HONOLULU – (June 2, 2025) In today’s Indo-Pacific, China’s engagement with the Global South is no longer a future possibility—it is a lived reality reshaping influence, investment, and the rules of the international order. Episode 45 of Dialogue features a timely exchange with Eric Olander, Editor-in-Chief of the China Global South Project. With grounded clarity, Olander analyzes China’s expanding presence across the region—its recalibrated Belt and Road strategy, contested resource ambitions, digital influence campaigns, and the growing agency of Indo-Pacific nations navigating these dynamics.

Defining the Global South in Strategic Terms

Though “Global South” remains a broad label for over 150 politically and economically varied countries, Olander emphasizes its resonance: “We chose ‘Global South’ in part because that’s how many countries refer to themselves.” This self-identification reflects a shared post-colonial heritage and an emerging sense of agency in shaping a system long dominated by Western priorities. For Indo-Pacific states, it signals a desire not just for recognition, but for a greater role in rulemaking. Still, some countries reject the term, seeing it as overly reductive or implicitly hierarchical, grouping disparate nations into a singular geopolitical identity that can obscure local agency and complexity.

Belt and Road Redux: Reform or Rebranding?

Now in its second decade, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has evolved. “Oh no, it’s genuine,” Olander insists. The era of mega-ports and multi-billion-dollar rail lines is giving way to “small and beautiful” projects: fiber cables, green energy hubs, and regional logistics centers. Chinese lenders now demand tighter due diligence, and President Xi has moved to curb inefficiencies, an implicit acknowledgment of early overreach and the growing need for political sustainability.

Rethinking Debt and Dependency

Cases like Sri Lanka’s default and Laos’s railway debt have fueled concerns about “debt-trap diplomacy.” Yet Olander cautions against simplistic narratives: “Be careful with that word dependency… the nature of a developing country is you’re always dependent—on China, on Europe, or on the U.S.” The challenge lies not in avoiding debt but in managing it: refinancing bad deals, diversifying credit sources, and using public-private partnerships to spread risk.

Strategic Resource Control: Rhetoric vs. Reality

From nickel in Indonesia to cobalt in Congo, China’s footprint in strategic resources is growing—but Olander pushes back against claims of dominance. “In terms of controlling resources, I think that’s overstated… U.S. FDI in Southeast Asia is more than double China’s.” Still, the concentration of Chinese capital in critical nodes—like smelting and refining—highlights both the ambition and asymmetry of current flows.

The Digital Front: Speed, Influence, and Sovereignty

China’s digital platforms are transforming commerce and communication across the region. “I can buy something in Vietnam and get it from Guangxi in 24 hours—no local value added,” Olander notes. This speed delights consumers but undermines local industries and regulatory capacity. Meanwhile, infrastructure built by Huawei and narratives propagated through TikTok raise urgent questions about sovereignty, cybersecurity, and the long-term health of regional media ecosystems.

Leadership in the Global South: Who Speaks for Whom?

Beijing’s efforts to position itself as the voice of the Global South face quiet resistance. “Most countries… resent the idea that there is a leader—no one elected you to be our leader,” Olander observes. Middle powers like India and Indonesia claim equal status, while smaller states prefer a balanced mix of partners over reliance on a single patron, even one dressed in solidarity rhetoric.

Hedging as Strategy: Middle Powers Navigate Multipolarity

Indo-Pacific countries are not choosing sides; they are mastering hedging. “Their equation is a both-and, not an either-or,” says Olander. Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” is emblematic—flexible but rooted. Nations like Indonesia and the Philippines balance security ties with Washington, economic links with Beijing, and investments from Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The goal is autonomy through diversification.

The Future: Agency in a Fragmented Order

The next international order may not be led by Beijing or Washington—it may be shaped by smaller states asserting their own models. “There is a reservoir of resentment toward the U.S.-led international order… so they like the idea of an alternative,” Olander concludes. BRICS expansion, the AIIB, and parallel digital standards provide that alternative. If the West cannot offer accessible capital and compelling visions, Indo-Pacific states will chart their own paths, with China or beyond.

Further Reading

To better understand China’s worldview, Olander recommends On Xi Jinping: How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism is Shaping China and the World by Kevin Rudd and The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers by Richard McGregor—essential reads for grasping China’s internal drivers and global ambitions.