



# Russian War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned

# Ukrainian economy

## ✓ Positive lessons

- **Financial and consultative support for entrepreneurs** since February 24th
- **Relocation** to safe regions **promoted** via **various financial incentives**
- Active and effective support allowed **65% of SMEs to resume operations** since start of invasion
- EU-Ukraine **business match-making platform** supports export
- State accumulated all available resources to **increase military budget**
- **Sanctioned Russian and Belarussian property confiscation procedure simplified**
- **Presidential initiative UNITED24 – fundraising platform collects donations**



# Ukrainian economy

## x Negative lessons

- **Confiscation of Russian property** is progressing, but slowly – **reduced effectiveness**
- Foreign financial support – **untransparent procedures may lead to corruption** and emergence of distrust – single transparent mechanism for managing budget funds required
- National Bank of Ukraine – set **limit for non-cash settlements, cash withdrawals, P2P transfers abroad** – **obstacles for volunteer help**




# Civil society

## ✓ Positive lessons

- **Public consultations** between the government, CSOs and citizens began **before the invasion**
- **Solidarity, support during massive displacement of population**
- **Cooperation between local authorities and CSOs** – assembly of first-aid kits, rehabilitation of the injured, legal assistance
- CSOs provide **up-to-date information** to citizens trapped in occupied territories

## x Negative lessons

- **Chaotic documentation of war crimes** – particularly in Kyiv region



# STRATCOM, fighting disinformation

## ✓ Positive lessons

- **Strategic communication in doctrinal documents**
- **Centre for Strategic Communications and Information Security of Ukraine, Centre for Countering Disinformation**
- **Joint work** with international partners **to shut down Russian propaganda channels** – successful as **several of them are now banned in the EU**

## x Negative lessons

- Since 2014, **each newly formed government tried to create its own STRATCOM**, its specialists leaving with them at the end of the term
- **Unsystemic approach, temporary solutions**



# Media

## ✓ Positive lessons

- Space for aggressor's disinformation campaigns limited due to **ban of media outlets known for disseminating hostile narratives**
- **Currently no openly pro-Russian channels on Ukrainian TV**
- On February 24th a **unified channel was established – divided air time, non-stop broadcasting**
- **Uninterrupted TV broadcasting** despite Russian shelling of TV towers in major cities

## x Negative lessons

- **Print media unprepared for the disruption of the supply chain** – before the invasion, 90% of paper imported from Russia and Belarus – significant rise in price



# Cyber resilience

## ✓ Positive lessons

- **IT Army of Ukraine** – community of volunteers coordinated by Ministry of Digital Transformation
- **Consolidation of international partners** to strengthen Ukrainian cyber resilience
- Enhanced protection of government systems and critical infrastructure – secure cloud-based system and strong multifactor identification system
- **State services moved online** to optimize bureaucratic procedures – e.g., **digital birth registrations, simplified war-time digital ID** recognized beyond the border



# Energy security

## ✓ Positive lessons

- **Reliance** on Russian gas **reduced**
- Own **production of gas expanded** and kept at sufficient levels
- **New suppliers of fuel** found in the EU swiftly
- **Enough coal stored for thermal power plants**
- **Hydropower plants play an important role in synchronizing EU and UA energy systems**
- **Resilient energy transmission system** despite numerous Russian cyberattacks





# Energy security

## x Negative lessons

- No steps yet taken to adapt gas transport infrastructure to nearing halt of Russian gas transit
- **Failure to preemptively deprive pro-Russian figures of share of critical infrastructure** despite existing legal grounds and enough time
- **Shortage of fuel could have been predicted**, infrastructure was not ready for diversification
- **Increased air defence of large thermal power plants** came too late, preventable blackouts occurred
- **Insufficient backup power supply** for critical infrastructure
- **Underdeveloped renewable energy infrastructure**, reforms required to fulfil EU obligations



# Security and Defence Sector

## ✓ Positive lessons

- Territorial Defence Forces
- Improved level of coordination in security and defence sector thanks to recently adopted doctrines & cooperation with NATO countries
- Constant transformations of institutional framework allowed for flexibility and sustainability of core elements
- Limited number of people in the top-level decision-making process lowers risk of information leaks and allows for fast responses
- Extensive training received from foreign personnel
- Decision of top-level political representation to remain in the capital was crucial for national and international morale
- Key classified communication lines remained operational
- Long-term prep: The level of public trust in the military increased from 55% in 2015 to 72% in December 2021



# Security and Defence Sector

## ✓ Territorial Defence Forces

- TDF **capability** was **established** in **2021** by the Law on the Foundations of the National Resistance.
- Declared **strength is 110,000**
- **32 brigades** (as of May 2022).
- **Commander** of TDF **reports to the Commander-in-Chief**.
- **Perform auxiliary functions to Ukrainian Security and Defence Forces** (AFU, National Guard, Security Service, Border Guards), though units of TDF also participate in combat actions.



# Security and Defence Sector

## ✓ Territorial Defence Forces

- Largely **equipped with light weapons**. Logistical support of TDF is performed by the AFU and local administrations
- TDF **is not responsible for the resistance movement** in the occupied territory, SOF is.
- **Morale is assessed as high**, with factor of territorial attachment playing significant role at the initial stage of war (before end of April)



# Security and Defence Sector

## x **Negative lesson: Lack long-term serious funding:**

2014 1.7% of GDP

2015 2.6%,

2016 2.5% ,

2017 2.5%,

2018 2.7%,

2019 2.7%,

2020 2.9%,

2021 2.5%

2022 appr. 20%

2023 projected 17.5% (combined defense and security)



# Security and Defence Sector

## x Negative lessons

- **Tactical level overlooked in military training plans** – many members of the armed forces left, leading to loss of knowledge and skills in the time of a large-scale invasion
- **Training-of-Trainers undervalued**, resulting in unfulfilled potential
- **“Remain calm” strategy until the last moment** – prevented thorough civilian preparedness
- Due to the lack of time and resources, large-scale interagency exercises, involving components of the Armed Forces, law enforcement, intelligence, emergency services **were not carried out.**
- **Inefficient counterintelligence system** – significant Russian infiltration ahead of the invasion
- **Information leaks** – personal and police databases



