

Regional Integration Through the Balkan Stability Pact

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This paper attempts to argue that the current structure of relations in South Eastern Europe (SEE), and in the Balkans in particular, requires increased levels of regional or local integration before any membership in greater bodies (like the European Union) can be considered. To demonstrate this, I will require a more specific definition of just what is meant by “integration.” The end of the Cold War has articulated the proposition that the amenities of the West can be extended to former communist societies in the wake of their transition to a market economy. Implicitly, this means that there will be material rewards for the majority (although these may be reaped in a relatively distant future) of peoples and countries hoping (sometimes expecting) to one day be members of the EU. During the twelve or so years that we have been living in the post-Cold War world, the necessities of reform and membership in a body such as the EU have been so pressing as to make these two concepts identical. In other words, it seems that integration is only seen in its legal or geopolitical sense, and its definition is limited to the goal of EU membership.

Integration means much more than that, however, and a large part of this paper focuses on a definition of membership that requires a transformation (or at least reassessment) of the identity of the would-be EU members. The second part of this paper describes the spirit of the Balkan Stability Pact as a tool of integration that is informed by a logic of cooperation and interdependence. This is a significant departure from recent Balkan history, to say the least. Therefore, a theoretical shift must precede the attitudinal shift. Realist policy-making must cede to institutionalism. This change, if the Stability Pact (in effect a legal illustration of liberal-institutionalism) is to succeed, must be made consciously. That is, theory must become policy.

My demonstration proceeds along two seemingly unrelated paths. The first part of this paper gives a thorough definition of the meaning of integration based on Claude Ake’s theories. I will find that a more supple definition of integration helps break new ground in the reassessment of identity in SEE. The second part of this paper puts realist and cooperative security theories in opposition and demonstrates that theory provides the outlines for rational policy-making. From that demonstration, we infer that realism—an exclusive approach—must give way to cooperation if integration as we understand it is to succeed. Part Two also provides a set of steps that must be met to enable integration to succeed and make the

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Stability Pact work. Part Three proposes the creation of a multi-national (multi-ethnic) regional peace support operations training center as an initiative that would harmonize regional and great power policies relative to SEE, develop long-term trust and democratic transparency, and lay a partial foundation for a secure peace that will redefine the region as an all-inclusive entity that will eventually be ready for EU membership.

For the purpose of this paper, my definition of the participants involved in the Balkan Stability Pact excludes Western European or North American states. These states are considered sponsors or benefactors. At best, this can only be considered a sketch of a study, but it should provide a good sense of whether the region is integrating and, thus, if this paradigm shift is being accomplished. This can provide an explanation for some shortcomings in the region and indicate the level of resistance that can be expected in the near future.

I do not think I am going too far out on a limb by stating that the Balkan Stability Pact is better than the *status quo* or the alternative system of relations between states that has been operating in SEE. However, the notion that regional integration through the Stability Pact must precede integration into the EU needs to be examined on its own merits.

Part One: Integration in Question

What do we mean by integration? It seems that, lately, membership in European and/or Atlantic institutions has come to be viewed as the functional equivalent to integration. In other words, integration is synonymous with accession to membership in a geopolitical entity or region.

What is perhaps more important to grasp is that, for integration to be considered truly successful, it is commonly held that the members (or would-be members) of a region or organization will acquire a certain measure of like-mindedness associated with this enlargement. The question of whether the arrival at this state of like-mindedness must precede membership, or whether membership will confer like-mindedness, gives an indication of the dilemma faced by decision-makers on both sides, and it also gives an idea of the complexity of the notion of integration. These difficulties and the errors they may trigger beg for an examination of the concept of integration. The complexities often prove so daunting as to leave analysts unsure of the Pact's real potential. Analysts do not deal well with uncertainty, and tend to deride any nebulous concept: the Stability Pact is often the target of derision. The reality is that the Stability Pact cannot do for others what others are not willing to do for themselves.

For the purposes of this essay, I will apply Claude Ake's theory of integration to all of South Eastern Europe. While Ake was devising a theory for the stabilization of post-colonial countries, we can safely use his theories for a region that was part of the empire of socialist thought. We can use his theories provided that we think of countries as if they behaved as individuals. There are limits to this

approach, because it suggests that consensus within a society is complete and/or that the leader is so strong as to be able to impose his/her will on society. This is rarely the case in the best of circumstances. Still, we need to start somewhere, and ascribing human characteristics to a state is a good starting point for discussion.

The claim that states behave within a region in the way that individuals do within a state can be made because, for instance, the European Union is a political system not unlike that which we find within a state. That is, it is a system operating on the transmission of inputs and outputs, but it is also a system that is grounded in certain values, that sees clear political and geographical boundaries to its influence, and that tries to accommodate all the members it feels are located within these boundaries.² This is the crux of integration. According to Ake, and according to what we have just said about the EU in relation to SEE, political integration is closely related to the problem of increasing “normative consensus governing political behavior among members of a political system.”³ Norms and values have something to do with membership in organizations and regions only insofar as new members have absorbed these new values and norms as their own and apply them consistently.

Readers will notice that, in the introduction, I drew a sharp distinction between the concepts of membership and integration. At the very least, membership is merely the geographic inclusion of an external actor into a larger or more influential (or more desirable) group. This does not necessarily mean that the new member is “integrated” in any other more meaningful way. For example, I may be attracted to the prestige of membership in a country club, but this is of little value if the club members do not see me as being an avid golfer. To reap the benefits of a sense of belonging, I need to be a good enough golfer to warrant membership in the first place. The ethics of that sport can be quite difficult for me to grasp if I am a professional hockey player. (Indeed, I may even have trouble seeing it as a sport in the first place!) But once I have learned and applied the norm that body-checking your opponent on the golf course is against the rules, we can say that I am integrated, i.e., more than simply a member.

It is this “absorption” process which I define as crucial to the process of integration. Integration is not synonymous with mere membership, but rather to the application of the responsibilities of membership, which incur little sacrifice, because responsibilities become second nature once integration is complete. Integration also includes the difficult process of inducing commitment and obedience to the beliefs, symbols, and values that will define the situation where political action will take place.⁴

² Michael Clarke and Brian White, eds., *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach* (Southampton, UK: Edward Elgar, 1989), 29.

³ Claude Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1967), 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

There are four ways to induce such commitment: authoritarian, paternalistic, identific, and consensual.⁵ The Stability Pact is the embodiment of a system of norms and values that present themselves as an alternative to the current structure of relations at work in the Balkans and in SEE, which is confrontational and exclusionary.

Authoritarianism or paternalism cannot be relied upon to create adherence to these norms and values, because this would require a strong personality at the head of each participant country of the Stability Pact. The recent presidencies of such strong-willed individuals such as Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, Alija Izetbegovic and Radovan Karadzic in Bosnia, and Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia proper indicate that there was little willingness to adopt a non-confrontational regime of relations in the region. The secessions of Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) may have been more successful and less bloody, but they betray the fact that there was no willingness present to work together as a reconstructed or redefined region.⁶ This is because there was more effort being devoted to reconstructing each new country's identity in (largely hostile) reference to the "other" than there was in reconstructing a whole region under a new common identity.

This is why identific theory presents a problem. In the case of SEE, the pride in being "Slovene," "Bulgarian," or "Albanian" superseded the pride in being a Southern Slav, or if one is desirous of including Albania more fully, a "South Eastern European." If the latter option of all-inclusiveness takes precedence over narrow identification, the new region can be integrated as a whole, which can then lead to an even broader process of integration. But this is extremely difficult to do at this point in time, for no sooner had each former Yugoslav republic become independent—in essence given *itself* a new identity through the disintegration of Yugoslavia—that it needed to wrestle with the identity that the recent Balkan wars had given to *each member of the region*.⁷

Ake's consensual approach, which he describes as optimal, seems better suited to describe what is happening with the Stability Pact. The consensus theory of political integration subordinates coercion as a method of ensuring commitment to new norms and values. It is useful in the case of SEE because, according to this point of view, all anti-social (or anti-associative) behavior is considered deviant.⁸

⁵ Ibid., 102–114.

⁶ Turkey recognizes Macedonia under its constitutional name.

⁷ Events and actions in part define identity. This is why a soldier with whom the author worked at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in 1998 described former Yugoslavs using several unsavory epithets. This is understandable, since the soldier in question had spent a week chained to a post as a human shield at an ammunition depot in 1995. Yet it is clear that, on a more fundamental level, this outburst betrays the mindset of the soldier insofar as he has a conception of what is acceptable behavior and what is not in a bellicose situation. This is in essence a clash of values operating over different norms concerning human rights and the laws of armed conflict.

⁸ Ake, *Theory of Political Integration*, 5.

Looking at the positions, statements, and actions of the NATO and EU communities during the Balkan wars, we see two organizations representing the nations of Western Europe and North America, exhibiting signs that they share the same values and beliefs regarding a non-violent approach to conflict management, respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. In other words, North America and Western Europe are integrated as regions and peoples because their statements and actions reflect commonly held beliefs within their respective populations.

Furthermore, we can also say that the new norms and values that the EU represented were already somewhat understood by the relevant populations of SEE. Brian Hall, in *Impossible Country*, tells how some Croats felt that subservience to Serb dominance in a reconstructed Yugoslavia would hinder their dreams of EU (then EC) accession. Similarly, the recent overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic's regime indicates that a decade of fixed elections has not dampened the ideals that Serbs have set for themselves. The reversal that we witnessed in Yugoslavia at the end of the 1990s shows that Serbs' hopes closely resemble those of the Croats, insofar as the pursuit of wealth and welfare are concerned. Pyramid schemes in Albania in 1997 demonstrated that the population is eager for the material rewards that were impossible during the years of communist rule and political isolation.

To the extent that this pursuit of wealth has now taken the form of the pursuit of the *benefits* of integration, rather than the pursuit of integration in itself, it denotes a significant departure from earlier norms. More importantly, it indicates that this departure is widespread within the region. Consensual integration along new European and Atlantic norms is thus theoretically possible. The problem seems to be that there is a double consensus: one revolving around the pride of nationhood, and one around the desire for better standards of living. There is a real risk that the Stability Pact may be used to provide a semblance of stability that answers the needs of human development and comfort (because it will encourage investment and delivery of aid packages) while at the same time allowing ethnic exclusiveness, the basis of identity-building and national defense formulation, to remain as a source of national consensus. Such a view could explain the laborious conflict recovery of Bosnia, the slow pace of change in Serbia, and the apparent "reversal" in Macedonia.

Thus, optimal integration can only happen if there is a change in the perception of national identity, because identity informs the structure of relations in the region by affecting the way in which we think about national security.⁹ Individuals constantly exposed to violence have trouble imagining that conflicts may not

⁹ Notes on a talk by Paolo Calzini at the 15th ISODARCO Winter Course in Andalo, Italy, on "Internal dynamism and external intervention in the Balkans," 20–27 January 2002. Calzini believes that the Balkan bloodshed is only explicable in relation to the history of the region. This, combined with the knowledge that identity is constructed in reference to the past, makes bloodshed inevitable. See Brian Hall, *The Impossible Country* (New York: Penguin, 1994), and Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts* (New York: Vintage, 1994).

always escalate into warfare. While disagreement can always degenerate into violence, the possibility that it may not is difficult to imagine between certain sets of countries. This is why the EU's explicit aim in the creation of the Balkan Stability Pact is "to create in South East Europe a situation in which military conflict will become unthinkable and *thereby* to expand to South East Europe the area of *peace, stability, prosperity and freedom* which the 15 member States have created [for themselves, it should be added] in the last 50 years."¹⁰

The reader will notice that this text posits a causal relationship between the creation of a situation void of violent conflict and the expansion of the zone of peace (a euphemism for the EU). The reader will also notice the relationship implied between peace, prosperity, and freedom.

There is something to be said about the question of whether prosperity brings peace, or if it is the other way around. Certainly, as far as donors and investors are concerned, stability and peace are a *sine qua non* condition for the disbursement of funds.¹¹ However, the alternate view is that, where some sort of distributive justice exists, there is the possibility that society will tend to cling to and improve the level of wealth it enjoys.¹² But neither stability nor wealth has been in abundance in SEE. Therefore, for intervention and aid to take place, stability and peace, even if imposed from without, must reign. This would seem to put the theory of consensual integration on its head, as it suggests that the muscle of some outside power can create the consensus that will result in stability. The promise of material welfare is conditional upon the success of the Stability Pact. This is undeniably a form of pressure that is being brought to bear by the EU, but also by the participant countries themselves. After all, they are the signatories of the Pact, and the foreign powers and international organizations merely its sponsors. Wealth and prosperity here are tools of appeasement that show no sign of triggering a real rapprochement between participants.¹³ In this sense, the Stability Pact is having real difficulties.¹⁴ Several commentators on the Stability Pact note that the responsibility for achieving stability lies with the donor countries, whose dish-ing out of funds is a recipe for success.¹⁵ In fact, success will be measured when

¹⁰ "The EU and South East Europe—Overview," at www.europa.eu.int/external_relations/see/intro/index.htm
Italics and brackets are the author's.

¹¹ IISS, "A System for Post-War South East Europe," in *Analisti I Ballkanit* 3:14 (July–September 1999): 82.

¹² Alvin Rabushka, "Economic, Civil, and Political Freedom: The Cases of Singapore and Hong Kong," in *Freedom, Democracy and Economic Welfare: Proceedings of an International Symposium*, ed. Michael Walker (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1988), 151.

¹³ Hanns-D. Jacobsen, "The Stability Pact for South East-Europe: Did it Work?," paper presented at ISODARCO's 15th Winter Course, Andalo, Italy, 20–27 January 2002, 14.

¹⁴ Albert Rakipi, "The Marshall Plan and the Stability Pact—A Comparative Approach," in *Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner*, ed. Albert Rakipi (Tirana: Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2000), 85–86.

¹⁵ This is indeed alarming: many point to the need for investment before donors or investors would

SEE countries will be able to agglomerate their respective identities around a new notion of region, trade amongst themselves first, and then graft their region onto the rest of Europe.¹⁶ I do not wish to imply that I view this as an automatic occurrence, but that these goals were stated both by Stability Pact participants and the EU. A major attitudinal shift must take place so that the Stability Pact succeeds and its success is seen as the key for entry into the EU.

This section has offered a thorough investigation of the meaning of integration. What I have highlighted is a more precise distinction between membership in an organization and the integration into its community of values. Furthermore, we have noticed that actors have sought to reap the benefits of integration without fully achieving it. The following section will demonstrate the size of the challenge, as political theory and policy-making are used as tools for decision-making.

Part Two: The Necessity of a Theoretical Transformation

While it seems evident that the realist point of view best explains the pattern of relations in the Balkans, there seems to be an indication that the theory has also come to serve as policy. The Stability Pact acts as an alternative to this approach, as a new theory “not so much for explanation, but rather for the building of new international relations.”¹⁷ Indeed, it could be the core of an actual “security community.” For this to happen, parties to the Stability Pact must change how they conceive of national security.

Realist notions of security focus on state security in an “egotistical” manner—that is, the realist view is that security is concerned with that state alone, to the detriment of its neighbors. Realism is inherently exclusive. The only stability that can be achieved in such a scenario is that of a balance of power. Realism may be confrontational, but it carries the seeds of its own peace.¹⁸

Stability for its own sake is highly undesirable for some because it does not lead to a sustainable peace (a controversial concept in itself). To Daniel Nelson, the Stability Pact is “an effort to buy stability cheaply and to substitute stasis or

be comfortable with giving. See Marta Muco, “Four Questions for the Stability Pact. A Regional Approach,” in *Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner*, 102. Jelica Minic, in “Reconstruction and Development Programme for South Eastern Europe,” says that the outpouring of funds is merely a pacifier, yet, in the same article, she recommends as a matter of priority “essential reforms and foreign capital inflow, especially foreign direct investments. . .” (in *Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner*, 123–24).

¹⁶ Bodo Hombach, “The Balkans—A Difficult Journey to the Stability Pact,” in *Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner*, 14. See also Pandeli Majko, “Albania and the Pact of Stability for South-East Europe,” *Analisti I Ballkanit* 3:14 (July–September 1999): 5; and Minic, op. cit., 124.

¹⁷ Rakipi, “The Marshall Plan,” 85

¹⁸ John Hertz, “Ideal Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 2 (January 1950): 157–180.

quiescence for balancing threats and capacities.”¹⁹ This perception may be overly pessimistic, but he has a point: stability is not security. If the Stability Pact produces consensus among its participants, it remains that the sponsorship afforded them by the EU also makes integration a paternalistic or authoritarian process. Similarly, the level of integration that Tito achieved within Yugoslavia may have been highly consensual, but it was also very paternalistic, and therefore far from optimal.²⁰ Hence, various ethnic groups—having not united around the idea of Yugoslavia, and plagued by tensions dating back centuries—remain available for future inclusion in authoritarian (identity-based) integration.

Just like ethnic groups needed to unite around the concept of Tito’s Yugoslavia, today’s SEE states must unite around the Stability Pact’s theoretical underpinnings, namely that of a Kantian view of security, where liberal democracies trade together and settle their differences without resort to violence.

This is an elusive prospect, because the quest for independence of each of the former Yugoslav republics has often been the basis of consensus in each of those respective societies. As a result, secessionist tendencies seem to be driven by mass parties. It is not surprising, therefore, that the parties and their leaders start to believe (until independence is achieved and factionalism begins) that they are the legitimate incarnation of their respective societies’ wishes. In the end, party and individual interest become synonymous with national interest.²¹

Because the concept is so closely associated with nation-building, any assessment of national security in SEE will tend to be ethnic-driven and non-negotiable. A zero-sum outcome is inescapable, and realism, no longer a theory, finds its characteristics transposed into the policies of a very few, but very powerful, individuals. It is this train of thought that spawned Europe’s first war in fifty years.

A disintegrating Yugoslavia’s values collided with an integrating Europe’s, which saw the situation in the Balkans as deviant, according to Western European norms. Europe, as an evolving cooperative security system whose “members must be prepared to engage in collective diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military action in areas outside their common space which may threaten their welfare and stability,” could not help but intervene.²² In the post-Cold War world, the international community could not stand idle in the face of “deviancy.”

SEE countries must effect a shift from an orthodox vision of security to one that favors cooperation. There must be a conscious decision by those in power to switch to a policy that prescribes “consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather

¹⁹ Daniel N. Nelson, “Stable Peace or Secure Peace?” in *Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner*, 36.

²⁰ Ake, *Theory of Political Integration*, 137.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

²² Richard Cohen, “From Individual Security to International Stability,” Marshall Center Papers, #3, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, April 2001, 2.

than correction and interdependence rather than unilateralism.”²³ The Stability Pact is a tool to achieve this, but there are reasons to hope that projects and investments will achieve that shift for the participants, rather than requiring the participants to willfully choose a new outlook. SEE leaders must individualize security. The only way to do this is to guarantee basic human freedoms and living standards. If these guarantees are made effective across an entire society, irrespective of ethnic background, individuality is reaffirmed. Thus, any promotion of the “national” interest ceases to be ethnic or group-oriented, because universal human security is subsumed under the rubric of the national interest;²⁴ thus the national interest becomes individual-oriented, aimed at the maintenance of the privileges and guarantees of basic human freedoms and economic needs.

As I outlined in Part One, there are indications that participants in the Balkan Stability Pact are seeking the benefits of integration without the effort of absorbing new norms and values. The academic literature emanating from the Balkans certainly supports this claim. It is essential that participants accept this new approach if they are to integrate as a region and make the Stability Pact a resounding success.

If the participants are unconvinced, as I believe they are, it is because they do not trust each other and are suspicious of a cooperative approach. They do not believe that a change from a realist policy to a cooperative/internationalist policy will bring them security. The removal of Milosevic is seen as a great step forward in eliminating this mistrust.²⁵ Still, other SEE countries, most notably Slovenia, have started their acceptance of EU norms and values without waiting for the departure of such irritants as Milosevic, Tudjman, et al. Slovenia is now well on its way to membership in NATO and the EU. The prospect of membership, and not membership itself, will promote a change in policy and theoretical outlook. To think that “successful integration . . . would produce changes in attitudes and enmesh each national, political and economic system with the others” is applying the logic in reverse.²⁶ If this were so, there would be no reason to exclude Turkey from the EU, since its NATO participation would have already modified its norms of behavior.

When people and states operate in a system with realist characteristics, they are never sure of what their neighbors are doing, because secrecy is a policy feature of realism. The only thing they can be sure of is that, whatever their neighbors are doing, it must be detrimental to them. Even if what they are doing is not detrimental to individual or state security, realism fosters the misperception. We do not

²³ Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intra State Conflict,” *Foreign Policy* 96 (Fall 1994).

²⁴ Cohen, “From Individual Security,” 10.

²⁵ Janusz Bugajski, “Balkan Contradictions: Yugoslavia and Regional Stability,” in *Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner*, 39.

²⁶ James H. Wylie, *European Security in the New Political Environment* (London: Longman, 1997), 180.

need to review here the security dilemma, but we do need to be reminded of some features of the alternative, which is cooperation.

Cooperative behavior may take place between participants of unequal strength. The advantage of cooperation, aside from the relatively equal distribution of rewards, is that any departure from cooperation is a clear statement of intention.²⁷ Cooperative behavior begets cooperation, as hostility begets hostility. The significant difference between the two is that cooperation brings security, while hostility can only achieve stability.

It would seem that, to reach that stage, participants would have to choose not to be hostile, and abide by the new rule of cooperation. The Stability Pact does not prescribe any rules of the sort, except reiterating the intent of each signatory, under the aegis of the EU, NATO, and other organizations and great powers, to strive for the objective of good regional relations. Nowhere in the document is there outlined a regional mechanism for conflict resolution. As such, this prescription is much too vague, and the role of other sponsors much too great, to foster this choice autonomously within each SEE country. At present, I doubt that a policy change can occur that will effect a real departure from realism; participants believe more in the responsibilities of the sponsors of the Stability Pact than in the advantages of a change in mentality.

Perhaps I can suggest a framework here. For neighbors to be certain of each other's intentions, they must start with democracy. Not because it gives freedom, but because it serves as the illustration to its neighbors that a given society is not motivated by a single idea. There must be the transparency that comes with plurality that serves to balance a society so that it does not seem to lapse back into extremism. Once this is achieved, investors and donors will be far more comfortable in forging ties. The resulting economic growth (which may not occur in the near term, but which will occur nonetheless) gives added security to individuals of the region. Freedom from want is added to freedom from fear. Once the region is secured by the application of democratic principles and some form of market economy (mixed in with some social guarantees that can always be sponsored by NGOs, IGOs, or foreign governments),²⁸ the new system of relations can now be codified, giving a legal basis to a philosophical concoction that was hitherto merely "imagined."²⁹ It remains that it is the sum of the volition of the participants that makes this a reality.

Infrastructure projects themselves, such as roads, power grids, and supply networks, will be seen as traditional security liabilities rather than as communication routes if the change in attitude does not come from within the society itself. Democratization must come before anything else. Democracy relies on the appli-

²⁷ Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation," *World Politics* (April 1988): 321.

²⁸ Nelson, "Stable Peace," 37.

²⁹ Charles King, "Strategy and Region-Building in the Wider Southeast Europe," in *Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner*, 49.

cation of measure and tolerance to political debate. These are not easy qualities to master for any population or leader after a decade of ethnic conflict, and this is why it is doubtful that facilitated communications and infrastructure reform can easily be made a prerequisite for the development of a spirit of tolerance, as Pandeli Majko suggests.³⁰ Security through trust must come first. Projects will only be successful not if they are generously funded, but if the region accepts that such projects are designed to foster interdependence, whose material benefits will emerge out of the acceptance that the “others” are there to stay, and that survival can only be mutual. Trust will come if cross-boundary accusations stop. What better way to prevent such accusations than a democratic society, with an independent media, and a system of government endowed with an effective opposition? An effective government opposition seeks popular approval by questioning the efficiency of those in power, instead of having a dictatorship tell the population that its troubles can be blamed on someone outside the state. Again, for a democracy to function, a society must believe in its mechanisms. Enough has been written about what constitutes democracy so that I need not reiterate it here. However, it must be said that every member of society is responsible for the maintenance of the democratic system. Basic individual freedoms must be guaranteed. Foreign direct investment, or, indeed, wealth of any kind will not give you that.³¹

In the short term, it costs a society more to develop projects it thinks will give it wealth than to implement principles of good governance. The Stability Pact, especially in its Articles 7, 8, and 10, provides a tentative framework to effect meaningful change in SEE relations, but the mention of so many sponsors and benefactors in Article 1 begs the question that is answered in Article 9, whether “countries in the region who seek integration in Euro-Atlantic structures, alongside a number of other participants in the Pact, strongly believe that this process will facilitate this objective.”³²

The lone paragraph stating the responsibilities of the participants in the Pact (SEE countries) indicates negatively that the Pact is a solution imposed from without, adding weight to any doubts we may entertain as to whether a theoretical shift has occurred in the minds of the participant states’ leaders. So much in the Pact depends on international organizations and countries outside SEE that we cannot help but be hopeful for some kind of success. The security of too many actors in the EU depends on it. Furthermore, this provides a litmus test for EU diplomacy, both collectively and individually for all EU nations. International credibility de-

³⁰ Majko, “Albania and the Pact of Stability,” 6.

³¹ Ramon P. Diaz, “Capitalism and Freedom in Latin America”, Ch. 6 in *Freedom, Democracy and Economic Welfare*. The experience of Latin American market economies that were also dictatorships demonstrates this point. The cases of Argentina and Brazil show that there can be economic growth, social inequality, and dictatorship within a society.

³² Article 9 of the Stability Pact. Notice that the definition of integration does not resemble what we have given in this essay, yet it comes from official sources.

mands that the Pact succeed, so that the EU can prove it can clean up the messes that occur in its own back yard.

For unrepentant nations, this can be a significant advantage, enabling them to play the necessity for an ill-defined success (which may limit itself in the near to medium term to achieving stability instead of real security) for more and more material benefits. Provided that success is not an illusion banking on stability rather than security, we should see the emergence of a new, fully integrated region able to bring completion to Europe. It may be that the test of security lies solely in the hands of the Stability Pact's participants, but there is no indication of what sanctions may be applied for any deviation from it. Provided that participants "accept that within each society there are contradictions and tensions that reveal what kind of community [they] really [are],"³³ the pride of demonstrating to the world that SEE states abide by modern norms of international behavior will bring them closer together as a region.

If Article 9 can serve as an indicator, regional integration should lead to EU integration. More than the pious statements of Eurocrats, the Stability Pact codifies Europe's intentions vis-à-vis South Eastern Europe. It also leaves room for any country not choosing EU integration to opt out, thereby manifesting its sovereign right as a state. According to our definition, and also looking at historical experience, this should not be cause for concern. Switzerland does not exhibit signs of poor integration despite not being member of the EU.

In this section we have set in opposition realist and cooperative security theories, have found that either could have a direct application for policy formulation, and that if policy formulation was a rational action, then one policy could be substituted for another. In essence, what we have achieved in this section is some sort of "debate on a postulate" which defined our vision as to how and why SEE countries needed to foster a change from a realist to a cooperative outlook. We have found that, in the case of SEE, strong support from interested states and organizations aimed at immediate stabilization needed to be combined, above all, with a deepening of democratic principles before infrastructure projects and investment bids could be expected to develop interdependence.

Mistrust and group-specific policies need to be eradicated through the carrot of short-term advantage for participants in the Stability Pact. Now the time has come for us to propose a project that should combine transparency, hard security, dialogue, and region-building in a meaningful way.

³³ John Ralston Saul, "Across the Great Divide," *Queen's Quarterly* 104:1 (Spring 1997): 14.

Part Three: Hard Security Initiatives

On the one hand, participants in the Balkan Stability Pact are eager to demonstrate that they are making progress according to both the letter and the spirit of the Pact. Despite signing off on the role of international organizations, SEE countries are still likely to be ill at ease with the notion of any foreign presence in their region. This is reciprocal. UN and NATO missions are also hoping for a way out, but not at the cost of a reemergence of regional tensions.

On the other hand, European values and norms are not yet sufficiently embedded to warrant Western withdrawal, or to foster the expectation that meaningful cooperation will be genuine and mutually beneficial. Legal and social structures are not completely adapted to full transparency, and neighboring states typically do not trust one another.

Could the creation of a regional peace support operations training center be an initiative that could achieve some or all of the objectives above? Functional civil-military relations could certainly be improved if officers could gain access to a common training center that would promote European models of military subordination to civilian control. It would bring together military personnel from all corners of South Eastern Europe, where they would acquire the same knowledge, eliminating one form of the security dilemma. Theoretically, courses at such a regional center would be integrated into the normal career paths of the student-officers, meaning that they would return to their duties after their studies to greater responsibilities, where they can practice what they have learned. The officers of the armies of SEE countries would have a chance to develop an ethos hitherto unknown to them, and, for some of them, gain closure from the events of 1991 – 99 and develop a new sense of pride in their martial activity.

Presumably, this would be an initiative run by NATO countries with the help of other organizations, so there would also be an opportunity to learn English (with a view to European integration). But, more than stronger contacts between each SEE country and with a Western sponsor through language, such a center could strengthen the spirit of dialogue that will lead to civilians trusting their militaries more (an essential feature in some multi-ethnic communities that are emerging from civil war) and also lead to militaries within the region trusting each other more by virtue of the transparency afforded by the commonality of the training program.

In time, the aim of this center would evolve to include developing a common regional doctrine for PSOs that could be extended to other areas. This is relevant in the context of the parallel processes of integration of the EU (which is crafting its common foreign and defense policy) and of the regional community of SEE (which would then be developing the tools and the habits of cooperation to better graft the region on to the EU in due time).

Peace Support Operations is a non-contentious sphere of activity. It is also an

activity that requires qualified and dedicated manpower. A regional peace support operations training center would develop the skills and leadership needed to hand back control over the region to its own authorities in anticipation of a greater pullout of foreign forces. So the intent would be far more than symbolic. It would be a practical tool destined to both integrate the SEE countries and to ease the removal of Western armies from the region. Any integration and any extraction are dependent on the degree and quality of rapprochement that occurs in the region.

Perhaps the greatest achievement of a regional peace support operations training center would be that it would train military personnel for modern contingencies. Peace support is fast becoming the principal activity of responsible armies. As an expression of the values of European societies, their respective militaries have adapted to the new policies that the norms of European community dictate. An indication of successful SEE integration would be obedience to the notion that unjustified, proactive, and aggressive use of a state's power of coercion is now proscribed in many cases.

If the military arm can learn restraint, it will be easier for politicians to advocate policies that demand such restraint. Furthermore, the army will become a more useful tool for the other members of a community (like the PfP, the EU or NATO), as their capabilities are similar and their outlook identical.

Provided that the center is located at a neutral site, that what is taught there is practical and applicable to real situations, that what is taught does not rub members the wrong way, that there is continued support from sponsors and benefactors, and—primarily—that participants freely choose to participate in good faith, such an initiative could fit nicely in the defense and security sub-table of the Stability Pact.

The Stability Pact has its shortcomings, but it does provide an adequate foundation for successful integration. Membership will follow integration if dominant EU and Atlantic values are absorbed and applied in the societies of South Eastern Europe.

To absorb these values and norms, SEE countries must put into practice the characteristics of democracy and the rule of law. Only this can permit foreign investment and confidence in the region for more funding of projects. A rules-based region has better odds of developing true cooperative projects, because there is the implicit acceptance that the neighbor's well-being affects your own. Infrastructure projects like roads and power networks cease to become liabilities, and instead foster greater trade and interdependence.

Trade cannot be generated in an environment ruled by instability. Therefore, this essay proposes a practical initiative to address the questions of civil-military relations, regional relations, capability, and region-building, all in harmony with national policies and priorities.

This could prove to be a stepping-stone in a long series of processes on the way to successful integration and consequent membership in Atlantic and European structures. The approach outlined above is proposed for discussion purposes and is quite open to criticism. I feel there is a certain logic in the transformation of SEE from a hotbed of tension to an area of peace. While donors have a responsibility during the incubation period of the Stability Pact, SEE countries are, in the final analysis, masters of their own destinies. And thus a simple positive decision from participant states' leaders is required. Anything else that leaders of SEE states may wish for outside EU structures, and indeed, outside EU norms, remains the privilege of sovereign states. "The new Europe [has demonstrated] that nationalism is a movement that over time cannot be suppressed or manipulated," writes Madeleine Albright.³⁴ But the experience of the former Yugoslavia demonstrates that, nowadays, there are stark limits to a state's sovereign rights.

Either through their own willingness, or through the benevolent (or coercive) pressure of neighboring powers, SEE countries must dissolve their new-found identities within a greater European identity.

³⁴ Madeleine K. Albright, "The Glorious Revolutions of 1989," in *The New Democratic Frontier*, eds. Larry Garber & Eric Bjornlund (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1992), 12.

