

GLOBAL POWER COMPETITION

CASE STUDY: RUSSIA



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Soviet Union Administrative Divisions, 1989

The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

DEPOSITORY



- ASSRs and AOs in the Caucasus
1. Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR
 2. Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR
 3. Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR
 4. Adzharskaya ASSR
 5. Nakhichevanskaya ASSR (Azerbaijan SSR)
 6. Adygeyskaya AO
 7. Karachayevo-Cherkesskaya AO
 8. Yugo-Osetinskaya AO
 9. Gorno-Karabakhskaya AO

KAZAKH Union republic (SSR)

- Union republic (SSR) center
- Autonomous republic (ASSR), oblast, or kray boundary
- - - Autonomous oblast (AO) or autonomous okrug (AOk) boundary

Note: The union republic administrative centers are shown. The only other administrative centers shown are for oblasts having the same name as their administrative centers.

0 400 800 Kilometers

0 400 800 Miles


* Areas with no oblast-level administrative divisions, where rayons are under direct republic jurisdiction

THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION



THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

A



Source: Sue Ann Kime and Paul Stich, *Global History*, N & N Publishing (adapted)



- National Capital (10, 110,000 In 2002)
- over 4,000,000
- over 1,500,000
- over 1,000,000
- over 500,000
- other main city
- other city
- Chief town of federal district
- Previous capital of republic, oblast, krai or okrug

RUSSIAN FEDERATION



0 km 275 550 825 km

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


PROBLEMS OF THE 1990s

- Military Dismemberment
- Economic Collapse
- Oligarchs and Corruption
- The “Health of the Nation” at Risk
- A Country in Need of Aid



NATO AT THE RUSSIAN BORDER



RUSSIA UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN

- **Putin's Perspective**
 - *Correct the disaster of 1991*
 - *Russia as an “essential” power*
- **Defining Spheres of Influence**
 - *Eurasia – neighboring states*
 - *Europe – strategically important*
 - *Beyond – situational (what is the purpose? Advantage?)*
- **Tools of Foreign Policy**
 - *Oil, gas, and arms sales*
 - *Information operations*
 - *The “image of stability”*





LATVIJA
(LATVIA)



EESTI
(ESTONIA)



РОССИЯ
(RUSSIA)



LIETUVA
(LITHUANIA)



БЕЛАРУСЬ
(BELARUS)



УКРАЇНА
(UKRAINE)



МОЛДОВА
(MOLDOVA)



საქართველო
(GEORGIA)



NORTH
CAUCASUS
(PART OF RUSSIA)

ҚАЗАҚСТАН
(KHAZAKHSTAN)



КЫРГЫЗСТАН
(KYRGYZSTAN)



ТОҶИКИСТОН
(TAJIKISTAN)



ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆ
(ARMENIA)



AZƏRBAYCAN
(AZERBAIJAN)



TÜRKMENISTAN
(TURKMENISTAN)



O'zbekiston
(UZBEKISTAN)




RUSSIAN ARMS SALES

Russian Arms Deals

Between 2016 and 2017, Russia exported over \$13 billion worth of heavy military equipment. These were the buyers.

World's leading weapons exporters



All values in millions of U.S. dollars

Aircraft: 7,558



India ordered 140 Su-30MK fighter jets. A deal worth between \$3-5.4 billion.

\$13.085 billion

Armored vehicles: 1,272

Air-defense: 662

Artillery: 34

Engines: 857

Missiles: 1,355

Naval weapons: 70

Other: 144

Sensors: 266

Ships: 867

Ships: 867

In 2017, Vietnam purchased 64 Russian T-90S tanks.

Data doesn't include unguided munitions, small arms, and other equipment.

Export value of heavy military equipment in 2016 and 2017

In 2016, Azerbaijan purchased 70 Russian BTR-82A infantry fighting vehicles.

Moscow has also provided equipment to the Syrian regime in recent years.

COUNTRY \$ VALUE


Algeria	2,348
Angola	286
Armenia	124
Azerbaijan	135
Bangladesh	242
Belarus	247
Brazil	5
Cameroon	11
China	1,499
Egypt	1,288
India	4,075
Iran	402
Iraq	300
Kazakhstan	361
Kyrgyzstan	22
Mali	23
Burma	54
Nicaragua	86
Nigeria	24
Pakistan	139
Peru	20
Qatar	4
Serbia	79
South Sudan	4
Sudan	75
Syria	22
Tajikistan	8
Turkmenistan	36
Vietnam	1,167

WAGNER

MERCENARIES



SHAPING THE MEDIA SPACE



IS RUSSIA A GREAT POWER?



AREAS OF COMPETITION: THE CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

- Does Russia Believe in “*Strategic Power Competition?*” In the CENTCOM Region?
- What Is the “End State” of this Competition?
- Regions to Consider:
 - *The Levant*
 - *Central and South Asia*
 - *The Arabian Gulf*



I. RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE LEVANT




RUSSIA AND SYRIA

- **Support for Assad**
 - *“Helping a friend”*
 - *Russia as a regional actor*
- **Low-cost/High-return**
 - *Combat experience*
 - *Refining roles of mercenaries*
 - *Arms sales*
- **Limiting the U.S. in the Middle East**
- **This Is Part of a Broader Russian Security Policy**



SYRIA 2021



“STRATEGIC POWER COMPETITION” OVER SYRIA

- Russia and China Question U.S. Goals
- Russia and China Oppose U.S. Presence
- A Divergence in Russian and Chinese Approaches
 - *Russia sees a clear “competition” with the U.S.*
 - *China is not competing at this time*



II. RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA



RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

- **Shared History**
 - *Colonial legacy?*
 - *Significance*
- **Formal Ties**
 - *Bilateral relations*
 - *CIS*
 - *CSTO*
 - *EAEU*
 - *SCO*
- **The Threat of NATO/U.S.**
 - *Presence in Afghanistan*
 - *Encircling Russia*



RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN

- **Formal Ties**
 - *Had tacit support for Ghani*
 - *Support for the Taliban*
 - *Russia as a “convener”*
- **The Withdrawal of NATO**
 - *Perceptions before August 2021*
 - *Collapse of the Ghani government and the U.S. and NATO departure from Kabul*
- **Redefining Russia’s War of 1979-1989**



CONNECTING OR BLOCKING OFF AFGHANISTAN?



“STRATEGIC POWER COMPETITION” OVER AFGHANISTAN

- Russia and China DO NOT Oppose U.S. Goals
- Russia and China DO Oppose U.S. Presence
- This is not a “New Great Game,” But *Cooperation Is Questionable*



III. RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE ARABIAN GULF



RUSSIA AND IRAN

- **Bilateral Tensions**
- **Security Cooperation**
 - *Arms sales*
 - *Intelligence sharing*
- **Shared Concerns**
 - *Transnational threats*
 - *The U.S. as a rival*
- **Is This a Strategic Partnership?**



“STRATEGIC POWER COMPETITION” OVER IRAN

- Russia and China Oppose U.S. Goals
- Russia and China Oppose U.S. Presence
- Russian and Chinese Views Align (*but are not identical*)
 - *Russia understands its limitations with Iran*
 - *China does not know Iran well and will make mistakes*



RUSSIA AND CHINA AT ODDS?



THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO)

Member states



Observer states



Dialogue partners



Guest attendances



THOUGHTS ON STRATEGIC POWER COMPETITION IN THE CENTCOM AOR

- **Russia, China, and the United States**
 - *Areas of cooperation*
 - *Areas of competition?*
- **Interaction among the Three Powers**
 - *Interests and capacity*
 - *Be mindful of wishful thinking*
- **Regional Actors and Agency**
 - *Three major sub-regions are distinct*
 - *Understand local interests and capacity*

QUESTIONS?



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