

CONNECTIONS

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THE DEBATE ON NATO EXPANSION

Eunika Katarzyna Frydrych



PARTNERSHIP FOR
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FALL 2008

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The Military Profession, Public Trust, and Public Interest

Giuseppe Caforio *

Public Opinion and the Institution of the Military

Trust in and prestige of the military profession are strongly influenced by the general public attitude towards the armed forces, in relation to the perception of threat by the public and the prestige that the military has overall in each country.¹ It thus seems opportune to begin this essay with a few elements of knowledge on these aspects of more general interest before moving on to a survey centered on the military profession in the more specific sense.

The profound geopolitical transformations that began in 1989 led, for a certain number of years, to a decreased perception of threat by European populations (and others as well) that was shortly followed by a sizeable decrease in armed forces and military budgets. But the illusion of the “end of history” and of a “peace dividend” soon had to give way to an international reality that was much more turbulent than in the past but which, up until the events of 11 September 2001, did not make a strong impression on European public opinion.² Threat perception was a datum of so little interest after 1989 that the Eurobarometer surveys of the 1990s and up to 2002 did not include this item in their questionnaires. The attacks of 11 September 2001 represented a turning point in a crescendo of preoccupations now registered by opinion polls that reveal, for the countries of the European Community, a sensitivity to individual threats and the trend described graphically in Figure 1.

After 2001, the citizens of the European countries examined in these surveys thus appear to be concerned by what have been termed the “new security threats,” namely international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime,

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¹ The term “military profession” is here understood chiefly as the officer’s profession, both because, according to the prevalent opinion among scholars, only officers are attributed the full connotation of a professional position: see Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York, Free Press, 1960); Gian Paolo Prandstraller, *La professione militare in Italia* (Milan, Franco Angeli, 1985); and Giuseppe Caforio, “The Military Profession: Theories of Change,” *Armed Forces & Society* 15:1 (Fall 1988): 55–70. This is because non-commissioned officers are normally considered semi-professionals, and because the most significant studies and researches to date have been conducted on officers; see Amitai Etzioni, ed., *The Semiprofessions and their Organization: Teachers, Nurses, Social Workers* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

² See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History* (New York: Free Press, 1992). For a discussion of the putative “peace dividend,” see John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” *International Security* 15:4 (Summer 1990): 5–56.




Figure 1: The Fears of EU Citizens (EU15)

Source: Eurobarometer surveys 57 and 59 (author’s elaboration); available at www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/.

an accident in a nuclear power station, ethnic conflicts, and a world war. These are all threats that, with the exception of only two—organized crime and nuclear accidents—appear to be issues that lie in the realm of military competence, and that also, at least in the short-term analysis (2002–03), prove to be on the rise.

The overarching security problem therefore no longer centers, post-1989, on the necessity of maintaining a balance of forces with an opposing armed bloc, but rather on the need to maintain a peaceful situation in the world, at least in the early part of this period. In the years since 2001, another security challenge has arisen alongside the need to maintain global stability: countering the new menace of Islamic fundamentalism in its more aggressive forms. This is also the framework of the exponential growth in the number of peacekeeping missions from the 1980s to 2000 and beyond, missions that have become an important part (at times preponderant) of the operational commitment of the armed forces in the European countries.

Public trust and interest in the armed forces follow the same trend—that is, an overall rise from the early 1990s to the present. Particularly interesting in this regard are the data of the European Values Study, which examined trust in the armed forces in thirty-four European countries over the 1990s. These surveys showed an overall average growth in trust in the armed forces, from 46 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 2000.³ To give a view that adheres more closely to the reality of the phenomenon, in

³ The thirty-four countries are: Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany (East/West), Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey (2001), and Ukraine. The European Value Study was not conducted after 2000.

Figure 2 below I have reported the data of five key European countries for the entire period 1990–2003, which better illustrates the growth trend.⁴




Figure 2: Trust in the Army: Trends from 1990–2003; A sample of five countries
Source: ZA3811: EVS—European Values Study 1990/2000 (release 2 May 2006)—Integrated Dataset, and Eurobarometer 61 for the year 2003. Available at <http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/velocity?mode=treeview#> and www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/, respectively.

Except for Poland, where public trust in the military nevertheless still remains at high levels, the trend is positive for all of the remaining four nations examined.

It is also interesting to observe the relative positions between the institutions in which European citizens place the most trust and their variations in the period. Figure 3 clearly shows how, during the post-Cold War era in Europe, the increase of trust in the armed forces has been matched by a decrease of trust in other institutions, such as the church, the police, and supranational institutions.⁵

⁴ A confirmation of the trend had already come from the research of Jan van der Meulen for the period 1990–97 in four countries: the U.K., France, Germany, and the Netherlands. See Jan van der Meulen, “Public Opinion, Mass Media, and the Military: A Programmatic Sketch of Perspectives,” in *The European Military in Transition*, ed. Maria Vlachova (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), 148–57.

⁵ The position of the church in the ranking of the institutions is strongly influenced by the data from the countries in the Orthodox Christian region, where the church still is the most trusted institution for most people, even today. (See, for example, the data of the SEE Public Agenda Survey, organized by the International Idea and SEEDS Network in 2002; data available at www.idea.int/europe_cis/balkans/.) In the fifteen-member European Union, on the contrary, is the armed forces and the police in the early twenty-first century that are vying for the top spot in citizens’ trust, followed by voluntary organizations; the church does not appear in the top five spots in the ranking (data from Eurobarometer surveys).




Figure 3: Trust in Institutions: Trends from 1990–2000: Thirty-four countries of the European Values Study
 Source: ZA3811: EVS–European Values Study 1990/2000 (release 2, May 2006)–Integrated Dataset.

Public Opinion and the Military Profession

As mentioned above, favorable attitudes toward the military profession have followed the same positive trend as displayed by the increasing trust shown by public opinion in the European countries in the military as a whole. This is attested not only by various opinion polls conducted in nearly all of the countries, but also—and perhaps even more convincingly—by the trend of the number of applications per opening in the various military academies. To briefly illustrate this trend with some available data, I have shown in Figure 4 below the trend of applicants per place in the military academies of four European countries in the period. As can be seen in the graph, the trend is rising everywhere.

In the same years examined in Figure 4, the military profession in the developed countries (and especially in Europe) also underwent far-reaching internal transformations that were not without substantial repercussions in its perception by civil society.

As I have written elsewhere, the changing face of the military profession in the 1990s appears to have been determined essentially by three causes.⁶ The first is that in everyday practice the European officer is called on to operate in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and, among them, increasingly often in Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The second is that the contingents deployed in these types of missions are more and more often multinational in character, with the result that officers have to cope with not inconsiderable problems of interoperability with the units of other

⁶ Giuseppe Caforio, ed., *The European Officer: A Comparative View on Selection and Education* (Pisa: ETS, 2000).




Figure 4: Number of Applicants per Place at Military Academies

Source: Giuseppe Caforio, ed., *The European Officer: A Comparative View on Selection and Education* (Pisa: ETS, 2000).

countries.⁷ The third cause is that, particularly in PSOs, military officers have taken on roles of an increasingly diplomatic nature for which they were not previously responsible, including maintaining relations with the local communities, with the local churches, with the international bodies, and with non-governmental organizations.

To prepare the new military professionals for these new aspects of their profession, substantial changes have taken place in both the substance and emphasis of the training processes at the military academies of most European countries which have, among other things, led to their programs drawing closer to those of sectors of the civilian universities (especially those of political science faculties).⁸ All this has led to phenomena of convergence of the institution of the military with civil society, a convergence that has, almost everywhere in Europe, made the work of military professionals more comprehensible (and better appreciated) than it was in the Cold War period, where the primary function of the armed forces was the rather cryptic one of deterrence.

Opinions and Attitudes of Young People Today Toward the Military Profession

Foreword on the Sample and the Research

Today's situation regarding the trust and interest of young people in the military profession is described here on the basis of data from an empirical survey that was conducted in eleven democratic countries on a broader theme, but which offers significant

⁷ The term *interoperability* is here taken to mean the necessity of coordinating the use of units with different armaments, different munitions, different military training, different legal and disciplinary rules, etc.

⁸ See Caforio, *The European Officer*.

insights for the subject under review.⁹ The particular significance of the research stems from the fact that it is not a generic opinion poll of a sampling of citizens from each selected country according to the common characteristics of representativeness of ordinary surveys, but a study focused on samples of students at both civilian universities and military academies. These “future elites” of the participating countries were surveyed in depth by means of a questionnaire consisting of forty-five questions administered during the year 2004–05. A total of 2,751 young people born between 1974 and 1986 were surveyed. The sample composition is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Composition of the Sample

| | Q20. What are you studying? | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------|-----------|------|-------------------|
| | Military Academies | Various | Economics | Law | Political Science |
| Number of useful questionnaires | 1230 | 212 | 519 | 452 | 338 |
| Percentages | 44.7 | 7.7 | 18.9 | 16.4 | 12.3 |
| Male % | 87.0 | 46.7 | 53.6 | 54.2 | 50.7 |
| Female % | 13.0 | 53.3 | 46.4 | 45.8 | 49.3 |
| Class year: % | | | | | |
| 1 st and 2 nd | 59.7 | 42.6 | 41.5 | 51.9 | 46.9 |
| 3 rd and higher | 40.3 | 57.4 | 58.5 | 48.1 | 53.1 |

As can be seen from these data, the sample seems sufficiently representative, both in its subdivision by gender (which, however skewed in certain cases, accurately reflects the gender composition of the individual universes surveyed) and in the distribution by class year. A more detailed description of the sample and of the research methodologies can be found in the volume devoted to a complete report on the research.¹⁰

The survey has particular interest both for its attempt to get a fix on some of the value attitudes of the youths in the examined countries at a given historical moment (thereby also permitting a diachronic comparison in a later analogous investigation) and for comparing these attitudes among the youths of different geopolitical areas. One aspect that might be considered a limit of this research must be borne in mind, however: it was conducted among those that we have called the “future elites” of the ex-

⁹ The countries where the survey was conducted are Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The general theme of the research was the cultural gap that exists between the civilian sector and the military sector. The research report was published in spring 2007; see Giuseppe Caforio, ed., *Cultural Differences between the Military and Parent Society in Democratic Countries* (London and Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007).

¹⁰ See Caforio, ed., *Ibid.*

amed countries—that is, only among young people attending university-level programs of study, with the exclusion of those already employed in other occupations. Our point of view hinges on the hypothesis that it is the elites who dictate the tendencies that are sooner or later followed by their peers.

The Results of the Research

The interest of young people in security issues in general is rather high, seeing that the sum of the “very much” and “somewhat interested” responses is 81.5 percent of the sample. The situation differs from country to country, naturally, as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Interest in Security Issues by Country

(reflecting a combination of responses in the categories “very much” and “somewhat”)

Source: All of the data shown in this figure, as well as in the figures and tables that follow, are taken from Giuseppe Caforio, ed., *Cultural Differences between the Military and Parent Society in Democratic Countries* (London and Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007).

This interest is of course more extensive among the youths who attend the military academies, but it also remains high among their peers at the civilian universities (71 percent).

In comparison with the view of other national institutions, the trust that the interviewed young people place in the military is high. Indeed, it occupies second place overall (outstripped only by universities): it is first for the French, German, Dutch, Romanian, and Swedish interviewees; second for the Bulgarians and Poles; third for the Italians; and fourth for the Slovenes. A separate case is represented by the Swiss respondents, for which the military is only ranked the fifth most-trusted institution in Switzerland, and the Spanish ones, who put it as low as eighth. We shall talk about the particular situations of these two countries later on. In general, the average responses indicate that the military is ranked among those institutions in which the interviewees have most trust, with the mentioned exceptions. In a subdivision according to gender it is males, as might be expected, who place more trust in the military than females.

A confirmation of the trust that the interviewed elites have in the military comes from analyzing their responses to the statement: “The military should be abolished.” Only 10 percent of the respondents answered affirmatively to this item, with the remainder responding negatively. If we break down this response according to the other variables present, we see that those most in favor of the abolition of the military are, in order, the Swiss (28 percent) and the Spanish (20 percent); women more than men (15 percent versus 9 percent); young Muslims (16 percent), who expressed this sentiment more often than those of other religions; and those who place themselves at the extreme left of the political spectrum (32 percent).

To the more specific question on the public image of the military profession in the respondent’s own country, the overall average of the respondents judges this image to be positive (56.3 percent), as illustrated in Figure 6 below.




Figure 6: Perceived Public Image of the Military Profession

But here, too, it is a deeper analysis that breaks down the responses and examines their intersections with other variables that give the most meaningful results. Starting with a breakdown by country (illustrated in Figure 7), we see that it is in the former communist countries that the military profession seems to have a better public image, while in the countries of Western Europe one records values quite close to the general average for the sample, with the significant negative exceptions of the Spanish and German respondents.

In a breakdown according to gender, it is the women who feel that the military profession has a more positive public image (3 percentage points more than the men): is the fascination of the uniform perhaps at work here?

More significant is the correlation with the respondents’ declared political positions, where, perhaps unexpectedly, it is those on the left who feel the image of the military profession is better in their respective country’s public opinion. Figure 8 below clearly illustrates this trend.




Figure 7: Perceived Positive Public Image of the Military Profession by Country




Figure 8: Perceived Positive Public Image of the Military Profession by Political Affiliation

It is possible that, especially among the members of the political right, who might be expected to traditionally hold a more favorable opinion of the military, an unsatisfied desire for increased public esteem for the military profession is at work here.

Public perception of the military profession according to respondents' declared religious faith is quite interesting. Orthodox Christians diverge significantly from the sample average by their much higher esteem (over 80 percent) for the military, a perception that remains high also for Muslim respondents (over 60 percent), albeit with less enthusiastic judgments than the preceding ones (see Figure 9). Decidedly more modest is the view held by Protestants and, even more so, by Catholics, whose trends also appear very similar, as shown in Figure 9. The lowest evaluation of the military is expressed by those who describe themselves as atheists (not included in the figure).

It would seem, therefore, that religious affiliation is not an indifferent data point in relation to people's views of the military profession and, in particular, it is linked to religious fervor. Indeed, responding to another question on church attendance, those who declare themselves Orthodox Christians also report higher rates of church atten-

dance than the sample average; at the other extreme, as we have seen, it is the declared atheists who offer the lowest assessment of the military profession’s public image. From these data one should infer, therefore, albeit with due caution, that religious observance and a pro-military mindset go hand-in-hand for the future elites of the European countries examined here.




Figure 9: Perceived Positive Public Image of the Military Profession by Religious Affiliation

Extending the analysis to the level of *prestige* that the respondents accord to the military profession, we see that it is ranked sixth among sixteen professions proposed for evaluation by the interviewees, after those of medical doctor, diplomat, university professor, lawyer, and manager. An excellent ranking overall, therefore, seeing as how it precedes prestigious professions like that of engineer, entrepreneur, pharmacist, journalist, and police inspector. The ranking varies significantly from country to country, however, as is show in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Perceived Prestige of a Professional Military Position by Country

| Country | Bulgaria | France | Germany | Italy | Netherlands | Poland | Romania | Slovenia | Spain | Sweden | Switzerland |
|--|----------|--------|---------|-------|-------------|--------|---------|----------|-------|--------|-------------|
| Prestige of officer profession (ranking) | 5 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 5 | 9 |

Perceived prestige according to gender varies by one position—the officer position comes in sixth place for men, seventh for women, who place engineers ahead of military officers in the sample average.

This positive assessment of the military profession is also confirmed by another item of the questionnaire, which reads “I am proud of women and men who serve in the military,” a statement that received 74 percent favorable responses from those surveyed. The national differences, reported in Table 3, are significant and interesting here in this respect as well.

Table 3: Pride in Respondents’ Countries’ Military Personnel, by Country

| Country | Bulgaria | France | Germany | Italy | Netherlands | Poland | Romania | Slovenia | Spain | Sweden | Switzerland |
|--|----------|--------|---------|-------|-------------|--------|---------|----------|-------|--------|-------------|
| % of respondents who are proud of their country’s military men and women | 81.5 | 84.4 | 70.0 | 80.9 | 78.1 | 59.5 | 74.4 | 70.2 | 59.3 | 79.1 | 45.6 |

In all the surveyed countries, however, this item elicits agreement from a majority of the interviewees with the exception of Switzerland.

In a breakdown according to religious faith, greater appreciation for military personnel is shown here too by Orthodox Christians (78.3 percent) than by the combined group of members of other religious faiths and respondents declaring themselves atheists (63.9 percent).

Finally, a respondent’s declared political stance appears to be a strong indicator of opinion on this point, as graphically represented in Figure 10 below.




Figure 10: Positive Consideration of Military Personnel According to Respondents’ Political Position

The rating, finally, of the professional training provided to officers at military academies is positive on the whole for 71 percent of the sample, but with sizeable differences between the cadets and the university students, as the latter appear more tepid in their esteem of this preparation, as is illustrated in Figure 11 below. Among university students it is especially women who give more negative assessments (33.4 percent) than both the sample average (29 percent) and their male peers (26.4 percent).




Figure 11: Military Officer Education Rating

Breaking this category of response down by religious faith, once again it is the Orthodox Christian respondents who stand out, having views of the quality of officer education that are much more positive than the sample average, as do those on the political right with respect to respondents who embrace other political positions.¹¹

Discussion

The presentation of the data above makes it possible first of all to confirm that public trust and interest in the military profession in Europe have grown in parallel with the manifestation of a different perception of the threat environment and an increasing confidence in the military institution overall. Analyzing the shifts in threat perception is particularly interesting. It substantially declined in quantitative terms in the period 1990–2001, but turned toward a wider range of threats and ones of a type more easily perceived by a public opinion that is not always particularly well informed on security issues. After 2001, public perception of the threats posed in the current security environment went back to increasing quantitatively, with obvious implications for people’s views of the military profession.

¹¹ But the two positions do not coincide: the favorable views held by those on the political right are particularly strong among young Catholics (41.5 percent) and Protestants (41.2 percent), while Orthodox Christians are at 19.3 percent.

At the same time, the positive performances turned in by most of the various national armed forces in different functions and theatres of operation in MOOTW and PSOs have produced growing trust in the institution and in the assessment of the image of the military professional. This has occurred at different levels and with different nuances in the various countries. Glancing the data reported in the previous section, one immediately notes that public trust and interest, in the responses of the interviewees, are much lower in some countries than in others, particularly in Spain and Switzerland, and to a lesser degree in Slovenia.

The Spanish respondents display the lowest level of interest in security issues, as well as of trust in the military in general. They show sizeable percentages in favor of abolishing the military (20 percent), and feel that the image of the military profession in the country is much lower than the sample averages. In a ranking of the professions according to prestige, they rate that of military officer eighth, against an average ranking putting the military profession in sixth place. And they are considerably less proud than the sample average of the men and women who serve in their nation's armed forces (59 percent in Spain, versus 74 percent overall).

This seems to be paralleled by the view that emerges from the Swiss respondents. Their level of trust in the institution of the military is low; they display a strong percentage in favor of abolishing the military (28 percent); in the classification of professions according to prestige they relegate that of military officer to ninth place; and they display the lowest level of pride in their fellow citizens in uniform (45 percent versus the sample average of 74 percent).

Despite the similarities in responses, the causes of this attitude are substantially different in the two countries. To attempt an explanation of them I must here make recourse to a different methodological tool than the one used so far. This instrument is a qualitative research study that we conducted by means of an expert survey in the examined countries, in parallel to the quantitative survey referred to above.¹² The responses given by the experts in the semi-structured interviews conducted provide important clues to the causes of the individual national situations in the two countries under consideration.

For Spain, according to the opinions of most of the interviewed experts, it is the heavy legacy of Francoism and the difficulties of the transition to democracy that have weighed on the public image of the military profession, contributing to the larger uncertainties around the process of change that, as mentioned, is influencing the military profession and its contents everywhere. In this context the stimuli provided by the new types of military missions characteristic of the post-Cold War era are often interpreted in the sense of casting doubt on the relevance of the military to the types of threats perceived today. In Spain, other institutions, such as the police, are the preferred actors to respond to these new types of threats.

¹² See Caforio, ed., *Cultural Differences between the Military and Parent Society in Democratic Countries*.

In fact, voices among the current elites question the military's suitability for the country's current needs, such as a university teacher who says:

Everyone goes on about peace missions and making militaries more human. But people don't believe in that, because they see that this doesn't avoid wars.

The armed forces can only survive thanks to the peace missions.

Another field of action is helping civil society. But the "Prestige affair" has shown us that they're always late and they're very slow and they couldn't resolve the problem. They took on a problem that is not theirs to solve.

The position of the Swiss interviewees stands completely apart: the country appears to suffer from something of an identity crisis that has repercussions on the use of the military in particular. Here, too, the words of one of the interviewees reflect a more generally shared attitude:

Switzerland has a very long tradition of neutrality. However, for the last twelve years Switzerland has been in an identity crisis. The main reason is that neutrality has lost its meaning: the cold war is over, Europe is united, there are no real security threats, and the UN charter has outlawed war. Nevertheless, people can't adapt their mindset so fast to the new situation—they need time to understand and realize that the solutions which worked for the last couple of hundred years will be useless for the future. Although political and military leaders are very much aware of the new situation of international politics, they must display a certain degree of awareness of the condition and the opinions of the citizens. As a consequence, they do a balancing act between talking about the important role of national defense and neutrality on the one hand and international cooperation and peacekeeping on the other.

A breakdown according to respondents' religious faith is interesting as well. Indeed, as already mentioned in reporting the individual data, a strong link is manifested between belief and religious practice on one hand and appreciation for the military profession on the other. As stated earlier, Orthodox Christians have particular esteem for the military profession, in all items examined here, with Protestants and Catholics placing themselves at the opposite end of the scale, and the Muslim respondents in an intermediate position. This breakdown does not correspond to the particular political positions of the interviewees: the correlation between declared religious faith and political affiliation does not follow the trend of the degree of appreciation harbored for the military profession.

Respondents' political views, then, seem to influence attitudes toward the military profession in a contradictory way. On the one hand it is the right-wing youths who judge the officer's public image less positively than the sample average; on the other hand, these are the ones who display the most appreciation for members of the military. Probably a partially unsatisfied desire for increased public esteem for the armed forces and their members is at work here.

The cadets at the military academies obviously exhibit more appreciation for their profession than the university students, but what is interesting to note here is that the gap remains moderate. Examining the data according to respondents' gender, lastly, one notes a general attitude that is more pacifist among women which makes them

have less positive views toward everything that is military, but with some contradictory attitudes in regard to appreciation of the officer's profession.

To conclude, one can say that the military profession in general, and that of the officer in particular, is today subject to a process of change that is swifter and farther reaching than the normal revision that has always gone on, and that public appreciation of it is on the rise in all of the examined European countries. This is also borne out in practical terms by the growing number of applications for openings at academies. The general shift now in progress from conscripted armed forces to professional armies¹³ poses the problem of examining not only officers and non-commissioned officers from the standpoint of professionalism, but also the rank and file, however incomplete such a study might be.¹⁴

¹³ For more on the shift from conscripted armies to professional armed forces, see Karl Haltiner, "The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe?" *Armed Forces & Society* 25:1 (1998): 7–36.

¹⁴ Perhaps the rank and file could be analyzed from the standpoint of semi-professions: for examples, see Etzioni, *The Semiprofessions and their Organization*; and N. Toren, *Social Work: The Case of a Semiprofession* (London: Sage, 1969). On non-commissioned officers, moreover, there are still very few studies: see Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., "Comments on the Non-commissioned Officer," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Army and the American People*, ed. Garry D. Ryan and Timothy K. Nenninger (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1987), 57–60; Arnold G. Fisch, Jr. and Robert K. Wright, Jr., eds., *The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps: The Backbone of the Army* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1989); Michele Marotta, *La condizione militare in Italia, Vol. II, Ufficiali e Sottufficiali* (Rome: Cemiss, 1994); and J.D. Pendry, *The Three Meter Zone: Common Sense Leadership for NCOs* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2001).