Lessons of 75 Years of Nuclear Weapons

Sugio Takahashi

75 years: Difference b/w the Cold War Era and Current Environment

- Cold War
 - Bilateral showdown between superpowers
 - Mutual Assured Destruction with strategic stability
 - Existential risk for human beings
- Current Environment
 - > Bilateral big nuclear power with second tier nuclear power
 - Proliferation
 - Complexities for strategic stability
 - Retaliation and damage limitation
 - > No longer existential risk (except US-Russia)

Two School of Thoughts on Deterrence

- As long as nuclear weapon exists, it can have deterrent.
 - > Assumption of existential deterrence: By retaliatory second strike capability
 - Retaliation based deterrence: Retaliation after receiving first strike
 - credibility of retaliation is the key
 - relatively cheap
 - Bernard Brodie; Thomas Schelling, and Robert Jervis
- Without serious preparation of nuclear utilization, deterrence would not work
 - > Combination of "warfighting" capabilities: counter-force, missile defense, and civil defense
 - Even though deterrence fails, it seek to limit damage
 - Physical effect is the key
 - > Expensive in general
 - > Albert Wohlstetter, Harman Kahn, and Keith Payne
- Caveat for extended deterrence: Healey Theorem

"To deter Russians, 5 percent credibility is enough, but to reassure Europeans, 95 percent credibility is necessary."

Nuclear Debate: Waltz vs Sagan

- Kenneth Waltz: spread of nuclear weapon would be better
 - > Nuclear weapon acquisition makes the state more cautious
 - > With moderate pace, nuclear proliferation will make the world safe
 - based on the first school of thoughts
- Scott Sagan: proliferation is dangerous
 - Proliferation of nuclear weapon will increase risk of trouble on command and control and other mechanical malfunction
 - ➤ it increases inadvertent nuclear utilization
 - based on second school of thoughts (or focus on risk from second school of thoughts)

Recent Debate: Deep Cut vs Limited Nuclear Option

• Deep Cut


Prioritized threat should be nuclear terrorism

- > Growing cyber threat increases the risk of nuclear command and control
- > US should deeply cut nuclear arsenal and rely on more smaller nuclear force
- De-alert should be promoted

• Limited Nuclear Option

- > US is losing conventional superiority and need to prepare nuclear option
- To counter Russia and China's low yield nuclear weapons, US also need low yield nuclear weapons (penetratable against A2/AD).
- > Current high readiness of nuclear force should be maintained.

Range of North Korea's Ballistic Missiles



*The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience.

Korean Peninsula: Traditional Geostrategic Framework (1)


The 1950 Korean War



- Japan (geographic term) played critical role to support US operation in Korean Peninsula
- North Korea lacked capability to strike Japan

Traditional Geostrategic Framework (2)


• Two separate sub-theater



* These circles shows images of theater


- Strategic assumption was: Korean Peninsula as main battle theater and Japanese Islands as staging/supporting theater.
- Since NK lacked capabilities to strike Japan (except SOF) until very recently, Japan theater was regarded as "safe" staging theater.
- 1997 US-Japan Defense Guidelines described Japan's "rear area support" for US. (* Defense Guidelines are not the plan against any regions and countries)

NK's BM as a Geostrategic Game Changer



* These circles shows images of theater


China's Ballistic Missiles



Thomas Shugart, "Has China Been Practicing Preemptive Missile Strikes Against U.S. Bases?" (February 6, 2017) (https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/has-china-been-practicing-preemptive-missile-strikes-against-u-s-bases/)







Theory of Victory against China's Theater Strike Capability

China' Theory of Victory Denial of first strike Missile strikes against air bases Missile strike against TEL advantage o man's air" strategy Counter- missile strike against Gaining air superiority "maritime dominance" Gaining command of the sea strategy through joint anti-ship strikes Missile strikes against point of origin "Prevent landing" Amphibious operation of amphibious forces strategy

Ally's Theory of Victory (options)