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Research Article

Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia

Steve Abrams

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of Soviet-style "active measures" as an element of modern Russian "political warfare." These techniques were commonly used during the Soviet-era, encompassing a broad range of influence activities, including: covert media placement, forgery, agents of influence, "friendship" societies, front organizations, and more. Today, in Putin's Russia, these active measures are once again in use, updated for digitally interconnected "global information space." The paper begins with an introduction to active measures, then discusses their role in Soviet foreign policy and the attempts by the American "Active Measures Working Group" to counter them. The paper then describes how the Soviet active measures playbook has been updated for the modern era, using three case studies as examples. The paper concludes with a discussion on strategy, reproducing a number of recommendations from key publications.

Keywords: active measures, agent of influence, deception operations, disinformation, hybrid warfare, subversion, KGB, Russia, Siloviki.

Preface: An Awakening

The neatest trick of the devil is to persuade you that he does not exist.
— Charles Baudelaire, 1869 [1]

They began to appear in late February 2014. Equipped with the latest military weapons and gear, stripped of identification and riding unmarked military vehicles, they rapidly seized ground.[2] While the world looked on in confusion, in a few weeks it was over; Crimea belonged to the Little Green Men.

[1] Charles Baudelaire, *Paris Spleen: Little Poems in Prose*, trans. Keith Waldrop (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2009), 60.

[2] Arto Pulkki, "Crimea Invaded by High Readiness Forces of the Russian Federation,"

Several months later, on a beautiful July afternoon, a shower of composite and aluminum aircraft parts suddenly darkened the blue skies of Eastern Ukraine, raining down upon the sunflower fields near Hrabove. The 298 passengers and crew of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 were all killed when their Boeing 777 was struck by a Russian-made 9M38 missile, launched by a Buk-M1 anti-aircraft system.[3] At over 18 feet long, the missile was nearly the size of a telephone pole, and traveling three times the speed of sound.

Screened by a schizophrenic torrent of state-sponsored propaganda, the Kremlin maintained innocence, distancing Russia from the controversial events and vehemently denying involvement – despite mounting evidence to the contrary.

For many Western audiences, their first introduction to modern Russian propaganda was the frenetic spin cycle surrounding these dramatic events. Described as "darkly, nastily brilliant" and "so much more sophisticated than Soviet propaganda," in the year and a half since Crimea's illegal referendum on independence, journalistic observation and scholarly analysis of the RT television network (formerly Russia Today) and others have helped raise awareness of the Kremlin's coordinated manipulation of Russian mass media.[4]

Unfortunately, RT and other state-controlled media outlets represent only one facet of a much larger influence campaign – a single tool in a range of understudied activities that constitute a concerning gap in the West's broader "soft-containment" of Putin's Russia.

An Introduction to "Active Measures"

> *In short, the Soviet approach to international relations can perhaps best be described as a form of "political warfare," with the manipulative and deceptive techniques of active measures playing an essential and important role.*
>
> — USIA Report, *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*, 1988-1991[5]

Suomen Sotilas, 3 March 2014.

3 Nick Miller, "MH17 Plane Was Shot Down by a Buk Missile, Russian Weapons Manufacturer Says," *The Age*, 3 June 2015, available at www.theage.com.au/world/mh17-plane-was-shot-down-by-a-buk-missile-russian-weapons-manufacturer-says-20150602-ghfdco.html (accessed 9 August 2015); Dutch Safety Board, *Crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight Mh17* (The Hague: Dutch Safety Board, 2015), 9, available at http://onderzoeksraad.nl/en/onderzoek/2049/investigation-crash-mh17-17-july-2014 (accessed 11 February 2016).

4 David Remnick quoted by Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, *The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money* (New York, NY: The Institute of Modern Russia, 2014), 14.

5 United States Information Agency, *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era* (Washington, D.C.: 1992), available at http://intellit.muskingum.edu/russia_folder/pcw_era/index.htm#Contents (accessed 19 August 2015). This document is digitally archived in hyperlinked sections. This quote appears in the section titled "The Role of Active Measures in Soviet Foreign Policy."

> *The most powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skillful, and obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable, and conditional.*
>
> —Vladimir Lenin [6]

The Russian Federation is currently waging "the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg … in the history of information warfare," pursuing a revanchist foreign policy considered by senior diplomatic and military leaders to be a tremendous security threat for both Europe and America.[7] While many in the West are by now familiar with Russia's infamous RT network, its state-sponsored media outlets are only the tip of the iceberg – the "white propaganda" component of a much broader system of influence activities designed to shape the global information space.

With roots in Leninist thinking, over generations the Soviets mastered a range of techniques known as *aktivnyye meropriyatiya*, or "active measures," ranging from simple propaganda and forgery to assassination, terrorism and everything in between. In the West, these politics by other means were simply referred to as "dirty tricks."[8]

Described by Major General Oleg Kalugin, the KGB's highest ranking defector, as "the heart and soul of Soviet intelligence," these "active measures were well integrated into Soviet policy and involved virtually every element of the Soviet party and state structure, not only the KGB."[9] As a major component of

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6 Ibid., Quote appears in section titled "The Soviet View of Compromise and Conciliation."

7 Michael Birnbaum, "Fearing Russian Expansion, Baltic Nations Step Up Military Exercises," *The Washington Post*, 16 May 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/fearing-russian-expansion-baltic-nations-step-up-military-exercises/2015/05/15/b5ee51ee-f8c8-11e4-a47c-e56f4db884ed_story.html (accessed 17 May 2015); Ian Johnston, "'Russia's Growing Threat: After Ukraine, Fears Grow That Baltic States Could Be Vladimir Putin's Next Targets," *The Independent*, 8 February 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russias-growing-threat-after-ukraine-fears-grow-that-baltic-states-could-be-vladimir-putins-next-targets-10032378.html (accessed 19 August 2015); Jamie Crawford, "Joint Chiefs Nominee: Russia Greatest Threat to U.S.," *CNN Politics*, 10 July 2015, www.cnn.com/2015/07/09/politics/joseph-dunford-russia-greatest-threat/index.html (accessed 17 August 2015).

8 "Soviet Active Measures," YouTube video, 23:31, posted by PublicResourceOrg, 9 December 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-X_bXL2Tgo (accessed 19 August 2015).

9 "Inside the KGB – An interview with retired KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin," *Cold War Experience*, *CNN*, January 1998, http://web.archive.org/web/20070627183623/http://www3.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/21/interviews/kalugin (accessed 8 July 2015). While some consider Kalugin a controversial figure, where referenced in

Soviet foreign policy, these tactics were incredibly well resourced. According to experts, the "Soviet active measures apparatus dwarfed, by a factor of perhaps 20 or 30 to one, the US governmental apparatus set up to analyze and counter its activities."[10] At their peak, it is estimated that the Soviet active measures campaign employed up to 15,000 people – more than the number of diplomats serving in the post-9/11 US Department of State.[11]

> *I would describe it as the heart and soul of the Soviet intelligence – was subversion. Not intelligence collection, but subversion: active measures to weaken the West, to drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO, to sow discord among allies, to weaken the United States in the eyes of the people of Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and thus to prepare ground in case the war really occurs. To make America more vulnerable to the anger and distrust of other peoples.*
>
> Oleg Kalugin, KGB Major General (retired) [12]

Even at the height of the Cold War, despite their massive scale, the use of these programs by the Soviet Union was not well understood, and today, broadly addressed under the ambiguous labels of "hybrid warfare" and "malign influence," these techniques are even less understood, and their use largely forgotten – relics of the Cold War.[13]

Unfortunately, it is becoming clear that Soviet-era active measures are alive and flourishing in Putin's Russia. Enabled by technology and adapted for a globalized world, their modern incarnations are much more sinister, with far greater range and speed – and, through the Internet, able to influence popular opinion on a scale never before possible.

Through the European Reassurance Initiative and Operation Atlantic Resolve, US and NATO allies are working to deter Russian military aggression along the Alliance's flanks.[14] Sector-based and individually-targeted economic

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this document, his quotes comport with a number of other firsthand accounts by KGB defectors; Thomas Boghardt, "Operation INFEKTION: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign," *Studies in Intelligence* 53:4 (December 2009), 1–2.

10 *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*. Quote appears in section titled "White or Overt Active Measures."

11 Pomerantsev and Weiss, *The Menace of Unreality*, 8; Matthew Asada, Susan Johnson and Cameron Munter, "Diplomacy Post-9/11: Life in the US Foreign Service," interview by Kojo Nnamdi, *The Kojo Nnamdi Show*, 22 September 2011, http://thekojonnamdishow.org/shows/2011-09-22/diplomacy-post-911-life-us-foreign-service (accessed 19 August 2015). The 15,000 figure is referenced by Pomerantsev and Weiss, and the number of post-9/11 diplomats comes from Kojo Nnamdi's interview.

12 "Inside the KGB."

13 Dennis Kux, "Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation: Overview and Assessment," *Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College* 15:4 (Winter 1985), 19.

14 US European Command Communication and Engagement Directorate, "Operation Atlantic Resolve Fact Sheet," 19 February 2015.

sanctions have been imposed on Russia by the US and the EU.[15] Western awareness of Russian propaganda is steadily growing, and steps are slowly being taken on both sides of the Atlantic to reduce the effectiveness and reach of the campaign.[16]

Despite efforts to mitigate Russia's military threat on one end of the spectrum and a white propaganda campaign on the other, publicly at least, the "gray area" in the middle remains largely unaddressed. This is key terrain – the battleground for active measure campaigns.

While the "means" have been updated for today's environment, strikingly close parallels may be drawn between the "ends" and "ways" of the Soviet active measures playbook and the "malign influence" of Putin's Russia.

By studying the exceptional and forgotten work of America's Cold War experts, and updating and adapting their 30-year-old lessons, today's security professionals and journalists can more easily identify and expose Putin's "dirty tricks."

Historical Background: President Reagan and the Active Measures Working Group

On January 20, 1981, Ronald Reagan was sworn in as the 40th President of the United States, beginning the first of two terms and opening the final chapters of the Cold War. Reagan's plan to end the conflict would be detailed in 1983 in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, but he had defined his vision years earlier.[17] In a 1977 conversation with Richard V. Allen, his chief foreign policy advisor, Reagan stated plainly, "My idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple … We win and they lose."[18]

A profound shift from containment and détente, the Reagan Doctrine, as the strategy outlined in NSDD 75 became known, took a much more aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union. Designed to "accelerate the demise of the Soviet Union," and "roll back" Soviet influence throughout the world, NSDD 75

[15] "Ukraine Crisis: Russia and Sanctions," *BBC News*, 19 December 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26672800 (accessed 19 August 2015).

[16] Bill Gertz, "House Adds Funds to Counter Russian Info War," *Washington Times*, 29 April 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/29/inside-the-ring-house-funding-bill-targets-russian/? (accessed 19 August 2015); "Lithuania to Ban Russian TV Channel for 'Warmongering,'" *Deutsche Welle*, 8 April 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/lithuania-to-ban-russian-tv-channel-for-warmongering/a-18370852 (accessed 19 August 2015).

[17] Norman A. Bailey, *The Strategic Plan That Won the Cold War: National Security Decision Directive 75* (MacLean, VA: The Potomac Foundation, 1998).

[18] Richard V. Allen, "The Man Who Won the Cold War," *Hoover Digest*, 30 January 2000, http://www.hoover.org/research/man-who-won-cold-war (accessed 6 August 2015).

offered clear strategic guidance and resulted in the broad implementation of new initiatives across all instruments of national power.[19]

Easily overlooked amid this transformation and lost in the high-stakes drama of the Reagan years was the formation of a small "part-time interagency committee" known as the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG).[20] Established in the summer of 1981 and producing a final report in 1992, the group operated for eleven years at the height of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union ultimately signaling its end.[21] Originally headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dennis Kux and nested under the US State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau, the group included stakeholders from numerous agencies, including the Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice (DOJ), Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA – later folded into State), and the (now defunct) US Information Agency (USIA).[22]

The mission of the AMWG was to identify and expose Soviet disinformation.[23] In their comprehensive study of the group, Schoen and Lamb write:

> The group successfully established and executed US policy on responding to Soviet disinformation. It exposed some Soviet covert operations and raised the political cost of others by sensitizing foreign and domestic audiences to how they were being duped. The group's work encouraged allies and made the Soviet Union pay a price for disinformation that reverberated all the way to the top of the Soviet political apparatus. It became the US Government's body of expertise on disinformation and was highly regarded in both Congress and the executive branch.[24]

What's in a Name? Defining the Scope of Soviet Active Measures

> *One way of looking at the impact of these activities… is to think of drops of water falling on a stone: five minutes, ten minutes, fifteen minutes, one hour, one day, nothing happens, but five years, ten years, fifteen years – you've worn a hole in the stone.*

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19 Bailey, *The Strategic Plan.*

20 Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb, *Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2012), 3.

21 Ibid. In 1992 the United States Information Agency published what appears to be the final publicly available US Government report on Active Measures, titled "Soviet Active Measures in the 'Post-Cold War' Era 1988-1991." While the report was officially published by USIA and clues to specific authorship are not available, it is almost certain that this document was produced by former AMWG experts as the organization was restructured and disbanded in the wake of the Cold War.

22 Ibid., 35.

23 Ibid., 4–5.

24 Ibid., 3.

— Dennis Kux, Former Head of the Active Measures Working Group, 1984 [25]

"The term active measures... was a catchall expression used by the KGB for a variety of influence activities."[26] In practice however, offering a more exact definition is difficult, for according to former US Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, "no phrase in English conveys precisely the meaning of active measures."[27]

For the interagency stakeholders of the AMWG—America's Cold War experts on the subject—arriving at a consensus definition proved exceedingly challenging.[28] In essence, the term embodied a range of activities limited only by the imagination and creativity of the KGB's half-million officers, and could include anything from simple propaganda to kidnapping, murder, drug trafficking, and the illicit support of terrorism.[29] Throughout its existence, members of the AMWG grappled over the nebulous definition of phrase: "State and CIA, for different reasons, wanted the term defined more narrowly," while "others defined active measures much more broadly to include overt propaganda, covert action, strategic deception, and other types of political warfare."[30] Schoen and Lamb explain:

> KGB influence activities did include setting up and funding front groups, covert broadcasting, media manipulation, disinformation and forgeries, and buying agents of influence. However, this understanding of active measures is too narrow. Soviet active measures went beyond overt and covert operations to manipulate perceptions and into the realms of incitement, assassination, and even terrorism. Soviet leaders made no major distinction between overt propaganda and covert action or between diplomacy and political violence.
>
> In practice, they all were tightly controlled by the Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which approved the major themes of active measures operations.[31]

Eventually, the difficulty of responding to such a broad range of activity resulted in the creation of a classified spin-off group "that operated out of the National Security Council (NSC) staff… us[ing] a wider range of methods and address[ing] a broader set of Soviet active measures than the group at State."[32]

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[25] "Soviet Active Measures," YouTube video.

[26] Schoen and Lamb, *Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications*, 8.

[27] Quoted in Kux, "Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation," 19–20.

[28] Schoen and Lamb, *Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications*, 66–67.

[29] "The Making of a Neo-KGB State," *The Economist*, 23 August 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/9682621 (accessed 11 August 2015); Brian Crozier, "The Other Side of Perestroika: The Hidden Dimension of the Gorbachev Era," *Demokratizatsiya* 4:1 (1996), 48–49. The 500,000 figure appears in *The Economist*, and Crozier describes KGB involvement in drug trafficking.

[30] Schoen and Lamb, *Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications*, 66–67.

[31] Ibid., 8.

[32] Ibid., 8.

While it is assumed that the classified group at NSC handled more kinetic and clandestine active measures, the unclassified working group remained focused solely on exposing Soviet disinformation. By limiting "its mission to countering Soviet influence operations that could be exposed in a compelling way with unclassified or declassified information" and "delineat[ing the mission] in a practical way, the group could hold itself accountable for identifying disinformation problems, finding ways to resolve them, and producing actual results."[33] Further, "the group's modest definition of purpose and holistic approach to the mission allowed it to concentrate on cases that were likely 'winners' and to do so with few resources, which made cooperation from parent organizations more likely."[34]

The concept of active measures, then, offered by the State Department's AMWG provides the best basis for an unclassified, open source examination of the issue, and a starting point for efforts to analyze and expose Russian active measures in the current operating environment.

Writing in a 1985 volume of the US Army War College Journal, *Parameters*, Dennis Kux elaborates on this concept, providing perhaps the best framework for understanding Soviet active measures – one that easily applies to contemporary analysis:

[Consider] the whole spectrum of Soviet foreign policy endeavors through the optic of "white," "gray," and "black" operations. Normal diplomatic, trade, aid, and informational efforts can be considered "white" or overt activities. "Gray" activities are those involving communist fronts, foreign communist parties, "clandestine" radio stations, or well-known media outlets for disinformation. While not officially acknowledged to be Soviet sponsored, semi-overt "gray" activities are widely known as under Soviet direction and control. In contrast, "black" activities involve genuinely clandestine operations: the use of agents of influence, spreading false rumors, duping politicians and journalists, and disseminating

From: Soviet Active Measures in the Post Cold War Era 1988-1991

[33] Ibid., 4–5.

[34] Ibid., 5.

forgeries and fake documents. Active measures fall under either the "gray" or the "black" rubric, although the line ... is often blurred.[35]

A 2009 volume of the CIA's professional journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, explains that two primary categories of active measures were in use during the Soviet Era, and describes their implementation:

1) Center gives *strategic go-ahead* for a disinformation campaign.
2) *Ideas* would be generated by residency officers assigned to read local press, books, and magazines for material that could be used for disinformation purposes.
3) Center would *evaluate* the ideas.
4) Still at the Center, *preparation* involved disinformation specialists writing in their native language, *approvals* by managers, and *translation*.
5) *Targeting* followed. The Center typically sought to launch a story *outside the Soviet bloc-controlled press* to conceal Moscow's hand. This was done frequently through *anonymous letters* and newspaper *articles* in the *Third World*.
6) Once published abroad, the *Soviet media* might pick up and further *propagate* the item by referring to its non-Soviet source.

The first category includes operations initiated and designed within KGB ranks and usually employs such traditional disinformation techniques as forgeries or agents of influence. The KGB conducts hundreds of these categories every year even though their impact is rather limited.

The second type was the result of a strategic decision at the top of the Soviet active measures pyramid and directly approved by the Politburo. Campaigns were usually planned to last several years and encompassed many elements of the Soviet state, including the International Information Department (IID), which directed official press organs, such as TASS, Novosti, and Radio Moscow; and the International Department (ID), responsible for liaison with foreign communist parties, international communist front organizations, and clandestine radios.

The KGB, ID, and IID would cooperate closely in executing a particular campaign with the means available to each – the KGB's Service A, responsible for forgeries and spreading rumors ("black propaganda"), the IID's press organs for official stories ("white propaganda"), the ID for clandestine radio broadcasts and the use of international front organizations ("gray propaganda").[36]

A growing body of evidence suggests that a very similar system of top-down control over Russian disinformation efforts is still in use by the Kremlin today, with journalist Peter Pomerantsev and a number of other former Russian media insiders describing their personal experiences from within the system. Rus-

[35] Kux, "Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation," 19.

[36] Boghardt, "Operation INFEKTION: Soviet Bloc," 3.

sia's disinformation campaigns, like the Soviet Union's, appear to be coordinated and controlled at the highest levels of Kremlin leadership.[37]

What's Past is Prologue

The USIA published a final report on active measures in 1992, but not because Kremlin influence campaigns had ceased to exist.[39] The report, titled "Soviet Active Measures in the Post-Cold War Era 1988–1991," highlights a number of interesting phenomena that took place at the twilight of the USSR.

> *Both the hard-line former communist forces and the Russian Government are engaged in active measures and disinformation operations, in the quest to achieve their political goals. Both groups should be expected to continue to pursue such operations vigorously.*
>
> *Until and unless a truly democratic regime that fully embraces Western ideals of truth, honesty, openness, and mutual advantage emerges in Russia, those in power or contending for power there will, most likely, find it to their advantage to continue active measures and disinformation operations.*
>
> — USIA Report, *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*, 1988-1991[38]

Following the Cold War's end, while the use of "crude, anti-American disinformation" waned, the KGB's active measures apparatus refocused its efforts, ratcheting up attacks on a range of new targets.[40] As the collapse of the Soviet Union neared, new influence campaigns focused on ensuring the survival of the Soviet status quo and preserving existing power structures.

Entering the 1990s, the KGB not only intensified its "defamatory disinformation against … domestic adversaries" of the Soviet Communist Party, but also "launched a major active measures campaign designed to create a benign, and false, image of the KGB."[41] Regarding the West, "Soviet authorities deliberately sought to influence Western policy" by spreading "alarmist active measures themes energetically as they attempted to turn to their advantage Western fears about the dangers of a break-up of the USSR."[42]

Unfortunately, the 1992 report by the AMWG would be the last of its kind, and the authors were clearly well aware of this. With this apparent, they of-

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[37] Carl Schreck, "Russian TV Deserters Divulge Details On Kremlin's Ukraine 'Propaganda,'" *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, 7 August 2015, www.rferl.org/content/russian-television-whistleblowers-kremlin-propaganda/27178109.html (accessed 12 August 2015); Pomerantsev and Weiss, *The Menace of Unreality*.

[38] *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*. Quote appears in section titled "Looking to the Future."

[39] See footnote 21.

[40] *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*. Quote appears in section titled "Crude, Anti-American Disinformation."

[41] Ibid. Quote appears in section titled "Executive Summary."

[42] Ibid. Quote appears in section titled "Executive Summary."

fered a number of predictions and warnings about the continued use of active measures by the new Russia and its former constituent states, stating that "many large fragments of the Soviet active measures apparatus continue to exist and function, for the most part now under Russian rather than Soviet sponsorship."[43]

In the wake of the Cold War and with the "Red Menace" defeated, Western attention would largely shift away from the former Soviet Union – now free to focus elsewhere. The West began to cut military spending, slashing programs and shedding experts and infrastructure deemed obsolete, with the savings earmarked for new domestic priorities – the so-called Peace Dividend.

With the threat of nuclear war averted, in the 90s a new range of conflicts and threats emerged to capture America's attention: Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, a decade of conflict and genocide in the former Yugoslavia, and the ascendancy of Al-Qaeda and the "new" threat of terrorism, as witnessed in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 1996 Centennial Park bombing, the 1996 Khobar towers bombing, and the 1998 bombings of US Embassies in Tanzania and Nairobi.

Meanwhile, with the KGB and its tools of "political warfare" seemingly consigned to the history books, a new, capitalist Russia was emerging from the ashes of the Soviet Union, with powerful oligarchs siphoning away state resources and creating a system of "kleptocracy," birthing a "mafia state" that would lead Russia into the era of Putinism.[44]

The Power Vertical: Vladimir Putin and the Siloviki

There is no such thing as a former KGB man.
— Vladimir Putin, 2006 [45]

Growing up in post-war Leningrad and "influenced by films and books," young Putin became enamored with the world of espionage, setting his sights on a career with the KGB.[46] After completing university in 1975, he officially joined its ranks, launching a 16-year career and attaining the rank of lieutenant colonel

[43] Ibid. Quote appears in section titled "Executive Summary."

[44] David Remnick, "Watching the Eclipse," *The New Yorker*, 11 August 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/11/watching-eclipse (accessed 19 August 2015); "Wikileaks: Russia Branded 'Mafia State' in Cables," *BBC News*, 2 December 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-11893886 (accessed 19 August 2015).

[45] Quoted in Anna Nemtsova, "A Chill in the Moscow Air," *Newsweek*, 5 February 2006, http://www.newsweek.com/chill-moscow-air-113415 (accessed 19 August 2015).

[46] Quoted in "Vladimir Putin: Biography," *Vladimir Putin Personal Website*, http://eng.putin.kremlin.ru/bio (accessed 19 August 2015); Masha Gessen, "Portrait of the Young Vladimir Putin," *Newsweek*, 2 February 2012, www.newsweek.com/portrait-young-vladimir-putin-65739 (accessed 11 August 2015).

before ostensibly leaving the service in 1991.[47] After the KGB, he entered politics, serving as Deputy Mayor of St. Petersburg until 1996.[48] In July 1998, he returned to the security services, where he was appointed Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) by President Boris Yeltsin – putting him in charge of the KGB's closest post-Soviet successor.[49]

Putin's official Kremlin biography offers a rather bland overview of his intelligence career, a chronology that minimizes his achievements and contrasts with a number of accounts – some of which claim "that Putin was deeply involved in several of the KGB's highest priority operations through the 1980s and into the 1990s."[50]

For "the man without a face" (to borrow from journalist Masha Gessen), an accurate, open source account of his time with the KGB may never come to light, and the truth of Putin's past will likely remain within the realm of speculation.[51] What seems clear, however, is that he served with the KGB's First Chief Directorate (responsible for foreign intelligence) at the height of the Cold War, during a period that overlapped with the existence of the US State Department's AMWG.

As an officer in the Soviet-era First Chief Directorate, Putin would have been "expected to spend 25 percent of his time conceiving and implementing [active measures]."[52] He would have first learned to wield these skills in 1975 during initial training and indoctrination at KGB School #1, and they would have been reinforced in Moscow in 1984 during his studies at the KGB's elite Andropov Red Banner Institute.[53] After serving 16 years with the KGB, and later as head of the FSB, there can be no doubt that Putin is well-trained in the use of active measures as a foreign policy tool – as were all KGB officers of his era.

Since his appointment as acting president in 1999, Putin has systematically consolidated power, placing an expansive network of trusted friends and security service veterans into positions of great influence throughout the government and Russian society at large.[54] This system has become known as the

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[47] "Russia 2000 Part 2: The Face of Russia to Come," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 11 October 1999, https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/russia-2000-part-2-face-russia-come (accessed 15 August 2015).

[48] "Vladimir Putin: Biography;" "Russia 2000 Part 2;" Gessen, "Portrait of the Young Vladimir Putin."

[49] Ibid.

[50] "Russia 2000 Part 2."

[51] Cf. Masha Gessen, *The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin* (New York: Riverhead, 2012).

[52] Boghardt, "Operation INFEKTION: Soviet Bloc," 1.

[53] "Vladimir Putin: Biography;" "Russia 2000 Part 2;" Gessen, "Portrait of the Young Vladimir Putin."

[54] Andrei Illarionov, "The Siloviki in Charge," *Journal of Democracy* 20:2 (April 2009): 70–71.

"Power Vertical," and its strongmen the "siloviki," or "power guys."[55] These so-called "securocrats" "reach … into all areas of Russian life. They can be found not just in the law-enforcement agencies but in the ministries of economy, transport, natural resources, telecoms and culture. Several KGB veterans occupy senior management posts in Gazprom, Russia's biggest company, and its pocket bank, Gazprombank."[56] Providing an eye-opening assessment of this phenomenon, in 2006 researcher Olga Kryshtanovskaya found that nearly 80% percent of Russia's elite have ties to the security services.[57] It thus appears that Putin has truly created a "neo-KGB state."[58]

Furthermore, Putin has now been at the top of the Russian Federation for more than 15 years, in 2008 flip-flopping with Dmitry Medvedev for a brief stint as prime minister before returning to the presidency through a slick interpretation of the Russian constitution. After Medvedev's 2008 extension of presidential term limits to six years, even without further constitutional manipulation, Putin could conceivably remain president of the Russian Federation until 2024 – outlasting Barack Obama and possibly the next two US presidents.[59]

With the likelihood of Putin's continued reign combined with the potential longevity of his vast siloviki network (which will likely far outlive the Putin era), it seems certain that active measures will continue to play a key role in Russian foreign policy well into the foreseeable future. With the hopeful "reset years" now a distant memory, the West must recognize the important role of active measures in Russian foreign policy, taking immediate steps to raise awareness and blunt the effectiveness of these "dirty tricks" in the modern era.

Everything Old is New Again

Following the dissolution of the AMWG, concrete, verifiable evidence of Russian active measures becomes much harder to expose, and the extent of their use in the 90s remains largely unknown. Reports of their use began to increase, however, after Putin came to office in 1999.

Open-source assertion that Russia was once again using active measures as a component of foreign policy came in the 2008 annual report of the Czech Security Information Service – equivalent to the US's FBI. The authors state unequivocally that the "operations of intelligence services of the Russian Federation … are by far the most active ones in our territory. The assumption that Russia readopted the Soviet practice of using active measures to promote its

[55] "The Making of a Neo-KGB State."

[56] The phrase securocrats appears in Illarionov, "The Siloviki in Charge," 69; "The Making of a Neo-KGB State" describes their reach.

[57] "Russia: Expert Eyes Security Ties Among Siloviki," *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073593.html (accessed 26 July 2015).

[58] "The Making of a Neo-KGB State."

[59] Jim Nichol, *Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and US Interests* (Congressional Research Service, 2014), 6–7.

foreign policy interests worldwide has thus been confirmed."[60] The report further emphasizes that "the forms and methods the Russian intelligence services use in their work have been, to a considerable degree, inspired by the forms and methods successfully employed by the Soviet espionage in the 1980s."[61]

More than seven years after the Czech report, with the lessons of Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and flight MH17 fresh in the global consciousness, it appears that the forecasts made in the AMWG's final 1992 report have also been confirmed. Today, it seems certain that the Kremlin's use of active measures in foreign policy did not end with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The use of active measures in modern Russian political warfare is merely the continuation of decades-old Soviet policy, itself a reflection of Imperial Russian methods.[62] In the 21st century, Russia has simply recycled and updated these age-old subversion techniques for use in a digitally interconnected and globalized world – the single world information area described by Soviet thinkers more than 25 years ago.[63]

Meet the New Tricks, Same as the Old Tricks

Although the "ends" and "ways" of Putin's active measures may be broadly analogous to those of the Soviet Era, many of the "means" have been updated for the contemporary environment. In some cases, old methods have been completely supplanted: gone are the typewriters and letter writing campaigns, replaced by view counts, retweets, and "troll factories." In other cases, old techniques are still effective, and front groups, friendship societies, and agents of influence still have their place today.

While state-sponsored media outlets like RT, Ruptly, and Sputnik are certainly part of the "information warfare blitzkrieg," analysis of their content and themes can lend vital clues to the presence of ongoing active measures in the "real world." As identified by the AMWG more than 25 years ago, then as now, Russian state-sponsored media outlets are the "white propaganda" component of a symbiotic, mutually supporting system of disinformation. In Putin's Russia, the state mechanism of subversion replicates its Soviet precursor, closely matching this description from the USIA's 1992 report:

> The 'black' (KGB), 'gray' (Christian Peace Conference) [a Soviet front group], and 'white' (Novosti Press Agency) elements of the Soviet active measures apparatus worked together, weaving a seamless web that first planted and then spread the

[60] Security Information Service of the Czech Republic, *Annual Report of the Security Information Service (BIS)* (2008), 5.

[61] Ibid., 5.

[62] Schoen and Lamb, "Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications," 9.

[63] *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*. Quote appears in section titled "New Thinking in Perspective: The Soviet View."

messages of Soviet active measures specialists, while obscuring their role in orchestrating this campaign from start to finish.[64]

Case Study #1: Media Manipulation, Troll Factories, and Useful Idiots

> *Our KGB staff, using new typewriters and wearing gloves so as not to leave fingerprints, typed up hundreds of anonymous hate letters and sent them to dozens of African missions. The letters, purportedly from white supremacists as well as average Americans, were filled with virulent racist diatribes. The African diplomats publicized some of the letters as examples of the racism still rampant in America, and members of the American and foreign press corps quoted from them.*
>
> — Oleg Kalugin, 1994[65]

During the Cold War, one of the most widely practiced Soviet active measure techniques was the manipulation of global media through planted stories. Mainly targeting third-world audiences, the KGB followed a methodology that could be summarized as plant, incubate, and propagate.

As described in *Studies in Intelligence*, false stories were first developed by KGB officers as part of a larger disinformation campaign, and then planted in an easily manipulated media environment – usually in the third world.[67] The story would then be picked up by local news outlets and allowed to incubate.[68] After some time, and depending on a story's "stickiness," when it had gained enough traction in smaller markets, larger Soviet press outlets would pick it up and propagate it to a wider audience.[69]

> *In 1983, the Patriot, a pro-Soviet Indian paper that often published pieces provided by KGB agents, released a story claiming that the US military created the AIDS virus and released it as a weapon. For a couple of years, the story appeared in minor publications that were mostly KGB controlled or sympathetic to the Soviets. After this incubation period, the slander was picked up in 1985 by the official Soviet cultural weekly newspaper, the Literaturnaya Gazeta. After that, the story began to spread rapidly. In 1987 alone, it appeared over 40 times in the Soviet-controlled press and was reprinted or rebroadcast in over 80 countries in 30 languages. The AIDS virus was terrifying and not well understood at the time, so this piece of Soviet disinformation was especially damaging to the US image.*
>
> — Fletcher Schoen & Christopher Lamb[66]

While these media manipulation efforts were usually easy for Western audiences to recognize and dismiss, sometimes even major Western outlets were duped into propagating the stories. Even if Western outlets never picked up the story, the seeds of doubt had

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64 Ibid. Quote appears in section titled "Manipulation of the Russian Orthodox Church."

65 Oleg Kalugin, *Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2009), originally published as *The First Directorate* (n.p.: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 54.

66 Schoen and Lamb, "Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications," 6.

67 Boghardt, "Operation INFEKTION: Soviet Bloc," 3.

68 Ibid., 3.

69 Ibid., 3.

been sown and, often, their rumors and conspiracy theories made their way back to the West and into public consciousness. In essence, with its Cold War media manipulation efforts, the KGB was "going viral" with its disinformation long before the Internet age.

As the now-famous meme goes, "on the Internet, no one knows you're a dog," and today it is far easier for Russian disinformation to go viral – without a legion of typewriters and a ream of stamps.[70] Plant, incubate, propagate has been replaced by tweet, retweet, repeat.

For example, in an article titled, "The Agency," the *New York Times* sheds light on the fascinating rise of Russia's so-called "troll factories." The organization profiled in the article is based in St. Petersburg, and known as the Internet Research Agency.[71] According to the article, "the agency had become known for employing hundreds of Russians to post pro-Kremlin propaganda online under fake identities, including on Twitter, in order to create the illusion of a massive army of supporters."[72] It then describes an interview with Ludmila Savchuck, former "Agency" employee turned whistleblower, who explains the workload: "Two 12-hour days in a row, followed by two days off. Over those two shifts she had to meet a quota of five political posts, 10 nonpolitical posts and 150 to 200 comments on other workers' posts."[73]

According to former troll farm owner Platon Mamatov, also profiled in the article, there are "scores of operations like his around the country, working for government authorities at every level."[74] At "The Agency" in St. Petersburg, Savchuck was just one of reportedly 400 employees.[75]

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[70] "On The Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog," *Wikipedia*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Internet,_nobody_knows_you%27re_a_dog (accessed 19 August 2015).

[71] Adrian Chen, "The Agency," *The New York Times*, 2 June 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html (accessed 20 June 2015).

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

The true scope of these relatively new trolling operations is unknown, and critically understudied. It would seem, though, that the troll farms accomplish a number of subversive objectives and are directly descended from several classic active measure techniques.

First, their efforts to pollute the global information space "have made it impossible for the normal Internet user to separate truth from fiction," shaping the environment for other Russian influence campaigns and messaging.[77] In addition, "waves of trolls and bots regularly promote pro-Putin hashtags" and stories, propagating the Kremlin's message with a magnitude that was impossible before the Internet and social media age.[78]

> *Agents of influence are foreigners who have been recruited by the KGB in order to be used to influence the opinions of foreign publics and governments. Agents of influence are extremely useful because they are perceived as loyal patriots of their respective countries who are simply expressing their own personal opinions, not scripts written by the KGB... The covert influence campaigns that they wage in public and private are not only the most difficult type of active measures operation to identify, but also potentially the most potent if the agent of influence is a senior government official or a respected public figure.*
>
> — USIA Report, *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*, 1988–1991[76]

While examples of social media "weaponization" are becoming increasingly common, a 2014 incident demonstrates how the Kremlin's hashtag propagation efforts can be amplified with the help of an American celebrity – a useful agent of influence perhaps blindly promoting the Kremlin's propaganda. Alexander Ovechkin is a renowned and immensely popular hockey player in America's National Hockey League (NHL). A Moscow native, he played a number of years for Dynamo Moscow and has been a member of the Russian National team on multiple occasions, both at World Championship events and during the Olympics.[79]

In 2004 he was the NHL's number one draft pick, signed by the Washington Capitals and entering the league during the 2005-2006 season. Two years later, he signed the highest paying contract in NHL history, worth $124 million over 13 years.[80] For his achievements on the ice, he was named rookie of the year in 2006, and Most Valuable Player in 2008, 2009, and again in 2013. He currently has 365,000 Instagram followers, and more than 1.42 million on Twitter.[81]

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[76] *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*. Quote appears in section titled "Agents of Influence."

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

[79] "Alexander Ovechkin," *Wikipedia*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Ovechkin (accessed 19 August 2015).

[80] Ibid.

[81] https://instagram.com/aleksandrovechkinofficial (accessed 19 August 2015); https://twitter.com/ovi8 (accessed 19 August 2015).



On August 28th, 2014, he instagrammed a professional photo of himself in a t-shirt that read, "No War." In the photo, he held a sign implicitly supporting Russia's involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, bearing the hashtag, "#SAVECHILDRENFROMFASCISM." The post received more than 17.4 thousand "likes," immediately reaching his nearly two million social media followers and garnering an even larger audience when the story was picked up by local and international media. Two weeks later (sourced from RIA Novosti), the story appeared on the English-language site of Russian internet news outlet Sputnik, which bills itself as a "provider of alternate news content" and is openly financed by the Russian government.[82] Sputnik's story emphasized the "strong [Western] criticism" Ovechkin received for his photo. Yet despite receiving criticism for his social media activity, Ovechkin continues to post pro-Putin content online, widely propagating the Kremlin's message and still serving as a useful tool in Russia's active measure arsenal.

Case Study #2: Driving Wedges in Western Alliances with Agents of Influence and Front Groups

A favorite strategy of Soviet active measure campaigns was to exploit rifts in Western alliances – particularly between EU and NATO member states. Russia continues to employ this strategy today. The European Council on Foreign Relations published a report in 2007 that brings some of these cracks into focus, highlighting "the EU's failure to agree on a common Russia policy" and demonstrating that this has "allowed the Kremlin to increase its leverage over the EU, through signing bilateral energy deals, playing the Kosovo card, asserting itself in the common neighbourhood, and dragging its feet on preventing nuclear proliferation."[83]

The report categorizes EU member states based on their stance toward Russia, singling out Greece and Cyprus as "trojan horses whose governments often

[82] "Ovechkin Speaks Against Fascism in Ukraine, Faces Criticism From Americans," *Sputnik News*, 10 September 2014, http://sputniknews.com/world/20140910/192814040/Ovechkin-Speaks-Against-Fascism-in-Ukraine-Faces-Criticism-From.html (accessed 19 August 2015).

[83] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, *A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations* (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2007).

defend positions close to Russian interests, and who have been willing to veto common EU positions. The [report] also reveals little-known facts such as Cyprus being the biggest official 'investor' in Russia, due to the amount of Russian capital which is saved there."[84]

Demonstrating the potential for a Russian "spoiler" within the EU, and at the very least, the manipulation of a high-level mouthpiece, in April 2015 Putin met with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, adding to the furor over Greece's potential departure from the EU – the so-called "Grexit." Coming at a critical time in the crisis, Putin's meeting with the Prime Minister was highly controversial, as were Tsipras' comments regarding Western sanctions against Russia. Tsipras said, "we have repeatedly declared our disagreement … this is our point of view that we constantly express to our colleagues in the EU. We don't think that this is a fruitful decision. It's practically an economic war."[85]

Manipulation of political groups is a classic active measures technique, and Russia is currently influencing a number of these groups in the EU – their stage-managed sound bites making headlines and scoring influence for the Kremlin. An article by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty from July 2015 highlights several concerning incidents involving French groups, likely tied to Russian active measure campaigns. In November 2015, for instance, the "far-right National Front party made headlines… when it accepted an $11 million loan from Russian creditors following talks between its leader, Marine Le Pen, and officials in Moscow."[86] The National Front party runs on an anti-EU and anti-immigration platform, and has been called a "pro-Russian bloc inside the EU Parliament."[87] In May 2014, the National Front Party became France's "top party on the European stage… polling a historic 25% of votes in the European elections."[88]

In a recent, highly controversial example of Russian manipulation, a group of ten French lawmakers from the mainstream political right visited Crimea in July 2015, becoming "the first… European delegation since the peninsula's un-

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[84] Ibid.

[85] David M. Herszenhorn and Liz Alderman, "Putin Meets With Alexis Tsipras of Greece, Raising Eyebrows in Europe," *The New York Times*, 8 April 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/04/09/world/europe/putin-russia-alexis-tsipras-greece-financial-crisis.html (accessed 12 August 2015).

[86] Claire Bigg, "Crimea Visit Spotlights Kremlin Sympathies Beyond French Fringes," *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, 29 July 2015, www.rferl.org/content/crimea-visit-spotlights-kremlin-sympathies-beyond-french-fringes/27159124.html (accessed 29 July 2015).

[87] Luke Harding, "We Should Beware Russia's Links With Europe's Right," *The Guardian*, 8 December 2014, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/08/russia-europe-right-putin-front-national-eu (accessed 12 August 2015).

[88] Kim Willsher, "Marine Le Pen's confidence vindicated by Front National election triumph," *The Guardian*, last modified 25 May 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/25/marine-le-pen-confidence-proves-vindicated-front-national (accessed 19 August 2015).

recognized annexation by Russia."[89] While in Crimea, the parliamentarians made a number of contentious statements, supporting Crimea's referendum on independence (note: which was deemed illegal by the EU), and stating that there was "no reason for Europe to maintain its sanctions against Russia."[90] The trip, which, according to the article, was "denounced… as a violation of international law" by the French Foreign Ministry, was organized by the Franco-Russian Dialogue Association; undoubtedly a Russian front group, and part of a "gray" active measures campaign directed against France.[91] A blatant indicator, the group's co-president, Vladimir Yakunin, is a close friend of Putin's with a reported KGB past. In March 2014 he was specifically named on a US Treasury Department list of sixteen Russians targeted for individual sanctions. The Treasury's justification was as follows:

> Vladimir Yakunin was appointed as chairman of the board of the Russian state-owned company Russian Railways on June 15, 2005; he has remained as head of the company ever since. Yakunin is being designated because of his official position in the Russian government, but he is also a close confidant of Putin. Yakunin regularly consults with Putin on issues regarding the Russian Railways company. In addition, Yakunin accompanies Putin on many domestic and international visits. Yakunin met Putin while both were working in St. Petersburg. Yakunin decided to create a business center in the city and contacted Putin for his support. In addition, Yakunin became a member of the board of the Baltic Maritime Steamship Company on Putin's instructions. Yakunin and Putin were also neighbors in the elite dacha community on the shore of Lake Komsomolsk and they served as cofounders of the Ozero Dacha Cooperative in November 1996.[92]

Yakunin is but one of Putin's many siloviki, and the Franco-Russian Dialogue Association one of countless state-sponsored friendship groups and discussion clubs. With innocuous-sounding names, similar groups such as the Valdai Discussion Club and many others remain a highly effective tool for manipulating public opinion and amplifying Kremlin messaging.[93]

Case Study #3: Defending the Cash Cow with Front Groups, Espionage, and the Media

Russia is a rentier state, with its energy sector alone providing "20-25 percent of GDP, 65 percent of total exports and 30 percent of [the] government

[89] Bigg, "Crimea Visit Spotlights Kremlin."

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] "Treasury Sanctions Russian Officials, Members of the Russian Leadership's Inner Circle, And An Entity For Involvement In The Situation In Ukraine," Press Center: US Department Of The Treasury, March 20, 2014, accessed August 12, 2015, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl23331.aspx.

[93] Amid controversy, in August 2015 Yakunin stepped down as head of Russian Railways to become a senator representing the Kaliningrad region. In October 2015, he announced plans to launch a policy focused global think tank.

budget."[94] In 2015, low oil prices devastated the one-dimensional Russian economy.[95] With a lack of economic diversity, any disruptions to Russia's energy revenues are a serious threat – and America's emerging fracking industry is a big one. Detailed in a recent article in the National Review, Russia has undertaken a "three-pronged strategy" to weaken the rapidly developing US fracking industry.[96] According to the article, Russia is using a combination of classic active measures, including: "covert payments to environmental groups in the West," and espionage directed at the "American energy industry."[97] The report further describes an ongoing case with the US Justice Department, in which three agents of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) were charged "with spying on United States' efforts to develop alternative energy resources."[98]

In support of these active measures, the campaign is constantly reinforced by state-sponsored propaganda, led by RT, which "recently released an hour-long documentary that 'documents' illnesses supposedly induced by fracking in the American heartland."[99] Similar active measures against fracking are likely to continue, with the Russian Orthodox Church potentially joining the fray and voicing concerns over the environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing.

Conclusion

Don't say, "We need another reset with Russia." And I'm the guy that said that to the president the last time around in the Oval Office.

— Michael McFaul, former US Ambassador to Russia, 2015[100]

Toward the end of the Cold War, NSDD 75 and the Reagan Doctrine provided clear, overarching strategic guidance for the whole of American government – a "single sheet of music" to synchronize the US approach to the Soviet Union. Today, no such guiding document exists for American policy toward the Russian Federation. While a nuclear-armed Russia may not pose the same existential threat to the United States that the Soviet Union once did, the current lack of a

[94] "Key Macroeconomic Indicators," Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, http://www.ved.gov.ru/eng/general/economy/ (accessed 12 August 2015).

[95] Anna Andrianova, "Russian GDP Plunges 4.6%," *Bloomberg Business*, 10 August 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-10/russian-economy-shrinks-4-6-as-oil-slump-risks-deeper-recession (accessed 12 August 2015).

[96] Tom Rogan, "Russia's War on Fracking," *National Review*, 3 February 2015, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/397755/russias-war-fracking-tom-rogan (accessed 24 June 2015).

[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Olivier Knox, "Russia 'Reset' Architect to Next President: Don't Try That Again," *Yahoo Politics*, 28 May 2015, https://www.yahoo.com/politics/russia-reset-architect-to-next-president-dont-120051660936.html (accessed 9 July 2015).

US strategy for Russia promotes confusion among the agencies and inhibits unity of effort in shaping an American response to Russian aggression.[101] With US policy left up to interpretation by individual actors, and without a cogent, definable end state, a disjointed, ineffective response and wasteful spending are likely outcomes. Additionally, lacking a united front, seams between government branches and agencies present themselves for exploitation. As described in a survey of the power relationship between the EU and Russia, for the EU's 28 member states defining a common strategy toward Russia is an even greater challenge, and, likely, next to impossible.[102]

Russia is the world's largest country and borders five EU member states. Its military is nearly 800,000-strong, with an estimated 20,000 tanks and more than 1,300 aircraft.[103] It possesses an estimated 7,500 nuclear warheads, and is training with Iskander tactical nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad.[104] With Putin potentially in office for another nine years, and the "reset" experiment now considered a failure, the US and others must develop a comprehensive strategy for dealing with Russia.[105] Without clear "ends," it is not possible to establish effective "ways" and "means."

Despite the lack of a defined US strategy, a number of think tanks and military leaders are discussing new approaches to a future that will increasingly involve the use of "hybrid warfare." One of these concepts, the so-called "third offset" strategy, envisions a future where "US capability advantages...[in] unmanned operations, extended-range and low observable air operations, undersea warfare, and complex system engineering, integration, and operation … could be leveraged to form a global surveillance and strike (GSS) network."[106] The strategy envisages a network of interconnected, autonomous stealth drones, unmanned undersea vehicles, underwater "payload" stockpiles, high-energy lasers, and counter-space capabilities.[107] This strategy is designed to offset the post-Cold War gains of potential adversaries, and allow the US to maintain military superiority well into the future. Proponents of this third-offset acknowledge, however, that it will not be a panacea. This incredibly expensive

[101] Crawford, "Joint Chiefs Nominee."

[102] Leonard and Popescu, *A Power Audit of EU-Russia*.

[103] Jonathan Masters, "The Russian Military," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 20 March 2015, http://www.cfr.org/russian-federation/russian-military/p33758.

[104] "Status of World Nuclear Forces," *Federation of American Scientists (FAS)*, http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ (accessed 17 August 2015); Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russia Is Putting State-of-the-Art Missiles in Its Westernmost Baltic Exclave," *Business Insider*, 18 March 2015, www.businessinsider.com/russia-placing-state-of-the-art-missiles-in-kaliningrad-2015-3?op=1 (accessed 17 August 2015).

[105] Knox, "Russia 'Reset' Architect."

[106] Robert Martinage, *Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability* (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014), ii, v.

[107] Ibid.

effort will not address a number of fundamental changes taking place in our increasingly globalized society.

Many experts believe that the nature of warfare has undergone a dramatic shift, and future conflicts will be dramatically different than in the past. As Thomas Nissen of the Royal Danish Defence College explains, "War is no longer about states against states (in the conventional sense), but about identity and identity claims, and about cosmopolitanism (inclusion) versus particularism (exclusion/nationalism). Contemporary wars are therefore more about control of the population and the political decision-making process than about control over territory."[108]

Recent Chinese and Russian military doctrines bear out this theory, making it clear that the global information space will be the battlefield of the future – with conflicts won and lost in phase zero of the conflict spectrum. China's "three warfares" strategy relies on "legal warfare, media warfare, and psychological warfare," and Russia's so-called "Gerasimov Doctrine" promotes "the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures."[109] With this in mind, it is extremely likely that use of subversion and active measure campaigns will only increase in the future. It is essential that the US and its allies recognize this threat, and rapidly develop solutions to counter it.

Recommendations

In their report, *The Menace of Unreality*, Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss acknowledge the escalating trend of information weaponization, proposing a number of insightful strategies to combat the effectiveness of coordinated disinformation and propaganda campaigns. Likewise, writing for NATO in a draft report on countering propaganda, reporter Witold Waszczykowski offers a series of suggestions for the Alliance.[110]

While Pomerantsev and Weiss acknowledge the contributions of the AMWG, they also understand the limitations of a Cold War approach and methodology in today's connected world.[111] Despite this, however, the group's experiences still offer a number of critical lessons and best practices for future government efforts to combat active measures and disinformation. Just as age-old Soviet techniques have been modernized through updated "means," the

[108] Thomas E. Nissen, *The Weaponization of Social Media* (Copenhagen, Denmark: Royal Danish Defense College, 2015) 8.

[109] Timothy A. Walton, *China's Three Warfares* (Herndon, VA: Delex Systems, 2012); Sam Jones, "Ukraine: Russia's New Art of War," *Financial Times*, 28 August 2014, www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html (accessed 17 August 2015).

[110] Witold Waszczykowski, *The Battle For The Hearts and Minds: Countering Propaganda Attacks Against the Euro-Atlantic Community* (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, 2015).

[111] Pomerantsev and Weiss, *The Menace of Unreality*, 41.

lessons of the AMWG can be similarly adapted, leveraging technology for greater collaboration, communication, and responsiveness than ever before.

A number of these lessons, along with the recommendations, are reproduced below. Any future effort to expose the active measures of potential adversaries should start with a thorough reading of these outstanding publications, for the first step in exposing an active measures campaign is awareness that the problem exists. Today, that awareness is sorely lacking.

Adapted from Pomerantsev & Weiss, The Menace of Unreality

Recommendations for countering the weaponization of information:

- Establish a "Transparency International" for disinformation
- Establish a "Disinformation Charter" for media and bloggers
- Establish/ hire "counter-disinformation editors" for media outlets
- Better public awareness campaigns about the use/spread of propaganda, and improved disclosure of personal interests by think tanks, pundits, etc.
- Targeted online work to assist those affected by intense propaganda: equivalent of online social work for those in heavily impacted areas.

Recommendations for countering the weaponization of money:

- Establish organizations and non-profit funding streams to support the journalistic investigation of corruption (Strategic Corruption Research). Establish a Journalist's Libel Fund to protect investigative journalists from vengeful lawsuits
- Support crowd-sourced investigative efforts to uncover corruption and/or propaganda, with NGO's as a vector.

Recommendations for countering the weaponization of ideas:

- Re-establishing transparency and integrity among think tanks and others: encourage self-disclosure of funding streams
- Establish a "Valdai Alternative" to counter the challenges posed by Valdai, Kremlin-friendly NGOs and the use of the Orthodox Church. Would bring together think tanks, experts and policy makers to help reinvigorate debate about the implications of Russian policy for both regional and global issues.

Adapted from Witold Waszczykowski's Draft NATO "Report on Countering Propaganda Attacks against the Euro-Atlantic Community"

- Countering Russia's information warfare should be elevated to the top of the Euro-Atlantic community's agenda
- Within the framework of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, it is necessary to authorize a specific Sub-Committee or another Assembly body to constantly monitor the evolution of this threat and to report to the Assembly on this issue on a regular basis

- Develop a more coherent narrative and a set of arguments refuting myths cultivated by Moscow, following up on NATO's Setting the Record Straight example.
- Further reinforcing NATO's Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) and relevant bodies in the EU to enhance the ability to respond swiftly to the most blatant cases of misinformation
- Policy towards classified intelligence information should be revisited to allow public diplomacy officers to use less sensitive information, including satellite imagery, in order to refute misinformation
- Establish platforms for exchanging best national practices among the Euro-Atlantic community and flagging potential information security threats
- Revisit legislation that strengthens legal counter-measures such as imposing fines for the use of hate speech and clear disinformation
- Encourage the world's leading media outlets to develop a set of high journalistic standards and encourage independent global watchdogs to monitor how these standards are being maintained
- Support international and national media initiatives in the Russian language, including launching a commonly funded Russian-language TV channel
- Revisit legislation to increase the transparency of funding media, NGOs and think tanks
- Make a clear distinction between Russian journalists, however biased, and propagandists repeatedly involved in distorting and fabricating information
- Apply individual travel sanctions against the most active propagandists and political technologists
- Consider innovative and inexpensive measures such as the greater use of humor: launching a TV show or a section in a newspaper that depicts and ridicules the most awkward cases of the falsification of information
- Invest in research and educate the appropriate people as to how to recognize, report and react to Internet trolls and orchestrated "trolling" attacks
- Increase capacity building assistance to countries like Ukraine in the field of strategic communications
- Organize surveys to regularly monitor the effect of Russian propaganda on the populations within the Euro-Atlantic space
- Encourage and promote the voices of popular Russian diaspora representatives with democratic views
- Support the community of professional historians to provide credible response to pseudo-scientific theories that glorify Stalinism, belittle the statehood of Russia's neighbors and falsify historical facts
- Encourage grassroots initiatives such as StopFake.org.

Lessons Learned by the Active Measures Working Group, adapted from Schoen and Lamb's, "Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference"

The AMWG operated using a Report, Analyze, Publicize methodology:

- *Report*: Received and combined reports from USIA posts around the world, the CIA, and FBI investigations (note: today, the USIA function could be replaced with enhanced support by Embassy Public Affairs teams)
- *Analyze*: Analysis took place in D.C.; group members came from across the Interagency and generally met weekly. Attendance varied and members rotated in and out based upon requirements at their 'day-jobs'
- *Publicize*: The group produced semi-regular reports on Soviet disinformation. The reports were unclassified and circulated throughout the Interagency and to the press. The group also developed a 'road show' to help educate personnel at Embassies, as well as host nation intelligence services and members of the host nation media
- By publishing their reports and conducting road shows, the group raised awareness, which led to a virtuous cycle of reporting. The more they publicized Soviet disinformation efforts, the more frequent and better reports they received from the field.

The AMWG stayed focused preventing 'mission creep' by defining a limited set of targets:

- It limited its mission to countering Soviet influence operations that could be exposed in a compelling way with unclassified or declassified information
- This methodology allowed it to concentrate on cases that were likely "winners"
- Remained focused on exposing disinformation (outright lies) rather than propaganda (persuasion).

The AMWG's approach to countering active measures included, critically:

- Effective counterintelligence
- Persistent and continuing exposure of disinformation
- Maintaining the highest standards of accuracy
- Maintaining an unimpeachable record of accuracy and trustworthiness, which allowed the group to remain credible (held their products to an internal, 'grand jury indictment standard,' setting extremely high internal standards to ensure their reports on Soviet disinformation were air-tight and impossible to pick apart)
- Worked to expose Soviet lies not in an ideological but professional fashion.

The Department of State was the AMWG's lead agency:

- Gave the group diplomatic credibility
- Helped ensure the group's efforts were managed with political sensitivity.

Senior leader support and protection was necessary for the working group's continued existence and success:

- The group had supporters at all levels of the executive branch
- Congressional leaders generated requirements, promoted group members, and lobbied for institutionalized capability to produce the reports
- The group also needed strong leadership to maintain effectiveness:
  - Having a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State lead the group was effective
  - Political appointees in positions of authority helped provide top cover.

The AMWG was an inexpensive solution to countering Soviet disinformation. The costs of exposing Soviet disinformation were insignificant compared to what the Soviets spent to create and distribute it:

- Producing high quality results with few resources made cooperation from parent organizations more likely
- The group had no mission-specific resources:
  - It drew only on the part-time contributions of existing experts and in-place State Intelligence analysts to cover manpower costs
  - Members had no budgets beyond normal travel and public affairs accounts controlled by their bosses.

The declassification of Interagency reporting and other evidence was essential to the group's success, providing the solid 'proof' they needed to support their 'cases':

- Declassification was contentious however: information sharing did not always occur due to parent agency concerns regarding the exposure of sensitive sources and methods.

Among the members of the group, expertise and a mission focused attitude were valued above rank.

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Research Article

The Threats and Challenges of a Multipolar World: A Ukraine Crisis Case Study

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Abstract: As the post-cold-war unipolar system transforms into a polycentric one, it becomes more complex and less predictable. The new system may be crushed with less effort than needed to keep it on track. The polycentric international system, as it emerges, suffers from hybrid threats. They are difficult to identify and predict. Russia pioneered exploiting the new vulnerabilities to gain unilateral advantages. Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine was just a starting episode of her wider attempt to crush the whole world order. Responsible world powers have either to fix the vulnerabilities of the polycentric world, or to block malicious attempts to exploit it.

Keywords: Multipolar world, polycentric world, hybrid war, Ukrainian crisis, Russian policy.

Introduction

The crisis in and around Ukraine has clearly demonstrated that the world has changed. This is not news for the most observant politicians and researchers. The changes accumulated slowly, and many of the consequences were predictable. However, until very recently, our vision of the world has fit into the general mindset of a "post-Cold War" era. It is no longer a world of two superpowers, but neither has it become a world with only one center of gravity, nor one of multiple poles, having frozen in time, mid-transition. Then, Russia decided to present Ukraine with a list of claims in a way that pointed a large arrow to the

past. In the words of Russian analyst Lilia Shevtsova, Russian President Vladimir Putin ended the global "interregnum."[1]

Poles in a Pole-free World

The basic idea behind the new world that has emerged was probably most aptly described five years ago by Richard Haass, who classified the new world order as "non-polar." Despite some similarity to the multi-polarity that existed prior to the First World War, today's centers of power are not "poles" in the fullest sense of the word, as the world's largest states once were: "States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations."[2] This vision has also been called a "polycentric" world. It is most fully described in the work, "Global Trends 2030: Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World,"[3] in which the key points coincide with those proffered by Haass.

Meanwhile, futurologists predicted a technological revolution that will fundamentally change the world, but this is still far-fetched. 3D printing has yet to overturn industrial manufacturing, cyberspace has not yet expanded to the extent it could, fuels are not yet harvested from other planets, medicine is still limited in the face of many lethal illnesses, biotechnologies are not yet flooding the world with food, and no solution has been found to counter climate change. Nevertheless, there is already a vision of how all this could take place in the foreseeable future.

The technological revolution aside, it is now possible to see how the rough contours of a polycentric world appeared earlier than researchers expected, which brings with them additional threats and challenges. The multipolar world that preceded WWI and the bipolar world that formed after WWII were absolute in the sense that the polarized spaces around each center were directly adjacent, with minimal neutral zones. The threats were predictable, and the reactions to them could be computed rationally. These can be described as traditional threats. The collapse of the bipolar system after the end of the Cold War turned the world, briefly, into a monopolar system. However, the strength of the American pole rapidly lost its absolute quality. New and growing centers of power suddenly appeared, each hoping to become a new pole. In turn, dur-

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1 Lilia Shevtsova, "Putin Ends the Interregnum," *The American Interest*, 28 August 2014, available at http://www.the-american-interest.com/shevtsova/2014/08/28/putin-ends-the-interregnum (accessed 31 August 2014).

2 Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity," *Foreign Affairs* 87:3 (2008), available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63397/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity (accessed 31 August 2014).

3 "Global Trends 2030: Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World," European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) (European Union Institute for Security Studies, March 2012), available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESPAS_report_01.pdf (accessed 31 August 2014).

ing this transitional period, new threats also appeared. The list is long, extended further by the multiple facets of globalization. Some of these are reflected in states and international organizations, in the institutions and policies dedicated to security. For example, at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO listed terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, cyberattacks, and natural disasters as key areas of its activity.

Traditional and new threats did not vanish with the advent of a polycentric world, but the conditions in which they appeared became qualitatively different. Spaces that were weakly structured around poles, or not polarized at all, became a systemic component. In such spaces there are centers of gravity of varying weights, the actions of which add dynamism to the global system in the absence of global management. The very concept of a new world order now has new meaning. Order exists as a manifest phenomenon, with its own, internal laws, but it exists as a system of rational management. Figuratively speaking, it is a motley fleet of ships, boats, and rafts, linked by ropes of varying strength, seized by an almost invisible seaward current that may lead to new shores, or lethal whirlpools. Nobody knows how to pick up the slack and articulate interconnections so that the fleet can become manageable and deliberately select its own course.

Returning to Haass' definition of a nonpolar world, a more precise delineation would be helpful, as the world is "weakly polar." There are poles, but they are not absolute, and they compete with centers of gravity of varying weights. The poles differ from the centers in terms of the degree of concentration of influence and power, and whether it is economic, political, military, or ideological. There are many centers of different types, with one or another resource at their disposal. Yet only poles connect different domains of power; they are still identical to states and groups of states.

It is hard to deny that the USA, the EU, China, and Russia are poles, but they do not have absolute influence. Corporations, international organizations, NGOs, and religious bodies—even unrecognized states—possess their own domains of influence and sometimes clearly hope to become new poles in their own right. The fields of power and influence emanating from poles and centers intersect one another and interconnect in an intricate fashion, transforming the problem of global management into a new challenge to international security.

The Ukraine Crisis: The Western Dimension

Descending from abstract theory to the situation on the battlefields of Eastern Ukraine, it is already possible to observe the concrete manifestations of some aspects of the polycentric world. Prima facie, the Ukrainian crisis fits into familiar categories: the separatism supported from abroad and the "regime change" toolbox are at play. However, closer analysis reveals Russia's effort to utilize the weaknesses of this polycentric world to reestablish itself as one of the poles. This is an effort that has global consequences.

Russia's foreign policy concept states that "international relations are going through a transitional period, the nature of which is the formation of a polycentric international system."[4] The formation of this system is not just taken as a given – it is Russia's desired end state. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently stated: "The fact that the crisis in Ukraine is one of the manifestations of the pains in which a truly polycentric world is born."[5] According to Russian logic, that country—through its actions towards Ukraine—is building a polycentric world, while the West is hindering it in order to "artificially slow down the advent of this multi-polar and polycentric world, which is the objective result of trends in world development."[6]

Russia's obsession with the idea of a polycentric world stems from the idea that, given its decentralized nature, it will be easier for Russia to realize its ambitions as a pole, expanding both power and influence, even if such expansion will be steeped in blood, human suffering, and economic losses. This is the negative reading of the new opportunities. At the applied level, the reason behind Russia's actions was laid out in early 2013 by Valery Gerasimov, head of the Russian General Staff, as follows:

> In the methods of resistance used, the emphasis is shifting towards broad use of political, economic, information, humanitarian and other non-military measures, implemented together with the protest potential of the population. All this is complemented with covert military methods, including informational warfare measures and special forces' operations. The overt use of force is often adopted under the guise of peacekeeping operations and crisis regulation only at a certain stage, usually to ensure that success in a conflict is absolute.[7]

This extract, which has been widely cited, is interesting for a number of reasons. Gerasimov spoke about the experience of the Arab Spring, but as is evident from this and other of his statements, he interpreted that phenomenon in the spirit of contemporary Russian conspiracy theories. The main thesis is that "color" revolutions and other political cataclysms are a new form of warfare conducted by the USA and the West in general, in which the target is Russia, with its "constructive" political regime and "untold" natural resources.

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[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by RF President V. V. Putin on 12 February 2013," available at www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F (in Russian) (accessed 31 August 2014).

[5] "Lavrov: The Ukraine Crisis is one of the birthing pains in which a polycentric world is born," *Oko planety*, 11 April 2014, available at http://oko-planet.su/politik/politiklist/238618-lavrov-krizis-na-ukraine-odno-iz-proyavleniy-teh-muk-v-kotoryh-rozhdaetsya-policentrichnyy-mir.html (in Russian) (accessed 31 August 2014).

[6] "US and EU hinder Russian actions in preventing global threats," *FOCUS News Agency*, 27 August 2014 (accessed 31 August 2014).

[7] Valery Gerasimov, "The value of science is prediction. New threats demand rethinking the ways and means of conducting warfare," *Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier*, 27 February 2013, available at http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632 (in Russian) (accessed 31 August 2014).

In Russia, and not only amongst the leadership, but also in mass consciousness, the conflict with Ukraine is seen as a "just" response to the actions of the USA. Some of the Russian arguments could even be worthy of attention, if not for the following circumstance: the way that Russia acted in Ukraine forced the degradation of the ideology, politics, and economy at each new stage of conflict escalation. Initially, the Russian information space favored the thesis that a "fascist junta" had come to power in Kiev. This could be called a curiosity of the information war, if not for the scale of the propaganda undertaken. Most of the Russian population, a significant portion of the population of occupied Crimea and the Eastern regions of Ukraine, was convinced that as a result of Western actions in Ukraine, fascism had raised its ugly head again and that Ukraine had "vanished" as a state, while Russia, as a result, had every right to use all tools available to neutralize the threat. The demonization of one's enemy has been seen in the history of the Western press, but the extent of the propaganda is important here. Russia's perception of the authorities in Ukraine is comparable only to how the Western information space would respond to a foreign body deserving as much hatred as Hitler, Milošević, Hussein, Gaddafi, and Kim Jong-un, all in the same person – and if it were also claimed that such a monster regime was created by Russia.

The "success" of this destructive information campaign and Russia's subsequent steps to escalate the conflict taken cannot be explained merely as a state monopoly and rigid, centralized management. Commercial PR agencies were widely used, as well as public organizations and financial and industrial holdings with a "patriotic orientation." The military portion of the operation to annex Crimea was the work of so-called "little green men" or "polite people" (well-equipped soldiers with no insignia) and organized by the Russian Defense Ministry and special services. Yet the social and political element was the neutralization of pro-Ukrainian forces, "switching" local authorities from Kiev to Moscow, organizing a referendum – all this was implemented with the aid of organized structures and finances from one of the major Russian financial and industrial groups. Then, a combined "strike group" composed of PR experts, mid-level politicians, administrators, and "dogs of war"—all reinforced with resources looted from Crimea, including seized weapons—was dispatched to Eastern Ukraine,[8] after the area had been "warmed up" through the mass media and flash mobbing by street fighters (the so-called "Russian Spring"). When the "blitzkrieg" failed, Russia was forced into a military escalation that, by the end of summer 2014, led to the deployment of regular Russian troops, again without insignia.

Although Russia has the right to have its arguments heard, the methods that it uses to enforce their validity place their reasoning in doubt. Westerners

[8] Oleg Kashin, "From Crimea to the Donbass: the adventures of Igor Strelkov and Aleksandr Borodaya," *Slon*, 19 May 2014, available at http://slon.ru/russia/iz_kryma_v_donbass_priklyucheniya_igorya_strelkova_i_aleksandra_borodaya-1099696.xhtml (in Russian) (accessed 31 August 2014).

mindful of "Realpolitik" quite rightly indicate Russia's natural reflexes with respect to expansion by NATO and the EU, and the Westernization of neighbors: "Imagine the fury in Washington, if China was building a powerful military alliance and attempting to include both Canada and Mexico."[9] Hence, the conclusion that Ukraine must be turned into a second Finland in order to resolve the current crisis, including not only military, but also economic and social aspects of forced neutrality.

The idea is not unworthy of attention, and could find resonance in Ukraine, if not for a number of caveats. Before the crisis in relations with Russia, and even in the initial stages thereof, nobody in Ukraine seriously discussed NATO membership. The non-aligned status of the country had been set in legislation. In 2008 NATO refused to offer Ukraine the Membership Action Plan (MAP), in line with the actual moods in Ukrainian society and amongst the elite. The idea of membership was supported only by a small minority (about 15 %). Russia's reaction to the EU's Association Agreements with Ukraine approached hysteria, and in the summer of 2013—long before signing—the hysteria had triggered trade sanctions, in an echo of the earlier reaction in 2008, to the possibility that a MAP could be on the table. Then, Russia told Ukraine that if Ukraine was denied NATO membership, it would be able to develop an economic partnership with the EU in parallel to simultaneously partnering with Russia. But when this question reached the practical implementation stage, it turned out that the EU, in Russia's view, was "Sodom and Gomorrah," greedily plotting to swallow Ukraine simply to spite Russia. While many consider this to be an exaggeration, even the most cursory review of the Russian information space reveals that this is, more likely, an understatement of how Russian interests are rationalized within the country itself.

Ukraine's experience is that no concessions to Russia are ever enough, and there is no stable status quo that does not rob the country of its identity. This is the core problem with establishing solid, friendly relations. The first episodes of Russian "saber-rattling" with respect to Ukraine took place as early as the early 2000s, when President Leonid Kuchma's administration was very far from any actual rapprochement with NATO and the EU. Here it is worth remembering that Russia, without any warning, built a damn connecting it to a Ukrainian island in the Kerch Strait, where a Ukrainian border post was located, and subsequently explained the incident as "the initiative of the local authorities" and the unexpected dislocation of troops to a Crimean military compound, and further as exercises and technical difficulties without notifying Ukraine in advance. Then, Ukraine tended to turn a blind eye and disregard such incidents. Later, the gas wars began against the "orange" government, which made loud declarations about NATO and EU membership, although it had not taken any concrete steps. When Viktor Yanukovych came to power in 2010, a short renais-

[9] John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault," *Foreign Affairs* 93:5 (2014), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault (accessed 31 August 2014).

sance began due to Ukraine's unilateral concessions on humanitarian, political, and military issues, including the declaration of a non-aligned status and an extension of leases for the Black Sea Fleet. However, as early as 2011 and long before the talks on EU Association Agreements had concluded, a cooling-off began as Russia discovered Ukraine's reluctance to engage in "genuine integration," which was actually understood as the formation of a single state. The trade war in 2013 was the final stage of this deterioration. This illustrates the notion that Russia is not satisfied with turning Ukraine into a second Finland, regardless of the political hints and messages it may disseminate through the media or diplomatic channels. Russia can tolerate Ukraine as an independent state only with the same status as Belarus, but no more than that. The very existence of Ukraine is viewed by the Russian elite as "geopolitical aggression" by the West. Golda Meir coined a phrase applicable not only to Israel, but also to Ukraine today: "We want to live. Our neighbors want to see us dead. This does not leave much space for compromise."[10]

Returning to the realm of theory, it is possible to demarcate a broader attempt by Russia to establish itself as a pole by using the vulnerability of the polycentric world that appeared, in this case, with respect to Ukraine. In 2013, Ukraine found itself in desperate financial straits and was approaching a default. The Yanukovych administration's maneuvers between the EU and Russia intended to rapidly obtain foreign aid. According to one assessment, Ukraine ended up in this situation due to changes in the global financial markets, following policy changes by America's Federal Reserve System.[11] There was no malicious intent aimed against Ukraine here – Ukraine was simply unlucky. The Ukrainian authorities subsequently took steps that triggered an acute internal crisis, which in 2014 led to total political upheaval. Russia perceived a threat from these events, but also an opportunity. In March it annexed Crimea, which allowed the Russian authorities to resolve many domestic problems, including the total marginalization of all opposition and redirection of social dissatisfaction towards Ukraine. Even if the initial assessment of the impact of the Federal Reserve System's actions prompts doubts, it illustrates how events can develop in a polycentric world without global management.

These events inspired Russia to build even more ambitious plans. A mass of statements and actions suggest a general plan that has not been declared officially: to create a chain reaction to tear apart Ukraine (without using military force when possible, but using force whenever necessary), provoking a schism within the EU on the Ukraine issue, disrupting plans to build a free trade zone between the USA and the EU, and isolating the USA from the European continent. The arsenal of resources brought to fruition is of interest, given its great

[10] "Goldele Mabovich' dream," available at http://www.freie-juedische-meinung.de/portraits/438-2013-05-02-19-17-17 (in Russian) (accessed 31 August 2014).

[11] Gideon Rose and Benn Steil, "Foreign Affairs Focus: Benn Steil on Fed Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, 2 August 2014, available at www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/audio-video/foreign-affairs-focus-benn-steil-on-fed-policy (accessed 31 August 2014).

range and the creativity behind it. Very powerful and effective propaganda resources were deployed and marginal political forces and individual politicians of influence were "incentivized" also in Europe and the USA, while public structures and economic agents were engaged, militarized "popular uprisings" were organized, and, finally, military units without insignia were deployed. The main approach for organizing this arsenal could be loosely labelled "public-private partnerships," following the PPP model so popular in the West, except for the malicious intent at the core of this ambition. It would be erroneous to consider the Russian attack on the West as merely the actions of the special services and armed forces. Russian policies enjoy considerable domestic support and a mass of volunteers in state structures and business, which possess their own tools, used to achieve common goals. The conflict with Ukraine was just a part of this broad attack, and Russia made full use of the vulnerabilities of the polycentric world.

The consequences of this offensive are well known: NATO has been given a new raison d'être laid out down on paper with the outcomes of the Wales Summit and the EU Association Agreements with Ukraine are signed and await ratification, while Russo-Ukrainian relations have become antagonistic. In the West, the poles have come into contact again like during the Cold War. Numerous areas of ambiguity have been localized in one key issue: whether Ukraine will withstand the new wave of tension, and what compromises it will adopt in a bid for self-preservation.

The Crisis in Ukraine: The Eastern Dimension

The Ukraine crisis has produced certain consequences on the Eastern front: in Transcaucasia, in Central Asia, and in the Far East. The mechanisms for these changes are many and varied, and cannot be clearly structured, just like the polycentric world itself. The effect is complex, and promises even greater tension. Even without this malicious intent from any side, the concentration of tension in points of vulnerability in a polycentric world can trigger the formation of threats.

The Russian Caucasus has been drawn into the Ukraine crisis if only due to the fact that the main brunt of the Russian forces in Ukraine was put together from so-called national battalions in military units in Russia's Southern Operational Command. This group faced the majority of the human losses on the Russian side during the initial stages of military action in Eastern Ukraine. Relations between the Slavic population of Russia and residents of the Caucasus are complex. In recent years, they have often spilled over into large-scale social clashes along ethnic lines. The Russian leadership has found ways to quickly deflect internal conflict, redirecting it against the Slavic population of Ukraine. However, the conflict now threatens to return to Russia through the border with Ukraine – which Russia itself rendered porous. An important aspect is that in Chechnya, formerly the most prominent separatist republic in Russia, there is another conflict that has also been pushed across the border. In Ukraine, Russia

is supported by the so-called "Kadyrovtsy" fighters – supporters of Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen president, who is loyal to the Russian leadership (thanks to generous financial injections). At the same time, Ukraine has been supported by divisions consisting of Chechens still loyal to the ideas of the late president, Dzhokhar Dudayev. They are in the minority, but under certain conditions they would be prepared for aggression against their motherland. In this case, the Caucasus could explode once more.

In Transcaucasia there are three frozen conflict zones: South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Political processes in Georgia exclude attempts to aggravate relations with Russia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia for the foreseeable future. However, in Nagorno-Karabakh escalation is possible. Azerbaijan's position is uncompromising: sooner or later sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh must be reestablished. Azerbaijan's economic and military might is constantly growing, and offset only by a convenient line of defense in Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian economic aid to Armenia, and the placement of a Russian military base on its territory. If Russia gets bogged down in the Ukrainian conflict, and proves to be weakened by international sanctions, Azerbaijan may yet get the chance to resolve the problem by force. A recurrence of the conflict already took place in July/August 2014. So far, it has been suppressed by Russian diplomatic interventions.

The chain of interrelations stretches from Nagorno-Karabakh to Central Asia. Attempting to disrupt the EU's Eastern Partnership program on all fronts (this was one of the episodes in the development of the crisis around Ukraine), last year Russia convinced Armenia to reject association with the EU in favor of membership in the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc). This triggered additional disagreements between Russia and Kazakhstan. The latter, with partnership relations with Azerbaijan, insists that if Armenia joins the common customs space, Nagorno-Karabakh should not be included in that space. Such membership conditions are hard for Armenia to accept. The Ukraine crisis has even further exacerbated the contradictions within EurAsEc. Kazakhstan's position on the issue of deeper integration with Russia has become more cautious. All references to possible political integration were removed from the Agreement creating EurAsEc, which was signed at the end of May 2014. Kazakhstan, together with Belarus, blocked Russian attempts to introduce coordinated trade sanctions against Ukraine. Moreover, Kazakhstan openly declared that it saw no economic threats for EurAsEc stemming from Ukraine signing Association Agreements with the EU, though Russia insisted that these existed.

The situation worsened even more at the end of August 2014 as a result of a clumsy comment by Putin about Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev: "He created a state in a territory in which there had never been a state. The Kazakhs did not have statehood."[12] Previously, only lower-level Russian politicians

[12] "Putin answered the Kazakhstan question," *Tengri News*, 29 August 2014, available at http://tengrinews.kz/sng/putin-otvetil-na-vopros-o-kazahstane-260975 (in Russian) (accessed 31 August 2014).

had mentioned doubts about Kazakh statehood. A fairly major scandal ensued, as did a counter-reminder by Nazarbayev with respect to EurAsEc: "Astana will never join organizations that threaten Kazakh independence."[13] In this case, the motivations of Russian politicians in provoking Kazakhstan against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis—be they malicious or careless—are not as important as the fact that tension in polycentric links is sufficiently acute to trigger a new crisis.

The exacerbation of the situation in EurAsEc due to the Ukrainian crisis has subsequently impacted relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). For Russia, Chinese neutrality in the Ukraine issue is important, as for Russia this is paramount to direct support. However, the effect of SCO activity in Central Asia produces a growth in Chinese influence, leading to a reduction in Russian influence. China is overtaking Russia both in terms of trade turnover and investment in the region. Moreover, Russian influence is linked to an exacerbation of disagreements between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on the so-called hydroelectric issue.[14] Moreover, Turkmenistan has virtually escaped Russia's grip. The growth of Chinese influence has now spread to all the countries of the region and is, so far, not generating conflicts.

A careful review of the situation in Central Asia reveals two important aspects. First, a like-for-like comparison of the trade turnover of each country in the region with external players shows impressive imbalances. For example, in the customs statistics for China and Kyrgyzstan for the same flow of goods, one country had figures several times greater than the other.[15] Recently, these differences have levelled out, but they still remain too great to be explained by calculations alone. Statistical data on the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Russia also show a large gap of more than 10 % in 2013 (USD 23.8 billion according to Kazakh statistics[16] and USD 26.5 billion according to Russian data.)[17] This indicates a large volume of "grey" trade in Chinese goods with Kazakhstan and Russia through Kyrgyzstan. Plans for Kyrgyzstan to join EurAsEc only exacerbate the problem.

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[13] "Nazarbaev announced Kazakhstan may exist the Eurasian Union," *Ak Zhayyk*, 31 August 2014, available at http://azh.kz/ru/news/view/22768 (in Russian) (accessed 31 August 2014).

[14] Uzbekistan perceives Russian investment in hydroelectric power in Kyrgyzstan as well as military aid to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as a threat from the viewpoint of access to water resources and resolving border disputes.

[15] Nurbek Toktakunov, *et al.*, "Mirror statistics of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2008-2012" (Bishkek, 2014) (in Russian).

[16] "The Foreign Trade Turnover of the Republic of Kazakhstan," available at http://www.stat.gov.kz/getImg?id=ESTAT084715 (in Russian) (accessed 31 August 2014).

[17] "Russian Foreign Policy with CIS countries," available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/vnesh-t/vnt-sng.xls (in Russian) (accessed 31 August 2014).

Second, Russia retains immense sectoral influence in the region due to its labor migrants. Their remittances from Russia make up a large part of the GDP of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Dependency is a critical issue for Tajikistan: Russia could hurt its economy by simply prohibiting personal remittances (see Table 1).

Table 1. Assessment of the Regional Countries' Dependence on Russia regarding Labor Migration.

Countries	Transfers from Russia, in millions of USD	% of GDP	% of Russian GDP	Migrants in Russia, in millions	% of population	% of population of Russia
Uzbekistan	6 633	11.68%	0.32%	2.58	8.53%	1.80%
Tajikistan	4 155	48.84%	0.20%	1.18	14.35%	0.82%
Kyrgyzstan	2 080	28.78%	0.10%	0.58	10.09%	0.40%
Kazakhstan	455	0.20%	0.02%	0.55	3.24%	0.38%
Turkmenistan	40	0.10%	0.00%	0.23	4.39%	0.16%

Note: calculations were performed based on data from the Russian Central Bank, Russia's Federal Migration Service and the World Bank. GDP was calculated at current USD exchange rates according to statistical data from 2013.

This means that by losing to China in trade and investment in Central Asia, Russia still has the option of negative influence: the ability to create a powerful crisis in the region, which would devalue China's growing impact. Russia does not have clear reasons to act in such a manner, but there can be no doubt of the level of Russian resolve if at any point China decides to utilize the weakening of its position due to the Ukraine crisis and Western sanctions.

From Central Asia, the effects of the Ukraine crisis extend into Russian policy with respect to Iran and the Far East. Russia has long supported Iran on the issue of Western sanctions. However, the recent progress on talks on the nuclear program, which since November of 2014 have threatened a long-term agreement and Iran coming out of isolation, coincided with the development of the Ukraine crisis. Iran entering global oil and gas markets implies a direct threat to Russia, given its economy's critical dependence on energy prices worldwide. Without having good cause or an opportunity to hinder the positive development of the talks on the Iranian nuclear program, Russia attempted to

link large volumes of Iranian oil to barter operations. Long-winded negotiations ensued on annually bartering around 25 million tons of Iranian oil in exchange for supplies of Russian products. So far, these talks have culminated only in the signing, in early August 2014, of a very modest memorandum on the barter of around 2.5 million tons of oil annually.[18] Russian interests in Ukraine thus proved to be connected to interests in the Iranian sphere.

In the Far East, the Ukraine crisis has also prompted a certain level of redistribution of forces. Japan, which has a territorial dispute with Russia, supported the Western sanctions. South Korea has maintained neutrality. China, as was mentioned, has rendered discreet support in order to pursue its own goals: the Ukraine conflict weakens Russia and the West, leaving more room for China to maneuver. North Korea is aligned with Russia, though Russia can barely expect to get much traction from this, aside from the opportunity to exert more negative influence on the situation by escalating the conflict around the North Korean nuclear and missile program.

Generally speaking, the Ukraine conflict's influence in the East does not appear as deep as it is in Europe. However, tension over a wide variety of issues has increased and, given a certain configuration of circumstances, unexpected predicaments could emerge. This analysis illustrates the variety of vulnerabilities of a polycentric system of relations and the possibility that crises could arise as a result of a geographically remote conflict.

Conclusion

The accelerated formation of a new system of international relations due to the crisis around Ukraine, which can be characterized fairly accurately as a polycentric world, has led to both new threats and challenges. The threats, which are usually considered to be of a traditional nature (war with the use of weapons), as well as new, detrimental technological developments, globalization, and climate change, have not vanished. However, a further threat has emerged: the absence, or at least a deficit, of global management; yet another threat is the possibility that the vulnerabilities of a polycentric world may be deliberately utilized.

The Ukraine crisis has demonstrated that a diversified system of relations that enables development could rapidly deteriorate into a Cold War situation. It appears that ordinary phenomena, such as minor economic and political clashes between the centers of power, internal political processes in individual countries, adjustments of the global financial system, and changes in oil prices are all capable of bringing about a momentary concentration of contradictions, in this case around Ukraine. At a certain point, Russia perceived internal political processes in Ukraine as a threat to its interests (this perception was the re-

[18] "Iranian Barter. Russia and Iran have signed an oil supply contract," *BFM*, 7 August 2014, available at http://www.bfm.ru/news/268124 (in Russian) (accessed 31 August 2014).

sult of internal processes within Russia itself) and decided to not simply protect itself, as it understood the concept, but also to make use of the vulnerabilities of the new international system of relationships for a large-scale redistribution of power and influence. This escalation triggered the return of a situation similar to the bipolar standoffs of the Berlin, Korea, and Cuban crises.

In the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far East, the Ukraine crisis has not triggered such significant changes. Nevertheless, a wide range of different interconnections have been subject to tension. As malicious interests appear, this tension could be released to form new conflicts, which may have no apparent connection to the events in Ukraine.

In a polycentric world, both positive and negative processes are accelerated. This means that local instability can rapidly lead to a concentration of diverse threats. Even if they are thoroughly studied individually and even if response mechanisms were identified in recent years, the rate at which they appear and the degree to which they manifest at any given time imply a new threat, which is unique to a polycentric world. This can be defined as the imminent instability of development.

It is difficult to offer any form of recommendation of how to act in the situation prior to the conclusion of the Ukraine crisis – perhaps the first crisis to fully embody the predicament described above. It is most probable that Ukraine will not only survive, but also remain capable of development as a democratic country with a fast-growing economy. This implies that measures will have to be taken to preserve the stable development of the polycentric world and prevent a roll-back to the old relationship models.

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Research Article

Torn Asunder from Within: Ukraine and the Lessons for Global Security

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Abstract: Russia's non-standard intervention in Ukraine was accomplished in four major areas—the economic system as a whole, the energy and security sectors, and information policy. The deliberate policy of the Kremlin has transformed Ukraine into economically fragile and institutionally weak nation. Due to efforts of former regime and Russian intelligence agencies, main Ukrainian government institutions were involved in semi-legal, semi-criminal transnational business scheme. Macro-financial vulnerability of Ukraine, in conjunction with a strained economic structure, proved to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for preparing and implementing hybrid aggression. The Ukrainian precedent might be replicated as a special operation to destroy statehood, whereby disruption is achieved through the escalation of internal political and economic challenges. One universal means of undermining statehood in an era of hybrid wars is to encourage corruption among holders of the highest office.

Keywords: intervention, security policy, hybrid war, informational warfare, systemic corruption, illegal economy, criminal business.

Introduction

Ukraine is undergoing a very difficult period in its history. The country is bidding farewell to its Soviet past, while the Russian Federation (RF) is attempting to restore the "Soviet Empire" – with Ukraine retaining within its sphere of control. The Ukraine drama has been playing out "online" before our very eyes, and events have developed so rapidly that experts and scholars are not only unable to keep up with all the details, but are experiencing great difficulty making sense of what is happening.

A brief chronology of the crisis that ushered in the "strange" Russia-Ukraine is as follows. Late in the day on 21 November 2013, young Ukrainians gathered in peaceful protest of the government's decision to suspend the process of Ukraine's integration into the European Union; about 2,000 people took to Kyiv's Maidan square. However, a violent dispersal of the tent city followed in the early hours of 30 November, after the failure of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius on 28-29 October. On 1 December a crowd of citizens, variously estimated at 400,000 to 800,000, gathered at Maidan.[1] This action assumed a distinctly anti-presidential and anti-government tone. Tensions between the protestors and security forces rose quickly and led to numerous clashes between them. The Ukrainian leadership tried in vain to stop the protests. On 16 January, despite blatant violations of procedural rules, the Ukrainian parliament approved anti-protest laws that greatly restricted the protestors' constitutional rights. On 19 January 2014 the confrontation escalated dramatically, with skirmishes between radical demonstrators and police. During the period of 21–22 January, three people died of gunshot wounds and many protestors were injured. By 18 February, yet another escalation of the situation led to mass bloodshed. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Public Health, 77 people died in Kyiv from 18 to 21 February, with the Ministry of Internal Affairs reporting 16 police officers dead.

This day proved to be a turning point and within the next few days a shift in power occurred. On 23 February the Ukrainian parliament assigned the duties of the president of Ukraine to the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada (unicameral parliament), Oleksandr Turchynov. Over the period of 23–27 February, this was followed by a change in the executive bodies of Sevastopol and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The new authorities in Crimea refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new Ukrainian government and appealed to the leaders of the RF for its good offices and assistance. Then, in the course of the next few weeks, the new leadership of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol unilaterally declared Crimea's independence and held a referendum. On 18 March an agreement was signed between the RF and the Republic of Crimea to accept the Republic of Crimea as part of Russia. After the annexation of Crimea, the focal point of tension shifted to the southeast of Ukraine. In other words, the members of local government bodies in some eastern regions followed Crimea's example of refusing to recognize Kyiv's authority and adopted resolutions stating their readiness to assume responsibility for defending constitutional order within their territories. Further, they declared that recent events in Kyiv had led to the paralysis of central authority and destabilization of the country.

On 7 April 2014 Ukraine's acting president Oleksandr Turchynov declared the start of an "anti-terrorist operation." On 12 April the terrorists seized the

[1] "1 December 2013 Euromaidan riots," *Wikipedia*: *The Free Encyclopedia*, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1_December_2013_Euromaidan_riots (accessed 5 August 2014).

first city – Slavyansk. The immediate consequences of this acute phase of the social and political crisis indicate that Ukraine had become the object of a new sort of aggression encompassing the following:

- the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (occupation and illegal inclusion into the RF);
- destabilization of the western and eastern regions of Ukraine and incitement to separatism (armed conflicts involving special forces and military mercenaries of a foreign origin, primarily from the RF; the declaration of new states; and attempts to illegally change Ukraine's constitutional order);
- the RF's unilateral disregard for and de facto failure to comply with the entire range of bilateral regulatory agreements and treaties forming the basis of Ukrainian-Russian relations (primarily the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the RF);
- the waging of an information war against Ukraine, unprecedented in scale of with regard to falsifications and insinuations;
- the discrediting of existing international treaties designed to guarantee the security and integrity of the Ukrainian state (borders, non-interference in domestic affairs, economic security, etc.);
- a de facto annulment of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, under which nuclear states guarantee Ukraine's security; a shattering of the regime of non-proliferation.[2]

At the same time, there are grounds to believe that the RF was secretly preparing to undermine Ukrainian statehood. As early as 2008, Ukrainian special services were informed of plans in the RF to invade the Crimean Peninsula, as evidenced by data on reconnaissance missions that had been initiated.[3] Parallel to this, at the 2008 NATO-Russia Summit in Bucharest, President Vladimir Putin of the RF declared that Ukraine was an artificial state with seventeen million Russians living in it. A month later, the RF incorporated changes into its national legislation, granting it the right to "defend" Russian populations beyond the borders of the state. Accordingly, credence can be given to some experts' claims that in 2008 the RF initiated a new type of undeclared aggression against Ukraine, using techniques that provided an "impetus toward" and/or "an awakening" of internal molecular conflicts (that is, non-conventional or hybrid

[2] More details in: "Memorandum. Lessons from the Ukraine Crisis: New Approaches to Security Policy (global, regional, national)" ("New Ukraine" Institute of Strategic Studies, 5 June 2014), available at http://newukraineinstitute.org/new/399 (accessed 26 July 2014).

[3] Ivan Kapsamun, "Regarding the Watershed Line," Interview with Valentin Nalivaychenko, *Den* [The Day], 19 June 2014, available at http://www.day.kiev.ua/ru/article/podrobnosti-intervyu/o-linii-vodorazdela.

warfare, non-standard armed conflict, etc.).[4] Consequently, in the spring of 2014 this war moved from a latent to an open phase.

The Transformation of Ukraine under the Aggressor's Pressure

Back in 2008, Putin's declaration seemed more like a wishful objective. Five years later, in 2013, the Ukraine of Yanukovych-Putin was dangerously close to the line beyond which Ukrainian statehood would de facto—and then perhaps de jure—cease to exist. Concerted actions by Russian officials resulted in the so-called "Yanukovych vertical" being firmly woven into a system of making Russia's interests a reality. The RF's non-standard intervention in Ukraine (prior to 2014) was accomplished in four major areas – the economic system as a whole, the energy and security sectors, and information policy.

The Russian president was well-informed about the specifics of ex-president Yanukovych's corporate state. This gave him the confidence to posit that Ukraine was "not a state" in the usual sense of the term and, based on that understanding, to determine the permissible level of interference in Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy. If personal enrichment was the highest objective for Yanukovych in all spheres of the country's life, for the Putin regime the range of tasks was significantly wider. In the economic realm, the RF's objective was to tie Ukraine tightly to Russia without allowing any alignment with the European Union or the US, and to impede the institutional and structural modernization of the economy.[5] Increasing Ukraine's energy dependence did not so much make it easier to accomplish those goals as it expanded the opportunities for the Kremlin to pursue a policy of energy overlording at the international level.[6] Ultimately, the transformation of government institutions into a centralized system and withdrawing resources from the economy created broad opportunities for the RF to "make wholesale purchases of the country's political and military leadership" and to "clone" within Ukraine a quasi-state modeled after Russia.[7]

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[4] One of the most consistent proponents of this approach is A. Illarionov, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, former advisor to the president of Russia, and former director of the Institute for Economic Analysis. For instance, in his statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives during the 2009 hearings, "From Competition to Collaboration: Strengthening the U.S.-Russia Relationship," he presented a list of nine "non-conventional" wars initiated by the Russian Federation. Available at http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/competition-collaboration-strengthening-usrussia-relationship.

[5] Iryna Klymenko, *et al., The Prospects for Relations between Ukraine and the Customs Union of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation* (Kyiv: National Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), 59 (in Russian).

[6] Iryna Klymenko, *et al.*, *Ukraine in Integration Processes in the Post-Soviet Space: Modeling Alternatives.* (Kyiv: National Institute of Strategic Studies, 2013), 44 (in Russian).

[7] Address by Andrey Illarionov, Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., at a meeting of the Economic and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Vilnius, 31 May 2014, available at

Informational interventions pursuing the dual purpose of aggression and deception utilized numerous methods of informational and psychological warfare ranging from the posting of tendentious information and half-truths to outright lies (hoaxes). Intended to support the communication and organizational implementation of the RF's predatory objectives in Ukraine, these informational interventions produced a specific "picture of the world" for consumption by Russian and Ukrainian citizens. For example, the vast propaganda campaign that accompanied the preparation and conduct of special operations to annex Crimea was dispersed over several areas.[8] This included several key objectives: (1) to demoralize the Ukrainian population; (2) to demoralize the armed forces and security agencies and to induce them to commit high treason; (3) to create a distorted "media picture" of events in the minds of Russian and Ukrainian citizens; (4) to create the illusion of mass support for the actions of the RF among the population of the southeastern regions of Ukraine; (5) to lend psychological support to adherents of radical alignment of Ukraine's eastern and southern regions with Russia; (6) to entice Western media to report events with a pro-Russian slant.

Control over the Ukrainian security sector ensured the coordination of all the components of the Russian aggression in Ukraine during the latent aggression phase. Access to the operational management of the security sector allowed the RF to exercise day-to-day control of information flows in Ukraine – including compromising information about the highest-level state officials. This prevented any political decisions objectionable to the RF and removed other threats to achieving the RF's objectives at the regional and global levels. According to testimony by Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), "…the 'legacy' of the Security Service of Ukraine after Yakymenko's leadership and in general during Yanukovych's tenure was a huge blow to the security of our country. The people who allowed it to happen—and who actually aided the enemy—are essentially state criminals."[9]

As can be surmised from the annexation of Crimea, the strategic goal of the RF's Special Services was to deprive Ukraine of the ability to defend itself in the event of open aggression, and this goal was achieved. It was at this juncture that the new leaders of the country discovered that the Ukrainian defense system was practically non-existent. Ukrainian experts who studied and reconstructed the motives behind various decisions on military security that predicated the Ukrainian army's loss of defensive capacity concluded that there was

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J8ISQpbfoBI (accessed 23 July 2014). The Russian version was is available at http://aillarionov.livejournal.com/696982.html (accessed 23 June 2014).

8 "Regarding the Informational and Psychological Component of the Russian Federation's Aggression against Ukraine," based on events of 1-2 March 2014 (Kyiv: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014), available at http://en.niss.gov.ua/public/File/englishpublic/Russia_aggression.pdf (accessed 23 June 2014) (in Russian).

9 Ivan Kapsamun, "Regarding the Watershed Line," *Den* [The Day], 19 June 2014 (in Russian).

ongoing covert interference by the RF in matters related to the state's management of the defense sector on a tactical and strategic level.[10] Staff appointments to executive military posts, management, financial, and especially political decisions on Ukrainian defense matters were constantly subject to intervention and adjustment from the RF. The last defense ministers of Ukraine (in Yanukovych's government), as noted in the study mentioned above, were citizens of the RF.[11]

Despite the widespread opinion that Putin could not fully depend on the fugitive Ukrainian president's loyalty, in Yanukovych he had a supporter, a like-minded person, and a follower, as the regimes the two of them were building in their respective countries were of the same type. There is no question that Yanukovych's Ukraine was *complementary* to Putin's Russia, although it did have certain important distinctions concerning practices of the criminal world.

The Taking of Ukraine

After Yanukovych fled and power changed hands in Ukraine, isolated data about the scale of the erosion of national identity have been gradually accumulated, analyzed, and summarized. However, many gaps remain in the overall picture. Important testimonies have either been irretrievably lost or intentionally concealed from the public.[12] Ukraine's official bodies have not yet completed their investigations and have not managed to process all the information in their possession. Thus, the public discourse is dominated by perceptions based more on journalistic materials than on official sources. For example, an examination of objects and documents that could not be removed from Yanukovych's residence simply due to lack of time points to the man being pathologically obsessed with his own personal enrichment.[13]

The hierarchy of corruption was structured so as to ensure an uninterrupted flow of money and material resources, ranging from the collection of tributes from small shopkeepers, bribery, the sale of job positions, and the seizure of businesses to illegal sequestration of budgetary funds. In this system, every government institution, every element of state governance, was dedicated to generating income for the personal treasury of the ex-president and his entourage. Accordingly, defense and law enforcement agencies were used primarily to serve the personal economic interests of the regime members: (1) collection

[10] For more details see: *Regarding the decline (partial loss) of Ukraine's defense capabilities (2000-2014). Expert study* (Kyiv: Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Research, Defense Express, 2014), available at http://issuu.com/ukrainian_defense_review/docs/ (in Russian).

[11] Ibid., 76.

[12] According to testimony by the head of the Security Service of Ukraine, beginning in December 2013 the ex-president's associates began to systematically destroy existing records of unprecedented thefts and other crimes by the regime.

[13] "Yanukovych's assets: a public initiative to gather information about the illicit assets of ex-president Yanukovych and his associates," available at http://Yanukovych.info/ru/viktor-yanukovych/ (in Russian).

of information (economic, financial, compromising, and so forth) about potential victims; (2) coercion (blackmail or the use of force); (3) collection of payments (legal and illegal); and (4) providing security for the hierarchy and the system of control it had created.

In April 2014 the State Financial Monitoring Service announced the interim findings (for March) of an investigation into the laundering of funds received from corruption and from the embezzlement of government funds and property by the former President of Ukraine and his relatives, as well as by officials of the former government and their associates. According to these materials, the total sum of financial transactions suspected of being involved in legalizing illegally-obtained income stands at UAH 77.2 billion (about USD nine billion). Incidentally, this number is absent from the English-language version of the agency's website.[14]

After coming to power in 2010, Yanukovych developed a strictly vertical hierarchy for managing the flow of money by eliminating competitors and simplifying the operational control of cash deliveries.[15] It is evident that the system for expropriating money from the Ukrainian economy was honed to the point that the amounts of riches accumulated over the years of Yanukovych's time in office could be comparable to the country's entire national budget. An analysis of the risks to the 2014 national budget, prepared during Yanukovych's tenure, makes it possible to measure the scale of the ex-president's ambitions during the last year he was in power (the next scheduled presidential elections were planned for early 2015). Experts estimated the possible losses to the budget resulting from schemes bearing the signs of corruption risks at about USD 24 billion (or nearly half of all budgetary expenditures).[16]

While preparing the present material, the author discovered a great number of testimonies and estimates in the independent media describing schemes for illegal expropriation of funds from the Ukrainian economy. In fact, the total amount of stolen resources—from USD 17–30 billion, according to various estimates—today serves to financially support the undeclared war in Donbass. Moreover, it is interesting to note that some elements of these schemes were put together long before Yanukovych's time. The tax machinations, along with smuggling and gas schemes, became the most profitable sectors of the shadow economy, commanding fierce competition for their control, not excluding the competition of winning the presidency and gaining a majority in parliament. It

[14] "Information from the State Financial Monitoring Service" (9 April 2014). Accessed on 28 July 2014 at http://www.sdfm.gov.ua/news.php?news_id=2546&lang=uk; http://www.sdfm.gov.ua/news.php?news_id=2592&lang=en.

[15] Some informed sources have indicated in personal conversations that Yanukovych preferred not to keep money in banks, but accumulated it in the form of cash, gold and precious material goods. This is indirectly confirmed by video footage of surveillance cameras in his residence that became available after he fled.

[16] Ivan Sikora, "Budget-2014: Systemic Risks Costing over 188 Billion UAH" (Open Society Foundation, 14 January 2014), available at http://osf.org.ua/policy-analysis-parlament/view/88.

would be difficult to presume these schemes are gone along with ex-president Yanukovych. To assess the scale of the degradation of government institutions and to better understand the challenges faced by Ukraine's new leaders given the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, it is worthwhile looking at the sources of Yanukovych's accumulated riches.

Example 1. According to estimates by the Ministry of Revenues and Duties, losses from so-called "tax pits" (companies for exempting profits from taxation) for 2011-2013 totaled USD 37 billion (i.e., USD 12.5 billion per year).[17] The scheme permeated the entire fiscal system of Ukraine and was controlled by the heads of the State Tax Administration, the State Customs Committee, and other regulatory bodies. Each of these government institutions was obliged to regularly transfer a fixed sum of cash to Yanukovych's associates.

Example 2. Public procurement is yet another thoroughly corrupt method of extracting resources from the economy. As a rule, only companies affiliated with the highest-ranking individuals in the regime could win formally competitive tenders to execute large government projects.[18] In addition, the value of the projects put up for competitive bidding had to be overstated by at least a factor of two. The scale of misappropriation from the central budget alone, and in state procurement alone, was estimated at USD 10 billion.[19]

Example 3. Control of government assets and access to the management and financial resources of state companies made it possible on the one hand to manipulate the assets under their control, and on the other hand to steal lending resources made available under government guarantees. As of March 2014, the total indebtedness of state-owned companies was UAH 140 billion (about USD 13 billion).[20] All these companies, like many other state-owned companies (for example, Energoatom, which produces electricity at nuclear stations), are unprofitable business entities, that is, they are incapable of functioning without support from the state budget. The Naftogaz company, a monopolistic operator in Ukraine's gas market, is an exception. The company's debt to creditors (USD 7.7 billion) came about largely as a result of machinations aimed at extracting funds from companies. According to various esti-

[17] Minutes of a plenary session of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine (Parliament of Ukraine), 19 June 2014, available at http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/5641.html.

[18] Unfortunately, this practice continues, with information appearing regularly on a website created by independent journalists for tracking corruption connections during government procurement actions; available at http://nashigroshi.org (in Russian).

[19] Sergey Lyamets, "Vladimir Dubrovksy: the Top-Down Power Structure Must Be Destroyed," *Ekonomichna Pravda* [Economic Truth], 18 June 2014, available at http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2014/06/18/466239/ (in Russian).

[20] "The sum total of state companies' debt is 140 billion UAH – Yatsenyuk," *RBC-Ukraine*, 27 March 2014, available at www.rbc.ua/rus/news/politics/obshchaya-summa-dolgov-gosudarstvennyh-kompaniy-sostavlyaet-27032014104500/ (in Russian).

mates, Yanukovych's associates made over USD 3 billion per year on these schemes.[21]

Example 4. Only companies that either belonged to the ex-president's circle or shared some of the benefits with him (usually 30–50%) enjoyed state support. In the coal industry alone, budgetary subsidies for coal extraction doubled—to USD 1.5 billion—during the period of 2009–2013.[22] Illegal coal mining was a second element of the coal subsidies scheme. By early 2014 coal extraction in makeshift mines had reached a record mark of six million metric tons, or practically 10% of all the coal produced in the country.[23] The direct gain from illegal activities is estimated at USD 250 million per year.[24]

If the proposition that the Russian and Ukrainian political and economic systems were operating in a complementary fashion during the period leading up to the Ukraine crisis in late 2013 is valid, it follows that Yanukovych's and Putin's main political objectives coincided. The former sought to strengthen a criminal and corrupt regime, the latter to maintain Ukraine as a non-democratic and non-free country within the RF's zone of control. Evidently, it was during the summer of 2013 that the Ukrainian ex-president made the final decision to break off relations with the West. This conclusion is based on the author's personal impressions and knowledge of the current problems of Ukraine's top leadership. In particular, apprehensions regarding future elections, the imminent economic crisis, and the RF's political blackmail were frequently expressed in meetings of the president's administration and of the government. Thus, underlying the ex-president's decision were the following motives: 1) the threat of losing sources of personal enrichment as a result of the coming financial and economic crisis; 2) the lack of prospects for quickly compensating for that income by integrating with the EU [25] and the threat of the enrichment scheme falling apart as a result of implementing an association;

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[21] For example, the oil and gas company "Naftogaz" purchases 18 billion cubic meters of domestically produced natural gas annually for the price of USD 53 per 1,000 cubic meters. The declared purpose is social – the sale of cheap gas to poor users. In reality, up to half the gas is sold at the inflated prices of Russian gas (USD 485), for Ukraine has neither a centralized system for accounting for gas supplies nor a competitive gas market.

[22] Sikora, "Budget 2014."

[23] In fact the prime cost of illegal gas is several times lower than the market price. However, after this gas is legalized as having been produced in a government well, its price increases by several factors. Thus, the owners of illegal gas wells make money twice – on the price machinations and on subsidies from the budget.

[24] "Cabinet of ministers has approved a plan to deal with illegal coal mining," Union of Coal Industry Workers, 13 January 2014, available at http://www.prupu.org/news/18361/.

[25] Anders Oslund, an expert in the economies of post-Soviet states, pointed out that the sum of ten billion USD, which ex-First Deputy Prime Minister Arbuzov was seeking from the EU, is the same amount which by the most modest of estimates is disappearing from the national budget as a result of their machinations. Anders Aslund, "Payback Time for the 'Yanukovych Family,'" *RealTime Economic Issues Watch*, 11 December 2013, available at http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=4162.

and 3) the presumption that Putin would agree to meet Yanukovych's financial needs, both state and personal (credit and access to gas deals).

The revolutionary events at Kyiv's Maidan square turned out to be a threat that neither Yanukovych nor Putin had taken into account. Accordingly, both leaders went to great lengths to suppress the protests.[26] On the eve of the open aggression, Ukraine was on the verge of defaulting, with its state institutions (army, police, judicial system, security service, and most national executive bodies) completely disabled.[27]

By the time the crisis came to a head, the major sectors of the Ukrainian economy were involved in semi-legal, semi-criminal transnational business schemes. Instruments of budgetary and fiscal policy were used to illegally extract a significant portion of the national GDP from the economy.

As a result of the Kremlin's intentional policy, with members of the former Ukrainian regime and Russian security services acting as providers, Ukraine was transformed into an economically vulnerable and institutionally weak state. For international observers, the annexation of Crimea was the turning point in understanding the Ukraine crisis. However, the loss of Crimea was only the beginning of the invasion's open phase. Analysis of the situation from the standpoint of political and economic realities is the key to understanding the strategy and tactics of the intervention. Accordingly, the unconventional war against Ukraine had begun long before it was noticed. In an era of hybrid warfare the threats also become hybrid – indistinct, veiled, distorted, and so on. When the aggressor is constrained (for various reasons) from using traditional weapons, it may use substitutes. In the case of Ukraine, it is clear that the use of non-standard tactics of "directed disruption" of the enemy's governing authorities and economic system gives the aggressor a clear advantage without resorting to armed confrontation.

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[26] Kapsamun, "Watershed Line." According to testimony from the SSU, at least three groups of high-ranking officials from the Russian Federation FSB were working within the Security Service of Ukraine from December 2013 through February 2014. During those months, all the modern weapons, personal files, archives—everything that a professional security service is based upon—were taken to Crimea. In recent years, Russian agents have had a constant presence in Ukrainian special security units, and during revolutionary activities have actively worked to develop and implement plans to suppress those activities (clearing of Maidan, kidnapping of activists, shooting people). Moreover, Putin's regime, presumably in concert with Yanukovych, was preparing for the annexation of Crimea and for events in Donbas. As early as March 2014, the SSU discovered separatist organizations in the territory of the Lugansk and Donetsk oblasts that were actually subversive groups. They had stores of weapons and money at their disposal. It was also established that the former commander of interior troops, ex-Minister of Internal Affairs Zakharchenko, and the former head of the SSU were involved in recruiting mercenaries and organizing shipments of arms into Ukrainian territory.

[27] *Ukraine. Request for a Stand-By Arrangement*, IMF Country Report 14/106 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2014), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14106.pdf.

In late July 2014, as work on this article was coming to a close, there appeared a fragile hope for a quick conclusion to the strange war in Donbass. However, the prospects for a more sustainable peace are difficult to achieve in the medium term. It stands to reason that social and economic problems on the one hand and dissatisfaction among oligarchic groups with the outcome of the conflict's hot phase on the other will provoke and tempt the outside aggressor to disrupt Ukraine from within again and again.

Conclusions and Recommendations for Ukraine

The RF's aggressive policy has resulted in a manifold increase in the risks of trans-regionalization of conflicts, the spread of hostilities to other countries (primarily Ukraine's neighbors), the destabilization of border territories, the intensification of separatist processes, and ultimately an escalation of security threats to Central Europe and the Baltic and Black Sea regions.

The Ukrainian precedent may be replicated as a special operation to destroy statehood, whereby disruption is achieved through the escalation of internal political and economic challenges (of countries, regions, and international blocs). One universal means of undermining statehood in an era of hybrid wars is to encourage corruption among holders of the highest offices and to rely on systemic corruption in institutionally weak states.

In the case of Ukraine, macro-financial vulnerability in conjunction with a strained economic structure proved to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for preparing and implementing hybrid aggression in a neighboring state. The circumstances accompanying the unleashing of the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine provide sufficient evidence to confirm the thesis that the specific economic interests of the actors in the conflict are instrumental to an armed conflict's onset as well as to impede its cessation.[28]

As such, there emerge three prominent recommendations for Ukraine. Firstly, the country should completely restructure the security sector, restore the capacities of the security service, law enforcement agencies, and military. The risks associated with addressing this task are a shortage of personnel, treason, and a lack of experience and resources. Secondly, it is necessary to strengthen the administrative and financial capacity of the institutions of government authority and dismantle the corrupt vertical structure. Addressing this

[28] Paul Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy," in *Leashing the Dogs of War*, ed. Chester A. Crocker et al. (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 2007), also available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/EconomicCausesofCivilConflict-ImplicationsforPolicy.pdf. Cf. also Ivan Briscoe, "Non-conventional armed violence and non-state actors: challenges for mediation and humanitarian action," The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), Report, May 2013, available at http://www.peacebuilding.no (accessed 20 July 2014); Mark B. Taylor, "Conflict Financing: What's Wrong with War Economies?" The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), Report, May 2013, available at http://www.peacebuilding.no/ (accessed 23 July 2014).

task involves pursuing a strict anti-corruption policy and carrying out institutional and structural reforms in the spheres of activity most involved in illegal schemes (e.g. budget, public procurement, banking, and energy). Finally, the financial base of the separatist movement must be destroyed and the shadow business in Donbass and in other regions that serve as the primary social cover for the "separatist" movement must be brought to a halt. The risks include the impossibility of fully closing the channels through which resources flow from the RF, the lack of control over seized territories and centers of criminal business, and the weakening or destruction of the social welfare systems for persons wishing to leave the conflict zone.

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Research Article

'Good' and 'Bad' Investments: Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Ukrainian Commanders but Were Afraid to Ask

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Abstract: The military conflict in Southeastern Ukraine provides vast research opportunities in most diverse areas and in a zone of ongoing combat with all its attendant social ramifications. This article provides a review of some key questions of this war: why volunteer battalions conduct some harmful and inhumane acts and what may be done next to prevent violence after the war. Because war creates big areas without any control, there are huge non-transferable investments, incidents like torturing civil people, etc. The authors try to explain what conditions may impact the behavior of battalions and what should the governments do after the war ends.

Keywords: Russian-Ukrainian conflict, psychology of violence, proxy war, non-transferable investments, volunteer battalions.

Introduction

The military conflict in the southeast of Ukraine is creating a vast field of research in the most diverse areas and has led to the creation of a local but ongoing combat zone with all its attendant social ramifications. A large number of volunteer battalions were formed within Ukraine during the first months of the war, which became some of its main players. As demonstrated by previous local conflicts in the post-Soviet space like the Chechnya wars and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the majority of such confrontations do not end when the situation is resolved by the governments of the parties involved. As many of these conflicts have the characteristics of a local civil war, a number of political, so-

cial, and cultural shifts occur in the conflict zone itself.[1] The participants, the volunteers of the battalions who find themselves involved in the conflict for an extended period of time may, when the conflict's hot phase ends, be transformed in the public consciousness from defenders of the homeland into an illegal military group. It is the fact of these fighters' *voluntary* participation in the hostilities that complicates their subsequent return to civilian life. This occurs especially if a battalion took on substantial political weight over the course of a conflict and later endeavors to influence the situation in domestic policy. As is apparent in the example of the conflict in Mukacheve, this is now a matter of immediate concern for Ukrainian policy and national security.[2]

Thus, the present research is devoted to an examination of the causes and consequences of this issue, and to the phenomenon of members of this battalion making so-called "non-transferable investments."[3] The core question posed is the following: how do the personal and social characteristics of the commander of a volunteer battalion affect the level of general non-transferable investments? This research aims to test two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1. The number of non-transferable investments made by a volunteer battalion overall is directly dependent on the commander of that battalion.

Hypothesis 2. A battalion commander's propensity for making non-transferable investments depends on his personal and social characteristics.

The research examines the following empirical material: volunteer battalions formed during the Ukraine–Russia conflict in 2014–2015; personal and social characteristics of the commanders of those battalions; the battalions' activities during the conflict; media coverage of their activities; and the official assessment of their activities by Ukrainian authorities.

To this end, the following research methods were used:

- Content analysis of open Ukrainian- and Russian-language media sources on the Internet;
- Content analysis of official documents of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the administration of the President of Ukraine, and Ukrainian government decrees;
- Correlational analysis of identified indicators and characteristics based on the data obtained from content analysis;
- A method of modeling social processes based on social and political theories and conventions.

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1 Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

2 Ivan Lyubimov, "Extractive Institutions, Closed Borders and Economic Development," available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2543169.

3 Tudor Lubenov, Ivan Marinov, Emiliya Velizarova, "Risk of Flooding: Activities, Parameters and Regional Peculiarities (Case study: Varbitsa watershed basin, Bulgaria)," *Glasnik Srpskog geografskog drustva* 89:4 (2009): 75–83.

To test the first hypothesis, the paper shall turn to classical works on the interaction between a leader and a given social group.

Sociological and Psychological Validation

In his work, "The Psychology of Evil," studying the phenomenon of non-transferable investments made by American soldiers in Abu Ghraib, Philip Zimbardo attempts to refute the classic notion that an inclination toward sadistic violence is an innate deviation in a human being.[4] Rather, it is relatively rare and applies to only 5% of humans overall.[5] The researcher posited that anyone—even the most seemingly normal person—is capable of cruelty and outward manifestations of violence if a number of factors are present. The core issue Zimbardo studied is that soldiers committed such acts against prisoners of war because they considered this to be the most fully "good" performance of the social role assigned to them; namely, they believed that by beating and abusing prisoners of war they would be able to obtain useful information from them, thereby gaining favor with the command structure.[6]

Based on empirical data obtained during the Stanford prison experiment, based on the Abu Ghraib issue, the research concludes that normal people will begin to use violence if four factors are present at the same time: (1) anonymity; (2) impunity (the relieving of responsibility); (3) an image of hatred with respect to the victims of the violence; and (4) an environment of brutality.[7] For the manifestation of the most brutal forms of violence, which include pillaging, abuse of prisoners, and the mass killing of civilians, it is important that all these conditions be met in their totality.

As can be noted, three of the four factors were present in the conflict in Southeast Ukraine. The image of an enemy did indeed exist, the environment was demanding, and ski masks and camouflage provided a sufficient degree of anonymity. As such, the only difference between battalions that made non-transferable investments and others is the fourth factor: impunity. Impunity, the removal of responsibility from the individual, in and of itself provides additional motivation to take this action as the best execution of the social role (warrior) in which he finds himself. Thus, the more violent his behavior, the better he manifests the required qualities, namely more successfully than those around him. The individual is capable of performing actions condemned by society when he is relieved of all responsibility for those actions. At that moment he believes even the murder of another can deliver the maximum benefit in his social group.

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4 Philip G. Zimbardo, "The Psychology of Evil," *Eye on Psi Chi* 5 (2000): 16–19.

5 Ibid.

6 Mark Danner, *Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror* (New York: New York Review of Books 2004).

7 Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and Philip G. Zimbardo, "Study of Prisoners and Guards in a Simulated Prison," *Naval Research Reviews* 9 (1973): 1–17.

In field conditions in a civil war, however, only commanders can provide soldiers with such impunity.[8] Therefore, the level of non-transferable investments by fighters is dependent on the commander's personal and social traits. In essence, a battalion commander becomes a "local dictator," a figure who builds a new social reality around the battalion. The commander is the sole source of orders that place the soldiers in certain social roles. In a civil war, there is weak vertical control over the commander himself and more often than not, an absence of control from higher levels. But even if such control exists, it is extremely difficult to exercise it at any given moment, since in conditions of constant combat it is the commander's duty to make operational decisions.

An experiment by another social psychologist, Stanley Milgram, supports the idea outlined above by appealing to human psychology.[9] The experiment designed by the researcher, where the test subject is supposed to obey another subject's orders (fulfill his role), revealed shocking results. The experiment consisted of simulated training where the subject was supposed to ask questions and, in the case of an incorrect answer, press a button that would produce an electric shock. When the readings on the scale approached "point XXX" (a lethal dose), screams and pleas to stop could be heard from the other side of a wall, but the head of the experiment insisted that the test continue. Ultimately, two thirds of psychologically "normal" people were able to continue to the point of "killing" the test subject. This experiment demonstrates that the presence of the factors identified by Zimbardo and the individual's desire to perform his social role as well as possible are capable of causing a person to commit non-transferable investments. The key factor in making these investments is impunity; in this case an "endorsement" from an individual who possesses a higher social status in a given group. The commander of a volunteer battalion in Southeastern Ukraine fully meets this criterion.

The direct relationship between a commander's personality and the number of non-transferable investments made by the battalion may be viewed from a sociological standpoint as well. A description of this idea is found in a work by American sociologist Erving Goffman devoted to the shaping of attitudes in US military regiments during the Second World War.[10] Goffman attempted to find a correlation between soldiers' behavior on the battlefield and in territory they occupied, as well as certain social and cultural traits of the soldiers themselves. The initial hypothesis was similar to commonly accepted dogma: sociologists had previously believed that the key factor in a unit's behavior was the personality traits of the overwhelming majority of the soldiers. That is, if a large num-

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8 Philip G. Zimbardo, "The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos," *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* 17 (1969): 237–307.

9 Stanley Milgram, *Das Milgram-Experiment* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1974).

10 Erving Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (New Brunswick, NJ: Aldine Transaction, 1961).

ber of criminal or marginal subjects were gathered in one unit, that military unit would have a greater probability of doing "bad things;" looting, for example.

Goffman's work makes it clear that this hypothesis was invalid. Even detachments consisting mostly of criminal subjects displayed heroism on the battlefield and strictly followed the command's orders. Yet other units that seemed less disposed to doing "bad things" did commit serious crimes. The best example supporting this hypothesis is the 101st Airborne Division, the "Screaming Eagles," which in 1944 consisted mostly of criminals, but performed in an exemplary fashion during the Bastogne operation.[11]

In addition, Goffman offers an alternative theory that is empirically confirmed in his research. The attitude and combat capabilities of a regiment are determined not by the overall number of soldiers, but by one or two active actors who often instill an image of their behavior in the unit. If a person appears in the unit and begins to actively urge his comrades to treat the local population cruelly and he himself is the first to begin acting in this manner, there is a greater probability that others in the unit will adopt an identical attitude.

Further evidence of this theory is present in an experiment by French social psychologist Serge Moscovici demonstrating that an active minority forces other members of a group to abandon their own position.[12] The experiment studied the ability of an active minority to impose their point of view on an agreeable or passive majority. The results showed that even a small but active group of agitators is capable of bringing those around them to their (often objectively false) point of view. It is this phenomenon that makes the study of a commander's personality important, as in a volunteer battalion (as opposed to regular troops) the commander is the primary source of ideas for the entire unit. It is he who shapes the battalion, meaning that he translates his values to the rest of the unit.

Thus, considering the aforementioned factors, analyzing the reasons for a battalion to make non-transferable investments, requires an understanding of the reasons for taking such actions on the part of the commander himself. The present hypothesis is that the personal and social traits of the commander influence this process. This issue, as well as the very concept of non-transferable investments, is examined in the following section.

Theory of Non-transferable Investments

The term "non-transferable investments" was coined by political scientist Milan Svolik in his article, "Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and the Fate of

[11] Mark Bando, *101st Airborne: The Screaming Eagles at Normandy* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Imprint, 2011).

[12] Serge Moscovici, *Psychologie sociale des relations à autrui* (Paris: Nathan, 1994).

Dictators."[13] He posits that a dictator in an authoritarian regime commits a number of acts that on one hand are aimed at strengthening his influence (persecution of his opposition, corruption, cronyism, and so forth) and on the other hand increase the chance of his prosecution should he be removed from power (a tribunal, imprisonment, or death penalty). Svolik terms as non-transferable investments those actions by a dictator that simultaneously satisfy two of these conditions, i.e., investments that an autocrat may only use while he is in power. Non-transferable investments are analogous to fraud, scams in a sort of abstract game that allows one to quickly achieve maximum gain, but at the same time threatens harsh punishment.

Expanding on this theme, Russian political scientist and economist Ivan Lyubimov applies the logic of the "dictator's dilemma" to individuals who possess a substantial amount of authoritarian control in certain conditions that are limited in time and resources.[14] As an example the author suggests military commanders in Argentina who repressed soldiers and robbed the civilian population with no fear of prosecution as long as they controlled a given territory. In such situations, local autocrats become "permanent bandits" who seek to increase their wealth by making non-transferable investments.[15]

Meanwhile, the individual faces a dilemma: by committing these illegal or illicit acts he will reap a windfall of benefits and privileges. However, if he loses power, the risks of payback increase. In order to make a decision the person must predict how the situation will play out and assess the probability and seriousness of prosecution in the worst case scenario.

In the framework of this study, it is assumed that the conditions of civil war pose a similar dilemma for commanders of military units, because with weak oversight from higher authorities and hostilities taking place within his own country, a volunteer battalion commander has total authority within the territory in which the battalion is operating. Thus, it is possible to apply the theory of non-transferable investments for the purpose of examining processes that occurred within Ukraine from May 2014 through March 2015. It was during this period that the executive authorities and the high command of Ukraine exercised the least control over the battalions' actions.[16] Therefore, the empirical portion of this study is built on a content analysis of mass media, open Internet sources and official documents from Ukraine's government bodies that de-

[13] Milan W. Svolik, "Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and the Fate of Dictators," *The Political Economist* 13:2 (2011): 7–9.

[14] Ivan Lybimov, "The Effect of Dictatorship," *Slon*, 9 July 2015, available at https://slon.ru/posts/53823 (in Russian).

[15] Martin C. McGuire and Mancur L. Olson, "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: the Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," *Journal of Economic Literature* 34:1 (1996): 72–96.

[16] Gerhard Simon, "Collapse and a New Beginning: The Ukrainian Revolution and Its Enemies," in *Conflict, Crisis, War*, a special issue of *Osteuropa* 64 (2014): 5–6.

scribe and characterize the actions of the battalions and their commanders during this period.

The following actions by battalion commanders served as examples of non-transferable investments:

1. Documented amoral behavior toward prisoners (abuse, violence, torture), as well as a refusal, on principle, to take prisoners.
2. Documented amoral behavior toward local civilians (looting, kidnapping, violence).
3. Use of battalion resources for personal gain (blackmail and attacks on businesses in a given territory, participation in smuggling, participation in corruption schemes to supply the battalion with resources, etc.).
4. Aggressive statements about other pro-Ukrainian forces.
5. Disdain for the lives of the battalion's own soldiers, leaving them in danger, etc.

It is important to note that the third item was the most common type of non-transferable investment made by commanders of Ukrainian volunteer battalions during the period in question. In accordance with the theory described earlier, the present paper considers all other actions by commanders to be transferable investments, i.e. actions that could benefit the battalion commander even after he loses that status.

Reasons and a Model for Making Non-transferable Investments by Field Commanders of Volunteer Battalions during the Conflict in Southeastern Ukraine

The second hypothesis of this study involves the following question: what motivates a volunteer battalion commander to make non-transferable investments? To find an answer, the "Theory of an Authoritarian Personality," as outlined by a group of researchers, was applied.[17]

Using methods of psychological analysis and associative testing, an F scale makes it possible to determine to what extent a given individual is capable of becoming a "local dictator."[18] The authors of the theory identify four main causes of the process: (1) the individual's personal history, (2) his personality traits, (3) his degree of satisfaction with his current social status, and (4) his current social setting.

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[17] Jos D. Meloen, "The F-Scale as a Predictor of Fascism: An Overview of 40 Years of Authoritarianism Research," in *Strength and Weakness*, edited by William F. Stone, Gerda Lederer, and Richard Christie (New York: Springer, 1993), 47–69.

[18] Jos D. Meloen, L. Hagendoorn, Q. Raaijmakers, and L. Visser, "Authoritarianism and the Revival of Political Racism: Reassessments in the Netherlands of the Reliability and Validity of the Concept of Authoritarianism by Adorno, *et al*.," *Political Psychology* 9 (1988): 413–429.

In the framework of the study these criteria were operationalized, which led to the following indicators:

1. age of the individual
2. level of education and profession
3. job experience, career, and employment history prior to participating in the conflict (special attention is given to whether an individual has a criminal record)
4. participation in public and political life prior to participation in the conflict
5. individual's social status prior to participation in the conflict
6. individual's career and employment after participation in the conflict
7. individual's social status after participation in the conflict.

Additionally, based on data from items 3 and 4, the authors formulated a secondary categorical indicator 8, and based on data from 2, 3, and 5 obtained secondary categorical indicator 9:

8. degree of the individual's disposition to take risks
9. individual's need to increase his symbolic capital.

The theoretical rationale for obtaining indicators 8 and 9 is based on French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's concept of transformation of various types of capital and on an adaptation of that theory proposed by contemporary Russian historian and political scientist Georgi Derluguian.[19]

The theory of capital transformation posits that an individual's capital (be it social, political, economic, or symbolic) may increase or transform from one into another through certain actions. In this regard, each of these types of capital requires practical implementation, which compels the individual to perform actions. In his work, Derluguian notes that a high level of symbolic capital (advanced education, broad erudition, and a high level of intelligence), but a rather low level of other types of capital is typical for most people in the post-Soviet space. For people there, this phenomenon creates a high degree of dissatisfaction with one's social status. The individual thus seeks to transform his symbolic capital into other types of capital – political, economic, or social.

In the conflict in the southeast of Ukraine, most commanders possessed a high level of symbolic capital (education and a high degree of public activity), and therefore sought to use the military conflict and their position as a battalion commander to transform it into:

- political capital (coopting into the existing elite)

[19] Georgi M. Derluguian, *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Georgi M. Derluguian, *et al.*, "Adept Bourdieu in the Caucasus. Sketches for the Biography in the World-System Perspective," *Directmedia* (2013). Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, "Forms of Capital," in *Cultural Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Imre Szeman and Timothy Kaposy (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 81–93.

- social capital (public recognition, enhanced image in society as a "Defender of the Homeland")
- economic capital (personal enrichment).

Thus, the need to transform symbolic capital into another type of capital becomes a key motivation for the battalion commander to make transferable or non-transferable investments. In this regard, each specific instance of transformation displays particular aspects:

1. In the case of symbolic capital being transformed into political capital, the individual resorts to non-transferable investments when the commander—despite his celebrity and political weight—is not coopted into the elite.
2. When symbolic capital is transformed into social capital, the individual proceeds to make transferable investments when he places an increase in personal popularity above the battalion's military successes or consciously exaggerates his contribution and the battalion's contribution to a positive outcome of the fighting.
3. Any transformation of a battalion commander's symbolic capital into economic capital is accompanied by an increase in non-transferable investments, since combat operations cannot be aimed at making profit. Any accumulation of wealth under such conditions is illegitimate and is regarded by society as amoral.

However, even when a commander is unable to achieve the desired level of capital, in many cases no transition to non-transferable investments occurs, because additional personal and social traits, which were operationalized earlier, affect the commander's "willingness" to do "bad things."

The empirical portion of this study also analyzes the effect of a constellation of social and personality traits, the level of an individual's predisposition to take risks, and the need to transform symbolic capital into ultimately making non-transferable investments.

Empirical Test of Hypotheses and Summary of Classification

The present study examined thirty of the largest volunteer battalions that operated during the conflict in Southeastern Ukraine.[20] It is worth noting that from the beginning, the sample excluded the military unit commanded by a major Ukrainian political figure, Dmitry Yarosh, because he differs significantly from other battalion commanders and requires analysis using entirely different methods.

In total, the study analyzed:

- Bereza, Yuri – commander, Dnepr-1 Battalion
- Berkelya, Oleg – commander, Kremenchuk Battalion

[20] See Annex 1 for more detailed information about the sources selected for content analysis.

- Biletsky, Andrei – commander, Azov Battalion
- Vitko, Artem – commander, Lugansk-1 Battalion
- Voytsekhovsky, Bogdan – commander, Kiev-2 Battalion
- Volsky, Igor – commander, Lvov Battalion
- Goncharov, Vitaly – commander, Svyatoj Mikolaj Battalion
- Gumenyuk ,Aleksandr – commander, Kievskaya Rus Battalion
- Deydey, Evgeny – commander, Kiev-1 Battalion
- Katruk, Volodimir – commander, Ternopil' Battalion
- Kolesnik, Nikolay (Mikola Kolesnik) – commander, Krivbas Battalion
- Kokhanivsky, Mikola – commander, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) Battalion
- Mateychenko, Konstantin – commander, Artemevsk Battalion
- Melnichuk, Sergei – commander, Aidar Battalion
- Moroz, Ruslan – commander, Vinnitsa Battalion
- Onischenko, Ruslan – commander, Shakhtyorsk Battalion
- Pisarenko, Aleksandr – commander, Sich Battalion
- Pitskiv, Roman – commander, Chernigov Battalion
- Polischuk, Aleksandr – commander, Ivano-Frankovsk Battalion
- Portyanko, Vladislav – commander, Sichyaslav Battalion
- Semenchenko, Semyon (real name: Konstantin Grishin) – commander, Donbas Battalion
- Storcheus, Ruslan – commander, Kherson Battalion
- Teteruk, Andrei – commander, Mirotvorets Battalion
- Fatsevich, Aleksandr – commander, Svityaz Battalion
- Fedorenko, Aleksandr – commander, Poltava 2 Battalion
- Shvalya, Nikolay – commander, Zolotye Vorota Battalion
- Shevchenko, Vyacheslav – commander, Kirovograd Battalion
- Shestakov, Sergei – commander, Shtorm Battalion
- Yagolenko, Andriy – commander, Slobozhanschina Battalion
- Yangolenko, Sergei – commander, Kharkov-1 Battalion.

Information was collected on each commander based on the indicators listed earlier. The resulting data was then digitized and, subsequently, correlation analysis was used to determine the effect of each factor on a commander's predisposition to make non-transferable investments.

The resulting dependence is presented in Table 1. The results require some theoretical interpretation and a search for causal links. These shall be examined step-by-step.

1. *The closer a subject's age is to 40, the greater his propensity to make non-transferable investments*. This correlation is based on the phenomenon of the "post-Soviet man" described by Derluguian. The generation of the 1980s in post-Soviet countries possesses the greatest sense of "lost opportunities" (after the fall of the USSR and the rise of capitalism on the 1990s). They are simultaneously seeking a means of self-realization, possess sufficient symbolic capital, and have a significant amount of time for an abrupt career upswing. To make this career advance, they are prepared to make non-transferable investments. In direct contrast, the younger generation (27–35) does not see the current conflict as their "last chance" and are thus less inclined to do "bad things." The older generation (47-60) does not feel ready to "stake everything."

2.1. *A subject's military education reduces his propensity to make non-transferable investments*. This consistent pattern can be explained as follows: battalion commanders who received a military (Soviet) education are the least likely to perceive a military conflict as a source of personal enrichment.

2.2. *A subject's education level does not affect his propensity to make non-transferable investments*. The overall results regarding this correlation vary. On one hand, the commanders who were more highly educated possess greater symbolic capital and have a greater need to transform it into some other kind of capital. On the other hand, the better-educated commanders more often than not have a higher social status and occupy a higher position in society, which means they are less prepared to take risks and make non-transferable investments.

3. *A criminal past or record increases the propensity to make non-transferable investments*. This pattern was to be expected. Individuals who had previously committed crimes have lower moral and social barriers against doing "bad things," and also have a higher propensity to take risks, which prompts them to make non-transferable investments.

4.1. *An individual's participation in entrepreneurial activities increases the propensity to make non-transferable investments*. This pattern is also explained by a subject's greater propensity for risk-taking if he has been involved in business activities. It should be understood that in post-Soviet Ukraine any entrepreneurial activities, especially medium and large businesses, involve heightened risk.

4.2. *An individual's participation in public and political activities has no effect on the propensity to make non-transferable investments*. Just as in item 2.2, no distinct correlation could be found between a commander's public and political engagement and his willingness to make non-transferable investments. On one hand, a commander's experience in this area raises his symbolic capital; on the other hand, that symbolic capital is based upon society supporting some of his merits, and committing acts that society views as immoral may lead to the loss of what the commander already has.

4.3. *An individual's participation in the activities of security services (police or intelligence agencies) reduces the propensity to make non-transferable in-*

Table 1

Factor	Effect
Age	• The closer the subject is to 40 years of age, the greater the propensity to make non-transferable investments.
Education	• A subject's military education reduces the propensity to make non-transferable investments. • A subject's education level does not affect his propensity to make non-transferable investments.
Criminal record	• A criminal past or record increases the propensity to make non-transferable investments.
Type of activity	• An individual's participation in entrepreneurial activities increases the propensity to make non-transferable investments. • An individual's participation in public and political activities has no effect on the propensity to make non-transferable investments. • An individual's participation in the activities of security services (police or intelligence agencies) reduces the propensity to make non-transferable investments.)
Social status (pre-conflict)	• The lower the individual's pre-conflict social status, the greater the propensity to make non-transferable investments.
Social statue (post-conflict)	• The higher the social status (career, income level) an individual attains in a certain period, the lower the propensity to make non-transferable investments in the future.
Propensity to take risks	• The higher an individual's propensity to take risks, the greater his propensity to make non-transferable investments.
Transformation of symbolic capital	• The greater the need to transform symbolic capital, the great the propensity to make non-transferable investments. • The overall level of symbolic capital an individual possesses has no effect on the propensity to make non-transferable investments.

vestments. This interrelation is explained by an already considerable amount of co-opting of the commander into the existing elite. In this situation, his further career in the security services depends on how much his actions in the post of commander meet the expectations of the leadership.

5. *The lower the individual's pre-conflict social status, the greater the propensity to make non-transferable investments*. This pattern was expected.

Commanders whose pre-conflict social status was fairly low have greater ambitions than their colleagues, and need more to increase their economic capital.

6. *The higher the social status (career, income level) an individual attains during a certain period, the lower the propensity to make non-transferable investments in the future*. This correlation attests to the efficiency of the mechanism by which the battalion commanders are assimilated into the existing economic or political elite. Early coopting may serve as a reward for the more successful commanders who commit only socially approved acts. Such cooptation may also serve as added incentive for other commanders.

7. For patterns related to 'propensity for risk' and 'need to transform symbolic capital' see the analysis in the paragraph above.

Based on the data obtained and on previously described patterns, we offer a summary classification of battalion commanders by dividing them into three groups according to the level of non-transferable investments they made. This classification is displayed in Table 2.

Table 2

High level of non-transferable investments	*Medium level of non-transferable investments*	*Low level of non-transferable investments*
Battalion commanders		
• Biletsky, Andrei, Azov Battalion • Voytsekhovsky, Bogdan, Kiev-2 Battalion • Kolesnik, Nikolay (Mikola Kolesnik), Krivbas Battalion • Melnichuk, Sergei, Aidar Battalion • Onischenko, Ruslan, Shakhtyorsk Battalion	• Kokhanivsky, Mikola, OUN • Polischuk, Aleksandr, Ivano-Frankovsk Battalion • Semenchenko, Semyon (Konstantin Grishin), Donbas Battalion • Bereza, Yuri, Dnepr-1 Battalion • Fedorenko, Aleksandr, Poltava 2 Battalion • Yagolenko, Andriy, Slobozhanschina Battalion	• Berkelya, Oleg, Kremenchuk Battalion • Vitko, Artem, Lugansk-1 Battalion • Volsky, Igor, Lvov Battalion • Goncharov, Vitaly, Svyatoj Mikolaj Battalion • Gumenyuk, Aleksandr, Kivskaya Rus Battalion • Deydey, Evgeny, Kiev-1 Battalion • Katruk, Volodimir, Ternopil' Battalion • Mateychenko, Konstantin, Artemevsk Battalion • Moroz, Ruslan, Vinnitsa Battalion • Pisarenko, Aleksand, Sich Battalion • Pitskiv, Roman, Chernigov Battalion • Portyanko, Vladislav, Sichyaslav Battalion • Storcheus, Ruslan, Kherson

		Battalion • Teteruk, Andrei, Mirotvorets Battalion • Fatsevich, Aleksandr, Svityaz Battalion • Shvalya, Nikolay, Zolotye vorota Battalion • Shevchenko, Vyacheslav, Kirovograd Battalion • Shestakov, Sergei, Shtorm Battalion • Yangolenko, Sergei, Kharkov-1 Battalion
Examples of non-transferable investments		
• Accusations against other battalion members aimed at asserting one's own authority; Irpen and Zhitomir (2014) are examples • Attacks against MVD representatives in Kiev • Organization of illegal demonstration in front of the Ministry of Defense in February 2015 • Kidnapping of officers and civilians, robbery, rape • Establishment of racketeering gangs • Smuggling coal from the DNR • Providing false information to official media	• Most common example is a commander abandoning his battalion during the Ilovaisk Kettle (Battle of Ilovaisk) to save his own life. Such actions caused the death of many soldiers.	• Extremely rare
Key reasons for making non-transferable investments		**Key factors preventing the making of non-transferable investments**
• Criminal past • Inclination to take risks • Social activity preventing being coopted into positions of power • Long period of low social status that prevents being coopted into power		• Military education prevents the making of such investments, as this changes the person's attitude toward conflict • Discipline • Past participation in brutal military conflicts

Conclusion

This research established a clear correlation between the personality and social characteristics of battalion commanders and the "bad things" done by the battalion, and consequently the level of non-transferable investments made by the commander personally. A strong link was also noted between the commander and the behavior of his battalion, namely, hypothesis 1 can be considered confirmed. There is a further link between the social characteristics of a commander examined according to the F-scale method and his further behavior during a conflict.

In summary, it can be said that the present methodology makes it possible to identify potential war criminals who are prepared to make non-transferable investments in the course of a conflict. This theory has broad practical applications. It may be used to predict which individuals will resort to non-transferable investments in a nascent conflict, such that it is now possible to prevent some war crimes and thus reduce the number of victims of a given confrontation.

Annex 1

Information sources for content analysis

1. Official website of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, www.mil.gov.ua
2. Official website of the Ukrainian Office of the Prosecutor General, http://www.gp.gov.ua/
3. ATO official Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com/ato.news
4. ATO Heroes New Agency, http://www.atoheroes.org/
5. Official ATO webpage, https://urp.ssu.gov.ua
6. Obozrevatel News Agency, http://obozrevatel.com/crime/
7. Unovosti News Agency, http://unovosti.tk/category/rassledovaniya/
8. DOSIE News Agency, http://dosie.su/

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Research Article

The Relevance of Clausewitz's Theory of War to Contemporary Conflict Resolution

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Abstract: This article argues that Clausewitz's writing on war nearly 200 years ago is still relevant for contemporary conflict resolution from at least three aspects: his idea that war is "the continuation of policy by other means"; secondly his analysis of the nature of war and the trinity theory; and finally his understanding of the nature of the strategy. The analysis in this article found that, if there is good policy from which to derive a strategy, and if we are able to apply it efficiently, with support of the people and international community, we have created solid preconditions to win the war.

In addition, Clausewitz's view of the issues associated with war, strategy and conflict resolution is important for understanding the major issues and decision making even while history and reality constrain his abstractions with today's experience. His theories and concepts are as relevant today as they were two hundred years ago. Therefore, the twenty-first century strategists and leaders are recommended to take into consideration Clausewitz's theories on war and strategy because they are still applicable today. In short, Clausewitz is a theorist for the twenty-first century.

Keywords: Clausewitz, war, policy, strategy, conflict resolution, security.

It is not what we have thought, but rather how we have thought it, that we consider to be our contribution to theory.

Tiha von Ghyczy, Bolko von Oetinger, and Christopher Bassford [1]

Carl von Clausewitz has been studied extensively for 150 years by dedicated scholars and is acknowledged to be one of the few truly great writers on war. Many aspects of his ideas and concepts have received much attention in recent years and continue to remain relevant, and are often used in today's doctrines and for civil-military educational processes. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the most important theoretical aspects of war and strategy expounded by Clausewitz, some of which are enduring contributions to contemporary thought and still relevant to today's strategists.

Three crucial points will be used to support this contention. The first point is a conventional reference to his thinking: one the one hand, "war is an extension of policy;" on the other, "war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." [2] The second point relates to his analysis of the nature of war and trinity theory. The final point concerns his understanding of the nature of strategy.

To begin, one may pose a basic question: what are Clausewitz's most important contributions to the theory of war insofar as they are relevant to strategists today? In other words, what can a nineteenth century Prussian general teach a twenty-first century executive or entrepreneur about the theory of war?

Clausewitz applied a scientific, methodological approach to analyzing war in all of its aspects. This article presents and examines his most important and enduring contributions to the theory of war and strategy, and underlines their most important aspects. Firstly, particularly noteworthy is his famous conclusion that "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means." [3] The essence of this theory was Clausewitz's description of the vertical continuum of war (policy and strategy tactics), which he presents in the strategic "ends, ways, and means" paradigm. According to this, Clausewitz explains that "…war in itself does not suspend political intercourse… War cannot be divorced from political life…" [4]

The excerpts above reveal how Clausewitz refers to the political objective of war. This observation accurately captures the key aspect of war: its subordination to politics. Clausewitz's teaching about the relationship between politics and war can therefore be concluded with this summary: "Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war...

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1 Tiha von Ghyczy, Bolko von Oetinger, and Christopher Bassford, eds., *Clausewitz on Strategy. Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist* (New York: John Wiley, 2001), 185.

2 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 75.

3 Ibid., 87

4 Ibid., 605.

Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books."[5]

Clausewitz sees war as completely subordinate to policy. In *On War*, he explains that "The political object—the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires."[6] In his view, "war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."[7] It seems fair to say that this definition remains relevant today, with the caveat that current conflicts include all kinds of asymmetric threats (terrorism, organized crime, drug cartels, and so on.) Clearly, this definition emphasizes the centrality of combat, which separates war from conflict. To support previous points, Clausewitz describes war as "…a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed – that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts."[8] This leads to a clear understanding of the distinction between war and conflict, particularly in today's contemporary environment in which the threats are often asymmetric threats. However, what differentiates warfare today from the warfare conducted during Clausewitz's time should be kept in mind. A crucial difference lies in the non-kinetic aspect of contemporary warfare – namely, in information warfare. As a result of globalization and technological development that enables instant messaging over different information platforms, information campaigns have a vital role to play in winning wars by winning hearts and minds, as well as by discrediting the enemy (for example recently in Afghanistan between NATO and Taliban forces).

In history, as well as in the contemporary world and in the future, Clausewitz's theories of war provide the scientific laws through which one may understand the nature of war. For him, however, war was not an activity governed by scientific laws, but rather a clash of wills or moral forces. Accordingly, the successful commander was not the one who knew the rules of the game, but the one who through his genius created them. This is the theory and philosophy of war that lends his work timeless value.

Clausewitz is further important today because of his efforts to grasp the intrinsic nature of war. His approach, philosophical in its method, is not to be interpreted as a checklist or a quantitative measure on how to address a war. When it comes to an extremely important point, the *morality of war*, Clausewitz says: "the moral factor is the most fluid element of all, and therefore spreads most easily to affect everything else."[9] No theory could be of any value, he maintains, that did not account for these interconnected elements – the uncertainty of all information, the importance of moral factors, and, lending emphasis to both of these, the unpredictable reaction of the adversary. This

[5] Ibid., 141.
[6] Ibid., 81.
[7] Ibid., 75.
[8] Ibid., 149.
[9] Ibid., 97.

is one reason, in Clausewitz's view, why moral forces are so important. As another significant reason for the highest importance of moral elements in war, Clausewitz emphasizes that

> They constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole, and at an early stage they establish a close affinity with the will that moves and leads the whole mass of force, practically merging with it, since the will is itself a moral quantity.[10]

Clausewitz discusses the moral qualities demanded of the troops elsewhere, concluding: "No matter how clearly we see the citizen and the soldier in the same man … the business of war will always be individual and distinct. Consequently, soldiers will think of themselves as members of a kind of guild."[11]

Moreover, warfare is "Trinitarian." Simply put, it is about people, armed forces, and government.[12] These three aspects are like three different codes of law. Among these aspects, people are the most sensitive in terms of supporting war. Without public support, no war can be conducted successfully. To have their constant support, it is extremely important that the pubic be well informed in order to be able to judge between "right" and "wrong." Naturally, people's support becomes strongest regarding what is right and wrong—indeed, it becomes completely unquestionable—when they are directly exposed to a threat. This could be any kind of direct security threat to their country that they perceive. However, it must be emphasized that, today, the success of the "trinity" also depends on international support in at least two ways: the legality of the war and international support to the governments in question. The importance of international support could be seen in the case of the USA invading Iraq in 2003, and also in the case of Afghanistan two years earlier.

At this stage, it is worth mentioning Bassford's observations about Clausewitz's trinity model, in which he points out:

> Clausewitz's Trinity is all-inclusive and universal, comprising the subjective and the objective; the unilateral and multilateral; the intellectual, the emotional, and the physical components that comprise the phenomenon of war in any human construct. Understanding it as the central, connecting idea in Clausewitzian theory will help us to order the often confusing welter of his ideas and to apply them, in a useful, comparative manner, both to the history of the world we live in and to its present realities.[13]

No one can win war passively; it can only be won actively and decisively. The combination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power (DIME) has become essential in the contemporary world. Intelligence is ex-

[10] Ibid., 184.

[11] Ibid., 187.

[12] Ibid., 89.

[13] Christopher Bassford, "The Primacy of Policy and the 'Trinity' in Clausewitz's Mature Thought," in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 74–90.

tremely important for conducting counterterrorism. It can save a lot of lives, money, and time, as well as ensure initiative against the asymmetric threats arising today. There is no artificial replacement for this trinity of people, government, and military. Rather than attempting to contrast proven theory with modern complexities of conflict and seeking possible discrepancies between the two, the potential manifestations of human behavior in a constantly changing world should be explored more deeply and precisely. This will facilitate a deeper understanding of the nature of modern conflict, in which man is the central actor. There is a tendency to criticize the view of the trinity as the synthesis of three central elements or "dominant tendencies" highlighting that any war is composed of violence and hatred. Regarding the interplay of chance, probability, and the element of subordination, however, the trinity is capable of helping understand the essential dynamics of war even today.

The best path to victory is the so-called *western way of war*, as it calls for the most initiative and decisiveness, and as such has a high chance of success. As Geoffrey Parker sees, this approach to war rests on five principal foundations: "Superior technology, discipline, an aggressive Western military tradition, a unique ability to challenge and respond dynamically, and the capability to easily mobilize capital."[14] All five of these pillars have continuity throughout history, and consequently have impacted today's Western militaries. This is clear not only with regard to superior technology and military discipline, but also the flexibility and adaptability of western military structures and organizations in the face of new global challenges. No one could imagine military formations just fifteen years ago that would be successful in today's conditions of asymmetric war. Though these five principles are considered essential preconditions for success, today's wars require a rather fine balance between the application of aggressive military strategy and kinetic means with the use of non-kinetic-oriented strategies. This is especially valid in counterinsurgency operations, such as those conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The next important point explains the meaning of strategy. The word "strategy" is often used in a variety of contexts. This term is derived from the classical Greek word *strategia*, the art of the general, or *strategos*. According to Clausewitz, tactics teach the use of armed forces during engagement, whereas strategy uses engagement with the objective of winning war.[15] To clarify this with Clausewitz's words:

> Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it: in

[14] Geoffrey Parker, ed., *The Cambridge History of Warfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1.

[15] Clausewitz, *On War*, 128.

> fact, shape the individual camping and, within these, decide on the individual engagements.[16]

The meaning of military strategy sometimes seems to be blurred by continuously appearing in connection with other concepts such as economic strategy, development strategy, the strategy of domination, the prevailing strategy, technological strategy, etc. This begs the conclusion that there are numerous domains of human existence today, all of which require their own strategies. Military strategy requires the continuous development and incorporation of military planners; consequently, military strategists must be familiar with the basic provisions of other strategies in order to face security challenges and, ultimately, win the war. This does not diminish the historical meaning of military strategy – to the contrary, in fact.

Referring to Clausewitz's meaning of strategy in modern times still implies the use of engagement, but with much more attention paid to other domains than in the past. Strategy is less about the simple statement of goals, objectives, or purpose, and more about delineating how those elements are to be achieved in order for a mission to be accomplished.

Strategy is about ends and the means of achieving them; it is concerned with the highest level of planning, with clear end goals, and a broad picture of how to reach them. While losing at the tactical level of warfare does not necessarily mean losing the war, losing at the strategic level most often implies that the war is about to be lost if either the strategy, key officers, or both are not changed: "The original means of strategy is victory [in engagements] – that is, tactical success; its ends, in the final analysis, are those objects which will lead directly to peace."[17] Although we live in the twenty-first century—technologically completely different from Clausewitz's time—his fundamental definitions are still valid.

In conclusion, this paper has argued that Clausewitz's strategy provides a conceptual link between ends and means during peacetime and during war, and his theory of war is still relevant to contemporary strategists. Today there are developments and variations in technology, geography, religion, and politics – factors for which his observations must be adjusted, and with which he would probably agree fully. Although his awareness of the dialectic of war is perhaps too philosophical for some practitioners looking for a checklist to conduct their operations, Clausewitz's overview is important for understanding major issues and decisions even when history and reality constrain his abstractions as they relate to today's experience.

War is seen as a cruel and relentless human activity that is an act of force to bend the enemy to our will, resolved with bloodshed. War is driven by policy and is its organic part. It is caused by interests and the human need for domination as a basic instinct of survival. It is not necessary to have two sides willing

[16] Ibid., 177.

[17] Ibid., 177.

to wage war; if just one side wants a physical clash, it will occur; in fact, the initiating side has an advantage, as does the chess player with white pieces.

Likewise, morality is a psychological power that leads toward victory and can be influenced by positive and negative ideology. It can bring either pure and glorious victory or lead to war crimes with a moral alibi. Contrary to morals that help to win, fog and friction are everlasting and inevitable intrusive factors in war. That these factors can be reduced by training, discipline, and high technology leads to a conclusion that more developed nations have a better chance at reducing them.

An essential element of support to the military during war is the backing of the public, which is strongest when it is directly exposed to threat. Only an active and decisive comprehensive approach can lead to victory. In terms of efficiency, the most successful waging of war uses the Western approach with its superior technology, discipline, and aggressive military tradition, along with the ability to respond dynamically and the capacity to mobilize capital. Regarding strategy, it is both an art and a science in using means to reach the ends of policy. Determining strategy is a highly demanding activity for its makers in the extremely complex contemporary world.

Ultimately, if good policy exists from which to derive strategy, and if it is possible to apply it at a high level of efficiency alongside arguments that gain the unwavering support of the people and the international community, there will be favorable preconditions to win a war.

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Research Article

The Rise of Intelligence Studies: A Model for Germany?

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Abstract: Intelligence Studies have established themselves as a common subject in higher education in the Anglosphere. Germany so far offers no dedicated program in the field. A postgraduate program that promotes an understanding of the role and context of intelligence, strengthens analytical skills and deepens subject-matter expertise would combine the best features of various educational models, and provide a real contribution to building a cadre of highly qualified intelligence professionals. In this research report, the authors succinctly document the state of the discipline, present examples of some twelve degree programs, and, finally, develop initial proposals for an intelligence curriculum for German universities.

Keywords: intelligence studies, curriculum, military education.

Introduction

Traditionally, universities have paid little attention to intelligence issues. Even those scholars and institutions specializing on national security and defense only scantly dealt with the intelligence. In the words of Sir Alexander Cadogan, "intelligence studies" used to present a "missing dimension" of international studies.[1] This only slowly started to change in the 1980s and 90s: investigations into high-profile intelligence scandals such as Watergate and Iran-Contra, but

[1] Quoted in Len Scott and Peter Jackson, "The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice," *Intelligence & National Security* 19:2 (2004): 140.

also the declassification of increasing amounts of intelligence files in the United States and the United Kingdom, led to a growing awareness of the important role of intelligence in international affairs. The first associations of intelligence historians emerged and the first specialized journals appeared on the market.[2]

However, it was not until after the events of September 11, 2001 that interest in the previously little-known discipline exploded: while in 2006, for instance, only four of the twenty-five top-universities in the United States offered courses on intelligence, this has since expanded to more than half.[3] At the same time, also universities in France, Israel, Spain, and other countries began to offer coursework and even specialized programs in intelligence issues. This development was driven by researchers, intelligence agencies, and scholars alike. On the side of academics, the wide-ranging consequences of intelligence failures such as 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Iraq sparked an increased research interest in intelligence as an important and yet underappreciated factor in national decision-making. At the same time, intelligence services themselves started to reflect on these failures and adapted the training of their officers and analysts.[4] On the side of students, the salience of the subject and the promising job market accompanying the expansion of intelligence agencies has more and more students interested in building a career in the field of intelligence – and in an education that could best prepare them for this.

In a recent review of the state of the field, its most prominent exponents agree that, in the last decade, the discipline has undergone a process of professionalization and established itself as an accepted sub-discipline of security studies. Its most important current research areas include diverse topics such as intelligence failure, politicization of intelligence, questions of oversight, the ethics of intelligence and the connection between national and intelligence cultures.[5] This assessment of a thriving Intelligence studies discipline, however, only holds true for the Anglophone world. It is particularly inaccurate for Germany, where intelligence remains an almost inexistent field.[6]

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2 Martin Rudner, "Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to Meet Societal Demand," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence* 22:1 (2008): 112.

3 Jonathan Smith, "Amateur Hour? Experience and Faculty Qualifications in U.S. Intelligence Courses," *Journal of Strategic Security* 6:3 (2013): 25.

4 For instance, the US Intelligence Community established "Centers of Academic Excellence" at four universities. This number has since increased to ten. See Rudner, "Intelligence Studies," 114.

5 Loch J. Johnson and Allison M. Shelton, "Thoughts on the State of Intelligence Studies: A Survey Report," *Intelligence and National Security* 28:1 (2013): 111.

6 As noted by one of the few scholars of the subject, Wolfgang Krieger, this absence is largely the result of three specific factors: a lack of declassified documents, the complete absence of former intelligence officials at universities—part of an overall lack of the so-called "revolving door"—and the particular mindset of German academia which is typically characterized by considerable disdain for research on defense and security issues. The history of two totalitarian regimes also means that this disdain is

The large numbers of students looking to make a career in intelligence has also led to the emergence of "intelligence schools," particularly in the United States. While "intelligence studies" as a traditional university discipline is geared towards producing students of intelligence, these schools have a more practical focus and are trying to educate future intelligence officials – in particular, analysts.[7] Instead of creating specialists whom intelligence services would then hire for their expertise, these programs—which are usually at the undergraduate or graduate level[8]—focus on functional knowledge and aim to educate "generalists" who are "trained in the methods and mechanics of intelligence analysis."[9] As a consequence of the research conducted at these schools, the subject of intelligence analysis is also increasingly developing into its own sub-discipline in the field.

Intelligence Education at a University?

This leads directly to one of the most contested and important questions in the discipline: what exactly can and should universities actually offer to the intelligence community in terms of education? As discussed above, the traditional primary channel through which universities catered to the needs of intelligence services used to be the training of specialists – be they political scientists, engineers or linguists. Such education would typically be undertaken before joining the relevant agencies. The required training for specific tasks would then usually occur not at universities, but in classified environments at the in-house institutions of the intelligence services.

The emergence of programs with specific intelligence curricula in the undergraduate and graduate field, particularly at intelligence schools, is already changing this pattern. Graduates of these programs bring less specialized knowledge and more practical training and skillsets. The usefulness of these programs remains contested as critics emphasize the importance of knowledge

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particularly strong in the case of intelligence. See: Wolfgang Krieger, "German Intelligence History: A Field in Search of Scholars," *Intelligence and National Security* 19:2 (2004): 187–189.

7 Stephen Marrin, *Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap Between Scholarship and Practice* (Routledge: London, 2011), quoted in Michael Landon-Murray, "Moving U.S. Academic Intelligence Education Forward: A Literature Inventory and Agenda," *The International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence* 26:4 (2013): 746.

8 For the purpose of this report, programs are divided into undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate programs. Undergraduate programs are bachelor degrees. Graduate programs are those master´s programs that are designed as "consecutive" and do not require extensive previous professional work experience. Although in common use there is no systematic distinction between "graduate" and "postgraduate" programs in the US and UK, this article will refer to postgraduate (professional) programs as, instead, programs that are aimed at practitioners with significant professional experience in their field. PhD programs are not discussed in this report.

9 Landon-Murray, "Moving U.S. Academic Intelligence Education Forward," 746.

and expertise on specific subjects over "training" in analytic tradecraft. As described by Lowenthal, "analysts are hired for a body of knowledge, not for a skill set."[10] Other leading experts argue instead that such programs are essential and provide unique resources to the intelligence community.[11] Another much disputed aspect is the uneven nature and quality of these programs, yet this might be typical for an emerging discipline. As can be seen, the degree to which the character of the entry-level candidates universities provide to intelligence agencies should change remains an important question in the field – with the tradeoff between subject-matter expertise on specific aspects on the one hand, and general training in important intelligence techniques on the other as its most contested subject.[12]

Change is also under way in the field of postgraduate education, and its role in the careers of intelligence officers is becoming increasingly significant. In light of the massive intelligence failures that occurred in the early 2000s, many intelligence services began to reflect on the status of their analytical communities. While the enquiries into the 9/11 attacks still mainly focused on the lack of inter-intelligence cooperation, they already complained that intelligence analysts had suffered from a "failure of imagination" and would have to challenge traditional thinking patterns.[13] But the main blow to intelligence analysis came when the enquiries into intelligence failures in Iraq clearly put them in the spotlight.[14] Reports about the failure emphasized a lack of analytical standards, which some blamed on the fact that "intelligence analysts [are] trained in the proper development of theoretical frameworks and research hypotheses and in advanced social-science analytic methods."[15]

In fact, many came to see the entire field of training and education as the greatest professional weakness of analysis.[16] As a consequence, it was increasingly questioned whether the training in the intelligence services' own institutions actually created sufficient intellectual flexibility to deal with the challenges of complex modern threat environment, and whether in-house training in classified environments actually promoted sufficient analytical rigor and re-

[10] Mark M. Lowenthal, "The Education and Training of Intelligence Analysts," in *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives*, ed. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 306.

[11] Landon-Murray, "Moving U.S. Academic Intelligence Education Forward," 768.

[12] For an in-depth discussion, cf. ibid.

[13] For a discussion of the intelligence requirements of the complex modern threat environment, see Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton, "Making Sense of Transnational Threats," *Kent Center Occasional Papers* 3:1 (2004), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/index.html.

[14] Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles and Innovations* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 5.

[15] Michael W. Collier, "A Pragmatic Approach to Developing Intelligence Analysts," *Defense Intelligence Journal, Joint Military Intelligence College Foundation* 14:2 (2005): 21.

[16] Lowenthal, "The Education and Training of Intelligence Analysts," 303.

flection. Thus, the traditional division of labor between intelligence services and universities came into question and intelligence services began assessing which role universities could play in improving their analysts. While universities were traditionally limited to providing entry-level intelligence officers, services started to see them as possible places for postgraduate education. Education was hereby viewed as one of the means to fix the lack of analytical standards blamed for intelligence failures.

Yet what could universities actually offer in terms of postgraduate education – especially if compared to in-house training, where analysts can use their own systems and classified materials? According to Goodman, academic settings offer two fundamental advantages in education when compared to closed, in-house training opportunities: their engagement in research—and thus the state-of-the art of the learning content—and the opportunity to engage with critical and unorthodox views. In the words of Frerichs and Di Rienzo, postgraduate programs can provide the "occasional shakeup in education" that is necessary if one wants to avoid "becoming locked in one epistemology, one perspective, and one approach to understanding intelligence."[17] Universities provide an optimal venue for such a shakeup, and can thus play an important role for safeguarding intelligence professionals from the classical analytical traps they often ignore in their daily business. Moreover, such programs also offer fora in which officials from separate settings in the intelligence community can exchange their common understanding of intelligence. This enables these officers to reflect their own role and fosters an understanding of cooperation with other parts of the "system" of intelligence.[18]

Curricular Approaches to Intelligence Studies

What do such university-led programs look like in practice? This section examines how programs on the undergraduate and postgraduate level are structured in terms of curricular design, based on the review of twelve programs, whose descriptions and curricula can be found in the appendix. Secondary literature is also referenced, particularly Rudner (2008) and Landon-Murray (2013).

According to Stafford Thomas, the discipline of intelligence studies can be roughly separated into functional, historical/biographical, structural and political approaches. While *functional* approaches deal with fundamental capabilities, such as analysis and evaluation, *historical/biographical* approaches explore the history of institutions and personalities. Meanwhile, *structural* ap-

[17] Rebecca L. Frerichs and Stephen R. Di Rienzo, "Establishing a Framework for Intelligence Education and Training," *Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)* 62 (2011): 72.

[18] See Michael S. Goodman and David Omand, "What Analysts Need to Understand: The King's Intelligence Studies Program," *Studies in Intelligence* 52:4 (2008): 1–12 (extracts, December 2008; original version classified). Cf. also Landon-Murray, "Moving U.S. Academic Intelligence Education Forward," 744–776.

proaches examine the organization and legal framework of intelligence services, whereas *political* approaches instead primarily deal with the use of intelligence by policymakers and the interaction between politics and intelligence.[19]

As explained above, the discipline of intelligence studies has established itself primarily in the Anglosphere. Yet major differences exist even between the United States and the United Kingdom. In terms of undergraduate programs, intelligence cannot be studied as an independent program or even specialization in the UK – even though individual modules on the subject exist. On the graduate level, intelligence programs in the UK are often simply variations of broader programs in international relations. Even at institutions such as King's College, which also offers a professional development program for the British intelligence services, a master's degree in Intelligence and International Security only differentiates itself by a single compulsory intelligence-specific module from a more general degree in war studies. These focus on lessons from historical case studies – evidence to the fact that intelligence studies as a discipline in the United Kingdom emerged primarily from the study of history.[20] An MA in intelligence studies, according to the British model, is thus mainly an enriched master's program in international history or international relations, and concentrated on specialist knowledge.[21] Even where programs have a wide intelligence curriculum, the main purpose of these classical university programs is the production of scholars on—and not practitioners in—intelligence.[22]

In the United States, the case is different. The structure of US undergraduate programs, which usually include the study of multiple subjects split into majors and minors, means that students can combine a minor in intelligence studies, for example, with a major in a foreign language, political science or economics. While the major thus equips students with subject matter knowledge on an issue, these intelligence studies minors often concentrate on the necessary skillsets.[23] Such programs are particularly common at intelligence schools, which reflect the American tradition of professional schools, an example being schools of public service, which combine both academics and practitioners in their teaching. In the postgraduate field, programs in the US can be much more intelligence-specific than in the UK and often mirror the courses taught in intelligence studies minors. Many professional schools, which offer

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[19] Stafford T. Thomas, "Assessing Current Intelligence Studies," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 2:2 (1988): 217–244.

[20] Scott and Jackson, "The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice," 141.

[21] For a more detailed description of British intelligence programs, see the program descriptions in the Appendix.

[22] See, for instance, the curriculum at the University of Aberystwyth.

[23] For an example of a typical minor, see the program description at the University of Mississippi in the appendix. The National Intelligence University offers a similar so-called *fourth year* Bachelor Degree, where students bring in the equivalent of three years of education from other colleges and take only one year of intelligence-specific education at NIU.

very well-received practitioner-oriented programs in international affairs, for example Georgetown University, also offer the same programs with an intelligence concentration. While they combine intelligence with other subjects—as in the UK—the focus on skills remains the main difference in this regard.

Postgraduate and professional education programs in both the UK and the US exist in a kind of reality of their own. Because they are aimed at intelligence officials who are already believed to be specialists with significant subject matter expertise, they avoid many pitfalls affecting undergraduate and graduate programs. Particularly the tradeoff between "specialist" and "functional" knowledge becomes less important for analysts who already possess some of both. In intelligence services institutions, such as the National Intelligence University (part of the Defense Intelligence Agency), postgraduate programs specializing on intelligence thus usually combine four features: *foundations*, *skills*, a strong *study concentration* and, finally, a master *thesis*. In their *foundations*, these courses mainly teach elements of international relations and security, about the role of intelligence and about the legal framework and organizational structure of the respective services. This is the spectrum that most corresponds with British programs and to what can be labelled "intelligence studies." In the *skills* category—the functional approach[24]—mainly intelligence analysis is taught, with a focus on techniques and future and scenario analysis. This spectrum corresponds mostly with courses offered at intelligence schools, but also at non-academic institutions such as CIA University.[25] The aim of these modules is often less the teaching of single techniques than a better appreciation of their limits and risks. Such programs correspond with those which also the German Federal Intelligence Service teaches in other countries under the name of "critical thinking". Surprisingly, while such modules are rather ignored in British graduate programs, they are mirrored by those courses offered in professional postgraduate programs in the UK: The closed, 10-week module offered at King's College exclusively to members of the British intelligence services focuses mainly on analytical skills.[26] Finally, such programs are characterized by strong and very specific study concentrations such as cyber or area studies. Aim in these concentrations is mostly an update of specialists, usually focusing on areas in which the university possesses specific strengths.[27] Finally, almost all programs end with a thesis requirement – which is a noteworthy, given that American universities do not always feature thesis requirements.[28]

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[24] Thomas, "Assessing Current Intelligence Studies," 239.

[25] While no detailed description is available in the unclassified domain, Lowenthal mentions the existence of such programs at CIA University. See Lowenthal, "The Education and Training of Intelligence Analysts."

[26] Goodman and Omand, "What Analysts Need to Understand," 2.

[27] For an in-depth discussion of U.S. intelligence curricula, see: Landon-Murray, "Moving U.S. Academic Intelligence Education Forward," 768–769.

[28] International Affairs Office, U.S. Department of Education, "Structure of the U.S. Education System: Master's Degrees," February 2008, available at

An Intelligence Curriculum for German Universities

As demonstrated throughout this paper, intelligence studies as an academic discipline and research program is focused on the intelligence aspect of other research subjects, and increasingly also on research into the professional skills required for work in the intelligence sector – especially in the sub-field of intelligence analysis. The field of intelligence studies has established itself as an increasingly common academic discipline and course program at universities, particularly in the US and the UK. This report has also argued that the subject is most suited for postgraduate professional degree programs. To preparing for a career in the intelligence services, and particularly in an analytical function, an undergraduate education that equips candidates with subject-matter knowledge is more important than training in general skills that may be required for the many diverse careers in the intelligence sector. Similarly, the training of entry-level intelligence officers is best left to the closed environments of the intelligence services, where they can train with the actual systems they will be using and have access to classified resources.

At the same time, the report also discussed that the success of intelligence studies in the Anglophone world has not met with an echo in Germany so far. While the German intelligence services have their own departments at the Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences (*Hochschule des Bundes Fachbereich Nachrichtendienste*), they focus on undergraduate education for generalists in intermediate-level posts.[29] To some degree, the existence of this program also precludes the necessity of similarly-structured undergraduate programs at regular public universities. In the graduate and postgraduate sectors, no similar program exists. This is particularly noteworthy as many of the reasons that have led intelligence services in the UK and US to establish postgraduate programs in recent years are also applicable Germany. Just as in these countries, most officers—particularly those in higher posts—are expected to bring the necessary skills into their service and receive little if any training afterwards (except in technical disciplines). Also in Germany, the "intelligence analyst" is a rather accidental profession. Analysts are hired for their expertise in a certain subject area—or simply assigned an analysis-stint as part of a "generalist" career—and most of the subsequent training they receive is focused on the preparation of intelligence products and the handling of databases rather than on analytical methods. Accordingly, it is very probable that common intelligence problems—such as a lack of common analytical standards—thrive also in these services.

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https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ous/international/usnei/us/master.doc (accessed 15 February 2016).

[29] The intermediate service (*gehobener Dienst*) is comparable to the *warrant officers*. While this corps is highly experienced and exceptionally qualified, its career scheme is limited to intermediate management (comparable to company grade officers).

Could a professional postgraduate program in intelligence studies be established at a German university, and who would be the ideal target for such a program? It is probable that these would not be students looking for careers in intelligence, but rather mid-level intelligence officers with several years of professional experience.[30] What would the curriculum of such a postgraduate professional degree program look like? Comparable programs in the UK and US focus on four aspects: basics, skills, study concentrations, and a thesis requirement. A similar structure could be followed by a German program.

A "foundations" block could look at the context in which intelligence is situated. It would typically include courses on the global political environment and the most important trends in economics and technology. It would also include, more specifically, intelligence studies-related content such as the role of intelligence among the elements of national power, as well as legal and ethical aspects of intelligence. The aim of the foundations block would thus be to introduce participants—many of whom may have been concentrating on very narrow or even niche subjects in previous years—to global, macro-level processes and their impact on intelligence and national security. Similarly, it would have them look beyond their service discipline at more general problems in the field of intelligence. By the end of this block, participants should have built a comprehensive picture of the global environment and of the role of intelligence. This block would be similar to the core curriculum at the National Intelligence University, where "the core curriculum is designed to help students develop global awareness and to understand how historical, economic, cultural, political, and social contexts affect intelligence and national security."[31]

A second skills block could focus specifically on the task of analysis. Coursework would consist of structured analytical techniques, scenario and futures analysis, net assessment, and military capability analysis. The purpose of this would be to update participants' knowledge and proficiency in the most state-of-the-art methods and research in these disciplines. Perhaps more importantly, participants' engagement with researchers should increase their awareness about the inherent problems of single techniques and analytical methods. This would help them critically reflect on their professional methodology and increase their resilience against typical reasons for intelligence failure. Such a block would thus be most akin to the 10-week course for intelligence analysts offered at King's College London, or the considerable coursework on intelligence analysis offered at Georgetown or Mercyhurst University.

In the third block, the study concentration, the main purpose would be the more traditional communication of knowledge – albeit at a postgraduate level. According to their professional occupations, students could enroll in a set of

[30] The comparable Master Degrees in Strategic Intelligence and Strategic and Technology Intelligence at the National Intelligence University have a median age of 37, while the King´s College program is aimed at "senior analysts."

[31] National Intelligence University, *Academic Catalogue 2013–2014* (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence University, 2014), 37.

courses in subject areas focused on study concentrations, such as area studies, terrorism, or cyber. They could thus profit from discussing subjects with other subject matter experts and develop an understanding of the state-of-the-art of fields of research beyond the classroom.

The thesis would finally give students the possibility to combine the three aspects pursued as part of the program: foundations, analytical skills, and subject-matter expertise. Such a thesis would focus on aspects of relevance to the intelligence community, and could thus increase the value of the institution.

Ultimately, establishing a postgraduate intelligence studies degree program at a German university would thus be far from impossible. While much of the coursework would have to be created from scratch, such a program would also benefit from the absence of existing dominant schools and approaches in the field of intelligence studies, and could select the elements from international programs it deems most appropriate for the needs of its students.

Appendix

Bachelor/Undergraduate Degrees

- Bachelor in Intelligence, National Intelligence University (USA)
- Undergraduate Minor in Intelligence and International Security, University of Mississippi (USA)
- Undergraduate Major in Intelligence Studies, Mercyhurst University (USA)

Graduate Degrees

- MA in International Affairs with Intelligence Specialization, Carleton University (Canada)
- MA in Intelligence and International Security, King's College London (UK)
- MA in Intelligence and Strategic Studies, Aberystwyth University (UK)
- MA in Intelligence and Security Studies, Brunel University (UK)
- MSc in Applied Intelligence, Mercyhurst University (USA)
- MA in Strategic Intelligence, Institute of World Politics (USA)
- MA in Security Studies with Intelligence Concentration, Georgetown University (USA)

Postgraduate Degrees

- MSc in Strategic Intelligence, National Intelligence University (USA)
- MSc in Strategic Technology Intelligence, National Intelligence University (USA)

National Intelligence University, Washington DC (USA)
Intelligence
www.n-iu.edu

Degree	B.Sc.
Duration	11 Months
Credits	57 Credits (86-114 ECTS)
Curriculum / Program Specifications	Core Modules Elective Modules
Entry Requirements	Members of the U.S. Armed Forces and federal government employees only, security requirements

Self-Description: "The National Intelligence University—previously the Defense Intelligence College—is the Intelligence Community's sole accredited, federal degree-granting institution. The Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI) is a fourth-year program that affords students who have completed three years or equivalent credits (80 semester hours minimum) of undergraduate study a way to earn their undergraduate degree in intelligence. It is designed to encourage the development of inquiring, responsible graduates who will dedicate themselves to the improvement of the national Intelligence Community."

Core Curriculum (All)

- Globalization and the Intelligence Landscape
- Intelligence Analysis
- Collection Assets and Capabilities
- The Nature of Conflict and Conflict Capabilities
- Intelligence and National Security Strategy
- Culture and Identity in an Age of Globalization
- Science, Technology and Intelligence
- Analytic Methods
- Terrorism: Origins and Methodologies
- The Analyst-Collector Integration
- Capstone Integration

Electives (Six)

- Intelligence: Building Stability and Peace
- Introduction to Denial and Deception
- Information Operations
- Homeland Security and Intelligence
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

- Africa: Intelligence Issues
- Middle East: Intelligence Issues
- Eurasia: Intelligence Issues
- Southwest Asia: Intelligence Issues
- East Asia: Intelligence Issues
- Latin America: Geostrategic Intelligence Issues
- Special Topics in Intelligence
- Europe: Intelligence Issues

* * * * *

University of Mississippi – Center for Intelligence and Security Studies, Oxford, MS (USA)
Intelligence and Security Studies
http://ciss.olemiss.edu/the-program/courses/

Degree	Undergraduate Minor
Duration	Two Years
Credits	18 credits (27 – 36 ECTS)
Curriculum / Program Specifications	Core Modules
Entry Requirements	Standard University Requirements, Open

Self-Description: "The ISS Minor is designed to prepare outstanding students at the University of Mississippi for entry-level positions in the United States Intelligence Community, private industry, and public sector intelligence and security analysis. Core competencies such as engineering, critical language (e.g., Arabic, Chinese), computer and physical science, international relations, and business are highly sought after by the Intelligence Community, and students in such programs are strongly encouraged to apply to the minor. However, outstanding students from any discipline may apply for the ISS Minor."

Represented Majors are: Accountancy, Arabic, Biology, Business, Chemical Engineering, Chinese, Civil Engineering, Classics, Criminal Justice, Economics, English, French, Geology, History, International Studies, Marketing Communications, Political Science, Psychology, Public Policy, Religious Studies, Spanish.

Core Modules

- Introduction to Intelligence Studies
- Advanced Analytics I

- Advanced Analytics II
- National Security Issues of the 21st Century
- Internship ("Senior Project: The equivalent of a senior thesis, students will apply the skills they learned in all previous courses to complete a project of practical benefit to the IC.")

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Mercyhurst University – Tom Ridge School of Intelligence Studies, Erie, PA (USA)
Intelligence Studies
http://www.theridgeschool.org/academics

Degree	Bachelor of Arts Major
Duration	Four Years
Credits	52 credits (78 – 104 ECTS) (only the Major)
Curriculum / Program Specifications	Core Modules Concentration: Language or Computer Elective Modules
Entry Requirements	Standard University Requirements, Open

Self-Description: "It is the mission of the Tom Ridge School of Intelligence Studies and Information Science at Mercyhurst University to produce graduates, through a variety of delivery modalities, who are skilled in utilizing a variety of sources of data and analytic techniques to lead the collaborative development of high-quality written and oral analytic intelligence products that, in service toward a just world, inform decision-makers, thereby fostering an appreciation for the dignity of work and commitment to serving others.

The first non-government initiative of its kind, the Bachelor of Arts in Intelligence Studies is a unique multidisciplinary degree, which has as its goal a graduate qualified as an entry-level analyst for government and the private sector. An academically challenging discipline, it combines a liberal arts core with a foreign language or computer science requirement, national and international studies, internships, and intelligence-related courses to provide its graduates with an advanced level of analytical skills."

Core Modules (All)

- Introduction to Intelligence Analysis
- Intelligence Methods and Analysis
- Intelligence and National Security
- Professional Communications

- Intelligence in Business
- Writing for Intelligence
- Law Enforcement Intelligence
- Strategic Intelligence
- Advanced Computer Applications or Introduction to Data Science

Language or Computer Science Concentration

Language Option (3 Spoken Language Courses)
Computer Science Option (select three): Advanced Computer Applications, Programming, Computer Operations, Networks, Information Systems Analysis & Design, Database Management

Intelligence Electives (select three):

- American Military History
- Intelligence, Military and Warfare
- Cultural Awareness for Intel Analysis
- Special Topics
- Improving Intelligence Analysis
- Advanced Law Enforcement Intelligence
- Cyber Threat Analysis
- Advanced Competitive Intelligence
- Terrorism
- History of Intelligence
- Internship

Non-Intelligence Electives (select three):

Five non-intelligence courses from overall course catalogue, e.g. Justice in America, Economics, History, Statistics, Geopolitics, Political Theory.

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Carleton University – Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Ottawa (Canada)
International Affairs with Specialization in Intelligence and National Security
http://graduate.carleton.ca/programs/international-affairs-masters/

Degree	M.A.
Duration	Two Years
Credits	5.0 credits (120 ECTS)
Curriculum /	Core Modules (1.5 credits)

Program Specifications	Specialization in Intelligence and National Security (1.5 credits) Language Exam Thesis (2 credits) (substitutable by four additional specialization modules)
Entry Requirements	Standard University Requirements, Open

Self-Description: "The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) has been Canada's premier program in international affairs for over 40 years. We have an international reputation for providing the interdisciplinary and policy-oriented education needed to understand an increasingly complex and globalized policy environment. Our MA offers several areas of specialization focused on current world events and policy issues, including conflict management, security, terrorism and intelligence, international trade and finance, international governance and development. You will apply to one of our six fields of study, in which you can specialize, or use as a foundation for a general program combining a variety of courses that fit your interests."

Self-Description – Intelligence and National Security track: "Reviews the core theories, concepts and challenges in international security and intelligence studies in the context of applied policy problems such as terrorism, disarmament, civil-military relations and law."

Core Modules (All)

- Policy Process and International Affairs
- Law and International Affairs
- Research Design and Methods for International Affairs
- Statistical Analysis for International Affairs
- Economics for Defence and Security

Specialization "Intelligence and National Security" (3 out of 7)

- Disarmament, Arms Control and Nonproliferation
- Contemporary International Security
- Intelligence and International Affairs
- Intelligence and National Security
- National Security Policy and Law
- Terrorism and International Security
- Selected Topics in Intelligence and National Security

Successful completion of second language proficiency examination

M.A. Thesis

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King's College, Department of War Studies, London (UK)
Intelligence & International Security Studies
www.kcl.ac.uk/prospectus/graduate/intelligence-and-international-security

Degree	M.A.
Duration	One Year
Credits	180 credits (90 ECTS)
Curriculum / Program Specifications	Core Module (40 credits) Elective Modules (80 credits) Thesis (60 credits)
Entry Requirements	Standard University Requirements, Open

Self-Description: "Intelligence and International Security examines the trends that continue to shape intelligence and geo-strategic developments in the 21st century. Students will develop an awareness of the ways in which intelligence issues manifest themselves in security issues in peace and war. Understanding of ethical dilemmas associated with intelligence activity."

Core Module

- Intelligence in Peace and War

Elective Modules (2 out of 34)

- Afghan and South Asian Security Issues
- Art and War
- Civil War in the US 1861-1865
- Complex Political Emergencies, Health & Security
- Conflict Prevention & Peace Building
- Conflict Simulation
- Conflict, Development and Islam in Russia, the Caucasus And Central Asia
- Contemporary British Defence Policy
- Current Issues in Science & Security
- Diplomacy
- East Asian Security
- Ethics in International Relations
- European (In)Security
- European Security
- Human Rights and Migration
- Interdisciplinary Approaches to (In)security

- International Politics of the Middle East
- Investigating Conflict in Global Politics
- Media and Intelligence
- Missile Proliferation
- Nationalism and Security
- Natural Resources & Conflict
- Open Source Intelligence
- Peace and Justice
- Proliferation & International Security
- Propaganda
- Reporting Wars
- Science & Security of Nuclear & Biological Weapons
- Security Issues in the Soviet Successor States
- The Conduct of Contemporary Warfare
- The Evolution of Insurgency
- The JIC and British Intelligence
- The Proliferation of Weapons
- US Foreign Policy

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Aberystwyth University, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth (UK)
Intelligence Studies (Research Training)
http://courses.aber.ac.uk/postgraduate/intelligence-studies-masters-specialist/

Degree	M.A.
Duration	One Year
Credits	180 Credits (90 ECTS)
Curriculum / Program Specifications	Core Modules (80 credits) Elective Module (20 credits) Optional Module (20 credits) Thesis (60 credits)
Entry Requirements	Standard University Requirements, Open

Self-Description: "This innovative Masters scheme is designed to facilitate the development of a critical awareness of the state of theory and practice in the field of intelligence studies in combination with an in-depth understanding of the contemporary use of force in international relations. The issues and de-

bates explored include contending approaches and conceptual debates concerning the nature and definition of both intelligence and strategic studies, and their mutual relationship."

Core Modules (All)

- Intelligence, Security and International Politics 1900-1945
- Intelligence, Security and International Politics since 1945
- Political, Social and Historical Research: Philosophy, Methods and Application
- Principles of Research Design
- Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis
- Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis

Elective Modules (at least one):

- Contemporary Strategic Problems Critical Security Studies
- British Counterinsurgency Warfare in the Twentieth Century
- Digital Connectivity: Digital Spaces and the Cyber Worlds

Thesis

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Brunel University, Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, London (UK)
Intelligence and Security
www.brunel.ac.uk/courses/postgraduate/intelligence-and-security-studies-ma

Degree	MA
Duration	One Year
Credits	180 credits (90 ECTS)
Curriculum / Program Specifications	Core Modules (120 credits) Thesis (60 credits)
Entry Requirements	Standard University Requirements, Open

Self-Description: "Intelligence and security policy issues are now one of the fastest growing areas of academic and public concern, especially since '9/11' and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today more than ever before national governments, international agencies and most major international corporations have an identified need for staff with a strong grasp of intelligence and security issues who can also demonstrate first-rate skills of research and assessment.

Taught by the internationally respected scholars of the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, backed up where required by practitioner expertise, the MA in Intelligence and Security Studies offers a unique opportunity for practical, policy-oriented graduate study of intelligence issues applicable across the private and public sectors around the world."

Core Modules (All)

- Intelligence Concepts: Issues and Institutions
- Intelligence History: Failure and Success
- Intelligence Analysis and Decision
- Contemporary Threats and Analytical Methodology

Thesis

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Mercyhurst University, Tom Ridge School of Intelligence Studies Erie, PA (USA)
Applied Intelligence
http://www.theridgeschool.org/academics

Degree	M.Sc.
Duration	Two Years
Credits	34 credits (51-68 ECTS)
Curriculum / Program Specifications	Core Modules (21 credits) Elective Modules (9 credits) Thesis (3 credits)
Entry Requirements	Standard University Requirements, Open

Self-Description: "It is the mission of the Tom Ridge School of Intelligence Studies and Information Science at Mercyhurst University to produce graduates, through a variety of delivery modalities, who are skilled in utilizing a variety of sources of data and analytic techniques to lead the collaborative development of high-quality written and oral analytic intelligence products that, in service toward a just world, inform decision-makers, thereby fostering an appreciation for the dignity of work and commitment to serving others.

The Master of Science in Applied Intelligence emphasizes the application of intelligence theory across the disciplines of national security, military, law enforcement, and competitive intelligence. The Mercyhurst program focuses on intelligence as a process, using (primarily unstructured) information from all sources and focused externally, that is designed to reduce the level of uncer-

tainty for a decision-maker. Given this focus, the coursework concentrates on developing deep researching abilities, proficient use of analytic techniques and methodologies, concise analytic writing, and effective briefing. The advancement of these analytic skills, in addition to an appreciation of the theory and history of the intelligence field, produce program graduates capable of leading in the knowledge-centric work environments of the future."

Core Modules (All)

- Research Methods in Intelligence
- Intelligence Theories and Applications
- Competitive Intelligence
- Law Enforcement Intelligence
- Intelligence Communications
- Contemporary Leadership in Intelligence
- Managing Strategic Intelligence Analysis

Elective Modules (Three)

- Advanced Analytical Techniques
- Cyber Threat Analysis
- Comparative History of Intelligence
- Intelligence Support to Targeting
- Geospatial Intelligence
- Financial Intelligence Analysis
- Intelligence and Business Strategy
- Data Analytics for the Private Sector
- Graduate Seminar: National Security
- Studies in Terrorism
- Intelligence, the Military, and Warfare
- Counterespionage and Policy and Practice
- Topics in Intelligence
- Grand Strategy: Strategic Planning & Intelligence
- Nonproliferation Analysis
- Internship

Thesis

* * * * *

The Institute of World Politics, Washington DC (USA)
Strategic Intelligence Studies
http://www.iwp.edu/programs/degree/master-of-arts-in-strategic-intelligence-studies

Degree	M.A.
Duration	Two Years
Credits	52 Credits (78 – 104 ECTS)
Curriculum / Program Specifications	Core Modules (36 credits) Electives/Concentrations (16 credits) No Thesis
Entry Requirements	Standard University Requirements, Open

Self-Description: "The Master of Arts in Strategic Intelligence Studies is designed for students who seek careers in the intelligence field, as well as professionals whose agencies or clientele are charged with the acquisition and interpretation of intelligence. The program features courses in fundamental intelligence disciplines, such as analysis and epistemology, intelligence collection, and deception. The program equips the student with all of the requisite tools and knowledge, required and anticipated, that are necessary for professional success in the field."

Core Modules (All)

- Economics for Foreign Policy Makers
- Geography and Strategy
- American Founding Principles and Foreign Policy
- International Relations, Statecraft and Integrated Strategy
- Western Moral Tradition and World Politics
- Intelligence and Policy
- Intelligence Collection *or* The Role and Importance of Human Intelligence *or* U.S. Intelligence in the Cold War and Beyond
- Estimative Intelligence Analysis and Epistemology
- Counterintelligence in a Democratic Society
- Foreign Propaganda, Perceptions and Policy *or* Public Diplomacy and Political Warfare or Political Warfare: Past, Present and Future

Elective Modules (total of four, including at least one in each specialization)

Specialization in the Art of Intelligence

- American Intelligence and Protective Security: An Advanced Seminar
- Cultural Intelligence for Strategy and Analysis
- A Counterintelligence Challenge: The Enigmas and Benefits of Defectors
- Forecasting and Political Risk Analysis
- Foundations of Homeland Security
- Military Intelligence in Modern Warfare
- Surprise, Warning and Deception
- Technology, Intelligence, Security, and Statecraft
- US Nonproliferation and Nuclear Policy

Specialization in Counterintelligence and Foreign Intelligence

- Al-Qaeda's Enemy Threat Doctrine
- Case Studies in Counterintelligence Operations
- Comparative Intelligence Systems: Foreign Intelligence and Security Cultures
- Counterterrorism and the Democracies
- Cyber Statecraft
- Foundations of Homeland Security
- History of FBI Counterintelligence
- Spies, Subversion, Terrorism, and Influence Operations
- Terrorism

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Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC (USA)
Security Studies with Intelligence Concentration
https://css.georgetown.edu/ssp

Degree	M.A.
Duration	Two Years
Credits	36 US credits (54 – 72 ECTS)
Curriculum / Program Specifications	Core Modules (6 credits) Intelligence Concentration (12 credits) Elective Module (6 credits) Research Seminar (Thesis) (6 credits) Exam (6 credits)
Entry Requirements	Standard University Requirements, Open

Self-Description: "The M.A. curriculum of the Security Studies Program (SSP) is designed to give students a solid grounding in the concepts, history, and substance of national and international security problems; as well as the skills to conduct original research and analysis on contemporary security issues."
Self-Description Intelligence Concentration: "In this concentration, students acquire an understanding of the practical dimensions of intelligence, including the intelligence cycle, the intelligence disciplines, problems of intelligence collection and analysis, covert action, and the intelligence-policy nexus. Attention is also focused on domestic intelligence, military intelligence, and the intelligence operations and cultures of other countries. Students also consider major conceptual issues such as the appropriate role of intelligence in a democracy, issues of oversight and accountability, the intelligence budget as part of the overall defense budget, and the complexities of secrecy. In addition to helping students prepare for careers in the intelligence community, this concentration also addresses intelligence issues in the military, government agencies, or in government-related industries."

Core Modules

- Theory and Practice of Security
- Grand Strategy and Military Operations

Intelligence – Concentration

Core Module

- Theory and Practice of Intelligence (compulsory core)

Concentration Electives (3 out of 22)

- Comparing Intelligence Services
- Covert Action / Counterintelligence
- Disruptive Analytics: Theory, Method, & Technology
- Key Problems in Intelligence Policy
- Thinking Critically about Intelligence and Policy
- Intelligence & The Military
- Human Intelligence Operations
- Domestic Intelligence
- Decision-Making in Stressful Environments
- Disruptive Analytics
- Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis
- Security Issues in South Asia
- Security Problems in the Middle East & Persian Gulf
- Politics of European Security
- China and Its Military

- Security Issues in Latin America
- Power Politics in the Greater Middle East
- Warfare in the Middle East
- Eurasia & Russia: New Security Dynamics
- Security Problems in Africa
- Globe Terrorism: Europe to Mediterranean
- Stability Challenges: South/SE Asia

Elective Modules (minimum of two)

Research Seminar (Thesis)

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National Intelligence University, Washington, DC (USA)
Strategic Intelligence
www.n-iu.edu

Degree	M.Sc.
Duration	11 months full time
Credits	43 Credits (70-90 ECTS)
Curriculum / Program Specifications	Core Modules (15 credits) Program Requirement (3 credits) Elective Modules (18 credits) Thesis (7 credits)
Entry Requirements	Members of the U.S. Armed Forces and federal government employees only, security requirements

Self-Description: "The National Intelligence University—previously the Defense Intelligence College—is the Intelligence Community's sole accredited, federal degree-granting institution. The main campus is located in Washington, D.C., but it possesses Academic Centers around the world. The Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence curriculum integrates the DNI's [Director of National Intelligence] published competencies, knowledge, and skills within the core construct of the University. Students in the degree program take the core courses to introduce students to the strategic nature of intelligence analysis. Students in the MSSI program study the human driven elements of intelligence covering political, military, economic, technical, and cultural topics as they relate to intelligence. Their thesis research must deal with a topic of importance to the IC [Intelligence Community]."

Core Modules

- Globalization and Intelligence Issues
- Social Analysis and the Spectrum of Conflict
- Intelligence Reasoning and Analysis
- The Compound Eye: Intelligence Collection
- Intelligence and National Security Policy

Program Requirement (either/or)

- Science and Technology
- Deconstructing Strategy

Elective Modules (6 total)

Strategic Area: "Military Strategy: Intelligence in Combat and Peacetime"

- Asymmetric Warfare: Future Strategies
- Joint Campaign Planning and Intelligence
- Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
- Engaging International Partnerships
- Strategic Crisis Exercise

Strategic Area: "Intelligence Community Issues and Management"

- Leadership and Management in the Intelligence Community
- Intelligence Resource Management: Process, Politics and Money
- Ethics and Intelligence
- Intelligence and National Security
- Advancing Intelligence Collection
- Signals Intelligence Resources, Methods and Operations
- Advanced Methods of Intelligence Analysis
- Transnational Issues in a Cryptologic Environment
- Covert Action
- Current Cryptologic Issues
- Operational Capabilities Analysis
- Geospatial intelligence: Situational Awareness or Decision Advantage
- Comparative Counterintelligence Analysis

Strategic Area: "Transnational Threats: Intelligence Challenges"

- Economics and Intelligence
- Roots of Terrorism
- Transnational Threat Environment
- Intelligence to Protect the Homeland

- Countering the Terrorist Threat
- Counterintelligence

Strategic Area: "The Geostrategic Environment: Closing Intelligence Gaps"

- Islam and the Modern World
- Africa: Geostrategic Intelligence Issues
- Northeast Asia: Geostrategic Intelligence Issues
- South Asia Intelligence Issues
- China in the Future
- Europe: Intelligence Partner and Analytic Subject
- Latin America: Geostrategic Intelligence Issues
- The Middle East: Geostrategic Intelligence Issues
- Sociocultural Intelligence
- Russia: Geostrategic Intelligence Issues
- The Caucasus
- The Near Abroad
- Iran: Geostrategic Intelligence Issues

Thesis Requirement

- Thesis Methodology and Design
- Thesis Proposal
- Thesis Research
- Thesis Completion

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National Intelligence University, Washington, DC (USA)
Strategic and Technology Intelligence
www.n-iu.edu

Degree	M.Sc.
Duration	11 Months
Credits	43 Credits (70-90 ECTS)
Curriculum / Program Specifications	Core Modules (15 credits) Program Requirement (3 credits) Elective Modules (18 credits) Thesis (7 credits)
Entry Requirements	Members of the U.S. Armed Forces and federal government employees only, security requirements

Self-Description: "The National Intelligence University—previously the Defense Intelligence College—is the Intelligence Community's sole accredited, federal degree-granting institution. The Master of Science and Technology Intelligence (MSTI) prepares students to recognize the impact of technological change on national security and intelligence."

Core Modules (All)

- Globalization and Intelligence Issues
- Social Analysis and the Spectrum of Conflict
- Intelligence Reasoning and Analysis
- The Compound Eye: Intelligence Collection
- Intelligence and National Security Policy

Program Requirement (either/or)

- Advanced Methods of Intelligence Analysis
- Science and Technology

Concentration (6 courses total, four from one concentration to earn the concentration)

Concentration: "Weapons of Mass Destruction"

- WMD Terrorism
- Counter-proliferation
- The Biological Threat
- The Nuclear Threat
- The Chemical and Explosive Threat
- Advanced Conventional and Non-conventional Weapons
- Strategic Crisis Exercise

Concentration: "Information Operations and Cyber Intelligence"

- Information Power and National Security
- Propaganda, Persuasion, and Influence
- Cyber Intelligence
- Foreign Information and Cyber Strategies
- Cyber Threat
- Social Networks and Intelligence
- Advanced Information Power Seminar
- Cyber Data Exploitation and Advanced Analytics
- Network Operations Environment-Engagement
- Information Influence and Deception
- Advanced Cyber Intelligence

Concentration: "Emerging and Disruptive Technologies"

- Advanced Science and Technology
- Advanced Conventional and Non-Conventional Weapons
- The Economics of Technology
- Case Studies in Technology Transfer
- Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment
- Strategic Crisis Exercise

Concentration: "Geostrategic Resources and Environment"

- Intelligence and the Changing Global Resource Environment
- Geology and Intelligence
- Nuclear and Other Alternative Energy Sources
- Electrical Power Systems and Distribution
- Strategic Crisis Exercise
- The Economics of Technology
- Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment

Concentration: "Foreign Denial and Deception"

- Introduction to Denial and Deception: History, Concepts, Issues, and Implications
- Denial and Deception: Psychological/Cultural Aspects, and National Security Decision Making
- Denial and Deception: Adversaries, Organizations, Activities, and Countermeasures
- Denial and Deception: Tradecraft, Tools, and Methodology

Thesis Requirement

- Thesis Methodology and Design
- Thesis Proposal
- Thesis Research
- Thesis Completion

About the authors

Prof. Dr. Uwe M. Borghoff is Vice President of the Universität der Bundeswehr München and Director of the Campus Advanced Study Center, the university's center for professional education. Dr. Brigita Jeraj and Alessandro Scheffler Corvaja are an Executive Assistant and a Research Associate at the Campus Advanced Study Center.