

Deficiencies in Global Governance and Implications for Defense Education

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Those contributing to international peace and stability act in an ever-changing, increasingly complex and inter-connected global environment. The international security landscape has changed considerably during the last twenty years, with important power shifts in international affairs, an acceleration of globalization dynamics, the spread of modern information technologies, and a diversification of powerful actors in world politics. In addition, a multitude of transnational security challenges—ranging from the proliferation of weapons to organized crime, including the trafficking of human beings, the security implications of migration, and the challenges of information and cyber security—are on the agenda.

Global governance, which is understood here as cooperative arrangements between various international actors—states, international and regional organizations, as well as actors from the private sector and civil society communities—to manage global processes under conditions of globalization and in the absence of a world government, is still weak when it comes to adapting to these developments. Significant deficits in global governance with respect to issues of peace and international security exist today, and will most likely continue to exist in the future. A key consequence is the continuous presence of insecurity and disorder. In such situations of uncertainty, there is a need for leadership and close cooperation among partners. Education will be crucial in enabling the armed forces to fulfill their role in this environment. Thus, leadership skills, political awareness, and versatility will all be important elements of defense education.

The global governance deficit requires us to better understand and deal with the changes in the international security landscape, including changing patterns of armed conflict and other forms of violence, the increasing threat to our financial and economic security, and the development and spread of new technologies. All these factors determine our security and defense thinking.

The Changing Security Landscape

The international system has witnessed dramatic changes during the last twenty years, shifts that have an impact on national, regional and international security policies. The period of the Cold War was a stable but potentially apocalyptic period of nuclear superpower competition. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States remained the sole superpower, dominating the international system and promoting liberal-

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ism worldwide. During the post-Cold War era, international and regional organizations were empowered, becoming influential actors in international affairs. The United Nations has assumed a greater importance on the world stage, and NATO and the EU have also enlarged their scope of activities to include crisis management and stabilization missions. They also changed the political and strategic map of Europe by expanding eastwards to include the former members of the Warsaw Pact and some former republics of the Soviet Union.

The beginning of the new millennium was then marked by the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the onset of the global war against terrorism. In the following years, asymmetrical warfare and the return to the use of force and interventionism have shaped international security policies. At the same time, the world has also seen the slow but steady rise of new powerful state actors, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (collectively referred to as the BRIC countries) and a redistribution of global power from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China, especially, has gained considerable power, developing into the world's second-biggest economy after the United States.

In addition to these "tectonic" developments, today's security landscape is very much influenced by two recent "game changers": the global economic and financial crisis of 2008, and the set of national movements in North Africa and the Middle East subsumed under the banner of the "Arab Spring" or "Arab Awakening." The economic and financial crisis has had a considerable impact on national, regional, and international peace and stability. As for the difficult transitions in the Arab world, in turn, the positive signs of the "awakening" are being overshadowed by armed violence, Islamist radicalism, and civil war.

"Attention, un train peut en cacher un autre"

In addition to these major developments in world politics, various other trends have influenced and are still shaping the international security environment and global governance.¹ Today, the world faces a series of transnational security threats that were unknown twenty years ago, threats that have flourished under the conditions of globalization.² The spread of organized crime (including human trafficking), the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (especially nuclear weapons and their delivery systems), extreme poverty, humanitarian crises and the spread of diseases—to name but a few of the most pressing challenges ahead—have a global dimension, transcending borders and requiring common responses.

¹ See Fred Tanner, Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, and Sunjay Chandiramani, "Security Strategies Today: Trends and Perspectives," *GCSP Geneva Paper* 9 (April 2009).

² With regard to transnational challenges to European and global security, see the European Union's report "Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model," released in March 2010; and NATO's Strategic Concept "Active Engagement. Modern Defence," adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19–20 November 2010.

Moreover, the vast spread of modern information and communication technology has multiple effects on today's security. Social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter played a key role during the Arab revolutions.³ Major military technological advancements, such as the use of drones, are changing the conduct of warfare. And the Internet has become the battlefield for cyber war and cyber criminality.

In recent years we have also witnessed a change in the understanding of security where states are gradually losing their monopoly over security, with more non-state actors getting involved, and international and regional organizations becoming key actors, especially in conflict resolution, peace building, and humanitarian aid. In this context, the nexus between development, social justice, and security has received more attention, leading to a broadening of the scope of security-related policies and actions.

Effective global governance is also challenged by the continuous diversification of the spectrum of powerful actors in world politics, namely the rise of non-state actors, such as non-governmental civil society organizations, multinational firms, and social movements. The number and relevance of non-state actors has dramatically increased in recent years, and has resulted in a significant shift of power between the economy and civil society on the one hand, and states on the other. The rising number of violent non-state actors, such as criminal organizations and terrorist groups, poses unprecedented risks.

Deficiencies in Global Governance

The international security system is continuously changing, with unparalleled challenges and new powerful actors emerging under the conditions of globalization. Global governance needs to adapt to these changes in order to keep pace with the developments. However, the existing global governance structures are still weak. Three examples allow us to illustrate how the current arrangements of global governance are failing to respond to the increasingly complex and multilayered security challenges: nuclear deterrence and the use of force, changing patterns of armed conflict and other forms of violence, and the dual nature of modern technology.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Use of Force

Despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence is still widely accepted as a policy instrument in the pan-European area and the world at large. Nuclear deterrence is based on an explicit threat to use nuclear weapons. All permanent members of the UN Security Council still maintain important nuclear deterrent forces. NATO, for example, also claims that it will remain a nuclear alliance as long as these weapons exist. NATO member states reiterated this principle anew during the Chicago Summit in May 2012, stating in the "Deterrence and Defense Posture Review" that the Alliance will hold on to "an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities for deterrence and defense to fulfill its commitments," and that "nuclear weapons are a core component

³ See Reda Benkirane, "The Alchemy of Revolution: The Role of Social Networks and New Media in the Arab Spring," *GCSP Policy Paper* 2012/7 (June 2012).

of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defense."⁴ This linkage of nuclear deterrence in Europe to the existence of nuclear weapons worldwide is not conducive to the ideal of a "Europe whole and free and at peace." In addition, the reliance on nuclear deterrence tends to encourage and legitimize the proliferation of these weapons. At this stage, one could argue that if deterrence is still a necessary ingredient of the international system, then it should be achieved through conventional means, because the potential price of nuclear deterrence is very high.

As part of the current intra-European deterrence structure, there are more than two thousand sub-strategic nuclear weapons stationed on European soil.⁵ The continued presence of sub-strategic nuclear weapons should be a concern to all of us. These weapons no longer serve any legitimate strategic purpose. Their continued presence, even though much reduced today as compared to the Cold War period, continues to represent a danger to societies in Europe. There is always a residual risk of nuclear accidents, nuclear theft, and nuclear terrorism. The elimination of sub-strategic nuclear weapons could signify an opportunity to engage in a multilateral arms control process that would also look at missile defense and conventional weapons. A reaffirmation of the need for multilateral arms control in Europe would also be important in view of the unfortunate impasse of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

Deterrence and the use of force are two sides of the same coin. Force continues to be used in several parts of today's world. The defining issue is that of legitimacy. For instance, NATO's use of force in Libya under "Operation Unified Protector" (OUP) from March to November 2011 was part of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), which called for "an immediate ceasefire" and authorized the international community to enforce an arms embargo, maintain a no-fly zone, and protect civilians. But there are many examples of the use of armed violence that is neither authorized nor sanctioned by the United Nations. This includes "targeted killings" carried out through unilateral intervention and drone strikes. On the one hand, the persistence of such violence reflects the inability of institutions of global governance to ensure the implementation of international norms relating to the prohibition of the use of force and their exceptions as set out in the United Nations Charter. On the other hand, it illustrates the fact that the definition of the use of force is changing in today's global system.

⁴ NATO, "Deterrence and Defense Posture Review" issued on 20 May 2012 at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago; available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease.

⁵ In 2010, the United Kingdom and France together stored 525 strategic nuclear weapons. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 66 (2010): 77–83. As of 2010, the United States deployed 150–200 strategic nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 67 (2011): 64–73.

Changing Patterns of Armed Conflict and Other Forms of Violence

Despite the lack of effective global governance structures to address armed conflict and other forms of violence, and thus to considerably mitigate human suffering, much progress has been achieved in crisis management and conflict resolution worldwide. Unfortunately, the resulting decline in the frequency of armed conflicts involving state militaries has been paralleled by an increase of armed violence outside traditional conflict areas involving non-state actors. The Human Security Report 2009/2010, “The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War,” makes a very strong case regarding the significant decline of armed conflicts over the last twenty years.⁶ According to this report, since the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts in which at least one of the warring parties is a government was a third lower in 2009 than in the peak year of 1992. Equally positive, the number of deaths resulting from armed conflicts has dramatically declined over the past twenty years, with the average number of deaths per conflict in the post-Cold War period being 76 percent lower than the average during the Cold War.

However, the remaining forms of conflict and violence do not fit into the traditional patterns of war and peace, or of criminal or political violence. The “Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development,” an initiative aimed at addressing the links between armed violence and development, has demonstrated how the distinctions between political and criminal types of violence are becoming increasingly blurred in the current security environment.⁷ Today, the main obstacle to peace consists in the high level of violent crimes that threaten peace processes and social and economic development.⁸ In broad terms, armed violence claimed about 526,000 lives per year between 2004 and 2009, including about 55,000 deaths resulting from armed conflict. Hence, about 90 percent of the victims of targeted armed violence are not killed as a result of armed conflict, but in a non-conflict environment, through homicides and law enforcement measures. Armed violence is the fourth-leading cause of death for persons between the ages of 15 and 44 worldwide. One of the most depressing examples is certainly Mexico, where drug-related criminal activity is accompanied by high levels of violence, resulting in 34,000 deaths in the four-year period from the beginning of Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s offensive against the drug cartels in 2007 through 2010.⁹ This means that more people were killed in Mexico than in Afghanistan during the same period.

The changing patterns of armed violence are facilitated by the abundance and availability of small arms. In fact, approximately 70 percent of all violent deaths are caused

⁶ Human Security Report Project “Human Security Report 2009/2010,” available at www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx.

⁷ For more information, see the initiative’s website, at www.genevadeclaration.org.

⁸ See Geneva Declaration Secretariat, *Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

⁹ See Mark Stevenson, “Mexico: 34,612 Drug War Deaths; 15,273 in 2010,” *Huffington Post* (12 January 2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/12/mexico-drug-war-deaths-2010_n_808277.html.

by firearms, ranging from 19 percent in Europe to 77 percent in Central America. There is also a strong increase in the general availability of weapons to civilians. This is mainly due to the presence of illegal trafficking and smuggling of firearms, but also as a consequence of the emergence of zones without government or security.

At the review conference of the “OSCE Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons” in May 2012, OSCE Secretary-General Lamberto Zannier also stressed the connections between small arms and the fight against violent and organized crime, underlining that the OSCE “should further strengthen practical links between the issue of illicit small arms and light weapons and other domains of the OSCE’s work, such as conflict cycle and transnational threats.”¹⁰ The main response to these challenges, as recommended by the World Bank, should be the effort to build legitimate institutions that can provide citizens with security, justice, and employment. It is also about building security governance structures that are resilient and have robust law enforcement capabilities.

Dual Nature of Modern Technology

Globalization also leads to more risks and threats from the growing dual-use nature of modern technologies. We live in an increasingly digital world, with a broad range of different information and communication technologies, and a very dynamic technology sector that impacts the private, public, economic, and military spheres of societies. Future warfare will feature major technological developments with the increased deployment of machines and robots in battle. Even now, the deployment of robots for clearing road-side bombs was discussed at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012 as part of the Smart Defense project.

Cyber security today is dealt with by armed forces and defense organizations not simply as a technical issue, but as a matter that has already found its way into military doctrinal thinking. Cyber security has offensive and defensive implications on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For the defense sector, the interface and cooperation with commercial cyber networks is essential. Along these lines, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) report “Global Trends 2030: Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World” predicts the rise of new, competitive, and dynamic offensive and defensive cyber capacities that will be essential for economic development and military advancement, but which will also create new points of vulnerability.¹¹ Cyber security is also a concern for NATO, especially with regard to the increasing number of cyber attacks on government administrations, businesses, and transportation and sup-

¹⁰ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “OSCE Meeting to Review the OSCE Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and OSCE Expert Level Session on Small Arms and Light Weapons Stockpile Management, Surplus Reduction and Destruction: Consolidated Report,” 4 July 2012; available at www.osce.org/fsc/92811.

¹¹ European Union Institute for Security Studies, European Strategy and Policy Analysis System Report, “Global Trends 2030: Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World,” 27 April 2012; available at www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/espas-report-global-trends-2030-citizens-in-an-interconnected-and-polycentric-world/.

ply networks.¹² In order to address these challenges, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) in Tallinn was established to serve as a research and training institute. The GCSP supported this institute as a partner in preparing the “Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.”¹³

Implications for Defense Education

The Role of Armed Forces in a Turbulent World

The armed forces have an uneven performance record in recent years. The most obvious observation is that the use of force alone cannot succeed in conflict management. Warfare has been replaced by expeditionary and stabilization missions, intervention, and “robust actions” in reconstruction and state building. With regard to Afghanistan, the hard work that has been put in and the important progress that has been achieved are unfortunately largely ignored in today’s political discussion of disengagement. Furthermore, the question of the future of Libya remains unresolved, despite the success of the NATO air campaign.¹⁴ In addition, Libya’s ongoing transition is still being affected by instability, both within the country and in its neighborhood—in particular, the Islamist uprising in northern Mali and terrorist actions in Algeria—which raises the issue of responsibility, especially with respect to the proliferation of weapons in Africa.

In the post-Afghanistan period—an era that will certainly be marked by austerity and shrinking defense budgets—the time of significant out-of-area commitments for NATO may come to an end. Concerning future roles and missions for the Alliance, the increasingly divergent situation among NATO’s European members has left the Alliance exposed to internal divisions. However, the future will most likely generate demands for more military engagements in Africa, the Middle East, and other areas outside the Euro-Atlantic zone. Partnerships and international cooperation with transitional countries in the Arab world and Africa should be on the top of NATO’s agenda.

The declining resource availability for NATO stands in contrast with increased defense expenditures by emerging powers outside Europe. In fact, the global future will be marked by new arms races and proliferation of new weapons technologies. Already today, there is a clear shift of defense expenditures from the Atlantic towards the Pacific.

¹² See NATO’s Strategic Concept, “Active Engagement, Modern Defense,” adopted by the heads of state and government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19–20 November 2010; available at www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm.

¹³ The manual is forthcoming in both paper and electronic copies from Cambridge University Press in 2013.

¹⁴ See Julian Lindley-French, “Strategic Pretence or Strategic Defence? Britain, France and the Common Security and Defence Policy after Libya,” *GCSP Policy Paper* 1 (April 2011).

The Challenge of Conducting Operations in Zones without Government or Security

In many regions of transition, a challenge exists for armed forces currently conducting operations in the dramatically altered environment in those regions. Areas that fall into a recognized conflict zone and that have a strong presence of armed factions, extremist groups, and criminal organizations are especially challenging operational theaters, and raise many important questions. How, for example, should one operate in an environment that is marked by asymmetry and by hybrid structures? Or, how should international security forces deal with hybrid structures in stabilization environments, black market economies and their actors, criminal disorder, and irregular tactics? Another question to be asked is how one can differentiate between stabilization and reconstruction, on the one hand, and counter-terrorist activities in the same area on the other hand. Finally, how is training for such environments compatible with training for the conduct of traditional defense operations?

Rupert Smith illustrates this complexity of modern warfare very well in his book *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, which has been referred to as a treatise on “war among the people.”¹⁵ In these non-traditional conflict environments, an integrated strategic approach, joint training, and joint planning with partners and representatives from international organizations and civil society would be especially important. In view of the rising significance of organized crime and the blurring of boundaries between conflict and non-conflict areas, as well as between political and criminal violence, training in pre- or emerging crisis environments as well as in semi-permissive or post-crisis environments would be of equal importance.

Modernizing Defense Training and Education

Modernizing defense training and education provides an important opportunity to respond to the prevailing deficits in global governance. First, defense training and education require a more international focus. Traditionally defense training has taken place on the national level, led by national military academies. In order to keep pace with current developments, however, defense education needs to promote multinational and multi-stakeholder training. From the perspective of training institutions and organizations, this may imply a stronger effort to expand their global outreach, for example through strategic partnerships. Over the last years, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)¹⁶ has developed a network of cooperative agreements with a range of defense education organizations, professional training centers, and universities from around the world. These partners include:

- The China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS)
- The Institute for Security Studies in South Africa (ISS)

¹⁵ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Penguin, 2008).

¹⁶ For further information on the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, see www.gcsp.ch.

- The Cairo Regional Centre for Training in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA)
- The National Defense University of the Republic of Korea
- The Royal High Institute for Defense of the Belgium Ministry of Defense (RHID)
- The National Defense Academy of the Austrian Armed Forces.

The GCSP has benefited from activities conducted with these international partners, such as faculty exchanges, joint research, training programs, and conferences. Additionally, what may add some value to the quality of defense education in today's complex and inter-connected security environment is to enhance the interaction and exchange between officials with diverse cultural backgrounds through joint training courses. With around 800 participants from 112 countries trained during the 2011–12 academic year, the GCSP attaches great importance to the culturally diverse composition of its courses.

Second, the content of traditional curricula needs to be updated. To help future leaders prepare for the challenges of security in the twenty-first century, training is required on non-traditional threats. These threats range from climate change to cyber security, and include new modes of response (such as e-diplomacy) and a focus on new actors (such as civil society and the media). In 2012, the GCSP organized, in cooperation with its partners, a number of well-attended events on new issues in international peace and security, such as the “Geneva E-diplomacy Day,” a seminar on cyber security, and a public discussion on “Current Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Implications for Regional and Global Security.” These training and networking events provided opportunities for experts to exchange views on some of the most relevant topics in international peace and security, which was very well received in “International Geneva.”

Third, preparing defense officials for the multiple challenges of today's security environment may require a stronger focus on the development of relevant skill sets. Complex environments require a different management approach including leadership, horizon-scanning, and cultural and political savvy. But other soft skills, such as foreign language skills, communication, media literacy, intercultural competence, and awareness of gender issues should also be integral parts of the defense curriculum. A comprehensive approach to defense education should include a portfolio of exercises, including a network of appropriately qualified trainers and supporting materials to enhance skills development. Defense curricula should also prepare for possible strategic reorientation or “game changers” (*ruptures stratégiques*), meaning that professionals are expected to be more versatile and multifunctional. It has to be recognized that a “one size fits all” approach is insufficient to confront the diverse security challenges of today's rapidly changing environment, and should be avoided.