies that the Japanese public are not as interested in politics and diplomacy as Koreans are, and the political stance as well as foreign policies of Japan would rather express the will of LDP leadership than that of the public. The two implications are mutually interactive—as the LDP can maintain, or strengthen, its political upper hand over the negligence of the public. To some extent, Japanese politicians do not 'represent' the public; rather, they are more likely to 'lead' them and project their views and opinions as if they are from the public.

In a nutshell, the conflict between South Korea and Japan can be seen as a quarrel between the public (South Korea) and the cabinet (Japan). One of the cases that reveals such unbalanced tug of war would be the

21. Chae Sung Chung, "The South Korean Candlelight Demonstration in 2008 and the South Korea-US Relations," *Korea Social Science* (Seoul National University, Institute of Social Science), Vol. 33 (2011): 49-73.

22. In-Mi Lee, "Sentiments and Politics: the Anti-Japanese Sentiment Flaming up Again in a Hundred Years," *Hyunsang-gwa Insik* (현상과 인식, *Phenomenon and Perception*), Vol. 43 No. 3 (2019): 267-75.

23. Isono Fujiko, "The post-surrender Democratisation of Japan," ed. Ian Neary, *War, Revolution & Japan* (Folkestone: Japan Library), 1993: 110-11.

Comfort Women Agreement in 2015 and its aftermaths.²⁴ Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Korean President Park Geun-Hye came to an agreement of concluding the ongoing dispute of comfort women in inter-governmental level. While Abe and his cabinet would have been quite satisfied as they must have perceived that the South Korean government gave consent to the end of the historical dispute, the South Korean public opposed Park's decision, claiming that it was not a unified standpoint of the people, and it became the omen of Park's dishonorable stepdown. Moon Jae-In, the successor of Park from the left-wing party, campaigned that the agreement should be re-negotiated, which brought a huge support from the public.²⁵ The South Korean public regards the Comfort Women Agreement in 2015 as a deal that was wrongfully made, and Japan still owes sincere apology and suitable compensations to the victims.²⁶ Japan, on the other hand, argues that the historical disputes including ethical gesture and further payback are all resolved completely and permanently, by the two agreements made with the Park family.²⁷

Another case would be the aforementioned trade conflict in 2019—

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24. For more information about the 'Comfort Women' Agreement, refer to: Myon Woo Lee ed., *Wuiianbu-habeuiwa Hanil-gwangye (위안부합의와 한일관계, Comfort Women Agreement and Korea-Japan Relations)*; Seoul: Sejong Institute), 2017; Kan Kimura, "Will the 'Comfort Women' Agreement Reduce Japan-ROK Mutual Distrust?" *Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies*, Vol. 27 (2016): 159-74.
 25. Jonathan Cheng, "New South Korean Leader Casts Doubt on 'Comfort women' Deal with Japan," *Wall Street Journal*, May 11, 2017. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-south-korean-leader-casts-doubt-on-comfort-women-deal-with-japan-1494500587>.
 26. According to a survey after the agreement conducted by Realmeter, 50.7% of the respondents answered that the deal was "unsatisfactory," and the negativity of the twenties and the thirties was around 70%; also refer to: Alastair Gale, "Japan-South Korea 'Comfort women Deal' Deal Faces Backlash in Seoul," *Wall Street Journal*, January 3, 2016. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/comfort-women-deal-faces-backlash-in-seoul-1451557585>.
 27. *Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea* with Park Chung-Hee (1965) and the *Comfort Women Agreement* with Park Geun-Hye (2015).

Japan's export restrictions of semiconductor materials and South Korean people's No Japan movement. The conflict was basically triggered by different viewpoints of South Korea's judiciary and Japan's administrative on the case of Korean forced laborers during the occupation. Japan believed that South Korean Supreme Court's decision was a violation of bilateral agreement as well as the international law stating that the application of international pact should come before the practice of domestic justice.²⁸ On the contrary, South Korean government claimed that the Supreme Court's decision is under the authority of the judiciary itself, and the president or any administrative agency has no right to intervene under the value of *trias politica*—the separation of powers.²⁹ The noteworthy point of this conflict was the difference of major players of action after the court's decision: in Japan, it was the government that engaged political retaliation on South Korea with trades; in South Korea, however, much before government's reaction, the people were in front criticizing Japan's political actions and expressed their animosity by boycotting Japanese products.

Of course, it was the South Korean government that indeed confronted and reacted to Japan as an official channel of diplomatic talks and

28. Japan argues that the compensations on Japan's colonial rule over Korea has been settled by the 1965 Treaty, as the term compensation in the agreement applies not only to the national level, but also to the individual level; refer to: Eric Johnston, "South Korea Ruling on Wartime Labor to Have Major Implications for Seoul-Tokyo Ties," *Japan Times*, August 2, 2020. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/08/02/national/south-korea-wartime-labor-ruling-japan/>.

29. South Korea argues that the 1965 Treaty did not settle the compensation claims in individual level, and the lawsuits of South Korean forced laborers against the Japanese government is viable. The Blue house commented that the decision of the judiciary cannot be intervened by the administrative; refer to: Hyonhee Shin and Joyce Lee, "South Korean Court Angers Japan with Order to Compensate Wartime Laborers," *Reuters*, November 29, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-forcedlabour-southkorea-idUSKCN1NY05D>.

negotiations; and there are heated civil movements of anti-Korean sentiment within Japan as well. What to point out, however, was that the distribution of power and the voice within each country were not equivalent. South Korean people expressed their detests against Japan bypassing diplomatic route more than the Japanese people did; and Japan's voice of anti-Korean emotions was more politically oriented than publicly reflected. This implies that the political and social atmospheres of the two countries are quite different, therefore the perception gap in between is fairly natural, where both South Korea and Japan are to be lost in translation.

IV. Affects of National Emotions

1. Security Aspect: Partners, but not Allies

The most significant fact that describes the South Korea-Japan relations in terms of the security policy is that they are partners, not allies, despite they are both allies to the U.S.³⁰ Each state holds strong military ties with the U.S. ever since the Cold War, but they have not improved their bilateral relations further into allies. The only security agreement that involves both South Korea and Japan is GSOMIA, which had gone through the crisis of termination in 2019. Although the withdrawal of GSOMIA was suspended, it proved how weak the South Korea-Japan relations had been, and could be in the future as well.³¹

Even when the GSOMIA was made between the two countries, there

30. Tae-hyo Kim, "Japan and Korea: Why Can't They Reconcile?" *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. 29 No. 2 (2017): 274-5.

31. Tae-hyo Kim, 275-6.

were heated disputes in Korea on whether to make a military pact with a country that had once occupied the nation. Upon such public emotions, the South Korea-Japan GSOMIA shows its uniqueness in terms of the duration. So far, South Korea has signed treaties of protecting classified military information with twenty-one countries.³² While most agreements either do not state the expiration date specifically or set five-year terms for extension, the GSOMIA with Japan is only effective in annual basis, with a condition that it would be automatically extended unless either government announces its withdrawal within ninety days before termination.³³

Also, many experts view that South Korea's GSOMIA with Japan was only to maintain or strengthen its ties with the U.S.³⁴ Washington have always strived to secure the trilateral alliance in East Asia against North Korea, China, and even Russia. As South Korea and Japan have not escalated their relations into allies, the GSOMIA would be the bedrock for the U.S. to preserve the yet not strong enough security bloc in the region. In some aspect, the existence of the U.S., or the pressure of Washington, is the only (or at least the strongest) reason that made the agreement in force, despite South Korea's animosity towards Japan.

32. There are more treaties with other countries or international organization (i.e. NATO) on military partnership and cooperation, only twenty-one refer to the 'protection of classified information' in the agreements. Refer to: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, "Bilateral Treaty." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/wpge/m_3834/contents.do.

33. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, *Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Japan on the Protection of Classified Military Information*, November 23, 2016. <https://treatyweb.mofa.go.kr/JobGuide.do#2016112200000001>.

34. As soon as the GSOMIA was signed by South Korea and Japan, the White House immediately released a press statement welcoming the agreement; refer to: "Statement by NSC Spokesperson Ned Price on Japan and the Republic of Korea Signing GSOMIA," November 23, 2016. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/11/23/statement-nsc-spokesperson-ned-price-japan-and-republic-korea-signing>.

2. Economic Aspect: Fragile Interdependence

The trade war between the U.S. and China in 2018 can be explained in many theoretical perspectives: first, it can be viewed as a power game between the hegemon and the rising power; second, it can also be a righteous battle for the U.S. to protect its valuable resources (both material and intellectual); lastly, some could view the rivalry of the U.S. and China as the return of the Cold War era, bringing back the ideological conflict of the 20th century between capitalism and democracy against communism and socialism.

However, none of these factors applies in the case of South Korea and Japan in 2019. The two states are not economic rivals, but rather share values of democracy and free market system planted by the U.S. after the WWII, so they have less reason for any ideological conflict. In other words, these are the reasons that the South Korea-Japan trade dispute is regarded as a conflict of hate, not a plausible clash of two rational states.

In addition, the fragility of South Korea-Japan economic interdependence can also be seen from the current status of Free Trade Agreement (FTA). As of 2021, South Korea has made seventeen agreements with forty-six countries,³⁵ and Japan has twenty-one agreements either in force or signed.³⁶ The two states once attempted to make the FTA in 2006, but failed to reach an agreement and the negotiation has been suspended.³⁷ While South Korea has joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that already includes China and Japan,³⁸ and the trilateral economic

35. Ministry of Trade Industry and Energy of the Republic of Korea, "Current FTA Situation of the Republic of Korea." <https://www.fta.go.kr/main/situation/kfta/ov/>.

36. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Free Trade Agreement (FTA) / Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and Related Initiatives." <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/index.html>.

37. Ibid.

partnership among South Korea, Japan and China is under negotiation,³⁹ the bilateral FTA between South Korea and Japan is under suspension until present. Considering that the two governments both support free trade and yearn to expand its economic territory via further interdependent ties, it would seem rather unnatural to witness the absence of economic agreements between the two neighboring countries.

3. *Social Aspect: Zainichi Koreans' 'Otherness'*

One of the most iconic symbols of the clash between Korea and Japan in social aspect would be the *Zainichi* issue. By definition, *Zainichi* (재일, 在日) is referred to as Koreans in Japan who are registered as “special permanent residents” by the Japanese Ministry of Justice.⁴⁰ The history of *Zainichi* goes back to the Japanese occupation of Korea in the early 20th century, and while the numbers vary, around 330,000 *Zainichis* are known to be living on the Japanese soil today.

The significance of *Zainichi* Koreans would be the identity of ‘otherness’. They are in the gray zone where neither Koreans nor Japanese recognize them as one of themselves. By their names and profiles, they hold nametags of *Zainichi*, or *Chosenjin* (조선인, 朝鮮人), within the Japanese society. However, they are excluded from the Korean society as well, as their natural behaviors and customs are more likely to be regarded as Japanese than Koreans. Considering South Korea and Japan’s exclusive aspects with relatively homogeneous ethnic demographics compared to the Western

38. “Current FTA Situation of the Republic of Korea.”

39. Ibid.

40. For more information about the legal status of *Zainichi* Koreans, refer to: Kyung Hee Cho, “Politics of Identification of *Zainichi* Koreans under the Divided System,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* (Routledge), Vol. 21 No. 3 (2020): 452-64.

cultures, the identity crisis of *Zainichi* Koreans for being neither Korean nor Japanese would be a tragic legacy of the history for them to bear.⁴¹

Either directly or indirectly (or both), *Zainichi* Koreans are facing discriminations from both sides. Many *Zainichis* in Japan testified that they have experienced discrimination from within their daily lives,⁴² and the forms of expressing such attitudes varies from radical protests to subtle harassments.⁴³ Through the lens from the Korean Peninsula, however, they are Japanese only with Korean façade, filled with Japanese minds and norms, which makes a wide identity gap. While both governments are striving to improve its cultural openness by embracing globalization, multilateralism and value of diversity, the *Zainichi* Koreans are in no place for such tolerance, veiled by ignorance of the two states.

V. Theoretical Interpretations on Emotions and Perceptions

1. Perception Gap: How Does Each State View Each Other?

Korea (both North and South) views Japan as an invader or an aggressor, based on the history of two Japanese invasions—one in 1592 and the other in 1910. For Koreans, Japan is under enormous debt as the war criminal,

41. For more information about the identity of *Zainichi* Koreans, refer to: David Chapman, *Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity* (New York: Routledge), 2008.

42. Yoshia Goto, “‘There is No Discrimination in Japan’: Survey Results Show Statement is Far from True,” *Mainichi Japan*, February 21, 2021. <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210220/p2a/00m/0na/015000c>.

43. Bumsoo Kim, “‘Blatant Discrimination Disappears, But ...’: The Politics of Everyday Exclusion in Contemporary Japan,” *Asian Perspective* (The Johns Hopkins University Press), Vol. 35 No. 2 (2011): 287-308.

and believes that ‘sincere’ apology is crucial for reconciliation. At the same time, as the history shows, diplomatic agreements between the two countries are regarded as an individual action that have not been approved by the Korean people as a whole; hence they have no significant meanings or effects at all.

Moreover, the ongoing political disputes are shaking the already fragile ties between them even more: Japanese politicians’ continuous tributes to the Yasukuni Shrine—the Shinto shrine where the war criminals of the Pacific War (who are regarded as the sacred heroes in Japan) are buried—are regarded as disrespectful provocations to neighbors (not only Korea, but also China);⁴⁴ the territorial dispute over Dokdo, or Takeshima as the Japanese call it, has risen as a new conflict in the 21st century;⁴⁵ and the issues of compensating forced laborers and comfort women still remain as a core trigger of drastic conflict.⁴⁶

Japan, on the other hand, views Korea as a ‘reneger’, one who keeps breaking promises. So far, there has been multiple contacts between South Korea and Japan (Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1965, the Kim-Obuchi Declaration in 1998,⁴⁷ and Japan-South Korea ‘Comfort Women’ Agreement in 2015), as well as two major statements from Japanese high officials—the Kono Statement in 1993,⁴⁸

44. Michiaki Okuyama, “Disputes Over Yasukuni Shrine and Its War Dead in Contemporary Japan,” *Religion Compass* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.), Vol. 3 No. 1 (2009): 58-71.

45. Paul Huth, Sunwoong Kim and Terence Roehrig ed., *The Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute: South Korea, Japan and the Search for a Peaceful Solution* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV), 2021.

46. Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel Sneider, “Japanese Colonial Rule, Forced Labor, and Comfort Women,” *Divergent Memories* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press), 2020: 195-213.

47. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century*, October 8, 1998. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html>.

and the Murayama Statement in 1995.⁴⁹ In Japan's point of view, the South Korean government is not capable of delivering agreements or statements to its own public, affected by the public emotion too easily, and changes its position in each and every administration, despite Japan's continuous efforts to develop cooperative relations.

Legal dispute of how to deal with South Korea after the WWII also lies as one of the key issues. Although Japan was in inescapable debt of reparation after its defeat in the WWII, it did not consider Korea as one of the recipients of any form of compensations. Korea was Japan's colony as it was annexed in 1910 and had been under occupation until the day of surrender in 1945; it leads to a question if Japan should pay the reparation to Korea, which is not a 'victor' of the War.⁵⁰ In extreme sense, some might interpret that Korea was also a part of Japan—as it had been under Japan's control. While moral dispute of compensation would still be valid despite Korea's position during the WWII, it is true that the status between South Korea and Japan was not equivalent to that between the U.S. and Japan.⁵¹

48. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, "The Kōno Statement: Its Historical Significance and Limitations," *Denying the Comfort Women* (Routledge), Vol. 1 (2018): 17-39.

49. Rwei-Ren Wu and Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan and Reconciliation in Post-War Asia: the Murayama Statement and Its Implications* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2013.

50. The reparation-compensation convey different meanings under South Korean law. Reparation (배상, *baesang*, 賠償) is a payback of illegal actions, while compensation (보상, *bosang*, 補償) is a payment when legal actions cause damages or losses. Based on the definitions, South Korea is not among the recipients of 'war reparation' – which can only be claimed by the victors of the War. The Korean definitions of reparation and compensation from: *National Institute of Korean Language*. https://www.korean.go.kr/front_eng/main.do.

51. South Korea views the Japanese occupation over the Korean Peninsula was made through illegal annexation; claiming that the treaty was not approved by the emperor of Joseon, as well as it was forcefully made against the emperor or the government's sovereign will. Therefore, the whole history of Japan's colonial rule over Korea would be illegal, which can be subject to legal lawsuit for 'reparations' against Japan. For

2. *Theoretical Interpretations*

A. **Constructivism**

The South Korea-Japan relations shows that not all politics are driven by rationality. Politics, especially democracy, projects collective wills of the people within; and they are not always necessarily rational. Emotions are mostly regarded as a discouragement for reasonable decisions in the arena of politics and diplomacy; however, it is merely a rhetoric before real decision-making progress. States' leaders elected through democratic procedure are bound by the will of the people, and they are obligated to fulfill what they have been expected to engage. Through the lens of academic observation, some policies or decisions might seem unreasonable, irrational, or even completely nonsense; however, for politicians, it might be a rational trade of give and take—as they win the election, they provide what the people have wanted in return, and build up mutual trust for their power or rule to be kept.

As such, the emotion is a core element embedded under the mutual interaction between the policymakers and the constituents, and it throws a theoretical challenge to two major theories of realism and liberalism, as they both emphasize the premise of rational state. Realism claims that a state will not challenge against the stronger, unless it is prepared.⁵²

more information about South Korea's legal perception of Japanese annexation, refer to: Yeong-don Loh, "The Legal Validity of the Convention between Korea and Japan of 1905," *Journal of Korean Political and Diplomatic History*, Vol. 28 No. 1 (2006): 57-86.

52. Realism emphasizes the significance of power in international order – explaining the dynamics of hegemony and rising power, balance of power, political decisions in nation-state level. Early realists include: Thucydides, Sun Tzu (孫子), Carl von Clausewitz, Niccolò Machiavelli, etc. For more information about realism, refer to: John J. Mearsheimer, "Reckless States and Realism," *International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications), Vol. 23 No. 2 (2009): 241-56. Also see works of Stephen Walt, Hans

Liberalism emphasizes the role of institutions, promotion of cooperation and mutual trust.⁵³ Under both theories, rationality is a bedrock of state's decision for conflict or cooperation.

Constructivism, on the other hand, views the world with different perspective. The core values of constructivism are social norms, collective values, and sentiments; and rationality is not a prerequisite. It claims that the individuals tend to gather based on their kinships, and the concept of the state is merely one of many levels of analysis (this is a key difference from realism and liberalism – as they see state as the basic level of analysis).⁵⁴ Therefore, the national identity, a collective entity, can spur antagonism against the other, especially if the group is tied with specific history of conflict. As Alexander Wendt stated, the status of anarchy is what states make of it, and self-help and power politics are socially constructed.⁵⁵

Constructivism can explain the clash of South Korea and Japan based on their emotions beneath complex international system. Realists would argue that the conflict between the two is nothing but an exhausting quarrel, and criticize the negligence of failing to see much bigger conflict between the U.S. and China; and liberals would also diagnose the situation negatively, claiming that the export regulation and the reactionary boycott is not helpful at all for further economic cooperation. However, despite

Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz.

53. Liberalism in broad sense supports the idea of free market system, democracy, role international institutions, and mutual interdependence. Early liberalists are mainly from the age of enlightenment, such as Immanuel Kant, John Locke and Adam Smith. For more information about liberalism, refer to: John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press), 2005. Also see works of G. John Ikenberry and Robert Keohane.
54. For more information about constructivism, refer to: Peri Roberts, *Political Constructivism* (London: Routledge), 2005.
55. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* (New York, USA: Cambridge University Press), Vol. 46 No. 2 (1992): 391-425.

such concerns of reasons, the animosities of Koreans toward the Japanese and vice versa are real, expressed not only through public movements but also via actual policies.

B. Game Theory – Prisoner’s Dilemma

The game theory can be applied in the fields of science, social studies, economics, and beyond. Among them, the concept of Nash equilibrium provides the most ideal outcome out of various options, given that there is no merit to deviate from the original strategy. In the end, it claims that the player gets no additional benefit by changing his course of action in an assumption that the other player does not change his strategy as well.⁵⁶ It supports the idea of rational decisions leading to optimal outcomes, which could be a neo-liberal approach.

However, the world of politics is not always optimal, and the situation between South Korea and Japan is not different. Based on the same status of options, the theory of prisoner’s dilemma states that the individual decisions can lead to negative outcomes. Under the presumption of zero-sum game, there is no absolute gain or loss; they are only relative. And the state would not search for optimal outcome for everyone, when it can choose the option of gaining more. The uncertainty of deceit always lies, and the opponent would also think the same. As a result, the assumption that the counterpart would not change their strategy cannot be applied, and it makes everyone to think more selfishly.⁵⁷

Prisoner’s dilemma provides result contrary to that of the Nash equilibrium, because it assumes that there is no mutual trust between the two players, and the risk of changing (or not changing) strategies always

56. Boudewijn de Bruin, “Game Theory in Philosophy,” *Topi*, Vol. 24 No. 2 (2005): 199-201.

57. *Ibid.*, 197-99.

lies on both sides. This premise is more applicable to the real-world politics, where each state puts its own interest before the mutual benefits. And when it comes to the antagonistic relations between the two countries, there is less chance of having faith and cooperation. It reduces the chance of mutually advantageous scenarios, and each state would act more for itself, not considering other's gains (or worse, hoping for the other's loss). Based on these layouts, it can be viewed that the South Korea-Japan relations is rather under the prisoners' dilemma spectrum than in the Nash equilibrium frame.

C. Prospect Theory – Three Anomalies

The last theory that can explain the background of South Korea-Japan relations is the prospect theory. It is based on the expected utility theory, an economics theory that offers guidelines for decision making process where the price for each choice is uncertain.⁵⁸ Under expected utility theory, an individual is recommended to choose among various options, based on opportunity costs. It claims that the choice of an individual is based on one's 'expected utility', as the future is full of uncertainties; and the expected utility can be rationally measured via quantification and comparison of risk appetites and preferences.

Prospect theory takes one more step and comes up with different conclusion. There are three major 'anomalies', that disproves the viability of the expected utility theory. The first anomaly is that people do not (or cannot) measure risk (probability) properly, or rationally.⁵⁹ For instance,

58. Magdalena Małecka, "The Normative Decision Theory in Economics: a Philosophy of Science Perspective. The Case of the Expected Utility Theory," *The Journal of Economic Methodology* (Routledge), Vol. 27 No. 1 (2020): 36-50.

59. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, Vol. 5 No. 4 (1992):

when Japan announced the export regulation of semiconductor materials to South Korea, it did not properly anticipate or prepare for the backlash of the Koreans against Uniqlo, which had nothing to do with semiconductors. The argument can also be applied in domestic matter, as the former President Park Geun-Hye had failed to measure the reactions of the public after she made the Comfort Women Agreement in 2015 with Japan.⁶⁰ It shows rational calculation of risks or probabilities is almost impossible to be precise, as there are more variables to consider than it seems, hence the outcomes cannot always be optimal.

Second anomaly of the theory is that people are more sensitive to their loss than their gains.⁶¹ In other words, although the quantitative measurement would be the same, gaining and losing something are not qualitatively regarded equal, and the sadness of losing would be much bigger than the happiness of gaining. It suggests that emotions of human beings are more tilted toward the negativity, and the loss aversion tendency is deeply rooted in human nature.⁶² Applying the loss aversion into the South Korea-Japan situation, three assumptions can be made: first, each state would perceive further gestures for reconciliation would be of its loss; second, they both consider the loss of moving first is much greater than the gain of reconciliation; and third (therefore), each would avoid approaching toward each other unless the counterpart moves first.

The last anomaly is that people's perception of loss or gain are not absolute, but relative.⁶³ This shares the common premise of the zero-sum

297-323.

60. Yangmo Ku, "Privatized Foreign Policy? Explaining the Park Geun-hye Administration's Decision-making Process," *Korea Journal*, Vol. 59 No. 1 (2019): 106-34.

61. Tversky and Kahneman, 298.

62. Mohammed Abdellaoui, Han Bleichrodt, and Corina Paraschiv, "Loss Aversion under Prospect Theory: A Parameter-Free Measurement," *Management Science*, Vol. 53 No. 10 (2007): 1659-62.

game concept, where one would believe he is still in loss if the other has gained more. It is difficult to set an ideal standard of absolute gain or loss, as it requires exact calculations with numerous fixed variables taken into account; and it is much easier for one to measure gains and losses by comparing with the others. And when it comes to the measurement of sufficiency in relative domain, perceptions and emotions become crucial determinants over objective data.⁶⁴ Based on this assumption, Koreans perceive that Japan's apologies and relevant gestures have not been sincere enough, regarding them as their loss until they are satisfied; whereas Japan would claim that it has apologized enough (or more than enough) over a half of a century, and further apologetic gestures to South Korea will be of its loss – both in relative and absolute terms.

VI. Implications and Conclusion

1. Implications

The case of South Korea and Japan shows that politics are not always necessarily driven by rationality. The animosities between the two states accumulated throughout more than a century might be explained under historical analysis but disprove the conventional premise that the contemporary international politics are mainly determined by rational decisions. The bilateral relationship of two the countries implies that constructivism is more apt than realism or liberalism especially in democratic world. Under realism, there is no assertion that South Korea would dominate

63. Jonathan Mercer, "Prospect Theory and Political Science," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 8 No. 1 (2005): 6.

64. *Ibid.*, 10-11.

Japan, nor is there any index that states South Korea's absolute superiority over Japan not only economically, but also militaristically. Nevertheless, South Korea's hate against Japan has been persistent, and people do not consider their capabilities before their emotions. Also, liberalism cannot logically explain the trade war between the two states over obvious mutual gains of economic interdependence. Only under constructivists' point of view, however, can the South Korea-Japan relations be explained, where rational decisions are nothing but political rhetoric, and diplomacy simply conveys the collective sentiments of the people in rather revised manners.

2. *Conclusion*

South Korea and Japan have three major gaps that nourish antagonistic sentiments between them: first, their animosities are mainly originated from the history, on how each state remembers the past; second, there is an anthropological gap, on how each culture has developed its collective viewpoints and perceives common diplomatic issues of conflict; lastly, based on these two gaps, each state would expect its counterpart to cross the abyss of emotions fueled with antagonism first, rather than mutually approaching for reconciliation.

For South Korea and Japan to overcome the sentiments of the people and narrow down the gaps, rationality and tolerance for mutual understanding, if not mutual trust, of perception and emotion would be required. Distinction of emotion from practicality in politics is regarded as a virtue, and it is no exception in South Korea-Japan case as well. History should not be forgotten, and emotions cannot be neglected, as the public and the decision makers of the government are all human beings connected to each other after all. However, leaders of the government are elected

with expectations that they will make rational and better choices with deeper insights over direct emotional expressions, which is why they are more capable and suitable for their positions. In the world of complex emotions and sentiments mixed and twirled, democracy is a basic system that can reflect public's voice through rational decision-making process, and thorough contemplation for the optimal resolution balancing rationality and emotion would be ever more needed for both sides.

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Banning the “Balloon Campaign”

- Are the Anti-DPRK Leaflets Justified? -

*Jeong Kipoom**

I. Introduction

In April 2021, the anti-leaflet law in the Republic of Korea (ROK, henceforth South Korea) was broken for the first time. Park Sang-hak, the chief of the Fighters for Free North Korea (FFNK), revealed that he had sent leaflets in defiance of the newly-passed law.¹ The South Korean National Assembly had adopted a law in December 2020 to punish those who send anti-North Korean leaflets.² The law, called Amendments of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, prohibits, among other things, “loudspeaker broadcasting toward North Korea” and “posting visual materials toward North Korea in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line vicinity”, “and disseminating leaflets and other items”.³ It is a law

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1. “North Korean Human Rights organisation disseminated 500,000 anti-North Korean leaflets.....The first case after the ban” (“탈북단체 ‘대북전단 50만 장 살포’.....금지법 시행 뒤 첫 사례”). 2021. YTN News. https://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0103_202104301351251299 (accessed June 13, 2021).
2. Strother, Jason. 2020. “Seoul Bans Anti-North Korea Leaflet Drops.” Voice of America. <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/seoul-bans-anti-north-korea-leaflet-drops> (accessed June 13, 2021).
3. “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for

that has shocked people inside and outside the country.

Apart from the controversy surrounding the efficacy and morality of balloon campaigning itself, the bill has caused an outcry because it is seen as a restriction of freedom of expression. This action of the Moon Jae-in administration, according to Yu Youngsu, evidently violates Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations (UN), which stipulates that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression”.⁴ While the Declaration does provide for restrictions to freedom of speech in some circumstances, the government has failed to justify the balloon leafleting as an action that is fairly subjected to these restrictions. This paper carries out qualitative research based on both primary and secondary sources to examine the anti-leaflet law, and presents three reasons that it is unjustified and unnecessary: firstly, although the Ministry of Unification insists on the ban for the purpose of promoting peace in the Korean peninsula, halting the leaflet drops does not guarantee an improvement in relations between the South and the North. Furthermore, the government’s claim to protect the right to life at the cost of the freedom of speech cannot be accepted because the fundamental cause of the danger in the border region lies not in the balloon leaflets, but in the reality of a divided Korea. The argument that the balloon sending should be prohibited based on the Panmunjeom Declaration also cannot be accepted because the Declaration has no binding effect. Lastly, the clear lack of sufficient discussion regarding this matter weakens the justification of the law. In

disseminating leaflets.” 2020. Ministry of Unification. <https://www.unikorea.go.kr> (accessed June 13, 2021).

4. Refer to “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” https://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021); Yu, Youngsu. 2021. “No Better Way to Promote Human Rights and Peace on the Korean Peninsula? Propaganda Leaflet Dropping and the South Korean Government’s Leafleting Ban.” East Asia Institute. <https://www.eai.or.kr> (accessed June 13, 2021).

order to provide context, I present the background and history of the use of balloon leaflet propaganda, and investigate both the pros and cons of balloon leafletting. Putting aside the question of whether the airborne material drops are justified, I also discuss their effectiveness, and I conclude that even though balloons might not be the most effective means of bringing about change on the peninsula, the banning of civilian leafletting is both unjustified and a threat to South Korea's democracy.

II. The History of Airborne Leaflet Drops

NGOs in South Korea were not the first to use airborne leaflet propaganda; rather, the history of its use traces back to World War II. In order to weaken their enemies psychologically, both the Allied and the Axis forces used leaflet propaganda. They employed various methods of delivering the leaflets, including dropping them from planes, firing them in shells, and sending them by balloon.⁵ The balloon leaflet propaganda also continued during the Cold War. Food and goods were sent using balloons to East Germany and Eastern Europe. This type of information dissemination was not done only by the government, however; private individuals and institutions also participated.⁶ Radio Free Europe/Radio

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5. "Psychological Warfare and Propaganda in World War II: Air Dropped and Shelled Leaflets and Periodicals." 1939-1945. Gale Cengage Learning. https://www.gale.com/binaries/content/assets/gale-us-en/primary-sources/archives-unbound/primary-sources_archives-unbound_psychological-warfare-and-propaganda-in-world-war-ii_air-dropped-and-shelled-leaflets-and-periodicals.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
 6. Macmillan, Bruce. (n.d.). "The Use of Balloons in The Cold War: A Method for Distributing Propaganda and a Means of Escape." The National Archives and Records Administration. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/berlin-wall-1962-1987/dvd/pdfs/vingettes/10_V-2.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).

Liberty, a news company that still reports in countries where freedom of speech is not fully guaranteed, also used balloons to spread their ideology of liberal democracy.⁷

In the Korean Peninsula, this method of spreading propaganda was first used during the Korean War. In the decades after the two Koreas reached the Armistice Agreement, the leaders of the South and North made numerous agreements to stop maligning each other.⁸ In spite of the Joint Communiqué and the Agreement in 1972 and 1992 respectively, airborne leaflets continued to be spread around the Military Demarcation Line. It was only paused when the Kim Dae-jung administration took office in 1998 and started engaging with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). From 2004, South Korean NGOs, such as FFNK, started to take part in the balloon campaign; the military-led leaflet campaigns restarted in 2010 as a response to the Yeonpyeong Island incident.⁹ When Park Geun-hye was in office, the North also continued balloon propaganda with messages that slandered the president of the South. It is in this context that the Moon administration banned it in 2020.

Arguments around the Balloon Campaign

The participation of civil groups in balloon launching has been a controversial issue among South Koreans since 2014, when there was a

7. Refer to RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, <https://www.rferl.org>

8. Son, Deok-ho. 2020. "The government mentions 1972 Agreement in order to stop Anti-North Korean leaflets" ("대북전단 철저 단속에 1972년 합의까지 거슬러 올라간 靑"). Chosun Biz. https://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2020/06/11/2020061103861.html (accessed June 13, 2021).

9. Ibid.; "North Korea drops propaganda leaflets over border." 2012. The Daily Telegraph. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9580747/North-Korea-drops-propaganda-leaflets-over-border.html> (accessed June 13, 2021).

military conflict between the South and the North in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). People in favour of the balloon campaign assert that it is the most effective way to provide information of the outside world to the public of the DPRK.¹⁰ Restrictions to internet access have prevented citizens of the DPRK from accessing information from the outside. Because of the strict control of the inflow of information, defectors testify that North Korean people believe the sovereignty of the South is violated, and that the ROK is actually controlled by the United States. Thus, Andrei Lankov claims that it is crucial to send leaflets showing how sovereign, free, and rich the South is compared with the North.¹¹ However, in David Fields' memoir of his conversations with North Koreans, he argues that the Kim regime has survived not because of the lack of information in the country, but because the people, especially the elites, are firm supporters of the regime and that they would not accept the "unverified" information from the outside as true. Fields states that although the proverb "you can't fool all of the people all of the time" is usually accepted as true, in North Korea's case, this maxim can be slightly modified: "you just need to fool some of the people most of the time".¹²

Even if it might now be easier to access information in North Korea through black markets than it was before, the supporters of the balloon leaflets argue that the act of sending leaflets should be acknowledged as part of the freedom of expression; they point out that expressing one's thoughts should be protected as a right of South Korean citizens, which

10. Kwaak, Jeyup S.. 2013. "North Korea Activist Wins Human Rights Award." *The Wallstreet Journal*. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-KRTB-3643> (accessed June 13, 2021).

11. Lankov, Andrei. 2009. "Changing North Korea: An Information Campaign Can Beat the Regime." *Foreign Affairs* 88(6): 95-105.

12. Fields, David P.. 2014. "True Believers: Conversation with North Koreans." *North Korean Review* 10(1): 93-96.

is stated in the Constitution.¹³ Park Sang-hak, the head of FFNK and himself a defector, also emphasises that he is “not living in Pyongyang” nor is he a “slave to the Kim family dictatorship”; he implies that in a country such as South Korea that defends democracy, his freedom ought to be protected.¹⁴

Moreover, some evidence may indicate that the balloon leaflets were effective. Balloons sent to the North contain information about the wealth in the ROK and about scandals of the Kim regime, as well as denunciations of the Kim family’s hereditary rule. They also carry goods such as sweets, radios, DVDs, essential items, and USD notes.¹⁵ Defectors’ testimonies support the idea that balloon propaganda is effective. For instance, a former personal guard of Kim Il-sung, Lim Yun-sun, was assigned to shoot down the balloons that contain leaflets. He testified during an interview with *Vice News* that the commodities, sweets, and erotic pictures actually help North Koreans to abate their antagonism towards the South, and even provide motivation to escape the DPRK.¹⁶

Furthermore, the supporters of civilian participation in the leafletting argue that the South gave such a wrong political message to the North as yielding to Kim Yo-jong’s aggressive demands. Kim Yo-jong, as the sister and spokesperson of Kim Jong-un, criticized the South Korean government for its lukewarm reactions towards the accountable NGOs,

13. *Daehanminkuk Hunbeob* [*Hunbeob*] [Constitution] art. 21 (S. Kor.)

14. Bicker, Laura. 2020. “South Korean balloons: Plans to stop people sending cross-border messages.” BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52917029> (accessed June 14, 2021).

15. “How Propaganda Flyers Try to Win Over N. Koreans.” 2014. The Chosunilbo. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/10/16/2014101600781.html (accessed June 14 2021).

16. “Launching Balloons into North Korea: Propaganda Over Pyongyang.” 2015. Vice News. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mhj4rH13eoc> (accessed June 14, 2021).

and threatened to discard the military pact between the ROK and the DPRK, to close the South-North Liaison office and to stop cooperating on the Kaesong Industrial Park. This behaviour, acceding to North Korea’s demands when the North threatens South Korea, sets a bad precedent of complying with the North whenever coercing the South.¹⁷ Moreover, the sensitive reaction of North Korea regarding the balloons shows that the DPRK government seems to view the leaflets as a threat to the Kim dynasty. If the leadership of the North didn’t take them seriously, it would just ignore them. Kim Yo-jong’s comments and warnings to the South Korean government, even calling the defectors who sent the leaflets “human scum” and “mongrel dogs”, demonstrates that the DPRK is concerned about this propaganda, which also indicates that it must be, to some extent, effective.¹⁸

The opponents of the balloon campaign, on the other hand, question the motives of those who send balloons. They claim that numerous North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) activists carry out the balloon campaign in order to be funded and supported by American organisations such as the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy (NED) rather than for the pure purpose of sending information to the North. Allegedly, NKHR activists intentionally choose such conspicuous actions as this for the sake of impressing their supporters, rather than out of an unalloyed commitment to freeing North Koreans. This claim is backed by Minkyu Sung, who argues that *post-humanitarianism* focuses more on “viewers” rather than on “victims”. Sung maintains that the “ruling paradigm of liberal

17. King, Robert. 2020. “South Korea Bans Balloons Carrying Leaflets to the North. Foreign Policy Problems Will Follow.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-korea-bans-balloons-carrying-leaflets-north-foreign-policy-problems-will-follow> (accessed June 14, 2021).

18. Bicker. “South Korean balloons.”; Evans, Stephen. “South Koreans wage chocolate propaganda war with chocolate pie.” 2014. BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29751650> (accessed June 14, 2021).

internationalism and its approach to rights and humanitarian politics” is not accidental but the result of Western imperialism. Thus, by emphasising “secular liberal values”, free states justify their intervention in non-free states. This justification also frames human rights in such a way that the people whose human rights are infringed are “victims”: always weak, reliant, and miserable. The notion of *post-humanitarianism* applies well to what Sung calls the “balloon warriors”. Sung interprets the situation in the following way: the defectors are encouraged by their funders, the NED, to alter their image from that of mere defectors to that of warriors fighting against wrongdoings on behalf of the “victims” still in the North.¹⁹ They send balloons in order to satisfy their supporters and gain more attention, rather than out of a sincere desire to promote change.

Opponents also claim that balloon dissemination puts the life of residents near the DMZ in danger, meaning that this case fits the criteria for exceptions to freedom of speech. The residents of DMZ feel unsafe, worrying about possible military confrontations. In 2014, there was a gunfire exchange near the DMZ, when North Koreans shot the balloons down which in turn provoked South Korean soldiers to return fire. In addition to the safety concerns, economic issues exist, especially among those who work in the tourism industry in Paju city, where visitors come to see the DMZ. Inhabitants complain about their reduced income as the number of tourists decreases as tension rises between the two Koreas.²⁰ The Ministry of Unification maintains that this is an obvious violation of the right to life

19. Sung, Minkyu. 2019. “Balloon warriors for North Korean human rights activism: a critique of North Korean defector-activists’ post-humanitarianism.” *Critical Asian Studies* 51(3): 355-367.

20. Lee, Ji-hye. 2021. “Politician Jeong Park mentioned that ‘Anti-North Korean leaflet law is a choice for the livelihood of the border line area’” (“박정 의원 ‘대북 전단금지법, 접경지역 생계 위한 선택’”). *Hangyeore*. <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/assembly/983731.html#csidx274b4a1c00ca59093034abddee6ef70> (accessed June 14, 2021).

and safety of South Korean citizens.²¹ Furthermore, the Kim regime is targeting the families of the defectors. According to the *Rodong Sinmun*, the state organ of the DPRK, mass meetings were held to criticise defectors in response to the balloon dissemination; people from various groups were involved, including the executives and workers of The Socialist Women's Union of Korea, construction workers of the Pyeongyang General Hospital, and students of Kim Chaek University of Technology.²² In the mass meetings, defectors are framed as criminals to be "torn to death" and the meetings seek to foster hatred towards the families of defectors.²³ In the DPRK, the freedom of assembly is not guaranteed. Thus, these kinds of mass meetings are supported by the government, which indicates that Kim has started to strengthen the supervision and oppression of the defectors. The opponents to the anti-North Korean leaflets argue that the "balloons" infringe the human rights not only of South Koreans but also of the families of defectors left in North Korea.

Furthermore, the opponents maintain that the practice is ineffective considering the longer-term consequences, although the supporters of balloon campaign assert that in some cases it actually encourages North Koreans to defect. It hinders long-term peace in the Korean peninsula by disrupting relations and increasing tension between the South and the North.²⁴ In showing its displeasure about the issue, the North has gone

21. Ministry of Unification. "On the amended provisions of 'the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act' for disseminating leaflets." 5.

22. Bae, Young-kyung. 2020. "North Korea has reinforced supervision on the families of defectors... Contacts and support from defectors living in the South are blocked" ("북한, 탈북민 가족 감시 강화.....남한정착 탈북민 송금·통화 끊겨"). Yonhap News. <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200625173500504> (accessed June 14, 2021).

23. You, Youngkyu. 2020. "Continuous mass meetings criticising defectors in North Korea... Will hatred increase against defectors?" ("북한서 '탈북자 비난' 군중 집회 잇따라.....혐오 커지나") SBS News. https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1005823088&plink=ORI&cooper=NAVER (accessed June 14, 2021).

so far as to include a clause about it in Panmunjeom Declaration. Kim Yo-jong's sanguinary language also displays the North's level of hatred towards the South sending balloons. Even though the supporters claim that Kim Yo-jong's anger implies that balloon campaign is effective, the opponents see it as another obstacle of the relationship between the South and the North.

The supporters of the government action also claim that balloon dissemination also causes environmental problems. Most of balloons fall in South Korea's border region short of reaching the North, and cause serious pollution, not to mention causing a hassle for the residents who have to clean them up.²⁵ Even when they do reach the North Korean public, the contents of the leaflets put the lives of any North Koreans who are found with them at risk. This claim is demonstrated in the interview of Lim, the former personal guard of Kim Il-sung. He admits that the leaflets were helpful providing new knowledge about the South. However, people could be killed just for keeping any kind of flyers that contain information insulting or criticising the Kim regime or the North Korean Workers' Party.²⁶

24. Ministry of Unification. "On the amended provisions of 'the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act' for disseminating leaflets." 3.

25. King. "South Korea Bans Balloons Carrying Leaflets to the North." <https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-korea-bans-balloons-carrying-leaflets-north-foreign-policy-problems-will-follow>.

26. Vice News. "Launching Balloons into North Korea: Propaganda Over Pyongyang." <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mhj4rH13eoc>.

III. Criticism of the Government's Justification

Clearly, those in favour of the balloon propaganda and those against it have rational arguments to support their beliefs. While attempting to improve the situation of North Korean Human Rights is crucial, the damage to South Korean inhabitants of the border line area should not be ignored. Yet, in spite of the valid arguments from both parties, the justification of the South Korean government's decision to ban the balloon campaign is questionable. South Korean citizens are divided over this Act, while human rights organisations at home and abroad criticise the government of the South for the ban.²⁷ Thus, the government's justification of its ban is an important element to consider. The overview of the Act, issued by the Ministry of Unification, states that prohibiting the dissemination of leaflets is crucial for improving the relations between the ROK and the DPRK, and for ultimately fostering peace in the Korean peninsula.²⁸ However, prohibiting leaflets does not guarantee peace in Korea. This can be observed from history: even though leaflet propaganda halted when Kim Dae-jung established the Sunshine Policy based on "peaceful coexistence", "peaceful exchange", and "peaceful unification", Kim's approach did not succeed.²⁹ The policy attempted to follow the model of East and West Germany's peaceful reunification. Yet the result was drastically different in the Korean peninsula: despite Kim's attempts to appease the North, the DPRK made a surprise attack in 2002 in Yeonpyeong Island and initiated its first nuclear

27. King. "South Korea Bans Balloons Carrying Leaflets to the North." <https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-korea-bans-balloons-carrying-leaflets-north-foreign-policy-problems-w-ill-follow>.

28. Ministry of Unification. "On the amended provisions of 'the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act' for disseminating leaflets" 3.

29. Bae, Jong-yun and Jung-in Moon. 2014. "South Korea's Engagement Policy: Revisiting a Human Rights Policy." *Critical Asian Studies* 46(1): 15-38.

test in 2006. As such, history demonstrates that North Korea can and will find reasons to disturb the peace whether or not the South sends the balloon leaflets. In this case, the Moon administration's reasoning indicates an overestimation of the likelihood of peace, and a vague hope for peace does not justify the Act's ban on South Koreans' freedom to express themselves.

In addition, the government provides a weak defence of its restriction of the freedom of expression, and fails to provide a satisfactory justification for its actions. The Ministry of Unification cites Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in the Amendments of the Act which states that "freedom of expression can be subject to certain restrictions". It also quotes Article 37 (2) of the Constitution of South Korea that states that the "freedom and rights of citizens may be restricted by law only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare", which is also stated in the ICCPR for the restrictions for freedom of expression.³⁰ The ICCPR states two situations when restrictions for freedom of expression are allowed: "(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (*ordre public*), or of public health or morals". Although the Ministry of Unification mentions reason (a) and claims that the right to life of the residents of DMZ is at risk, the current situation does not fulfil the necessary criteria to justify restricting freedom of expression. The DMZ area is already a sensitive area, not because of the flying leaflets, but because of the nature of the two Koreas' truce. There have been confrontations in the past which had nothing to do with the balloons. Banning the balloons does not protect national security as reason (b) states either. Obviously, there are national security risks along the border

30. Ministry of Unification. "On the amended provisions of 'the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act' for disseminating leaflets." 4-5.

regions, just as the supporters of the Act claim. However, as mentioned above, the threat to national security is fundamentally due to the current status of the two Koreas; halting the leaflets would not change the consequence of the underlying danger. Thus, it is the responsibility of the government to establish adequate policies to protect its citizens’ freedom of expression as well as their right to life because the real cause of danger here lies not in the balloons but in the unpredictable behaviour of the DPRK.

Especially in a region where there still lingers an ideological war, and in a country where citizens were deprived of civil rights for decades, freedom of expression should be restricted only in limited circumstances and only for the very best of reasons. South Korea has a dark history when the freedom of expression was neglected by the military governments. The media was controlled, and the people were not allowed to read certain books to be kept safe from “contamination” of thoughts. In such a country, any restrictions on the freedom of expression should be exercised only with extreme caution and in a very narrow sense in order to protect civil liberties.

The Ministry of Unification also asserted that imposing legal limitations on civilian organisations is necessary due to the agreement made by the leaders of both the South and the North in the Panmunjom Declaration. Article 2 (1) of the Panmunjom Declaration stipulates that South and North Korea agree to cease “all hostile acts and eliminating their means, including broadcasting through loudspeakers and distribution of leaflets, in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line”.³¹ Nonetheless, legal experts maintain that the Panmunjom Declaration is not legally binding because it was not ratified by the National Assembly, nor does it specifically stipulate that individual actors should be bound to this clause. According to Ethan

31. The full text of Panmunjeom Declaration is available on The Korea Times website (https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/04/731_248077.html).

Hee-Seok Shin, it is illegal under international law to restrict the freedom of speech only based on such a treaty between countries, as the Panmunjom Declaration.³²

Furthermore, the Moon administration failed to persuade the nation regarding this matter. A survey about the government ban on leaflet propaganda held by Realmeter shows that 50% of the 500 respondents agreed with the government's decision, while 41.1% disagreed.³³ Considering how controversial this issue is, the government should have taken more time and put in more effort for discussing and addressing ideas and concerns about this Act rather than enacting it as soon as the North's demanded it. This decision was also criticised by the international community. US Congressman Chris Smith expressed his concern even before the prohibition of sending leaflets was legalised, mentioning that the ban on leaflet propaganda would be a severe threat to democracy in Korea. He saw this matter as the South Korean government's failure to protect Civil and Political Rights.³⁴ Human Rights Watch, an international NGO, published a report voicing several concerns about the South Korean government's action. According to the report, the list of the banned items from the Amendments of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act is vague, which can elevate confusion. Besides, the punishment for the violation, which is

32. Kim, Subin. 2020. "The controversy surrounding the anti-North Korean leaflet: Human Rights versus Safety (대북전단을 둘러싼 '인권 대 안전'의 논란)." BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/korean/news-53103488> (accessed June 15, 2021).

33. "Enactment of anti-North Korean leaflet law, 'Agree' 50.0% vs. 'Disagree' 41.1%" ("대북전단 금지법 제정 '찬성' 50.0% vs. '반대' 41.1%"). 2020. Realmeter. <http://www.realmeter.net/대북-전단-금지법제정-찬성50-0-vs-반대-41-1/> (accessed June 15, 2021).

34. Smith, Chris. "Rep. Chris Smith voices 'serious concern' over South Korea's growing disregard of fundamental civil liberties, acquiescence to Communist North." 2020. U.S. Congressman Chris Smith. <https://chrissmith.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=409071> (accessed June 15, 2021).

“imprisonment to up to three years and/or a fine of up to 30 million Korean won”, is too harsh.³⁵ This is not good for South Korea as a democratic country that should comply with the international standards of liberal democracy and human rights.

IV. The Effectiveness of the Balloon Campaign

Whether or not a ban is justified, the efficiency of the balloon leaflets is another matter that should be discussed separately; a weak justification for the ban does not necessarily mean that the balloon launching is the most effective method for information dissemination. There should be better means of conveying information to the North and of improving the fundamental rights of North Koreans. The contents of the leaflets sent with the balloons by the NGOs have been especially controversial; some claim they include fake news and groundless personal attacks with provocatively edited pictures. In 2013, for example, a South Korean online community blamed balloonist organisations for sending fake pornographic photos of Ri Sol-ju, Kim Jong-un’s wife, in order to humiliate the leadership of the North.³⁶ Merely insulting and provoking the Kim regime with such content is hardly helpful to the peace process or to enlightening North Koreans.

Andrei Lankov claims that showing the economic gap between the South

35. “Human Rights Watch Submission to the Ministry of Unification.” 2021. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/18/human-rights-watch-submission-ministry-unification#_ftnref6 (accessed June 15, 2021).

36. Kim. “The controversy surrounding the anti-North Korean leaflet: Human Rights versus Safety (대북전단을 둘러싼 ‘인권 대 안전’의 논란).” <https://www.bbc.com/korean/news-53103488>.

and the North is an effective way to convince the North Korean public. He also suggests that this approach is especially suitable for North Korea; the economic situation and international status of North Korea have been extremely poor, especially compared with that of the South, although North Korea has been establishing policies under *Juche* ideology, or self-reliance, from the 1950s. Thus, demonstrating this reality would help the people of the North to realise that their ruling ideology is problematic. The Kim dynasty has been successful at forcing its people, or at least the elites, to revere and obey the country's leadership, notwithstanding all the poverty and the lack of freedom. Since the pressure to the regime from the outside is ineffective, it is a much better approach to enable North Korean people to access more information about the real world so that "pressure for change" can come from within, according to Lankov.³⁷ He also compares the situation in the Korean peninsula with that of Germany during the Cold War. He mentions that the basis of the victory of the liberal democracy was the successful spread to the East of information about the free and rich West. It is important, however, also to identify differences between Korea and Germany. The latter sent leaflets seeking friendship rather than undermining its eastern counterpart, while the leaflets in Korea are full of mutual slander.³⁸ Furthermore, Jieun Baek, a fellow at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School, also maintains that the flow of information in North Korea has a positive influence on the people. She states in her book that North Koreans also get information through China, not necessarily targeted at the Kim regime, but just for daily lives such as product prices and weather. Still, receiving more information helps them to question their own

37. Lankov. "Changing North Korea: An Information Campaign Can Beat the Regime."

38. Macmillan. "The Use of Balloons In The Cold War: A Method for Distributing Propaganda and a Means of Escape." https://www.archives.gov/files/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/berlin-wall-1962-1987/dvd/pdfs/vingettes/10_V-2.pdf.

government regarding what the “facts” really are.³⁹

New tactics of sending information also should be developed as technology has improved since the Cold War. It is almost impossible to measure how many leaflets sent with balloons actually reach people, as this tactic is too dependent on the weather. The fact that the outcome cannot be anticipated or evaluated in proportion to the input also suggests that this method may be ineffective although it is also difficult to know for sure. While a ban on balloon leaflets is not the right way forward, the government and private individuals should invent more creative and effective methods than balloons in order to safely and successfully convey information to the “hermit kingdom”.

As already mentioned above, even the increased inflow of information might not precipitate the collapse of the Kim regime as scholars like Lankov expect. Information is already easier to access through China and black markets than before. People who are taught from birth that the Kim family is great and that they are supposed to revere and serve the family may never change how they think and may not accept the truth, or may choose to ignore the truth for their own benefit. The DPRK is in a situation that it cannot give up on nuclear weapons because they seem to be the last resort for the Kim regime. Thus, rather than coercing them to denuclearise completely, encouraging the North to play a role in the international society is a more practical approach in order to improve the Human Rights conditions in North Korea. As a leader eager to revive the economy, Kim Jong-un is more favourable to a market economy system than his predecessors.⁴⁰ The more North Korea gets involved in the market economy,

39. Baek, Jieun. 2016. *North Korea’s Hidden Revolution: How the Information Underground is Transforming a Closed Society*. London: Yale University Press. 88-89.

40. Lim, Eul-chul. 2017. “The situation and prospect of the market economy in North Korea after Kim Jong-un’s rule (김정은 집권 이후 시장경제 변화 실태와 전망).”

the more it will need to initiate trading with other countries for better profits; the more it is engaged with other countries, the harder it is to act aggressively and arbitrarily, even including Human Rights violations.

V. Conclusion

Even though South and North Korea have agreed on a truce, psychological warfare between the two Koreas has been continuing for decades.⁴¹ The Human Rights groups, operated by defectors, claim that they send balloon leaflets and goods in order to reveal the truth and free North Koreans eventually.⁴² Nowadays, scholars assume that since the mid-1990s, there have been more possibilities to access information in North Korea thanks to the growth of the black market, or *jangmadang*. The inter-Korean summit talks in 2000 also aided in opening up the DPRK to outside, accordingly leading to a greater information influx than before.⁴³ Yet North Korea is still a country where people's basic rights are ruthlessly infringed. The UN Human Rights Council reported in 2014 that the DPRK has "an absolute monopoly over information and total control of organized social life".⁴⁴

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- 시선집중 GSJ 244: 2; Bae and Moon. "South Korea's Engagement Policy." 15-38.
41. Jung, Jin-Heon. 2014. "Ballooning Evangelism: Psychological Warfare and Christianity in the Divided Korea." MMG Working Paper 14(7): 13-15.
42. Kim. "The controversy surrounding the anti-North Korean leaflet: Human Rights versus Safety (대북전단을 둘러싼 '인권 대 안전'의 논란)." <https://www.bbc.com/korean/news-53103488>.
43. Park, Dae-gwang and Jin-moo Kim. 2012. "A Research on the Ways to Facilitate the Inflow of Free-world's Ideological Tide into North Korea." JDPS 28(1): 161-188.
44. Refer to the "Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." https://seoul.ohchr.org/EN/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/EN/Documents/Commission%20of%20Inquiry/COI_FULL.doc&action=default.

Moreover, Kim Jong-un has more recently announced a harsher punishment for those who seek foreign influence, including wearing jeans or watching foreign dramas.⁴⁵ In this context, the defectors’ desperation to free North Koreans can be understood.

As a separate matter from the effectiveness of the method, the law to penalise balloon launching should not be accepted. Stopping civilians from sending propaganda materials cannot bring about amicable relations between the two Koreas. History shows that the Kim regime can and will come up with other reasons to disrupt peace. In addition, the South Korean government’s claim to protect the right to life at the cost of the freedom of expression cannot be justified; those civil rights are entirely separate matters in the case of balloon leaflet drops. Furthermore, the government’s approach to find the basis of the ban in the Panmunjeom Declaration is unacceptable because it has not been ratified by the National Assembly. Finally, the leadership of the South should have taken more time and caution to examine this issue and go through more thorough debates in public before imposing direct limitations on its citizens’ basic human rights. As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, Park Sang-hak is the first known violator of the law. How severely he will be punished for breaking the Amendments of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, if at all, is not yet known. What is clear, however, is that this law will not lead to a long-term peace, while it only puts South Korean democracy at risk. It is the responsibility of the government to make effective policies to protect the residents near DMZ as well as reconsidering the ban that restricts the freedom of South Koreans.

45. Bicker, Laura. 2021. “Why Kim Jong-un is waging war on slang, jeans and foreign films,” BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57225936> (accessed June 15, 2021).

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Abstracts of Essays

Denuclearization/Peace Negotiation in Jeopardy

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After the breakdown of the Hanoi summit between Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim Jung-En, the denuclearization and peace negotiations stand at a crossroads. Several factors contributed to the failure; over-reliance on a top-down approach, North Korea's sense of triumphalism and counteroffensive from Washington's foreign policy establishment.

Now, North Korea may consider a 'new path'. In the meantime, situation would deteriorate through tit for tat between Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea may resort to provocation. Then, we would face a catastrophic situation.

What is to be done? The most important thing is to prevent situation from worsening and focus on the restoration of negotiations. For that to happen, South Korea, North Korea and the US must all be cautious and see what policy adjustments they need to make. That said, what Seoul should do is; first, coordinating with Washington more closely, second, talking Pyongyang into acting prudently, third, asking Washington for restraint and flexibility, fourth, working with Washington and Pyongyang to bring their talks back on track, fifth, encouraging Mr. Trump's continued attention on the denuclearization issue.

The current situation requires both Koreas and the US to reconsider their approaches. The only way to revive negotiations and prevent a catastrophe is to think realistically and exercise prudence. Every party owes their due efforts.

Causes and Resolution of Conflict between Korea and Japan

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Both South Korea and Japan are at a crossroads between the collapse and recovery of a relationship. As Japan filed a 'Forced Labor' case under the International Court of Justice,

an action that implies a chance of hostile economic relationships, South Korea is now forced to choose its stance. Unlike the previous South Korea-Japan relations, Japan changed its position by becoming the 'first to provoke.' Japan comprehends the Supreme Court's ruling on the 'Forced Labor' case as a landmark decision that turns over the fundamental premise of the 'Treaty of 1965.' Therefore, Japan argues the responsibility is now mainly on the South Korean government.

As distrust between the two countries has accumulated, an emotional dispute is now somewhat inevitable. To make matters worse, Japanese companies' unwillingness to compensate the 'victims of forced labor' seems to aggravate the tension between the two countries.

Since both sides are aware there's no winner in such mud wrestling, a compromise to reach an agreement seems unavoidable. In a situation where the conflict is at its peak, it is highly recommended for both countries to make a prompt decision for consensus instead of ending up with reluctant compromise.

After ISIS: Retrospect and Prospect

In Nam-sik

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Current situations in and around Levantine area regarding demise of ISIS does not necessarily mean official end of violent extreme movement based on religious fundamentalism. It would be predictable the next stage of violent extremism will emerge in the aftermath of defeating the ISIS. In this regard, it looks much more difficult to be tackled by the international community due to the lack of motivation to stand together.

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Prospects for US–Russian Relations After Helsinki Summit

Eom Gu-ho

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Some experts are worried about the recent relationship between US and Russia as new Cold War, but the international context and character of the current US-Russia relationship is completely different from the Cold War era. Nevertheless, US-Russia relations seem to be inevitable for a considerable period of time as much as during the Cold War. The root cause is that the national and international identities of the two countries are based on incompatible value systems embodied in the competitive forms of exceptionism and universalism.

Considering Trump's domestic policy ability, the degree of conflict between US foreign policy under the new administration of the United States, and the degree of sanctions (persistence or mitigation), the four scenarios are possible. Considering that foreign policy conflicts between two countries are unlikely to be lowered, sanctions are likely to continue, and Trump is likely to be re-elected, the scenario of maintaining the current situation of managing escalation of conflicts is realistic to be.

With the breakdown of the INF Agreement and the uncertainty of the New START extension in 2012, the threat to strategic stability between the two countries is likely to increase significantly. The conditions for improving bilateral relations can be considered as follows. First, nuclear equality for strategic stability between two countries should not be undermined. Second, the spread of MD in Europe is refrained. Third, compromise of Russian concessions and mitigation measures of US sanction against Russia in the eastern Ukraine issue should be made. Fourth, a joint response to international terrorism must be restored. Fifth, the United States does not unduly deteriorate relations with China and Iran. Finally, it provides a mechanism for cooperation in which Russia can cooperate with the United States as a key stakeholder of the region in the North Korean nuclear issue, which is easy to embrace. However, as long as both countries believe that time is on their side, it is unlikely that this condition will be established.

The Future of the U.S.–China Relations and South Korea’s Choice

Lee Seong-hyon

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As of June 2019, this article diagnoses the nature of the U.S.-China trade war not as a trade dispute but as part of a larger “power competition” for the future global leadership. It advances the following arguments. First, the U.S. and China have already entered the early stage of the ‘Thucydides Trap.’ Second, it will be a long-term process, taking one generation. The trajectory of U.S.-China relations will include momentary compromises and deteriorations, temporary agreements and then again deteriorations. It will repeat this process several times. Overall, the relationship trend will look like a “downward equalization parabola.” Third, negotiations between the U.S. and China are not a search for a solution, but can be seen as a process of divorce. Fourth, unlike some common anticipation, China will not surrender. China sees the current state in history as a “period of strategic opportunity” to leapfrog China’s development to outstrip the United States. Although it may suffer in the short term, but it believes that time is on its side in the long term. Fifth, South Korea will be among the countries that will suffer the most. Historically, the security of the Korean Peninsula has been most vulnerable during the process of “power transition” in neighboring powers due to its strategic location in regional geopolitics. For the Korean society, the issue of ‘Korea’s choice between the U.S. and China’ can emerge as the most polarizing discourse in the future.

Forty Years of Sino–Japanese Relationship and Its Future

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Forty years have passed since China and Japan normalized their relations in 1972 and signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978. The two nations’ relations of this period can be divided into two. During the Cold War the relationship can be defined as “stability and improvement”. And after the end of the Cold War it can be defined as “instability and exploration”. This is because during the Cold War there was a common enemy of the Soviet Union, but after the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union disappeared and while China is rising, Japan is pursuing new national identity.

In the meantime, due to the disputes over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands which took place since 2010, the Sino-Japanese relationship has deteriorated to the worst level since 1972, when the two countries normalized their relations. However, two nations' relations are improving to a limited extent since Japanese Prime Minister Abe paid an official visit to China in October 2018. Although two nations' relationship is improving a little recently, it does not appear to be elevated to a honeymoon stage. This is because there is structural issues such as Sino-Japanese historical rivalry and US-Japanese alliance. Therefore, in the near future the relationship will alternate between confrontation and cooperation within a certain limit and probably more confrontation will appear.

The North Korean Defectors Problems and Major States' Interest

Ahn Chan-il

President, The World Institute for North Korea Studies

After the summit of 4.27 Panmunjom last year, the two Koreas summit was held twice and the summit between North Korea and America was held twice, but the peace mood on the Korean peninsula is not stable.

Sometimes there is an ominous news from North Korea of the denuclearization is sluggish.

In the early 1990s, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries, the capitalist economic system was spreading. The distribution of food and necessities stopped due to domestic and foreign situations in North Korea based on the socialist economic system.

The North Korean economy was in trouble because of the inability to supply food and necessities. The economic crisis in North Korea spread quickly throughout North Korea.

Since then, mass defectors have become diverse and complicated, especially by planning, asylum and brokers. Over 60,000 to 200,000 defectors from China and Southeast Asia are potential candidates for entry, and their entry is an important diplomatic issue.

Although the number of North Korean refugees is steadily increasing, the number of North Korean refugees has almost halved since 2009 because Kim Jong Eun has been controlling the North Korean defectors, strengthening the Chinese border, and cracking down on brokers.

The Origin and Future of Venezuelan Presidential Game

Son Hye-hyun

Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy

In Venezuela, Maduro who take de facto control and Guaido who is supported by the international community are playing the presidential game arguing that they are the legitimate presidents of Venezuela. The world is divided over who it recognises as the country's president. The current political turmoil in Venezuela have began in 1998 with the formation of pro-Chavez and anti-Chavez confrontation, which was formed since Hugo Chavez took office. Chavez's successor, Maduro, has been under constant pressure from the opposition from the beginning of its term in office due to the lack of legitimacy of the election. But he could remain in power backed by the military and poor. However, with the recent economic collapse, massive immigration, and the distortion of the democratic system, as the venezuelan crisis has spread throughout Latin America, Latin American right-wing governments and the international community are strongly pressing on Maduro's resignation. At the beginning, there was a great expectation that Guaido would enable regime change. However, he has yet to make visible result and it make him nervous. The future of Venezuela depends on the interests of various actors such as the military, the poor, the US, China, Russia and the Lima group. Peaceful settlement through dialogue and negotiation is most desirable, but as Maduro will not give up his will to power and as the US diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions will make Manduro more dependent on China and Russia, the Venezuelan crisis could be extended to geopolitical conflicts. Therefore, the venezuelan issue should be solved peacefully by the venezuelans without external intervention and the international community should help them to come to the negotiating table.

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Outlook for North Korean Denuclearization Negotiations and Desirable South Korean Policies

Song Jong-hwan

Ambassador (Retired) / Chair Professor, Department of International Relations,
Kyungnam University

While the trade war between China and U. S. continues, the Indo-Pacific Strategy centered the U. S., Japan, India and Australia is countering China's military expansion in the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile talks have commenced between the U. S. and North Korea for North Korean denuclearization and dialogue has begun between North and South Korea for improving the relationship between the Koreas since 2018, but no real progress has been made.

Since 1992, through negotiations with South Korea, the IAEA, the U. S., and participating countries of the Six Party Talks, North Korea has agreed a total of seven times to denuclearize. Each time, North Korea subsequently refused to perform the agreed upon steps to denuclearize and have succeeded only in buying themselves time to weaponize their nuclear capabilities.

In talks that began in 2018 with the U. S. and South Korea, North Korea again agreed to denuclearize, but afterwards North Korea revealed that it has no true intention to denuclearize, by refusing to report its nuclear materials and facilities and demanding U. S. concession. Therefore, it is unlikely that any kind of talks with North Korea will be successful in denuclearizing North Korea.

Strong negotiations, military and diplomatic policies, and other multi-pronged efforts to secure the denuclearization of North Korea should be adopted. If those efforts ultimately failed, last resort measures to democratize North Korea by collapsing North Korea's Single Supreme Leader regime should be considered, in order to ensure the survival of South Korea and South Korean democracy and to achieve peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Geopolitical Implication of South Korea–Japan Conflict in An Era of US–China Competition

Park Cheol-hee

Professor, Seoul National University

Fault line of geopolitical competition between US and China is shifting eventually to North, starting from South China Sea, East China Sea and to the Korean Peninsula. Chinese attempts to influence the Korean affairs have been visualized when it pressured South Korea to step back from THAAD deployment and when it intervened North Korean denuclearization based upon its strategic interest. Under this situation, deepening conflict between Korea and Japan symbolizes internal division within the US alliance network. Non-strategic conflict between Korea and Japan does not serve the interests of both countries. Neither does it serve that of the US. It gives benefits to the third parties like China and North Korea. Therefore, the fault line of geopolitical conflict in Northeast Asia should be drawn not at the southern but at the northern end of the Korean peninsula.

The 30th Years Anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall – Its Implication and Lessons to the Korean Peninsula –

Sohn Seon-hong

Former Consul General in Hamburg, Germany

The year 2019 celebrates the thirty years anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Berlin Wall was a 167.8km long concrete wall surrounding West Berlin, located in the center of East Germany.

After the Second World War, Berlin, located in the Soviet occupation area, was divided into West Berlin, controlled by Western Allies and East Berlin, controlled by the Soviet Union. To control the whole of Berlin, the Soviet Union staged Berlin Crisis twice, Berlin Blockade in 1948 and an Ultimatum in 1958. But the Soviet Union's attempts were turned down by the strong opposition of the Western Allies and West Germany.

At the time the East German regime was facing a serious problem of its people fleeing to West Berlin. To prevent East Germans from fleeing to the West, the East German regime began to build a concrete wall surrounding West Berlin.

The Berlin Wall suddenly became the symbol of Germany's division. Germany's problem could be only solved once the wall has been removed. But there was no possibility of the collapse of Berlin Wall owing to East Germany's stiff opposition.

But on 9th November 1989, the Berlin Wall suddenly collapsed. It was a result of peaceful revolution, triggered by escape and demonstration of East German peoples. Taking advantage of the collapse of Berlin Wall, West Germany achieved unification. The fall of the Wall and German unification provides much implication and lessons to the Korean Peninsula.

Lessons of the Development Aid History and Burdens of Korea

Cho Won-ho

Former Ambassador to Gabon, Former Vice President of KOICA

International development aid is a product of World War II which brought about the disruption of world economy. Success of the Marshall Plan witnessed the necessity of foreign aid. President Truman's Point Four inaugurated the development aid history. Since then development discourses have evolved through several distinctive phases. More than four trillion dollars were provided. A numerous development policies were recommended. A numerous theories and models were introduced. But foreign aid is criticized for its ineffectiveness. The politics and models have proved to be inappropriate. The theoretical rationale has proved to be unrealistic. Development pessimism prevailed. Aid critics insist that aid does more harm than good. The argument that there are negative returns to aid is gaining weight. At the beginning of the aid history, Korea was an aid recipient. Now Korea is a member of the OECD/DAC. Korea has endogenously developed assets which are differentiated from other donor countries. International development community wants to share the assets.

Russia's Rising and Returning to Africa

Song Geum-young

Former Ambassador to Tanzania

On 23-24 October 2019, the Russian city of Sochi will host the first ever Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum, which means Russia's returning and pivoting to Africa since 30 years post-cold war.

There are several reasons for Russia returning to Africa. First of all, Russian President V. Putin wants his country to play a leading role in Africa as a major international power. President Putin had been working after the fall of the USSR to rebuild relations with Africa with the goals of creating an anti-western bloc and a multipolar world. In addition, the economic sanctions imposed by the West following the 2014 annexation of the Crimea have pushed Russia to seek new geopolitical friends and take an interest in Africa.

Secondly, Russia has focused on forging strong military ties with Africa, enhancing arms sales, military training program. According SIPRI, from 2013 to 2017 Russia is leading suppliers of arms(39%), ahead of China(17%), the United States(11%). Arms sales, security cooperation are significant instruments which Russia relies to strengthen its influence.

Thirdly, Russia wants to strengthen economic cooperation and explore trade and investment across Africa. Russia's trade with Africa increased from \$5.7billion 2009 to \$17.4billion 2017, and the accumulated Russian investment in Africa from 2003 to 2017 amounted \$17billion. Russia has been aggressively promoting nuclear technology, mining, oil and gas investments.

Many African governments are looking to diversify their partners and have been interested in Russia's returning. Last December, the U.S. announced a new African strategy to compete with Russia, warning that the increased Russia's influence poses a significant threat to its national security interests and undermines peace and security in Africa.

Russia is expected to continue to re-establish old soviet ties and buy influence in Africa, which can lead to fostering perpetual disputes in Africa and escalating competition between Russia, China, Western countries. Russia's returning to Africa suggests that Africa will be increasingly be a place where international rivalries play out.

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The ROK's in-between 'Middle State' Identity and Diplomatic Principles in the Era of the US-China Competition

Jun Bong-geun

Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA)

Korea is a 'middle state' situated and squeezed between the US-China strategic competition. Korea as a middle state could be a pivot state receiving love-calls from both sides and a bridging state connecting both sides. Or Korea could be a shatter zone state, squeezed and destabilized between great powers, as it had suffered historically. Korea's diplomatic decisions today is such a critical issue for all of us as its rise or failure in the future totally lies on such decisions. The US-China strategic competition is one of the biggest foreign policy threats to Korea just like many other like-situated middle states. To effectively deal with the US-China competition, Korean diplomacy should define its national vision and national interests based on its geopolitical identity. Only then unified integration of national power and strategic diplomacy will be possible.

This paper proposes 4 possible Korean identities as follows: a divided state with vulnerable national security due to the division, a geopolitical middle state surrounded and squeezed among both great power competition, and land and sea powers, a middle power state supporting rules-based international order, a trading state with a high foreign economic dependency. This report proposes 'a global peace bridge state' as Korea's national vision in the US-China competition era. Also five diplomatic principles that Korea should follow in the US-China competition era were also proposed: principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, peace coexistence, regionalism and international cooperation, multilateralism and rules-based international order, and national unity. Such principles replace such traditional diplomatic principles as the absolute coincidence of Korea-US alliance, wait and see, reactive adaptation that the Korean diplomacy followed throughout the US-led Cold War and post-Cold War era. These principles proposed here for era of the US-China competition should become Korea's general diplomacy principles that Korea should adopt in order to perform a strategic and autonomous diplomacy.

China's Internal and External Challenges and Xi Jinping's Leadership

Shin Sang-jin

Professor, Kwangwoon University

Xi Jinping tries to succeed in realizing the task of “the great revival of the Chinese people,” seeking support from the Chinese people and making his name in the history of the Communist Party. But can Xi Jinping overcome internal economic and social contradictions and U.S. protectionist policies to promote China's economic development and social stability? Can the national governance system be modernized and promote the national power while maintaining political and social stability? Furthermore, can China establish “new type of international relations” that will continue to guarantee favorable conditions for the revival of the Chinese people? As Xi Jinping himself declares, China is in a ‘time of great changes that did not exist for a hundred years’, so it is highly difficult to guarantee whether Xi Jinping could be recorded as a leader who has successfully responded to severe challenges and threats and received historical evaluations such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.

According to these problem consciousness, this paper discusses the internal political and economic problems and challenges and the external threats that Xi Jinping will face in the future, and prospects whether Xi Jinping overcomes these challenges and governs China successfully or not.

Japan's Foreign Policy and Korea–Japan Relations

Jin Chang-soo

Director of Center for Japan Studies, The Sejong Institute

As the confrontation between Korea and Japan has deepened in 2019, both countries are fallen into a vicious cycle of nationalism and populism. As a result, Korea and Japan tend to flow into the frame of “pro-Japanese vs. anti-Japanese”. In this circumstance, it seems that it is patriotic to blame the other side rather than discussing the national interests seriously in both Korea and Japan. Promoting conflict between Korea and Japan with patriotism makes patriotism aggravates to manage the relations of both countries.

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With no interest, strategy and active role of the U.S. to improve Korea-Japan relations, the situation in Korea-Japan relations will be difficult next year. South Korea is likely to adhere to the principle of Korea-Japan relations, as general elections are scheduled for April next year. In addition, Japan's Abe Cabinet has no political incentives to improve Korea-Japan relations. As a result, it is not easy to prepare a turning point for improving relations between Korea and Japan next year. Thus, it is desirable for the two countries to manage the relationship between Korea and Japan in order not to deteriorate. For this, the government should postpone an action of encashment concerning the Forced Labor Issue, and should create a situation to come up with solutions for the problem of Forced Labor through a consultation with Japan. If these compromises between Korea and Japan is not reached well, the Korea-Japan relations could confront the worst situation next year.

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The Confrontation between the US and Iran in 2020

In Nam-sik

Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy

Renewed US sanction on Iran deepened Iran's economic woes, and caused a shortage of basic necessities and power shortage, stroking anti-government sentiment among the low-income Iranians who have traditionally supported Iranian revolutionary regime. As the current situation could threaten the regime's survival, it is forecast that the supreme leader will not completely shut the door of renegotiating with the US even if he chooses to take a tougher stance and pursue maximum resistance. Iran could choose to engage in a new negotiation linked to the results of the US presidential election and its own presidential election in 2021. So given the recent political developments on both sides, the current tensions between the US and Iran are expected to persist until the end of this year or the first half of 2021.

COVID-19 and China's Political System Crisis

Lee Ki-hyun

Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

COVID-19 has been spreading not only in China but also worldwide. In the process, China showed a changed status. China's growth in national power has made China's crisis a global crisis, and has influenced the behavior of neighboring countries and the international community to deal with this problem. The spread of COVID-19 stems from the problem of Chinese bureaucracy. This is because the early response failed due to the concealment of bureaucrats against the emergence of new viruses. Accordingly, the CCP and Xi Jinping's responsibility for the spread of the virus have been brought up. Especially, the Western media has suggested this criticism will affect the stability of the political system in China. However, the epidemic crisis will not be easy to shake the legitimacy of the Xi Jinping regime and the CCP dictatorship. The CCP has developed a variety of crisis management capabilities through several public crises similar to this crisis, and the Chinese public also has some consensus on the need for the CCP.

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Abstracts of Essays

North Korea's Short-range Projectiles and National Security

Cho Seong-ryoul

Advisory Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Strategy

After the no-deal at the U.S.-DPRK summit in Hanoi, the North Korean armed forces have launched short-range projectiles one after another. The North's test-firing of a short-range projectiles did not violate the U.S.-DPRK summit agreement to stop testing ballistic missiles between medium-range and continents and the Sept. 19 inter-Korean Military Agreement banning hostile acts along the border. However, it is against the spirit of the Sept. 19 Military Agreement aimed at easing military tensions, and a short-range ballistic missiles clearly violated the U.N. Security Council resolution.

North Korea's four new short-range projectiles have extended their range and increased their accuracy rate by replacing aging tactical weapons with new ones. By doing so, the North is building the anti-access area denial(A2AD) capability to "stand back outside the territory" such as striking major military bases in the South, blocking the landing of allied forces and blocking the supply. It also aims to complete a conventional-nuclear combined military strategy by combining short-range projectiles with intermediate-range & intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The North Korean military recognizes that the prospects of denuclearization negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea are uncertain and that it is necessary to have 'optimum military forces' for national defense even if the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula takes place. However, the South Korean government has no choice but to regard the short-range projectiles of the North Korean military as a threat to national security as they are targeting South Korea directly. The South Korean military should maintain military readiness based on the South Korea-U.S. joint system, while managing military threats from North Korea through inter-Korean arms control. However, it should be remembered that arms control is only Plan B and military deterrence is Plan A.

Characteristics of North Korea's Changing Policy Lines in Recent Years

Hwang Il-do

Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA)

Whenever the North Korean regime announces a new strategic line, external observers tend to look at changes in Pyongyang's internal message to the North Korean people via state media, and the reshuffling of the North's leadership positions. Conventionally, the level of changes in these two dimensions was highly consistent with each other, which means when there was a serious change in messages, the scope and scale of the reshuffle were also enormous and profound. What's intriguing in the current picture is that this consistency is not valid any more, and there were no significant change in the high ranking officials even after the drastic shift of policy direction or despite Kim Jong-un's pungent criticism of the current situation in his address. His recent focus on changing internal messages instead of reshuffling senior leaders seems to give him more political options, via minimizing the influence of bureaucrats and technocrats in the decision-making process while maximizing his own influence. And it is also worth noting that First Deputy Director Kim Yo-jong of the Central Committee of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party has been increasing her influence in the North's policies. This could be an indication of Kim Jong-un's increasing distrust towards bureaucrats, thus any shake up in diplomatic ranks will likely be of less significance in the coming years.

An Analysis of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

- Is Article VI a pactum de contrahendo? -

Kim Young-won

Visiting Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT) consists of three pillars, namely non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons technology(first pillar), promotion of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy(second pillar), and the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament(third pillar).

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Despite many attempts by rogue states like North Korea to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT, a universal treaty which has now 191 parties, is considered to have achieved a relatively successful result in the field of non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As a result, the future task the NPT needs to deal with will be the achievement of the third pillar, the complete nuclear disarmament.

Against this backdrop, this paper aims to analyse the accurate meaning of the Article 6 of the NPT which stipulates the goal of the general and complete disarmament according to the general rule of interpretation of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties together with the practices of the International Court of Justice and the international organizations, especially the UN. Through this study, this paper examines the nature of the obligation under the Article 6, more specifically, whether the obligation is a ‘pactum de contrahendo (contracting parties assume legal obligations to conclude future agreements)’ or a ‘pactum de negotiando (contracting parties assume legal obligations to negotiate future agreements)’.

To conclude, based on this analysis on the nature of the obligation, this paper evaluates whether the Parties to the NPT, more specifically, the nuclear states, carried out their obligations in good faith and furthermore, studies how we achieve the goal of eventual disarmament in the future.

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Abstracts of Essays

Globalization and Deglobalization: Spread of Nationalism and Trade Protectionism, and Global Governance

Lee Sang-hwan

Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

COVID-19 has brought about the new ways of life such as deglobalization and digitalization in international society. A reverberation against globalization resulting from COVID-19 accelerates deglobalization trends in domestic and global societies, and deviations from shared values like liberal democracy result in a Neo-Cold War Order. Ideological confrontations under the Order show a market-oriented capitalism of the US versus a state-oriented capitalism of China in an economic perspective, and an American democracy versus Chinese authoritarianism in a political perspective. We are concerned about the phenomena that globalization and open societies move to deglobalization and closed societies. A valuable lesson COVID-19 taught us is that communitarian cooperation and open society guarantee optimistic futures in global order.

The 70th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the 6·25 War in Korea and the Diplomacy of the ROK

Kim Myongsob

(Professor, Yonsei University)

This article aims to retrospect the diplomacy of the Republic of Korea regarding the United States, the ally of the ROK, and the People's Republic of China, the biggest trade partner, focusing on the legacies of the 6.25 War in Korea which started on 25 June 1950 and ceased on 27 July 1953, and to prospect the two track diplomacy of the ROK to develop the present armistice regime which has been making possible a "long peace" into a more permanent peace regime.

International Relations of the Beginning, Truce and Lessons of North Korea's Invasion War on June 25, 1950

Song Jong-hwan

Former Ambassador,
Chair Professor, Department of International Relations, Kyungnam University

The War on the Korean Peninsula was started through North Korea's surprise invasion of South Korea at 4:00 a. m. on June 25, 1950 in a scenario starring Joseph Stalin as director, Kim Il Sung as lead actor, and Mao Zedong as supporting actor. However, that historical fact has been muddled by the political climate and relationship between North and South Korea especially since 2018.

On the 70th anniversary of that War, the author synthesizes: (1) his prior academic papers analyzing Russian documents relating to North Korea's invasion of South Korea which were made public since 1992 by the Russian Government; (2) a Chinese scholar's research paper concerning the Chinese participation in North Korea's invasion of South Korea, based on Chinese records; and expounds upon the international relations during the initiation, Chinese participation and truce of that War.

Although it has been 67 years since cease fire was declared, war between the two Koreas still continues. South Korea, which was the biggest victim of North Korea's invasion, is having difficulty discerning ally versus enemy due to changes in its political climate. In this plight, the author discusses the lessons that were taught by the War which was initiated by North Korea's invasion of South Korea, and proposes methods of handling South Korea's current state of affairs.

10 Years after Arab Spring and the Schism of Middle East

Song Geum-young

Former Ambassador to Tanzania

This decade started with massive anti-government protests in the Arab world, known as the Arab Spring, which quickly spread from Tunisia in December 2010 to other countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Over the past ten years, fall of old regimes, civil wars, refugee crisis, and sectarian divisions have defined MENA.

Libya, Yemen, and Syria have plunged into civil conflicts, which show no indication of ending soon. The Syrian war created the worst refugees crises, almost 6 million Syrians fled their country since 2011.

One of the most defining events in MENA was the deepening Sunni-Shia schism. Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia turned the civil conflicts in Syria and Yemen into protracted proxy wars with no end in sight. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates cut diplomatic ties with Qatar in 2017 for its alleged close ties with Iran. In order to fight Saudi Arabia, Qatar has strengthened military cooperation with Turkey and withdrew from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 2019. The competition between Saudi Arabia and Qatar has exacerbated regional hostilities.

Since the Arab Spring there has been a continuing power vacuum in MENA, which intensified the competition for hegemony among Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran over a new regional order. The United States is attempting to scale back its involvement, Russian influence is increasing. Russia has translated its long-running military support for the Syrian regime into its newly found status as the essential external player. Turkey is supportive of Russia in Syria, however, against Russia in Libya.

The Korean government imports most of oil and gas from MENA and will need to take active part in an international cooperation to protect energy supply routes.

Prospect of the Possible Talks between the US and North Korea and Denuclearization, Based on the John Bolton's Memoir

Woo Jung-yeop

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Although John Bolton's memoir is no longer on spotlight like it had been since before its official publication, the difficulties it pointed out in the process of the denuclearization of North Korea remain unresolved. This article considers possible interpretations of the memoir and examines the prospects of the future negotiations based on these interpretations. The critical part of the analysis lies within the factuality of his story rather than his own subjective assessments of the situation. For example, the part in which North Korea demanded "all" or "partial" lift of the sanctions can suggest whether there is a possibility of a successful negotiation between the US and North Korea. Bolton argues any agreement that does not incorporate a complete denuclearization of North Korea inevitably calls for a "small deal" and this type of agreement

will not be able to force North Korea to implement the procedures agreed upon, unless there is a comprehensive agreement on the end state in which North Korea promises to give up all of its nuclear arsenal. Without Bolton having to say it again in his book, the US has been persistent about the end state or the specific definition of “denuclearization” in the negotiation process; while North Korea, on the other hand, demands a lessening of the sanctions in advance. Hence, at this point, it is extremely unlikely to observe any progress at a working level discussion. The current balance point since after the summit in Singapore has put both nations at a stalemate and unfortunately, it seems very unlikely to move anytime soon.

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Foreign Policy of the Donald Trump Administration

Kim Sung-han

Dean & Prof, GSIS/DIS of Korea University, Former Vice Minister of MOFAT

The diplomatic keynote of the Donald Trump Administration for the past four years can be defined as illiberal nationalism. Its three pillars consist of (1) America First policy; (2) weakened multilateralism; and (3) least emphasis on democratic values. President Trump made a critical shift on the premise that liberal international order had thrived on American sacrifice and it should be drastically changed. In particular, he has focused on China by declaring a trade war and attempting to decouple China from the global value chain. President Trump, however, would have drawn more support from allies and partners if he had concentrated on the exclusion of China from the ICT sector alone rather than trying to decouple China from the general trade and investment network. In addition, his indifference on multilateral cooperation has led to unilateralism and it has provoked the alienation of US allies and partners. President Trump's top-down approach to North Korea has not come up with a breakthrough for the North Korean nuclear problem due to the absence of prior working-level consultations over the roadmap and the detailed points of divergence. Regarding the alliance, President Trump thought of reducing USFK. If he was reelected, President Trump would have tried to trade denuclearization for the phase reduction of US forces, which would have led to a symbolic alliance without achieving the verified denuclearization of North Korea.

Global Hegemonic Competition and New U.S. Foreign Policy

Lee Sang-hyun

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One of the distinct trends in the recent international order is the rise of the great power politics, commonly referred to as the 'return of geopolitics.' The West was relieved at the end of the Cold War, but since then, revisionist countries such as China, Russia, and Iran

have rebelled against the U.S.-led international order. These countries have something in common that they attempt to defy the current U.S.-led international order. The rivalry between these countries and the United States is developing into a U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia hegemonic competition. Behind the return of geopolitics lies politics of identity between the great powers. ‘Identity politics’ means a dynamic that determines the degree of engagement and exclusion that exists between members of different groups. The ongoing strategic competition among the superpowers is largely based on this politics of identity. With the election of Joe Biden as the next U.S. president, the global hegemonic competition has taken on a new aspect. As the key tenets of overall foreign policy, Biden emphasizes the restoration of U.S. global leadership. This change is based on the self-reflection that U.S. leadership has weakened as the Trump administration has pushed for foreign policies that put U.S. national interests first under the banner of ‘America First.’ Recently, the U.S. policy for China, on the premise that the essence of U.S.-China relations is strategic competition, has focused on preventing China from further weakening the free and open rule-based international order. The conflict between the U.S. and China and Russia is a matter of fundamental values, suggesting that it is not of a nature that can be resolved by easy compromise. Above all, how hegemonic competition will unfold in the future depends on how quickly and firmly the U.S. global leadership will be reestablished. The U.S. strategy for dealing with the hegemonic competition among great powers is to respond by networking alliances and allies. South Korea should try to diversify its security and economic portfolio to spread the risks of competition for hegemony among great powers.

The Biden Administration’s North Korean Denuclearization Policy

Kim Jin-ha

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The Biden administration aims to renew the US-led rule-based liberal world order and restore the traditional alliance relationships of shared values and mutual trust by means of principled diplomacy. The new North Korean denuclearization policy could be formulated in line with such grand goals.

The Biden administration is likely to adopt an engagement-oriented action-for-action incremental approach that seeks North Korean denuclearization in a step-by-step manner. A series of interim agreements might be needed to reach the final agreement for complete and comprehensive North Korean denuclearization. The Iranian model (JCPOA) could be re-made

and tailored to be applied to the North Korean case.

Strategic management of economic sanctions and other pressures can be employed to induce North Korea's participation and compliance. Multilateral negotiation frameworks could be preferred, in which U.S. allies and China would actively participate for successful deals with North Korea. Protracted negotiations between working-level diplomats and experts are much expected.

Trade Policy of the Biden Administration

Choi Seok-young

Ambassador for Economy and Trade of MOFA, Senior Advisor of Lee & Ko

International trade has experienced unprecedented changes for last four years under the Presidency of Trump. Having contributed to the world economic development by promoting trade liberalization, the U.S. has taken strong protectionism and unilateral actions for the sake of the national security. To respond the U.S. actions, China and the European Union took countermeasures, leading to the paralysis of the multilateral trading system. The U.S.-China conflicts have aggravated with the technological competition and strategic competition, and the relations of the U.S. with its allies have also strained. Together with these geopolitical tensions, the technological innovation and the spread of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic have become the 'New Normal' of the international economic and trade order.

Against this backdrop, Biden Administration's trade-related policy priorities could be characterized with 4 Rs: that is, revitalize the U.S. economy, reset with allies to define common interests, reengage the WTO and rationalize export control regime:

First, it is urgent to help get the U.S. domestic policy right. For Biden Administration, it is critical to take new domestic policy initiatives arising from the recession to boost up economy, and to address pandemic and geostrategic conflict with China. Biden Administration will pursue legitimate legal defense under a system governed by the agreed upon rules, whenever the U.S. policy is subject to international challenges Second, the new administration will reset with allies to define common interests and reengage the WTO to ensure long term cooperation in areas of joint concerns about China and the WTO. It will work with allies to address Chinese unfair trade practices such as intellectual property infringements, forced technology transfer, state capitalism, industrial subsidy and state owned enterprises. Biden Administration will take principled approaches towards China, while the U.S. and China have to cooperate in the fields

of global issues that include climate change, the pandemic and WTO reform among others. Third, Biden Administration is expected to rationalize the increasingly expansive export control regime and make it more multilateral. Trump's unilateral U.S. export controls on high-technology goods and services to mitigate national security concerns have significantly increased trade coverage and triggered new channels of conflict even with allies; Lastly, Biden Administration will hold the position that the WTO should continue to provide the essential trade rule book for the U.S. and the rest of the world. To this end, the U.S. will quickly prioritize improvements to the WTO's core functions such as legislative, judiciary and executive ones. In particular, it is urgent to reestablish a working WTO dispute settlement system to replace or to modify the operation of the Appellate Body. The U.S. would also prioritize negotiations with a limited, critical mass of countries over a smaller package of essential issues such as industrial subsidies, digital trade and state-owned enterprises among others.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned trade policy priorities of the Biden Administration, both home and foreign political environments are not necessarily beneficial to carry out them. At home it is imperative to get cooperation of the Republican Senators in enacting laws and nominating senior officials. On foreign fronts, it is expected that governmental interventions throughout the world will show more protectionist trends to muddle through the economic recession and to restrict foreign investment. Moreover, trade agenda will be expanded to the trade-related areas such as environment, labor and human rights, which will lead to more protectionism rather than market opening. The reshoring of manufacturing and the U.S.-China decoupling in production, trade, investment and high technology areas will be expedited. Overall, the uncertainty of the world economic order will continue to be increased thanks to the aggravating U.S.-China conflicts in the fields of economy, trade, technology and beyond.

The Republic of Korea is forced to take strategic judgments and positioning under the conflicts between the U.S., its ally and China, its neighboring power. In the midst of the geo-political risks such as U.S.-China decoupling, Korea should take proactive actions in monitoring trade and investment policies of the big powers and consider overall risk aversion strategies. Based on free democracy and market economy system, it should pursue domestic trade policy and build up multi-layered trade agreements networks. Korea should also participate in the WTO reform discussions and consider to join or develop the regional trade architectures whatsoever in the Asia-Pacific region.

Prospects for Biden Administration's Multilateral Diplomacy

Choe Won-gi

Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy

The incoming Biden administration in the United States is expected to return to the traditional foreign policy approaches that prioritize multilateral diplomacy, democratic values and human rights, alliance relations and partnership with like-minded democracies. President Biden is likely to convene a 'global summit of democracies' in order to build a coalition against China, and Korea is surely to be invited as one of its closest allies. Korea's participation in the democratic alliance led by the United States could be a double-edged choice in the context of ongoing US-China rivalry. However, Seoul needs to make greater efforts to improve its strategic options and capabilities by taking a proactive and forward-looking stance toward the Biden administration's new multilateral initiatives.

Prospects of Pyongyang's Foreign Policy in 2021

Cha Du-hyeogn

Principal Fellow, Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Pyongyang's diplomacy has focused on three major strategies Since the establishment of the regime in 1948: ① maintaining cooperative relations with traditional socialist allies such as China and the Soviet Union, ② inducing support from third world countries centered on non-alignment movement, ③ attacking weak points of ROK-U.S. alliance and the Western bloc. Under these three strategies, North Korea has pushed foreign policies that appropriately blends isolation, deception, and 'calling my way.' While Pyongyang's foreign policy in the early and mid Kim Jong-un era, especially from 2012 to 2016, was based on this strategic direction, its efforts were focused on enhancing relations with China and Russia, establishing direct U.S.-North Korea negotiations, and expanding international base centered on EU countries.

Pyongyang's diplomatic efforts, however, were confronted with obstacles in 2017 due to the growing international backlash against the assassination of Kim Jong-nam and its nuclear/missile tests. North Korea's diplomatic standing reduced, and direct negotiations with the United States were hampered by the inauguration of the Trump administration. China and Russia also disagreed with North Korea's excessively tough foreign policy. On the contrary,

2018 was a very encouraging year for North Korea. The three summits with South Korea and the U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore provided the foundation for North Korea to break away from its image of ‘hermit kingdom’ and to be a ‘normal’ member of the international community. Based on this, it promoted the U.S.-North Korea dialogue and reinforced ties with existing allies, and secured the capacity to focus on managing traditional diplomatic footholds in various regions. But the momentum for Pyongyang’s diplomatic maneuver weakened dramatically in 2019, as the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi ended in a ‘no-deal.’ In addition, North Korea’s diplomacy has fallen into a total crisis as it faces the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

Factors that have caused North Korea’s diplomacy to be troubled, especially the sluggish U.S.-North Korea negotiations and the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis are likely to still frustrate North Korea in 2021. To overcome this, Pyongyang will first seek to strengthen triangle cooperation among North Korea, China and Russia, and there is a possibility that Kim Jong-un may visit China and Russia during the first half of 2021. In this case, however, North Korea will maintain vigilance on the risk that strengthening relations with China and Russia would lead to North Korea’s political and economic dependency. At the same time, It could target areas of power vacuum in the Middle East, such as Iran and Syria. The provocation against the U.S. is also a fully anticipated scenario, and North Korea may test-fire ICBM/SLBMs introduced at the military parade marking the 75th anniversary of Korean Worker’s Party establishment in 2020. It is also expected that Pyongyang will first try relatively comfortable provocations against the South Korea in the sense that it will sound out the U.S. response before conducting provocative acts against Washington. This policy direction was once again implied by hard-line messages toward Seoul and Washington at the 8th Korean Worker’s Party Congress.

Suga Administration’s Foreign Policy and Korea–Japan Relations

LEE Won-deog

Professor, Kookmin University

The Suga regime has the characteristics of a provisional regime established in terms of crisis management following Abe’s sudden resignation. If he wins the LDP presidential and lower house elections this year, he will become a full-fledged administration. While Abe has pursued a policy with a strong nationalistic character as an ideological politician, Suga will

pursue pragmatic and populist policies. The Suga regime is trying to strengthen the alliance with the U.S. and promote the Indo-Pacific strategy initiative by inheriting the Abe administration's global strategic diplomacy. Along with the strengthening of the alliance with the U.S., the government is pursuing foreign policies focusing on stable management with China.

On diplomacy with North Korea, Suga aims to resolve pending issues such as kidnapping, nuclear weapons and missiles and normalize relations with North Korea. Negotiations with North Korea can be resumed to create a peace mood necessary for the successful hosting of the Tokyo Olympics. The Japanese government cannot rule out the possibility of improving Korea-Japan relations if an opportunity arises. This is because improving Korea-Japan relations can be a political asset for Suga. Furthermore, with the launch of the Biden administration, the pressure on normalization of Korea-Japan relations is expected to intensify. In particular, if a clue is found to resolve the issue of conscription, it could be a great opportunity for the Japanese government to improve Korea-Japan relations.

If South Korea gives up its wisdom to preemptively resolve the issue of conscription and actively tries to negotiate with the government, it could pave the way for dramatic improvement of Korea-Japan relations and restoration of relations. If the issue of conscription is resolved, the problem of export regulation and GSOMIA is not a big problem, and the restoration of cooperation in North Korea policy could also take place. The Korea-Japan relations improvement process would be good if the Korea-China-Japan summit talks, which will be held early this year, were put into motion.

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Korea–Latin America Relations: Past, Present and the Future

Shin Soong-chull

President of Korean Council on Latin America & the Caribbean

The diplomatic history with Latin America will mark its 60th anniversary next year. Over the past 60 years, our relationship with Latin America has steadily developed through several stages. Now, as we enter into the new 60 years, we must look for ways to further develop our relationship with Latin America from a new perspective.

In this regard, the relationship between Korea and Latin America and the Caribbean over the past period was divided into three stages to examine the current status of cooperation during each period, and suggested a plan for win-win cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean which could be considered as a blue ocean and “an undervalued blue-chip stock” for us.

The Trajectory of Regional Cooperation in Latin America: Past, Present and Future

Kim You-kyoung

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Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Until now, cooperation in Latin America has experienced a lot of success and decline. However, regional organizations in Latin America have not been able to respond effectively to the recent political and social crisis. This essay examines the trajectory of regional cooperation in Latin America, focusing on changes in regionalism and regional organizations, and diagnoses the current situation. The current crisis of regional cooperation in Latin America is caused by the structural limitations of Latin American countries that are vulnerable to changes in the global market externally. Internally, it is affected by political and ideological divisions by the change of regime in the region. Accordingly, regional cooperation is repeating integration

and fragmentation, stagnation and activation. However, despite the current crisis, the efforts of regional organizations to respond to COVID-19 suggest an opportunity to explore new regional cooperation on various issues in the future.

U.S.–China Hegemonic Rivalry and Latin America

Kim Ki-hyun

Professor, Sunmoon University

The competition for hegemony between the US and China is intensifying. Based on the remarkable economic growth, China has challenged the dollar's hegemony by envisioning an economic bloc of yuan through 'One belt, One road' project. In addition, China is dreaming of becoming a 'cyber superpower' by entering the high-tech industry beyond the level of the low-cost manufacturing industry. The United States has begun to regard these Chinese attempts as security threats. Accordingly, the United States has initiated efforts to prevent allies from participating on a 'One belt, One road' project and Chinese companies from entering the 5G network construction. This pressure from the United States is making it increasingly difficult for developing countries to take double game strategy.

Latin America, which has traditionally been under the control of the United States, has not escaped from this whirlwind of competition for hegemony between the United States and China. China became the second trading partner in Latin America after the United States. The first export destinations for Brazil, Chile and Peru are already China. China is also the largest lender in Latin America. Based on this economic influence, China has requested that Latin American countries participate in the 'One belt, One road' project, and is hoping to actively enter the 5G network construction project in Latin America.

In response, the United States is putting pressure on Latin American countries not to fall into China's "loan diplomacy trap" and not to deal with Huawei. The United States is now poised to wait no longer to see China's growing influence in Latin America, which was its traditional hegemonic region. This article examines the US response strategy to China's expansion in Latin America in the context of U.S.-China hegemonic competition.

Is Brazil a Land of the Future?

Kim Chan-woo

Ambassador to the Federative Republic of Brazil

Eighty years have passed since the book, “Brazil: Land of the Future”, by Stefan Zweig was published. In his book, Zweig describes Brazil as a country of diversity and inclusion with vast land and immense resources, to which we should aspire. However, Brazil still remains a land of the future as it was in eighty years ago. The reason why Brazil has not flourished in reality is due to the “Brazil cost”, which includes the inefficient system, burdensome tax, unmanageable labor law and prevailing corruption and which has remained in Brazil for more than decades. To eliminate this cost, politics must play an active role, but this has been a very challenging task to the government under its ‘extreme’ multi-party system. The Jair Bolsonaro administration, inaugurated in January 2019, has pursued fiscal soundness in the short term and enhancement of productivity in the long run. However, this administration has faced many obstacles that could be difficult to overcome and is still far from reaching the goals. Notwithstanding this pessimistic outlook, foreign direct investment in Brazil has continuously been made over a long period of time, and this fact vindicates that businesses can still make profit despite the cost. However, what is necessary is to carefully assess the sectors and business models of which such investment is made and to make strategic approach. The commercial and economic relationship are of priority to both Korea and Brazil, and it can be enhanced by the amicable relationship between the countries. Currently, the trade agreement between Korea and Mercosur is under negotiation. If concluded successfully, this agreement will further improve the relationship between Korea and Brazil, allowing the countries to enter into a new 60-year cycle after the establishment of diplomatic relationship in 1959.

Korea–Argentina Relations: Turning Potential into Reality

Jang Myung-soo

Korean Ambassador to the Republic of Argentina

Although Korea has established its diplomatic relations with Argentina in 1962, it was not until the Korean agricultural immigration to Argentina in the mid-1960s to deepen the bilateral relations. Overcoming the difficulties in the early years of immigration, the Korean

community has settled down successfully in Argentina. The friendly and cooperative relations between Korea and Argentina were highlighted by the establishment of the “Comprehensive Partnership for the Common Prosperity toward the 21st Century”, agreed between President Roh Moo-hyun and President Nestor Kirchner in 2004. Argentina is facing economic difficulties such as volatile foreign exchange market, foreign debt, high rate of inflation and poverty. But it has also a great potential with its vast agricultural capacity, natural resources and advanced technologies. The Korea - MERCOSUR Trade Agreement, currently under negotiations, is expected to bring new opportunities in promoting trade and investment between Korea and the MERCOSUR. It is up to the entrepreneurs and governments of Korea and Argentina to seek practical ways to turn potential into reality.

Korea–Mexico Relations: Past 60 years, Coming 60 years

Suh Jeong-in

Ambassador of Republic of Korea to Mexico

Mexico is 10th most populous country(130 million) in the world and is 13th largest country by size(2 million km²). Mexico is a de facto unitary market with the USA and has a huge influence in the USA due to the presence of 38 million Mexican.

In 1905, 1,033 Koreans arrived in Mexico and two country became strategic partners after 100 years. Since next year will be the 60 year anniversary of diplomatic relations between two countries, it is high time for two country to reflect upon the past 60 years and prepare for the coming 60 years.

Korea and Mexico are co-members of OECD and G20 based on its economic size, 10th and 16th, respectively. Korea is No.4 trading partner of Mexico and Mexico is No.1 trading partner of Korea in Latin America. Direct flight between two countries, which started in 2017, first in Latin America, is a main corridor between East Asia and Latin America. Many Koreans benefitted from it in evacuating from Latin America due to Covid19 pandemic last year. In this March, federal legislature of Mexico designated May 4th as ‘Day of Korean immigrants.’ for the first time for a foreign country.

I want to put forward three main directions for the coming 60 years which are ① widening and deepening the current cooperations ② exploring new areas of cooperation in the post-Covid19 era ③ composing concentric multi-layered diplomatic networks of bilateral(central and local), subregional, regional and global levels.

In order to deepen bilateral economic cooperation, it is urgent for two countries to lay institutional foundations such as signing of Free Trade Agreement and acceding as an association member of Pacific Alliance. Health and science and technology are promising areas of new cooperation and digital technology is a key to overcome the tyranny of distance. It is very important to establish networks with local governments, since Mexico is a federal state consisting of 32 states. My embassy is preparing to publish reports on the trade and investment environments of 32 states and a book on Korean business network in Central America. US government is discussing the development program of Northern Triangle of Central America with Mexican government to deal with the root cause of migration and Korea has to probe a possibility of making trilateral framework for it on a sub-regional dimension. Furthermore, Korea's diplomacy needs to expand its horizon to regional organizations such as OAS and IDB as well as global ones like UN.

Now is time for Korea to look Latin America. We have to prepare a strategy which utilizes the strengths of Mexico and Korea-Mexico relations and overcomes the physical and psychological distances through on-line diplomacy based on transformative digital technology.

60th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between Korea and Chile, Friendly and Cooperative Relationship

Jang Keun-ho
Ambassador to Chile

Korea and Chile, having developed friendly and cooperative relations since 1962, will celebrate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relationship in 2022. Chile was the first country in Latin America in recognizing the Korean government and signing Korea's first FTA.

Chile, with its diverse climate and unique geographic features, has developed agriculture and mining as its core industries.

Korea has forged a mutually beneficial trade structure with Chile, importing agricultural products and mineral resources such as copper, and exporting automobiles, electronic products among others. The bilateral FTA, which entered into force in 2004, has played a key role in expanding bilateral trade. It is noticeable that, in recent years, Korea's investment in Chile has significantly increased in the energy sector.

Chile, being the first OECD country in South America, has actively pursued regional cooperation in the Pacific Rim by joining APEC, participating CPTPP and forming the Pacific

Alliance(PA). Chile keeps a pragmatic foreign policy that values the traditional cooperative relationship with the United States as well as promotes trade and investment with China.

The conclusion of ongoing negotiation to revise the Korea-Chile FTA and to allow Korea's joining the Pacific Alliance as an associate member is to contribute to expanding further bilateral trade and investment. In addition, It is highly expected that the two countries will level up their cooperation in the fields of hydrogen economy, astronomy, Antarctic research, climate change and other areas where Korea's technology and Chile's geo- and bio-diversity are combined.

To enhance bilateral relationship in the future, both countries should make more efforts to revitalize existing dialogues, to establish a new 1.5-track dialogue and to promote studies on each other and youth exchanges for one's better understanding of the other and identifying new areas of cooperation.

The Embassy of Korea in Chile will continue its efforts as a front-runner by closely working with various public and private entities from Korea in the Chile.

Korea and Peru, Partnership toward Co-prosperity

Jo Yung-joon

Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Peru

After going through an unprecedented political turbulence in the past three years, Peru is faced with both sanitary and economic crises coming from the COVID-19 pandemic. The current Francisco Sagasti administration is tasked with addressing these crises as well as handing over its power to the next government that will start in late July.

Peru has been not only a principal friendly state in Latin America but an exemplary cooperation partner to Korea. Both countries have been upgrading the existing cooperative ties into more dynamic and multi-dimensional cooperation partners. The recent years have witnessed vibrant cooperations between the two countries in the areas of development cooperation, infrastructure-building, public health, national defence, and e-government, amongst others. Against this backdrop, Korea and Peru are required to prepare for a new relationship seeking increased partnership toward co-prosperity in the post-COVID era.

Special Cooperative Relationship between Korea and Colombia

Choo Jong-youn

Korean Ambassador to Colombia

The bilateral relationship between Korea and Colombia is often described as a ‘blood alliance’, traditionally friendly and cooperative relations or a strategic cooperative partnership. There are many common points between Korea and Colombia. The two countries have the same size of population and both are regarded as ‘Middle Power.’ They also share the experience of colonial rules and civil war. The two Pacific countries both value the cooperation with the U.S.. There are 4 key components which underpin the friendly and cooperative relations between the two nations. These are Colombia’s participation in the Korean War, the Korea-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, summit-level exchanges which took place 6 times in the recent 10 years, and Korea’s renewed designation of Colombia as priority partner country in development assistance. Also, from the Korean perspective, we can identify 4 factors that contribute Colombia’s strategic value to Korea. First, Colombia is a reliable middle power in Latin America. Second, Colombia is the most representative liberal market economy in the region. Third, Colombia has abundant natural resources. Forth, Korea is best perceived in Colombia, comparing with other latin american countries. That is called a ‘Korean premium’. There are also some challenges to the bilateral relations. While Korea gives more emphasis on its companies’ participation in Colombia’s infrastructure projects, Colombia mainly focuses on exporting its products to Korea as well as attracting Korean investment. Moreover, the trade and investment between the two countries tend to stagnate or shrink. Colombia’s complex domestic political situation after the Peace Agreement is also to be taken note of.

Prospect of Venezuelan Crisis: Light is at the End of Dark Tunnel

Yeo Seung-chul

Chargé d’affaires to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Based on the world’s best oil reserves, Venezuela has grown into an economic powerhouse by registering the world’s highest economic growth rate for several years. However, since the late 1970s, the country started to tilt out of control, and Venezuelans, feeling skeptical about plural democracy through bipartisan politics, placed Chavez, a young military politician,

as their leader. Chavez, who took office in 1999, suffered twists and turns under the early regime, but continued to maintain a relatively stable situation until 2012 with popular support thanks to the rising international oil prices and his charismatic leadership. However, the regime of Maduro, who succeeded Chavez in 2013, is currently facing the worst economic crisis in the history of the Caribbean in Latin America. Carmelo Lauría Lesseur, who served as Venezuela's Minister of Economy, Information and Interior in the 1970s and 1980s, as the presidential secretary and as the governor of Caracas, claims that fear inspired by ignorance is a representative problem with the economic mind of Venezuelans whose strong belief in government intervention will solve many economic problems, sustaining a prevalent class concept in the process of market mechanism, and an excessive longing for the economic authority of political power. As descendants of the hero of South American independence, Simon Bolivar, it is difficult to predict whether they will see the problems pointed out by former Minister Lauria and recharge them, or whether they will continue to be trapped in a labyrinth. However, since there are always ups and downs in history, I have positive hope. Similarly, Korea-Venezuela's bilateral relations need constant attention so that they can spur vigorously again.

Korea–Bolivia Relations and the Future Challenges

Kim Hak-jae

Ambassador to Bolivia

Despite Bolivia's great potential, including its diverse culture, tourism potential, as well as abundant natural resources, little is known about the country in Korea aside from its famous Uyuni Salt Flats. This paper examines comprehensively the recent political and economic situation in Bolivia, as well as Korea-Bolivia relations in order to deepen the understanding about the country.

Bolivia has faced political turmoil since the presidential election in October 2019. The same year in November, Evo Morales unwillingly stepped down from presidency following allegations of electoral fraud. After the right-wing Jeanine Añez constitutionally took over the office, the tension between the Añez Administration and the Movement to Socialism (MAS) has escalated. However, the political situation is gradually stabilizing since the MAS reclaimed its power with Luis Arce in the 2020 presidential election.

Nevertheless, before the Arce Administration, an urgent task of economic recovery from the negative impacts of Covid-19 is awaiting. In order to tackle this problem, efforts should

be made to carry out economic restructuring, expand long-term investment in domestic projects, strengthen export competitiveness, and reduce fiscal deficit. As to foreign relations, it is expected that the current government would reinforce its ties with its leftist counterparts in the region as well as China, while keeping its distance from the US.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bolivia in April 1965, Korea has maintained a friendly relationship with the country. In particular, in the past decade, there was a sixfold increase in the number of Koreans visiting Bolivia. In this respect, for the benefit of the Korean tourists, it is necessary to conclude a Visa Waiver Agreement between the two countries. Bolivia is also one of the four of our ODA priority partner countries in Latin America. Given its abundant natural resources as well as the soaring demand in infrastructure, the potential for economic cooperation between the two countries is also high. Moreover, as Hanryu such as K-pop is highly popular in Bolivia, the cultural cooperation is expected to strengthen in the future.

Recently, the detention of ex-interim president Añez has yet again raised tensions within the country. One hopes that the Arce government would implement constructive policies for the national development in the spirit of tolerance and integration, and in turn, with the political stability in place, the ties between Korea and Bolivia would further strengthen in the future.

Perspectives of the Bilateral Relations between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Guatemala

Hong Seok-hwa

Korean Ambassador to the Republic of Guatemala

Guatemala currently faces overlapping challenges, such as a lack of medical personnel and facilities necessary to respond to COVID-19, the economic downturn, and accumulation of public complaints against the government. However, if the expansion of COVID-19 vaccinations around the world and economic revitalization, especially the US Biden government's economic stimulus measures, take effects this year, Guatemala is expected to recover significantly due to increased exports, increased raw material prices, and increased family remittances.

Guatemala serves as an experimental market for Korean SMEs including textile companies to enter Latin America and a base for bypassing the US market. As only Guatemala is currently excluded from the Korea-Central America FTA, it is necessary to actively renegotiate Guatemala in consideration of the economic status and influence of Guatemala in Central America, the

need to protect existing Korean companies, and the possibility of further entry of Korean SMEs in the region. Opportunely, President Giammattei and other key figures of Guatemala are actively seeking a FTA and economic cooperation with Korea.

COVID-19 and its resulting global economic downturn, protectionism, and disconnection of the global value chain have brought awareness to the importance of solidarity and mutual cooperation in the world. In the post-corona era, we should actively cooperate to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals of UN, such as eradicating poverty and improving malnutrition in developing countries such as Guatemala through multi-faceted healthcare cooperation. In response to Guatemala's recent interests and expectations from us, we must actively share our high quality ICT, healthcare technologies and public administration, which have proven international competitiveness, to promote national interests and dignity.

China's Policy toward the United States: In a New Era of Strategic Competition

Kang Jun-young

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Since January 2021 inauguration, the Biden administration has unmistakably pointed to China as “the sole competitor” who has the potential to continually challenge the stable and open international system by combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power, thus the “China challenge” occupying the center of U.S. foreign policy. For its part, the Xi Jinping leadership has declared not to yield to U.S. pressure and described that bilateral ties has already moved beyond the strategic competition stage and entered a new era of strategic opposition.

In particular, the Biden administration is trying to establish a confrontation between the international community and China through the sharing of U.S.-led multilateral norms, and is targeting China with such universal values as democracy, freedom, and human rights. This is because it is appropriate to form a democratic alliance while minimizing the burden on the U.S. economy.

It appears that China has taken a head-on approach against U.S. pressure. China announced it would build a dual circulation(雙循環) system that expands domestic demand and revitalizes international trade, and to build a “scientific and technological powerhouse,” while expressing

its will to establish a “digital Leninism.” China is thus active in reorganizing the international trade order and is eager to secure allies and partners in response to the “Democratic Alliance.”

South Korea, which is caught in U.S.-China competition, expects China to play a role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. But, in light of the fact that North Korea-China ties are closer than the ROK-U.S. alliance, a “coordinated disturbance” with the U.S. may occur. A hasty adjustment of the ROK-U.S. alliance or an indiscreet cooperation with China over the North Korean nuclear issue is harmful to the ROK-U.S. alliance and could lower the ROK’s strategic position. A well-tailored set of strategies based on national interests and principles is called for.

Inauguration of the Biden Administration and US–Russian Relations

Ko Jae-nam

President of Korea Eurasian Policy Institute

The U.S.-Russian relations, which are in the worst situation during the post-Cold War period, are expected to worsen as the Biden administration was launched on January 20th this year. The recognition and evaluation of Putin and Putin’s domestic and foreign policies by the Biden administration’s high-ranking officials, including Biden, the Congress and mainstream media are extremely negative. In addition, the expansion of the free trade order, the value extension of free democracy, and the reinforcement of the global alliance system, which are the core foreign and security policies of the Biden administration, will also act as factors of conflict between the two countries. Therefore, there is very little hope for improvement in bilateral relations.

The US-Russian relationship is a factor that has a profound influence on the global situation and the situation on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the trilateral relationship between the United States, China, and Russia. In particular, putting the value of liberal democracy first and the strengthening of the alliance system pursued by the Biden administration will act as a factor that will further worsen the US-Russian/US-China relations in the future, which will limit Korea’s cooperative diplomacy with Russia and China.

Therefore, based on the belief that the relationship between the US-Russia under Biden’s administration is the accumulation of bilateral relations over the past 30 years, this paper first look at the mutual perceptions of the citizens of the two countries, the process of intensifying conflicts between the two countries during the post-Cold War Period, and major factors in order to lay the foundation for prospecting future bilateral relations.

U.S.– E.U. Relations at the Beginning of the Biden Administration

Yoon Sung-won

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The EU's relationship with the US is very special. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were introduced in order to contain the expansion of the Soviet and Communists' influence in many parts of Europe. Through the Marshall Plan, European Payments Union was implemented. The EPU brought about rapid economic recovery of European countries by not only solving their 'dollar gap' but also facilitating their intra-Europe trade. It played a crucial role in establishing the European Economic Community in the end as well. As such, the EU-US relationship started right from the beginning of the European integration. Their 'special' relationship is characterized by the high degree of interdependence in their trade volume. When the two parties accelerated their free trade negotiations (so-called 'TTIP'), however, the US leadership has changed. The Trump administration shattered the amicable bilateral relationship by causing various disputes with the EU. Both sides confronted each other in many different issues such as trade and WTO reform. Meanwhile, the EU developed its relationship with China, EU's 'comprehensive strategic partner'. In the 2018 summit, the EU and China's leaders agreed to cooperate for WTO reform. More recently in 2020, both sides concluded in principle their trade deal (so-called 'CAI'). To the US' concern, most of the EU Member States participated in China-driven AIIB. However, since Joe Biden took office in 2021, some changes are noticed in the EU-US relations. For instance, President Biden was invited to the European Council meeting, where the leaders of both sides reconfirm their all-time alliance. The EU may still face any conflicting situation with the new US government. Both parties, however, are expected to deal with any troubles in a more effective way than in the past.

The E.U.'s American Policy in the New Transatlantic Era

Cho Hong-sik

Professor at the Soongsil University

After a turbulent period of transatlantic relations during the Trump administration the US and Europe are enjoying a honeymoon characterized by efforts from both sides to rebuild the traditional strong alliance. Several structural transformations such as the weakening of

confidence on NATO, the Brexit, or the emergence of the Chinese global power have nevertheless taken place during this period.

The European policy towards America thus holds both the reinforcing trend of transatlantic alliance as well as a search for European strategic independence. The Trump era has underlined the potential harm American domestic politics can bring onto the security alliance and has exacerbated the conflict of economic interests between America and Europe. On the other hand the Chinese ascent is a factor of reinforcement for transatlantic alliance.

Facing these contrasting challenges the US and the EU will be tempted to bring forward the alliance of democracies as a political and cultural association of nations not only for America and Europe but also for countries such as India Australia Japan and South Korea. That alliance would be a way to engage Europe into an anti-Chinese front from the American perspective and to strengthen European solidarity from inside. For Britain the alliance should provide an astute solution to the isolation resulting from the Brexit.

The Act on Consular Assistance and the Protection of Overseas Korean Nationals

Lee Whie-jin
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The Act on Consular Assistance came into effect on January 16, 2021 to provide more practical and comprehensive consular services to overseas Korean nationals. It is significant that the consular assistance is to be provided based upon the law in a systematic manner, away from the formerly implemented ‘consular affairs guideline’. The government has the responsibility of drawing up and implementing the necessary policy in accordance with the law to protect the life and property of overseas nationals from possible incidents and dangers.

It is suggested that the government focuses upon possible preventive measures concerning the protection of nationals, and strives to obtain accurate information on nationals residing or sojourning temporarily overseas. The cooperative working framework among all concerned government agencies needs to be established.

A Study on the Soviet Union's Participation Patterns in the Middle East War

Chung Kee-jong

Former Ambassador to Qatar

During the Cold War after World War II, the Soviet Union intervened in several Middle Eastern wars. Soviet troops supported Egyptian transportation to Yemen and sent MIG pilots and SAM air defense units to Egypt to fight Israel. Shortly after Iraq's socialist coup, Soviet military demonstrations near the Turkish border supported the coup's success, resulting in the collapse of the U.S. Northern Tier. Soviet participation was carried out privately and indirectly at a carefully selected time and remained secret for a long time. The aim was to undermine the Western solidarity by using pro-Soviet Arab countries, and to acquire the traditional southward policy of the sea and unfrozen ports. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has been engaged in the Syrian civil war more active. (Key Words: Middle East War, Yemen Civil War, Suez War, Six Day War, War of Attrition, October War, Baghdad Pact, Syrian Civil War)

Is China's Authoritarian Rule Sustainable?

Yeon Sang-mo

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Xi Jinping, who became the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, is returning to the extreme authoritarian rule of Mao Zedong era. He is strengthening one-party rule of the Communist Party centered on himself domestically and is conducting assertive diplomacy externally. Currently the problems of China's authoritarian rule are as follows: Firstly, Xi's dictatorship is strengthening and political power is being centralized around him. Secondly, sons and daughters of Communist Party's high-ranking officials became privileged class, which is directly related to corruption problem. Thirdly, China's intellectuals are criticizing the Communist Party. Fourthly, due to ferocious opposition of the U.S. resulting from China's assertive diplomacy, China is in trouble.

There are a few reasons why it is difficult for the Communist Party to maintain the authoritarian rule: Firstly, there is citizens' discontent with authoritarian rule regarding corruption,

increasing income disparity and press control. Secondly, although only buttress for the Communist Party rule is economic progress, economic future is not bright. Thirdly, the ideology of communism is fading. However, China's Communist Party has the strong will to stick to authoritarian rule. Firstly, the Communist Party has the tradition to repress diversity of opinions since Mao Zedong. Secondly, currently the Communist Party strongly argues that intellectuals' constructive criticism in China comes from Western countries' conspiracy and a lot of citizens seem to buy this argument.

In conclusion, whether China's authoritarian rule will survive depends on delicate tension between two factors: the one is citizens' yearning for the state's stability, the other is citizens' dissatisfaction over the problems of the Communist Party's authoritarian rule which include Party's becoming privileged class and its related corruption, dictatorship and social suppression.

In Pursuit of the Enhancement of Korea–Cuba Bilateral Relations

Cho Kab-dong

Former Ambassador to Colombia

In January 1959, Fidel Castro with a banner of anti-U.S. and socialist revolution succeeded in attaining power in Cuba and opted for the relations with north Korea, and leaving the diplomatic relations with the south in inactive state. The foreign ministry of the South has had intentions to recover the old ties with Cuba through the multilateral international institutions, or the personal visits to Havana by some high ranking diplomats of Korea, but Cuba hardly showed any sign of receptiveness. Nevertheless, the officials of the Cuban government and the public in general are showing always their friendliness toward the people of South Korea.

In order to reach the rapprochement between the two countries, the economic and cultural exchanges were considered necessary and the efforts were made on the basis of non-governmental level.

A focus was made on a bid to overcome the basic problems arisen out of the national socialist economic structure of the insular nation. In 2008 Fidel Castro ceded the power to his faithful younger brother Raul Castro, who decided to introduce very cautiously private properties and small scale personal businesses. In due course of reviewing the economic adjustment, KOTRA was admitted to establish its office in Havana, but unfortunately its establishment in Cuba could be hardly esteemed as a gesture of increasing bilateral ties with Korea.

Here I was pleased to present a Korean entrepreneur called Juan Jose Kim with fluent Spanish and familiar with the Latin American temperament ever since his early boyhood. The late Fidel Castro, former President of Cuba, awarded him in person a diploma of appreciation for the valuable support to the Cuban economy, offering the timely solution with the Hyundai Mobile Diesel Electrical Plants, capable of covering almost 50% of electricity demand of the Caribbean island. The entrepreneur Kim also supported, among other areas, during seven years consecutively from the year 2006, inviting the Daejeon Opera Company to hold the Korea-Cuba Joint Opera Performances at the National Theatre in Havana.

On the other hand, the Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean with the support of the Korea Foundation participated for the first time in the Annual Book Fair of Havana in February 2014 with a Korean Stand, where I was honored to represent my country. On this occasion I was given a privilege to offer a special lecture on Korean Literature at a public hall of the fair, which was relayed to the whole nation by the Cuban National Television.

Since the Castro brothers' times are fading out and the period of Miguel Diaz-Canel is on the stage, a matured moment will be sooner or later to show up hopefully for Cuba and for Korea.

Triple Crown of My Life in Athens

Chung Hae-moon

Former Ambassador to Greece

My ambassadorial posting to Greece coincided with three monumental events with consequences for mankind's civilization as well as the relations among nations ; namely, Athen's hosting of the 28th Summer Olympics in August 2004, President Roh Moo-hyun's state visit to Greece at the beginning of September 2006 and Greece's assumption of the non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council for the terms of 2005-2006. In parallel, the campaign by Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon to seek the office of the top diplomat at the UN was in full swing. I was quite privileged to be present at the creation of history. It did represent the highlights of the Athen's sports extravaganza that the athletes both from South and North Korea marched together at the opening and closing ceremonies of the Athen's Olympics. President Roh Moo-hyun's state visit, the first ever by a sitting Korean President, to Greece, opened a new chapter in the growing partnership between the two countries. Greece's support for candidate Ban Ki-moon, meanwhile, proved instrumental in his eventual winning the appointment to the position of the UNSG. In a nutshell, I would like to hold these extraordinary experiences dear as triple crown, as is often referred to in sports achievements.

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Abstracts of Essays

Korea's Development Cooperation Policies and Achievements

Cho Yeong-moo

Director General for Development Cooperation,
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After the Korea International Cooperation Agency was established in 1991 as the primary implementing agency of grant aid, Korea has made remarkable achievements in raising the quantity and quality of its development cooperation.

Today, Korea is the 16th largest provider of official development assistance and is drawing on its own experience of transforming from a least developed country into a full-fledged donor to help developing countries with poverty reduction and sustainable development.

Yet, challenges remain for Korea. It needs to increase its contributions to a level that matches its economic power and make its development cooperation more efficient. This paper reviews the key policies and achievements of Korea's development cooperation in the last three decades and presents future policy priorities and directions for supporting the international community to accelerate the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals and elevating Korea's global status as a leading development cooperation partner.

Major Policy Issues of Development Cooperation at the OECD DAC

Ko Hyoung-kwon

Ambassador, Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Korea to the OECD

Korea officially transformed from a recipient to a donor country by joining the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The DAC carries out three major functions: collecting and analyzing the Official Development Assistance (ODA) statistics, establishing international norms on development co-operation, and sharing these norms. This paper will analyze five major policy issues which have been discussed at the DAC. Firstly, the modernization of development effectiveness, a discussion on which Korea took a leading position in 2011

at Busan. This work aims to update the principles of development effectiveness by reflecting the recent change of the environment and circumstances of development cooperation. Secondly, the implementation of DAC recommendations on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus. Thirdly, blended finance, which has been accelerated by the adaptation of the Blended Finance Principles in 2017 and Guidance in 2020. Fourthly, in order to cope with climate change, updating statistical reporting directives and ways to enlarge the role of blended finance for climate responses of developing countries. Lastly, a new recommendation for civil society to be adopted, which aims to promote civic space, support civil society, and incentivize civil-society organization (CSO) effectiveness, transparency, and accountability.

The DAC's recommendation guidance and communiqués have significantly affected the policy and institutions of Korea's development co-operation. Ten years after joining the DAC, Korea has improved its policy and system to the level of other DAC members.

Historical Achievements and Challenges of International Development Cooperation

Kwon Yul

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After World War II, international development cooperation began in earnest. The international community has tried to effectively contribute ODA to developing countries. Historically, ODA has been used as a major means of addressing the North-South problem. After the 1960s, international efforts to support underdeveloped countries began to expand under the leadership of the United Nations. In the mid-1970s, the international community shifted to a new development strategy called Basic Human-Need (BHN).

However, in the 1980s, the IMF began to expand its restructuring loans as economic instability intensified due to the global economic downturn and accumulation of foreign debt in developing countries. Since the 1990s, global interdependence has intensified due to globalization, leading to economic liberalization and rapid expansion of exchanges between countries and regions, including trade, investment and finance, leading to a new paradigm shift.

The MDGs was adopted at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit as poverty eradication emerged as the most pressing task facing the world. With the emphasis on the importance and necessity

of ODA to achieve millennium development targets for poverty reduction and developing countries in the international community, efforts were made to expand ODA volume, strengthen global partnerships with developing countries, and promote aid effectiveness.

With the fourth High Level Forum in Busan, discussions on the development effectiveness have expanded the perception that a more comprehensive approach is needed to achieve the sustainable development goals(SDGs), and the international community has established an integrated framework to cover socio-economic development and environmental issues for sustainable development.

Since the international community emphasizes balance and harmony of social development, economic development, and environmental issues for sustainable development, the target and scope of development goals are expanding and securing development resources is emerging as a key issue. The focus should be on securing whole-governmental approach for policy coherence, establishing global partnerships with various stakeholders, and enhancing development effectiveness through results based management.

The Pandemic and International Development Cooperation: A SDG-centered Holistic Approach to Global Crisis

Kim Tae-kyoon

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The unprecedented pandemic of COVID-19 hampered international development cooperation which global governance has employed as its critical backbone to be implemented in an effective fashion. Given that the global governance system backed by international organizations, particularly the United Nations, faces the big challenge of the corona pandemic, individual states begin to return to national protectionism via vaccine diplomacy and the liberal international order is placed in crisis. In response to this malfunctioned system of global governance, this article proposes an alternative strategy for not only handling the global health crisis but also enhancing the resilience of global governance through an integrative diplomacy of multilateral development cooperation and a SDG-centered holistic approach.

How will We Reshape the Governance ODA in the Era of Post-Corona?

Chang Hyun-sik

President of Family KOICA

The world is taking a huge hit in health, politics, and economy as international exchanges and supply chains are cut off due to the COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020. However, there is also a hopeful prospect that the global village that has suffered a pandemic will return to its normal state when the treatment of COVID-19 has begun with the supply of vaccines. If there is one area that is most affected by the corona virus, it can be international development cooperation. COVID-19 brings negative and positive impacts on the international development. Negatively, the donors' ODA is likely to be reduced and the existing ODA delivery method should be modified. On the positive side, it is possible to increase the local ownership by enhancing capacity building of the recipient countries. The most effective way to solve various problems in developing countries after COVID-19 is to develop their policies, systems and human resources in the public sector, including the health sector. Issues directly related to capacity building must be an improvement in the governance of the field. To this end, domestically, when establishing our policies, we need to strengthen the coordination role of the Committee of International Development Cooperation(CIDC) in each area related to COVID-19 such as education, inequality, women, and the environment, including the health field. In addition, by expanding the concept of the governance, it should be applied to all fields of the ODA. Methodologically, a more comprehensive and integrated the Whole-of-government approach is required to achieve the SDGs. In terms of international governance, through strengthening international solidarity, it will be possible to provide more vaccines to developing countries through COVAX along with the suspension of intellectual property rights in the supply of corona vaccines. Lastly, in terms of strengthening the governance of the recipient countries, it is necessary to transfer the know-how of our comparative advantage, to support the strengthening and innovation of the public administration field in developing countries.

Implementation and Effectiveness of the Saemaul Undong in Developing Countries

Chang Dong-hee

President, Saemaul Globalization Foundation

On the occasion of the UN Sustainable Development Summit held in New York in 2015, OECD recognized Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement) as most effective tool for rural development in developing countries. Gyeongbuk Province where Saemaul Undong was first launched in 1970, has been implementing a variety of Saemaul Undong cooperation works in a few Asian countries since 2005. In order to conduct more efficiently Saemaul Undong projects in developing countries, Gyeongbuk Provincial Government founded Saemaul Globalization Foundation in 2012. Saemaul Pilot Village which aims at showing off a model case of rural development is the core work of the Saemaul Globalization Project. It has as its essential elements for success voluntary participation and empowerment of villagers and increase of household incomes.

The Foundation secured sustainability of the project by implementing it in line with the policy of the recipient countries in Vietnam, Indonesia and Senegal. The Foundation witnessed a sharp increase of household incomes in Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Senegal and a strong empowerment of villagers in Rwanda. The movement to improve living environment by separating garbage in a few villages in Indonesia was highly appreciated by the local government in Indonesia and is expected to spread to other villages.

As the achievement done in a few pilot villages by the Foundation is made known, central as well as local governments in the recipient countries request the Foundation to expand the projects furthermore. Furthermore, there are increasing number of countries which ask for the Saemaul Undong assistance. High appraisal of the works of the Foundation is well manifested by the conclusion of 'Headquarters Agreement' with Senegalese Government, which granted to the Foundation's Office in Senegal the privileges and immunities equivalent to those of diplomatic missions. It is encouraging for the scholars and government officials in Sri Lanka to found Sri Lanka Association of Saemaul Study.

The assistance provided by developed countries thus far has not produced fruitful results, only to increase dependence mind-set in many developing countries, whereas the Saemaul Globalization Project is evaluated to be self-sustainable as it values the empowerment of villagers as its key element. In addition, it is cost-effective. It is only the Republic of Korea which can argue for its ownership. That is why it is necessary for the government of ROK to promote Saemaul Globalization Project as Korea's flagship ODA brand.

Good Governance and Effectiveness of ODA

Cho Won-ho

Former Ambassador to Gabon, Former Vice President of KOICA

There is a widespread perception that official development assistance (ODA) is successful only when associated with good governance in the recipient countries. But it is ethnocentric prejudice and epistemological prejudice. Good governance in development business refers not only to steering role but also to sustaining coordination between donors and recipients. It means that good governance should be associated also with donors, based on the trust, reciprocity and mutual interdependence. In this vein, donor coordination, often called harmonization, is a major theme of international development cooperation agreements of the 21st century, including the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. But empirical studies witness that donors on average have failed in meeting the coordination goals they established for themselves. In particular, their competition for export markets and political support from the recipients have undermined coordinated aid activities. One of the major characteristics of good governance is consensus-oriented. As UN and World Bank indicate, it can only result from an understanding of the historical, cultural, social contexts of the recipients. Nevertheless, donor governments and multilateral aid organizations have ignored these determinants. Specifically, the history of colonial rule, through which the recipients remain trapped in suboptimal production equilibrium and low expectations level about future perspective, is not reflected in development discourse. That is why postcolonialism poses challenge to development discourse and attempts to recover the lost history and the voices of the dominated. Effectiveness of ODA with good governance is an ideal.

The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime and International Development Cooperation

Lee Jin-young

Professor, Jeonbuk National University

International Development Cooperation (IDC) generally involves effort by the international community to solve poverty in developing countries, as well as to promote and protect basic human rights. The special situation on the Korean Peninsula, however, makes it difficult to

implement such traditional models of international development cooperation. Here the South Korean government's policy toward North Korea and the international community's sanctions against the latter need to be considered. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Korea established forms of IDC would not be applicable in the case of North Korea, the sphere of activity is limited to inter-Korean economic cooperation or to private organizations. In line with this background, this study examines the trends and characteristics of aid to North Korea by the South Korean government over the past 30 years and examines the volume, sector, and policy frameworks of aid deployed in the context of the unique relationship between the two countries. South Korea's policy toward North Korea is also considered part of its foreign policy, so it is necessary to approach both domestic and international factors simultaneously. This study tries to consider both domestic policy and international environmental changes. First, I will consider all changes in policy toward North Korea caused by changes in the government, and second, international discussions on international development cooperation. The international community continues to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea despite existing sanctions. In other words, not only the South Korean government but also the broader international community are continuously attempting to engage with North Korea in limited areas of development cooperation. Beyond this, North Korea's appeal to UN SDGs to the community with the international community suggests that may serve as a framework for expanded inter-Korean exchanges over the years to come. While given the limited areas of cooperation between the two Koreas in, human, material, and economic exchanges, however, it is difficult to predict the future, this study emphasizes the importance of UN SDGs and HDP Nexus's approach as promising areas of exploration for development cooperation with North Korea.

Cases of Korea's Grant ODA Projects

Kim In

Director of Gangwon International Development Cooperation Center &
Professor, Yonsei University

Korea's Official Development Assistance (ODA) has continued to grow quantitatively and qualitatively over the past 30 years. The 2019 ODA budget is 3.5 trillion won, and the Korean government announced the 3rd Framework Plan for International Development Cooperation (2021~2025) that plans to double the volume of the current ODA by 2030. Korea's ODA policy framework and its implementation system, which established before and after joining

OECD DAC in 2010, have secured mid-sized countries by overhauling and developing a business promotion system to come up to the international norms and standards for foreign aid. In particular, it is highly regarded by the international community for Korea's development experience in poverty reduction and economic growth. and Korea's case set a precedent in the history of development cooperation program.

The Country Partnership strategy (CPS) is a national ODA support strategy that oversees major support areas and action plans for the partner counties based on Korea's ODA strategy and development tasks. Through the consultation process with the relevant countries, it is established based on comprehensive consideration of diplomatic strategies and development needs for the countries concerned, providing the basis for promoting customized ODA for each partner country. The implementation of such cooperation strategies by countries not only increases the consistency of policies and enforcement, but also improves the performance of the project in line with the development needs of the partner countries.

In this article, I would like to introduce KOICA's Grant Aid projects, As a good representative, these projects supported 24 priority partners countries selected through the 2nd Country Partnership Strategy by the Korean government.

The Significance of Korea's Joining CPTPP in the Midst of Rivalry between USA and China

Kim Byong-seop

Former Korean Ambassador to El Salvador

Twelve Pacific countries, including USA, concluded an ambitious trade agreement, TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) in 2015, but President Trump dropped his country out of the list right after his inauguration in early 2017. The remaining eleven members, led by Japan, reached a new agreement, CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership). Korea has only joined RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), another trade bloc of fifteen members including China & Japan, but not CPTPP. Currently, the urgent goal in Korea's trade agenda is becoming a member of CPTPP.

Koreans will face two major political events in 2022: a presidential election and a nation-wide local election. To join CPTPP, the government must overcome strong resistance from various groups of vested interests and anti-liberalization sentiments. Beyond the threshold level of just becoming a member, the government should carry out an ambitious and comprehensive

deregulation initiative.

The world is now witnessing two major streams which can affect the global value chain, especially in East Asia: cumulative rules of origin subscribed in CPTPP and RCEP; and an intensifying rivalry between USA and China on high-end technology. The rivalry started heating up early in the Trump Administration in the mid 2010s, and worsened after the inauguration of the Biden era in 2021, on the issue of semi-conductor chips and batteries, etc.

Overseas market and high-end technology are namely 'core interests', to borrow a common Chinese terminology, for Korea, who is highly dependent on foreign trade. Korea's diplomacy, taking advantage of regional trend of mega FTA, should offer extended and diverse foreign markets for local exporters. The government should also take part in the various international forums to reorganize global supply chains of strategic items. When the government is not active in the work, Korea may be left behind in the new local orders well as in the new global value chain which will be reorganized around alliances and partners.

CPTPP and RCEP are not mutually exclusive, nor are targets for a country to choose one or the other. As far as it is in the best interest of the country, the Korean government should neither hesitate to join nor avoid the agreement, even if international power politics are projected in the agreement.

An Assessment of Whether Japan's Release of Fukushima Radioactive Water into the Sea is a Violation of International Law and Viable Corresponding Measures Korea May Take

Lee Seok-woo

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On April 13, 2021, the Japanese government announced its plan to release contaminated radioactive water from the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant. In response to Japan's announcement, South Korean President Moon Jae-In ordered Korean officials to explore options to refer the case to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and make a request for provisional measure. As a result, it has become evident that Korea and Japan have entered a new phase in their history of disputes under international law. An assessment of whether Japan's decision to discharge contaminated radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean over the course of 30 years starting from October 2022 is in violation of international law and a review of responses including provisional measures of the ITLOS require a prudential

approach for the following reasons.

It should be noted, first of all, that in order for the ITLOS to decide on an order for provisional measures, an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction over the dispute must be presumed and the immediacy of the circumstances and serious damages as related to the right of Korea as a complainant must be demonstrated. In short, the situation has not ripened to proceed with the case. We cannot exclude any possibilities that a decision on provisional measures by the ITLOS would merely emphasize the aspect of international cooperation such as giving prior notification or providing information.

At the present stage, it would be appropriate to strongly demand Korea's right to participate in the investigation being conducted by various international committees and institutions for the purposes of collecting data and appropriating evidence related to the concerned discharge of radioactive water. Moreover, it would be more important to take all the necessary measures to induce Japan to cooperate at a practical level.

Meanwhile, discussion of this issue under the purview of international law implies that the appropriate consideration of international adjudication is being taken which is essential to manage stable relations between Korea and Japan.

Roads for Korea's Foreign Relations after Moon-Biden Summit

Kim Jae-bum

Vice Chairman, Korea-America Association

Through the Moon-Biden summit meeting in Washington, DC on May 21, the Republic of Korea adequately evinced the strategic balance of interest it pursues between the United States, its ally, and the People's Republic of China, its partner for strategic cooperation. Major results from the summit were diverse in a range of fields, including the complete abolishment of missile range for the ROK armed forces, pursuit of economic and technological alliance, formation of global COVID-19 vaccine partnership, promotion of peace process on the Korean Peninsula, and agreement to jointly advance to nuclear power plant markets.

As the results were products from close consultations between the two countries, intimate communication, coordination, and collaboration are also required for their fruitful implementation. On the other hand, the ROK has faced with the task of how to harmonize the results in relation to third countries. Although it is not possible to satisfy all the counterpart states, the ultimate goal for diplomacy is to build possibly optimum relationships first with the ally, next with

partners and neighbors and then hand them over to successors.

The reality is that it has not been possible for the ROK, as a divided nation surrounded by the most powerful ones, to properly project its national power in the region. Yet as it has abundant global roles to play as one of the ten major states in the world, the ROK needs to unfold strategies to exercise its influence in third regions and to lead the effects from it to spread to the Korean Peninsula and its surrounding area. To make it happen, the ROK should keep on strengthening its close cooperative ties with the member states of international organizations to which the United States is affiliated.

If the world was bifurcated into “the West versus the rest” in the post-Cold War era, it is being transformed into “China and the rest” in this post-globalization age. Under such circumstances, the answer is clear to a question in principle by which side the ROK should stand. But owing to its geopolitical particularity as a divided country located close to China, the ROK cannot but continue to take appropriate actions in compliance with concrete situations and times, which it should in turn make such circumstances understood by its friends.

Only on the basis of a stout ROK–U.S. alliance, it is possible not merely to develop its partnership for strategic cooperation with the PRC but also to create a virtuous circle for North–South dialogue and the improvement of ROK–Japan relations. Also going forward, it is hoped that the ROK government will take roads to diplomacy on which it takes balances and rhythms appropriate to the realities, while responding positively and proactively to the surrounding situations that will repeat drastic changes.

P4G Summit in Seoul and Korea’s Climate Diplomacy

Yoo Yeon-chul

Deputy Minister and Ambassador for Climate Change, MOFA
Director of 2021 P4G Summit Preparatory Office

The P4G Seoul Summit, the first multilateral summit on climate and the environment hosted by the Republic of Korea, successfully concluded on May 31 with the adoption of the Seoul Declaration. The summit brought together 67 heads of state and government and more than 200 participants from governments, international organizations, businesses, academia, civil society and the young generation. It may well be dubbed the “Green Olympics” as it provided such wide-ranging participants with an opportunity to exchange their views on the urgent global issues of climate change and the environment.

The international community appreciated that the ROK had shown its global climate leadership by hosting the P4G Seoul Summit that contributed to promoting global solidarity and cooperation for responding to climate change and environmental issues. The participating countries welcomed the ROK's initiatives for strengthened climate action such as the Korean Green New Deal policy, 2050 Carbon Neutrality goal, commitment to stop public financing for new overseas coal-fired power plants and plan to announce a further ambitious NDC target. A wide range of countries and international organizations including the U.S. and China endorsed the Seoul Declaration, which will contribute to more active and enhanced discussions on global response to climate change ahead of COP26 to be held in November this year in Glasgow, UK.

Once one of the poorest countries in the world, the ROK has transformed itself into an advanced economy, gaining the status and ability to play a bridging role between developing and developed countries in renewing the global efforts for climate change response. The ROK needs to announce its updated NDC with even greater ambition at the upcoming COP26 so as to consolidate its inclusive climate leadership in the world. The ROK will continue to actively engage in international fora such as the G7, the G20, and COP26 and take part in climate discussions to play such a bridging role.

How can We Define Bolivia? Bolivia Awaits Us.

Jung Kil-hwa

President, Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE)

Recently, there are many books by public officials residing abroad. In the case of Latin America, the works by former and current government officials such as the MOFA and KOTRA is increasing. <My Bolivia, Uyuni Bolivia>, written by Hak-jae Kim, who served as the ambassador to Bolivia, draws a more interesting attention. The author has already demonstrated his specialty in Latin America through <My Mexico, A Deep Look at Mexico>. In this book, the author said, "While I was in Mexico, the main agenda in my head was 'How can I define Mexico?'" The conclusion he reached is Mexico, where "Mixture creates novelty." It is the result of a diplomat who has been digging into Latin America. <My Bolivia, Uyuni Bolivia> is also a product of his own exploration and experience of Bolivia.

In the preface of <My Bolivia...>, the author says that this book is composed of observations, notes, and analysis with attention for the host country while living in Bolivia. It is a book

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that explores the history of Bolivia, the authentic Bolivianidad, the human figure of Bolivian people, and the connection with Korea than the most famous destination, Uyuni salt desert. The author, who defined Mexico as ‘a place where mixture creates novelty’, uses the subtitle in <My Bolivia...> as ‘a place full of unexpected surprises’. It contains a frank feeling about Bolivia.

Ambassador Kim’s quests such as ‘How can I define Bolivia? They are incessantly questioning the identity of Bolivia. This book is a kind of essays by an expert diplomat’s exploration and reflection on the host country. Bolivia’s tourism slogan is Bolivia awaits you. If the Covid-19 subsides in the near future and we can find Latin America and Bolivia, we might be able to carry a mobile phone in one hand and <My Bolivia, Uyuni Bolivia> in the other hand. I hope that one day like that will come. Bolivia awaits us.

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Special Contribution to the 30th Anniversary of Korea's UN Membership

Ban Ki-moon

Chairman of Ban Ki-moon Foundation for a Better Future,
8th Secretary-General of UN

We were able to join the United Nations with North Korea on September 18, 1991. Our joining the United Nations was, in a word, a national festival. As a Korean citizen and diplomat, I, who worked hard for the Republic of Korea to join the United Nations, felt indescribable reward and joy.

However, 30 years after joining the United Nations, it seems that the Korean people do not seem to care much about the meaning of joining the United Nations, and they do not seem to have much interest in the United Nations itself. Korea's indifference to the United Nations is undesirable in a situation in which Korea's international responsibility as a member of a de facto developed country is growing.

As we celebrate the 30th anniversary of our accession to the United Nations, it is time for us to take a leap forward in United Nations diplomacy. We need to dramatically increase our international contribution through the United Nations. One of the most necessary things for this to happen is for our government and people to realize that the Republic of Korea is at the heart of the international community, not on the periphery. With so many world powers among our neighbors, we still tend to think of ourselves as weak. It is also true that division and the threat of war are limiting our bold and active diplomatic steps. But from a global perspective, we are an undisputed economic powerhouse, and the world is waiting for our more active role.

To this end, first of all, it is necessary to significantly increase the share of support for developing countries. In particular, aid to Africa should be increased. Ethical contribution is as important as financial contribution to the international community, and its core is to proactively practice universal values of humanity. Also, what I would like to ask the Korean government is to take the lead in the humanitarian response to the climate crisis.

Let's strive to achieve the goal of aid of 0.7% of GDP as soon as possible, and take the lead in implementing the universal values of humanity. We need to pay more attention to the UN, and Korea's top talents should advance to UN organizations.

When I was Secretary-General, a lot of Koreans made their way to the UN headquarters and other UN-related organizations, but after I left, it was relatively low. The fact that many Koreans enter the UN headquarters is also a powerful way for the Republic of Korea to contribute to the universal development of mankind.

Significance of Korea's Joining the United Nations and Its Contribution as a Non-permanent Member in the Security Council

Shin Dong-ik

Former Ambassador to Austria

Year of 2021 is the 30th anniversary of the Republic of Korea's joining the United Nations (UN) in 1991 which was long-time yearning for Korea since the establishment of its legitimate government in 1948. For its 30 years' diplomacy in the UN, it is remarkable to note Korea's achievements such as Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's devoted service for 10 years, non-permanent membership in the Security Council twice for the terms of 1996-97 and 2013-14, transition from recipient to donor country in the ODA (Official Development Assistance) status, and conducting chairmanship and hosting important international conferences in various areas.

In relatively short period of time, Korea's contribution to the UN was quantitative first, but it has gradually become more qualitative in the field of peace keeping, disarmament and non-proliferation, development cooperation, climate change, health, youth, women and so on. By doing so, Korea has been recognized as one of leading countries which contribute greatly to address pending global issues.

The author had worked for the UN and multilateral diplomacy as a career diplomat in Geneva, New York and Vienna as well as at the headquarters. Based on his experience of activities in the UN, particularly in the Security Council (2013-14), Korea's contribution as a member of the Security Council and legacy left by Korean Secretary General Ban will be reviewed. In addition, mid-and long-term direction and ways to actively pursue Korea's UN and multilateral diplomacy will be presented together with challenges and limitations given to Korea after its fast development in the UN diplomacy for past 30 years.

The Establishment of International Norms and the Role of the UN as a Peace Organization

Park Heung-soon

Vice-President, UNA_ROK / Professor Emeritus, SunMoon University

The United Nations contributes to promote trust among nations, facilitating stable and predictable international relations with establishment of sustaining institutionalized multilateralism. The utility of the UN lies in conducting a wide-range of activities in order to promote ‘the maintenance of international peace and security,’ stipulated in the UN Charter. Among others, the two principal organs, the General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council (SC), play a central role in debating, making or implementing various international norms. The norms established by the two bodies provide framework, principles, or institutions of the international society necessary in realizing the goals of the UN. The existence and operation of the international norms today serves as a foundation and reflection of multilateralism and multilateral diplomacy. The multilateralism based upon universal norms, reciprocity and indivisibility indicates managing and maintaining a rule-based international order.

Both the GA and SC have a legislative function, but their authority and status are different.

The GA can only make a recommendation with no legal effects in spite of its highest authority. In contrast, the SC under the Chapter VII of the Charter can adopt resolutions with a legally-binding effect applicable to all UN member states. Noticeable is the case of ‘thematic resolutions’ which deal with various global issues concerning all the UN members, not with certain states or situations. Most of the thematic resolutions usually has been suggesting universal and general principles and criteria, and requesting the member states of implementing the obligations with domestic legislations. Some of the examples, explained in a sketch explanation, include such themes as Women, Peace and Security; Non-proliferation; Counter-terrorism; Peace Operations; International criminal justice; Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). Although they are different in the degree and level, and effectiveness, the development of international norms as such contributes to the stability and evolution of the international society. However, the UNSC in exercising its exclusive power should make efforts in avoiding the problems of either politicization among the major powers of the Council or of abusing its exclusive power, as often criticized. The enhanced legislative role of the UN in this regard has some implications upon the future of the UN, and also upon the role of Korea (ROK) and its middle power diplomacy toward the UN. Thus, the main focus of this writing as a whole will deal with the significance, establishment, and evolution of the international norms and some of the specific cases of norm development in order.

Achievements of Koreans Entering International Organizations and Future Tasks

United Nations Division,
International Organizations Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

The number of Koreans in international organizations has steadily grown ever since the ROK's admission into the United Nations back in 1991 and nowadays accounts for a significant share of Korea's contribution to the international community.

Today, 917 Koreans in international organizations play a decisive role in helping enhance Korea's global prestige with their full competence, while a few of them have even assumed the heads of the UN Secretariat, the UN General Assembly, the World Health Organization, etc.

In commemoration of the 30th anniversary of Korea's UN membership, this paper aims to evaluate Korea's enlarged presence in international organizations in terms of the number of Korean employees and explore ways to further increase Korea's human contribution to the global society.

The United Nations Command in the Republic of Korea and the Peace on the Korean Peninsula

Oh Young-dahl
Professor, Chungnam National University

The Republic of Korea (ROK) marks the thirtieth anniversary of its access to the United Nations System this year. The ROK has been maintaining a longstanding relationship with the United Nations ever since its establishment and, in particular, through the Korea War of June 1950. This article has explored the past, present and future status matters of the United Nations Command (UNC) stationed in the ROK. The debate on the status of the UNC was prompted by the recent peace mood formulated on the Korea peninsula in connection with a series of North-South Korea and the US-North Korea summit meetings. The existence of the UNC and the US-ROK alliance has to do with the ever-present North Korean military threat in the real sense of the word. North Korea continued to deceive South Korea and the United States in relations to its nuclear weapons program and long-distance missiles program

and has declared the completion of those weapons. In this context, it is imperative that the ROK should maintain the UNC as a crucial deterrence against North Korean provocation in the near future. In addition, the ROK should actively support and participate in the revitalization programme of the UNC by the US as a matter of wisdom.

How to Cope with the U.S–China Strategic Competition?

Kim Dong-won

Former Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Korea University

The world is currently in the process of transition from a strategic competition between the United States and China to a new Cold War, and the governance structure and economic landscape of world international politics are fluctuating due to technological nationalism and deglobalization. Therefore, not only the United States and China, but also Korea is facing a strategic turning point.

Strategic competition between the United States and China is pluralistic and complex of cooperation, competition, and confrontation centered on trade and technology. In this complex game, Korea is the party most likely to be devastated, and with its geopolitical location, Korea has value as an important global supply chain. The value as a supply chain is a security value and a bargaining power that can gain strategic patience from the US and China. As technological nationalistic competition and technological transformation develop, Korea is facing a strategic turning point in the global supply chain, and a response strategy at the national strategic level is needed. The minimum response principles that can be derived from the above review are as follows.

(1) Make the most of the area of cooperation and competition between the United States and China (companion area). Active participation of Korean companies in the US supply chain strengthening policy is consistent with ‘safety’ and is also appropriate for ‘regularity’ in that it can keep away from China’s pursuit.

(2) Proposals for both the United States and China to disrupt the existing balance of cooperation, competition, and confrontation and to establish an irreversible hostile relationship should be rejected.

On the other hand, the uncomfortable relationship with Japan is in line with China’s interests, so there is no need to rush to sympathize with China.

(3) In the strategic competition between the United States and China, Korea's bargaining power lies in its value in the global supply chain. Therefore, Korea is the most lethal party to technological nationalistic competition. As falling behind in technological nationalistic competition is directly linked to security failure, strong and consistent industrial support policies and corporate ecosystem innovation are needed.

20 Years after the United States' Intervention in Afghanistan and Taliban's Takeover of Afghan Government

Song Geum-young

Former Ambassador to Tanzania

On August 15, 2021, the Taliban came back to take over power in the wake of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. In 2001, the U.S. overthrew the Taliban regime to defeat al-Qaida and also sought to vanquish the Taliban. It failed in those objectives on the 20th anniversary of 9/11, although the U.S. prevented Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. The United States never succeeded in establishing democratic Afghan state and good governance or persuading Pakistan to stop its support for the Taliban.

In light of the Taliban's rapid takeover of Afghan cities this summer, the most striking American mistake is the overestimation of the capabilities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). ANDSF surrendered to Taliban offensives, refusing to fight. Without American military support, the ANDSF should have been in a position to defend major cities. Besides, Afghan leaders constantly put their corrupt self-interests ahead of the national one. The corruption and graft hollowed out ANDSF which the U.S. spent 20 years in constructing at the cost of some \$88 billion. Afghan soldiers went months without pay and without the necessary supplies to defend themselves.

Furthermore, the United States overestimated its ability to address Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. For years, U.S. sought the support of Pakistan for counterinsurgency and stability in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan has been more interested in providing arms and funds to Taliban.

In particular, Afghanistan's political leadership never cohered on how best to fight the Taliban. There were continued tensions between regional warlords and former Afghan Presidents which badly undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government. By contrast, the Taliban continued to enjoy popular support since 2001. Indeed, a major element of the Taliban's victory

was its bargaining with local militias and power brokers, promising them that the Taliban would allow them to maintain some access to local economic interests. In the end, the Taliban success owes much to Pakistan's support and the corruption of Afghan elites.

That a future Taliban government will maintain itself in power depends on how it handles armed opposition to its rule and manages the country's poor economy and international relations. It is expected the Taliban government will focus its efforts on creating a stable government and securing international cooperation, considering it badly needs domestic security and economic recovery, international aid, and financial ties to the outside world. There is likely to be intensified competition for a new regional order and leadership among Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Iran to fill power vacuum in Afghanistan which the withdrawal of U.S. forces left on August 30, 2021.

Understanding One Hundred Years of Korean Diaspora in Cuba

Byun Dae-ho

Former Ambassador to Croatia

On April 15, 1905, 1,033 Koreans (including their families) arrived in Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula after signing a four-year labor contract. They were put into the daunting task of harvesting the henequen, a type of thorny agave. Although Koreans left their homeland to escape economic difficulties, they were international labor exports disguised as legal labor migration between Mexican and Japanese companies. They were treated like slaves upon arrival in Mexico, but their diligence and hard work contributed to the improvement of henequen productivity.

In March 1921, about 300 Koreans immigrated to Cuba, believing that Cuba's economic and educational environment was much better than that of Yucatan, and that they could make a good living even if they worked in sugar cane fields. However, during this period, the Cuban economy deteriorated dramatically due to the fall in sugar cane prices, and they dispersed again in search of the henequen farm in the Western part of Cuba. Later some Koreans became entrepreneurs from the 1930s, running inns, chain stores, and grocery stores. Koreans gradually migrated to cities such as Havana and settled in various occupations such as textile manufacturing, bus business, and furniture manufacturing.

Koreans were treated as Japanese by the Japanese consul in the early stages of immigration and by the Cuban government after the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941. However,

the Matanzas Korean National Association overcame this problem by declaring that Koreans were citizens of the Korean Provisional Government in China, actively supporting the Cuban government's position against anti-fascism, and officially revealed the position of Koreans in the struggle against Japan in the Pacific War.

Since the early days of immigration, Koreans have united around the Korean National Association in each region to maintain their identity and community. In particular, the activities of the Matanzas Korean National Association were prominent. They overcame difficult life at the henequen farm through mutual aid, tried to preserve Korea's unique cultural traditions such as Korean holidays, food, and music, and also tried to spread the Korean language. At the same time, a number of Korean youth associations and women's associations were organized by the Korean national associations in Cuba which lasted until the 1950s. In March 1943, Koreans organized the All-Cuban Korean Association in Havana with the permission of the Cuban government. But the Association failed to unify Koreans due to the lack of leadership and dissolved in 1953 by the Cuban government.

Koreans supported the independence movement by raising funds for the independence movement through the Korean National Association. Amid difficult economic conditions, from 1937 to 1944, they supported the independence movement by collecting a donation of \$1289, remittance to the Central Assembly of the Korean National Association, and sending \$264 to the Provisional Government. It should be noted that during the Pacific War, an anti-Japanese struggle was officially declared by the Association.

The identity and solidarity of Koreans gradually weakened, mainly due to the Labor Nationalization Act of 1933, the basic rights stipulated in the 1940 Constitution (Cuban Citizenship Qualification Regulations), and the social changes that emerged after the establishment of the revolutionary government in 1959. In addition, with the defeat of Japan after World War II, the anti-Japanese movement was disappeared and Koreans rapidly assimilated into Cuban society and became Cuban. Currently, about 1,100 Korean descendants live in Cuba.

Choice of Bulgaria, Red Rose of the Balkan – From the Flash Point of Europe to the Honor Student of EU –

Lee Ho-shik
Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the Republic of Bulgaria

The land yogurt and roses, Bulgaria is perceived as a peaceful and calm country. However, beneath this peacefulness exists a modern history of tears of blood and regrets of wrong choices

and misjudgements. With Korea situated under similar circumstances with Bulgaria in regard to geopolitical proximity to great powers and the experience of gaining independence as well as overcoming national division, examining the footsteps of Bulgaria's foreign policy decisions will serve as a good lesson to Korea in making decisions in the future.

Upon independence, Bulgaria was divided into North and South. 7 years later, Bulgaria accomplished unification, winning the war against Serbia. In the First Balkan war in 1912, Bulgaria ousted Turkey from the Balkan peninsula and extended its territory to the Aegean sea. However, avarice for the territory of Macedonia and Thessaloniki led to the misjudgement of the situation. In 1913, Bulgaria entered the Second Balkan war against Serbia and Greece and Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria was conquered. Bulgaria realized the importance of rational and cool judgement, balance of attack and defence, fine tuning of foreign policy through severe frustration.

In the First World War, Bulgaria took the line of Germany and Austria and flew into the battle field of the third Balkan war for revenge. The result of the wrong choice was ruthless. The Versailles Treaty took away the territory of Aegean sea, leaving Bulgaria with only the Black sea coast. When the Second World War broke, Bulgaria picked out the card of Germany again in vain. The misjudgement of the situation and wrong choice made by the leaders brought about a profound disbelief and cynicism of Bulgarian people. From that time, Bulgarians throw a joke which says if you want to pick out a correct choice, take the line opposite of the Bulgarians.

Bulgaria experienced the socialist regime for 45 years until the collapse of Eastern European communist block. While the western Balkan region was integrated into the Yugoslavia, Bulgaria kept distance from Serbia leading Yugoslavia. This decision saved Bulgaria from the bloody turmoil which struck the whole Yugoslavia in the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia 50 years later.

As the Warsaw Treaty Organization collapsed in 1990, Bulgaria made a rapid decision of picking out the line of EU and NATO and joined the NATO. Some analysts say that Bulgaria's choice of the EU means 'once again my love' German which is a key player of the EU economy. German enterprises are doing leading role in the Bulgaria's business circle as well. In the political and military point of view, Bulgaria is following the NATO principle led by the UK and US. Amid the Crimea peninsula crisis, which heightened the military tension between Russia and US, Bulgaria is pushing ahead the military modernization project under the support of US.

Surrounded by the super powers, Korea and Bulgaria have been compelled to confront the competition and choice for survival. Located in the far east of the European continent,

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looking over the grand grassland of Middle Asia, Bulgaria is searching for the best choice for the rosy future and overcoming the past misjudgement of situations and the failure of choice. Located in the far east of the Eurasia continent, confronting the tide of the US - China strategic competition, Korea is searching for the wisdom not to be urged to select one alternative. Bulgaria, from the flash point of the Europe to the honor student of EU, and Korea, from the turmoil of challenge to the emerging power of G10 will shake their hands together as brothers of the 'Master of Choice' in near future.

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