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Nonproliferation – “a Global Perspective”

Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies
National Defense University

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The United Nations and Nuclear Weapons – Historically Linked: The First UN General Assembly Resolution (1/1)

VIII. RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE

1 (I). Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy

Resolved by the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a Commission, with the composition and competence set out hereunder, to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters:

separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.

The Commission shall not infringe upon the responsibilities of any organ of the United Nations, but should present recommendations for the consideration of those organs in the performance of their tasks under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

Seventeenth plenary meeting, 24 *January* 1946.

(*c*) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

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1. The Disarmament and Nonproliferation Regime

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The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime –

a framework of treaties, agreements and instruments designed to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons and bring about their eventual elimination

24 January 1946 – first Resolution of the General Assembly, which established a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and set forth the goal of eliminating all weapons "adaptable to mass destruction"

Treaty **1961** – Entry into force of the **Antarctic Treaty**, which effectively made Antarctica a nuclear-weapon free zone

Treaty **1963** – Conclusion of the **Partial Test Ban Treaty**, which aimed to end nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space

Treaty **The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons** – opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in **1970** – aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and reach total nuclear disarmament while ensuring fair access to peaceful nuclear technology.

Treaty **The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty** – opened for signature in September **1996** but not yet in force – bans all nuclear-related test explosions

Treaty **The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons**- entered into force 22 Jan **2021** – is the first multilateral instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination.

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U.S.-Soviet/Russian Nuclear Arms Control



Source: Natural Resource Defense Council, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE AREAS

Demarcation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, nuclear-weapon-free status and nuclear-weapon-free geographical regions

NWFZs currently encompass the following areas, which include all the land-based territory in the Southern Hemisphere:



The establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones is a measure to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and security

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

- **Is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime**
- **Opened for signature in 1968**
- **Entered into force in 1970**
- **Indefinitely Extended in 1995**
- **Article VIII.3: Five yearly cycle of review conferences**

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Three Pillars of the NPT

- **Pillar I:** Disarmament:
  - **Article VI** requires States Parties to pursue good-faith negotiations aimed at reaching the world free of nuclear weapons, calls for effective measures to bring this about
- **Pillar II:** Non-proliferation:
  - **Articles I and II** of the NPT prohibit the transfer or provision of assistance in manufacturing of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states
  - Under **Article III** of the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon states undertake to accept safeguards on their nuclear activities to verify they are only for peaceful purposes
- **Pillar III:** Right to peaceful use of nuclear energy:
  - **Article IV** acknowledges the right of all States Parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

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States Parties to the Treaty

- States that have joined the Treaty = 191
- Non-Party States: India, Israel, Pakistan, South Sudan
- DPRK claims to have withdrawn from the Treaty – status is disputed



“NPT 2.0”: 1995 Review and Extension – The Strengthened Review Process

- **Package of Outcomes: Three Decisions and One Resolution**
  - Decision 1: Strengthened Review Process
  - Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
  - Decision 3: Indefinite Extension of the NPT
  - Resolution on the Middle East: A zone free of WMD

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NPT Outcomes: 1995, 2000, 2010

NPT 1995 Review and Extension Conference Decision 2	• CTBT • FM(C)T • "reduce nuclear weapons globally"
NPT 2000 Review Conference "13 Practical Steps"	• CTBT • FM(C)T • "reduce nuclear weapons globally" • "Unequivocal undertaking"
NPT 2010 Review Conference "65 Point Action Plan"	• Reduction in the global stockpile • Diminish the role and significance • Prevent the use of nuclear weapons • Reduce the operational status • Enhance transparency and confidence

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Major Post-Cold War Proliferation Challenges: "Rogue States"

- Discovery of proliferation networks
- Discovery of undeclared facilities
- Regional focus
- Emphasis on proliferation and need to strengthen safeguards (Additional Protocol), not superpower conflict



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Proliferation Challenges: Role of the United Nations

Resolutions related to nuclear weapons prior to 1995 (5)

- Resolution 20 (1947) – Atomic Energy Commission
- Resolution 74 (1949) – Atomic Energy Commission
- Resolution 255 (1968) – security assurances
- Resolution 825 (1993) – DPRK NPT withdrawal
- Resolution 984 (1995) – security assurances from NWS to NPT NNWS

Resolutions related to nuclear weapons after 1995 (38)

- Resolution 1172 (1998) – India/Pakistan
- Resolution 1441 (2002) – Iraq and WMD
- Resolution 1540 (2004) – non-state actors
- Resolution 1673 (2006) – support to 1540
- Resolution 1696 (2006) – Iran
- Resolution 1718 (2006) – DPRK
- Resolution 1737 (2006) – Iran
- Resolution 1747 (2007) – Iran
- Resolution 1803 (2008) – Iran
- Resolution 1810 (2008) – 1540 mandate
- Resolution 1835 (2008) – Iran
- Resolution 1874 (2009) – DPRK
- Resolution 1887 (2009) – summit level non-proliferation and disarmament
- Resolution 1929 (2010) – Iran
- Resolution 1977 (2011) – 1540 mandate
- Resolution 1984 (2011) – Iran
- Resolution 1985 (2011) – DPRK
- Resolution 2049 (2012) – Iran
- Resolution 2050 (2012) – DPRK
- Resolution 2055 (2012) – support to 1540
- Resolution 2087 (2013) - DPRK
- Resolution 2094 (2013) – DPRK
- Resolution 2105 (2013) – Iran
- Resolution 2141 (2014) – DPRK
- Resolution 2159 (2014) – Iran
- Resolution 2207 (2015) – DPRK
- Resolution 2224 (2015) – Iran
- Resolution 2231 (2015) – Iran (JCPOA)
- Resolution 2270 (2016) – DPRK
- Resolution 2310 (2016) – NPT/CTBT
- Resolution 2321 (2016) – DPRK
- Resolution 2325 (2016) – 1540 review
- Resolution 2345 (2017) – DPRK
- Resolution 2356 (2017) – DPRK
- Resolution 2371 (2017) – DPRK
- Resolution 2375 (2017) – DPRK
- Resolution 2397 (2017) – DPRK
- Resolution 2572 (2021) – 1540 mandate

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Establishment of 3 key norms:

- **Norm against use**
- **Norm against proliferation**
- **Norm against testing**

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2. An evolving nuclear context

Nuclear Modernisation Programmes at a glance



France is retrofitting submarines, replacing warheads and delivery aircraft, and developing of a new joint radiographic/hydrodynamic facility with the United Kingdom.

Russia's strategic and nonstrategic nuclear force modernisation includes the retiring and replacing of Soviet-era missile systems as well as the introduction of a new class of SSBNs. Also developing new novel delivery systems.

United States is modernizing all three legs of its strategic nuclear triad through replacement systems (SSBNs, GBSD, LRSO).

The DPRK is developing and testing delivery systems, including an ICBM and SLBM. Only State to have tested a nuclear weapon since 1998.

United Kingdom replacing its current group of four Vanguard-class nuclear-armed submarines and developing new Mk4A Trident warhead. Announced intention to increase warhead stockpile.

Pakistan is increasing its nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles, including low-yield SRBMs. Expanding plutonium production capacity.

China's nuclear arsenal modernisation efforts are focused on the development of its nuclear triad and delivery systems, particularly its missiles and submarines. Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal?

Israel has not acknowledged that it has manufactured nuclear weapons but continues to develop the nuclear-capable Jericho III ICBM, though its production and deployment status remain unknown.

India is developing a strategic nuclear triad (ICBM, SSBN, SLBM).

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Emerging Challenges: Technological Advances







Advances in technology facilitating "strategic conventional" weapons systems and asymmetric responses.

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Pushback on Slow Disarmament Progress

Figure 3: Signatures, ratifications, and vote on TPNW adoption





- "Humanitarian consequences" movement
- Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2021)
- Refusal to accept stricter non-proliferation measures without progress in disarmament

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3. Key questions in response to the current context

How can nuclear risk be reduced in an era of multipolar competition?

Can nuclear weapons be considered in isolation from other strategic developments?

Is the current regime still fit for purpose?

The role of the Tenth NPT Review Conference

- Was supposed to be held in April-May 2020 - delayed due to the COVID-19 Pandemic
- Tentatively scheduled for January
- Focus?
- What can it achieve?
- What are the consequences of failure?

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NPT Review Conference: Key Issues

- Implementation of previous commitments
- Reaffirmation of Reagan-Gorbachev
- Nuclear risk reduction
- Strengthened safeguards system
- Grapple with regional proliferation crises
- Facilitate access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology

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A new vision for the disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons?

Comprehensive analysis to facilitate shared understandings about:

- **Strengthening the safeguards regime in the face of emerging challenges (e.g., technology)**
- **How to include all types of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles**
- **How to address missile defense systems**
- **How to move beyond bilateral arms control**
- **How to address the risks posed by the intersection between nuclear weapons and new domains (cyberspace/outer space)**
- **The development of CBMs to reduce current tensions**

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Global proliferation challenges will exist for as long as nuclear weapons do. The only way to eliminate nuclear risk is to eliminate nuclear weapons. In the interim, urgent steps need to be taken to preserve the norms against proliferation and use.

Nuclear weapons are a global problem – the impact of any use would transcend national borders – and, therefore, all States have a responsibility to work to ensure they are never used again and for a world free of nuclear weapons.