



**Thoughts on:  
COVID-19,  
The Biden Administration's  
Evolving Foreign Policy,  
&  
Foreign Policy Challenges**

**LTG (Ret) Terry A. Wolff  
23 March 2022**

The views expressed are solely those of the author  
and do not represent official US Government policy.

Wolff - NESA

# Agenda

- **Opening Big Ideas**
- **COVID-19 Impacts**
- **Biden Administration's Foreign Policy at 1 Year**
- **Foreign Policy Challenges**
- **Q & A**


# **Big Ideas – Biden Foreign Policy**

- **Russia's Invasion of the Ukraine has overtaken all Foreign Policy issues – “Dawn of a New Century”**
- **COVID-19 remains a Security Issue** and has created a “New Normal and a New Operating Environment” – We must Adapt to Live with the Virus.
- **Societies often change when** confronted with: 1) Wars; 2) Recessions; 3) Pandemics; 4) What About Climate Change?
- **Nations Respond to Threats Based on Their National Security Interests**
- The Biden Team has built on the Trump Administration's **Great Power Competition Framework** (China & Russia), will have to deal with a number of **Regional Power Challenges** (Iran & nK), and **Functional Issues** (Cyber, Climate Change, WMD Proliferation, and the Pandemic).
- The Biden Foreign Policy Team are an experienced and trusted group of advisors who will refine the Biden Foreign Policy Approach.
- The Middle East and North Africa offers plenty of challenges for the Biden Administration.





# COVID Impacts

Source: NYTimes via State & Local Health Agencies



**“Shifting Baseline over Time” Syndrome!**



	DAILY AVG. ON MAR. 20	14-DAY CHANGE	TOTAL REPORTED
Cases	29,905	-33%	79,624,123
Tests	994,891	+3%	—
Hospitalized	16,465	-57%	—
In I.C.U.s	2,837	-60%	—
Deaths	1,103	-27%	970,082

**US & COVID-19**


- Omicron Variant Impacts surged thru Jan22 and have diminished since Feb 22.
- Cases per day down to 29K (589K) (-47%)
- Daily death toll 1.1K (was 2.5K) with 970K overall; w/ 574K more deaths- preCOVID
- Avg COVID hospitalized #s fallen from 150K to 16K (was 50-100K Fall 2021)
- Vaccinations: 1M+ per day /256M vac'd (#1)=77% ; 217M completed=65%. 96M boosted (29%). *Tale of 2 nations*
- Biden Admin continues to push for additional COVID spending to address COVID-19 public health issues.

**Bottom Line – COVID-19 is not over in the US or around the world. Must “Learn to Live with the Virus”.**

**Daily Avg / Jan 22 / Total Rep**

Cases	29K	589K	79M
Tests	925K	2.1M	—
Hosp	16K	151K	—
Deaths	1.1K	2.5K	970K

NYT as of 21 March 2022



## COVID-19 Thoughts

- Pandemic is far from over
- This will be a 36+ month event
- Variant & Case Load Impacts
- Reporting is uneven: # of cases, infected, tested & deaths
- No cure for the coronavirus - yet
- Remarkable vaccine dev process - must get the world vaccinated


## COVID-19 Impacts

- WWide recess(-3% 2020 to 3.5% 2022)
- Job loss has been large (scarring?)
- Those in extreme poverty rising
- Travel & tourism impacted
- Energy demand & price fluctuates
- Food Insecurity growing
- Globalization/Supply Chain challenges
- Protest movements – unmet expect.
- Disinformation efforts ongoing
- Bad actors exploiting opportunity
- Pandemics have lasting impact &
- Possible Wildcards?

1918 Flu Pandemic Worldwide Deaths = 50M (675K in US)  
 Asian Flu 1957 Worldwide Deaths = 1-2M (116K in US)  
 1968 Flu Pand. H3N2 Worldwide Deaths = 1-4M (100K in US)  
 2009 H1N1 Worldwide Deaths = 150-575K (12K in US)




	DAILY AVG. ON MAR. 20	14-DAY CHANGE	TOTAL REPORTED
Cases	1,770,202	+14%	470,667,396
Deaths	4,799	-34%	6,076,506



### Vaccination rates by region

As a share of total population. The height of each bar is proportional to the region's population.

● Partially vaccinated ● Fully vaccinated ● Received additional dose



79% of shots have gone into high & upper middle-income nations  
14% in low-income nations - 1 dose

## Vaccination Data Points (Need to up gun):

- **11B Doses (5B indiv) / 65% of world's pop= #1**
- **10 vaccines being used Wwide**-> AZ-183 C; Pfizer-158 C; Moderna-90 C; Sinopharm-90C J&J-89 C; Sinovac-49 C; Sputnik-47 C
- **WHO COVAX Goal** 2B vaccinations in 2021 to low-income nations (40%) & 70% by end 2022
- **US Contribution 449M** -> 1.1B -> 70% world
- **Vaccine Distribution** of 1.3B US/G7 excess doses is key in near-term
- **US knows what needs to be done.** "But this isn't the great British "bakeoff" & depends on supply chain resilience".
- **US chaired FM Vaccine Mtg** in Dec & HoS in 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter, FY22
- **Big pharma 2021 output=12B vac (1B/mon)**
- **\$50-70B to vaccinate** the rest of the world
- **Who is in charge and owns this effort?**

Top 14 Nations: UAE; Chile; Brunei; Portugal; Malta; Cuba; Qatar; PRC; Argentina; Cambodia; Bhutan; Macau; Singapore; AUS; New Zealand

US-558M; PRC-3.2B; India-1.8B; Brazil-407M; Pak-219M; Ger-171; RF-161M; Egypt-75M; Turkey-146M; Syria-3.3M; Jor-9.7M; Iraq -17M; Iran-146M; Tun-13M






# Thinking About U.S. National Security



# Thoughts About the USA – A Republic

- **USG & the Separation of Power (Balance of Power) between the President (Executive) and Congress (Legislative) results in dynamic tension & friction**
- **Civilian Control of the Military**
- **Executive Branch's InterAgency Process is designed to offer choices to the President – Definition of Goals / Objectives (ENDS)**
- **Tools of Statecraft – D/I/M/E/P/I/Fin/t (WAYS)**
- **Congress controls the MEANS via Appropriations (\$\$), Authorization & Oversight**
- **Lots of Players involved in the crafting of US Policy which impacts clear communications & understanding – so Read Directly what leaders (POTUS/SecState/SecDef/Congress Big 8) say**
- **“Say-Do” Syndrome – Policy Pronouncement to Action to Program**
- **Impact of Social Media & Technology and Time on Decision Makers**
- **Transition Periods**

# On US Senior Leader's Minds Now . . .



## U.S. National Security Interests

- The survival of the Nation
- Prevent catastrophe attack of US territory
- Security of the global economic system
- Security, confidence & reliability of our allies
- Protection of US citizens abroad
- Preserve & extend of universal values

## U.S. Security Concerns

1. China
2. Russia
3. Iran
4. nK
5. VEOs
6. Cyber Threats

## Biden National Security Priorities

1. Protect the security of the American people
2. Expand economic prosperity & opportunity
3. Defend democratic values
4. Revitalize & modernize our alliances & partnerships

## Sec Def's Priorities

1. Defend the Nation & Protect Our Interests
2. Take Care of People
3. Succeed Thru Teamwork

# National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC)

Principal forum for consideration & integration of national security and homeland security and policy issues requiring Presidential determination.



- Invited to every NSC mtg:
- Counsel to President
  - NSC Legal Advisor
  - Deputy NSA (secretary)
  - Others as required

- Types of Meetings:
- NSC
  - Principals (PC)
  - Deputies (DC)
  - Interagency Policy Committees (IPC)

Other executive depts/agencies/senior officials as appropriate

Based on National Security Act of 1947  
Supplemented by NSM – 2, dated Feb 4, 2021





# The Evolving Biden Foreign Policy

# President Biden's Foreign Policy

## Three (3) Tenets of the Biden Foreign Policy


- ❑ Repair US credibility and influence in the world
- ❑ Deal with global challenges “from climate change and mass migration to technological disruption and infectious diseases”
- ❑ Re-empower trust in democratic institutions & international system.

*“The next U.S. president will have to address the world as it is in Jan 21, and picking up the pieces will be an enormous task. He or she will have to salvage our reputation, rebuild confidence in our leadership, and mobilize our country and our allies to rapidly meet new challenges. There will be no time to lose.”*

## Four (4) Principles of the Biden Foreign Policy

- (1) Renew Democracy at Home
- (2) A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class to succeed in the global economy.
- (3) Back At the Head of the Table in terms of working with allies and partners to mobilize collective action on global threats via a balanced & coherent approach with diplomacy in the lead.
- (4) Prepared to Lead

# The Biden's National Security Team – A Trusted Group



NSA Jake Sullivan



DNSA Finer



SecState Blinken



DepSState Sherman



USS-PA Nuland



USUN AMB Linda Thomas-Greenfield



USAID AMB Power



DNI Haines



CIA AMB Burns



DHS Mayorkas



Treasury Sec Yellen



SecDef Austin



DepSecDef Hicks



USD-P Kahl



SE Climate Kerry



# President Biden's Security Team – Other Key Players



VP NSA Gordan



Homeland SecAdv In-Pac Coord Campbell  
L. Sherwood-Randall



ME Coord McGurk



Iran Envoy Malley



DNSA Neuberger  
Cyber & Technology



SrDir Europe Sloat



SrDir S.Asia S. Guha



SrDir Russia - Green

## Biden Health Team



XAVIER  
BECERRA

HHS SECRETARY



DR. VIVEK  
MURTHY

U.S. SURGEON GENERAL



DR. ROCHELLE  
WALENSKY

CDC DIRECTOR



DR. ANTHONY  
FAUCI

CHIEF MEDICAL ADVISER



JEFF  
ZIENTS

COORDINATOR OF THE  
COVID-19 RESPONSE



NATALIE  
QUILLIAN

DEP. COORDINATOR,  
COVID-19 RESPONSE



DR. MARCELLA  
NUNEZ-SMITH

COVID-19 EQUITY  
TASK FORCE CHAIR



# USG An Open Book -- Documents Worthy of a Scan

## INTERIM NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

MARCH 2021

PRESIDENT JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.



New NSS and NDS due out

## INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY

OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 2022



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

### ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

February 2022  
With Information as of January 2022

Threat Assessment Released March 22 – see Hill Testimony

STATEMENT OF  
GENERAL STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, UNITED STATES ARMY  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND  
BEFORE THE  
SENATE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE

15 MARCH 2022

COCOM Posture Statements

A CONTINENT OF GROWING STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER  
MAY 2021

Defense Budget Overview

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST

DoD FY23 Budget Will Be Sent to Congress Soon

MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
2021

DoD Reports to Congress

OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

Controlled by DoD/OSI/Office of Overseas Contingency Operations  
CUI Category: OISEC  
SFC-REL-TO-USA-NSF1-DI-SSAC-NAFC-SAC-D-NAE-D-HSSAC-ICOR-5561-  
NSFC-OSFC-ITAL-SAC/SFAC/NAOS/SPSP-  
DOC-SIC-000\_202\_004.4308


# Biden Administration – Interim NSS Guidance Document

## National Security Priorities (4)

- Protect the security of the American people
- Enduring interest in expanding economic prosperity and opportunity
- Committed to realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life
- Reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world

## Ensuring our national security requires us to:

- **Defend and nurture the underlying sources of American strength**, including our people, our economy, our national defense, and our democracy at home;
- **Promote a favorable distribution of power** to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions; and
- **Lead and sustain a stable and open international system**, underwritten by strong democratic alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, and rules.



New NSS and NDS due out soon

**RENEWING AMERICA'S ADVANTAGES**  
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance

### TABLE OF CONTENTS


Introduction .....	6
The Global Security Landscape .....	7
Our National Security Priorities .....	9
Conclusion .....	23

# Biden Administration – Interim NSS Guidance Document

## “In the Middle East”

- **Israel** - maintain our ironclad commitment to Israel’s security, further its integration with its neighbors and resuming our role as promoter of a viable two-state solution.
- **Iran** - work with regional partners to deter Iranian aggression & threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity
- **VEOs**. Disrupt al-Qaeda & related terrorist networks; prevent an ISIS resurgence & address humanitarian crises
- **Redouble our efforts to resolve the complex armed conflicts** that threaten regional stability
- **Yemen. Back UN efforts to end the war.**
- **Aim to de-escalate regional tensions & create space for people throughout the Middle East to realize their aspirations.**

*“We do not believe that military force is the answer to the region’s challenges, and we will not give our partners in the ME a blank check to pursue policies at odds with American interests and values i.e. Yemen”*



**RENEWING AMERICA'S ADVANTAGES**  
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance


### TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .....	6
The Global Security Landscape .....	7
Our National Security Priorities .....	9
Conclusion .....	23

# Biden Administration – Interim NSS Guidance Document

## “On Africa” (from Page 11)

- **Continue to build partnerships in Africa**, investing in civil society and strengthening long-standing political, economic, and cultural connections.
- **Partner with dynamic and fast-growing African economies, even as we provide assistance to countries** suffering from poor governance, economic distress, health, and food insecurity exacerbated by the pandemic.
- **Work to bring an end to the continent’s deadliest conflicts and prevent the onset of new ones**, while strengthening our commitment to development, health security, environmental sustainability, democratic progress, and rule of law.
- **Help African nations combat the threats** posed by climate change and violent extremism, and support their economic and political independence in the face of undue foreign influence.”




**RENEWING AMERICA'S ADVANTAGES**  
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .....	6
The Global Security Landscape .....	7
Our National Security Priorities .....	9
Conclusion .....	23



## AFRICOM's View



## What I've Heard GEN Townsend Say Recently

- The U.S. cannot ignore Africa.
- Our Competitors (RF/PRC) see Africa's rich potential.
- VEOs are growing most rapidly in Africa.
- On the African continent we're seeing competition between democracy and authoritarianism.
- A few troops and a few dollars go a long way on the continent that is 3.5 times the size of the U.S.

**Bottom Line – A Modest Investment (Democracy, Diplomacy & Defense) goes a Long Way.**

## From GEN Townsend's Written Testimony -- On VEOs

- **GTI -- 7 of 10 countries w/largest increase in terrorism in 2020 were in SSA, w/BF suffering a 590% increase.**
- **ISIS & AQ-aligned VEOs remain a potent and growing threat across much of Africa.**
- **In EAfrica, al-Shabaab remains the greatest threat to U.S. persons & interests in the region and the homeland, undermines progress in Somalia, and is working to re-establish ties with AQAP.**
- **Sustained CT pressure has significantly weakened VEOs in North Africa - problem has shifted southward SSAs.**
- **JNIM has metastasized into a powerful, sprawling terrorist network threatening Mali, BF, Niger, and litor. WAF.**
- **ISIS's exploitation of ungoverned spaces in SSA, has increased these groups' ability to destabilize local governments, exploit fragility and instability factors, and drive radicalism.**
- **Increased collaboration among ISIS groups in central Africa is a concerning trend that is expanding the terrorist threat to Mozambique, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.**

**"It is my judgement that greater and more coordinated efforts are necessary by our African and international partners, with continued U.S. support, if we are to check the pervasive spread of violent extremism—especially in East and West Africa".**



# **Early Decisions & Actions**

## **The 1<sup>st</sup> Year**



- **Domestic Issues and the Pandemic Response are getting 80% of the attention.**
- **Diplomacy - back at the center of our foreign policy.** Rooted in our democratic values. Rejoined WHO and UN Human Rights Council. ***Meetings with:*** G7 & EU; Quad; Japan; South Korea; India; Israel; China; NATO; EU; GC D-ISIS; G20; COP26
- **Diplomacy & Foreign Assistance.** Summit of Democracy. Strengthen Alliances. Fix DoS and invest in diplomacy and economic development.
- **Defense.** Will defend US Vital Interests. NDS due out. Must reform & focus on emerging technologies, cyber space, deep sea to outer space.
- **China – Compete & Cooperate.** US Indo-Pacific Strategy & DoD Strategy published to meet the growing challenge of China in the Indo-Pacific and globally. Expect NSS & NDS to highlight operational concepts, technology, and force posture.
- **End Forever Wars.** Afghanistan Withdrawal & Taliban Rule. Continue to support fight against Da'esh & VEOs.
- **Arms Control.** U.S. and Russia agreed to extend New START for five(5) years.

## **Biden Administration – Early Decisions & Actions at 1 Year**

- **Cybersecurity.** “SolarWinds hack”, Microsoft Exchange & Ransomware attacks. NSC DPNSA for Cyber has generated cyberspace initiatives and partnering req.
- **Russia-Ukraine.** Build an international response to Russia’s invasion.
- **China.** Post Olympic activities. Russia-China axis.
- **Iraq.** Government formation & Strategic Dialogue Discussion readouts.
- **Iran.** “JCPOA Future” in light of recent Russian demands.
- **Afghanistan.** Taliban Rule – Impacts beyond the humanitarian crisis?
- **Libya.** US stands behind UN–facilitated LPDF agreement. Path to Future Elections & departure of militias/PMC.
- **KSA.** No offensive support for Yemen fight. Will continue to help KSA defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and people.
- **Yemen.** UN led Negotiations with the Houthis? Limited sanctions? Ground for a peace settlement? Special Envoy Lenderking working.
- **Climate Change.** Rejoined Paris Climate Agreement. Hosted Earth Day Summit. Post Glasgow COP26 path – SE Kerry convened a follow-up min-summit 27 Jan 22.
- **Economic & Trade Efforts.** Details for Build Back Better World effort?
- **Immigration.** Restored Refugee Admissions Program - will grow #s to 125,000+ per year. Overturned Muslim ban. U.S. southern border challenges.
- **Human Rights Approach** focused on equal rights -> Women & girls, LGBTQ individuals, indigenous communities, people with disabilities.





**VEOs  
(ISIS & AQ)  
A Few Lessons Learned in  
the Fight Against Da'esh**



**ISIS  
&**



## The VEO Challenge

“The idea that the United States should focus less on counterterrorism and more on other issues is a bankrupt premise.” . . . “Less than three years after the U.S. military withdrew from Iraq, it launched operations there again against the Islamic State in 2014.” . . . “I hear this riff all the time: We’ve got to rebalance, as though this is somehow a zero-sum game. I understand how attractive that idea is — it’s just completely unrealistic. It never works. It never lasts.”

LTG (Ret) Michael Nagata, Middle East Institute – Distinguished Research Fellow  
From Washington Post, 13 Dec and Dan.lamothe@washpost.com

# 2022 GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM




## Key Findings

- **Deaths from terrorism fell for the 6<sup>th</sup> consecutive year to 7,142 deaths, representing a 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of what they were in 2015 1% decrease from the prior year.**
- **2021 Attacks increased by 17% to 5,226 largely due to violence in the Sahel region and instability in countries such as Afghanistan and Myanmar.**
- **7 Of 10 countries most impacted by terrorism deteriorated in 2021.** MENA, Europe, Russia and Eurasia, South America and sub-Saharan Africa regions all recorded falls in deaths from terrorism of at least 10%.
- **3 of 10 most impacted countries were in the Sahel region.** Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso recorded subst. increases in terrorism deaths of 81, 174 and 74 respectively.
- **JNIM is the fastest growing terrorist organization and was responsible for 351 deaths in 2021, a 69% increase.**
- **Afghanistan remains the country with the highest impact from terrorism for the 3d yr followed by Iraq and Somalia.** Deaths increased by 14% to 1,426. Other Top 10 incl: BF, Syria, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Myanmar, & Pakistan.


## 71,000 and counting

Islamist terrorist attacks, number of fatalities, '000

### By Islamist group involved



### By region



### By country, 2007-21†, % of total



\*Includes unidentified groups †To August 2021

Source: Dragonfly, Terrorism Tracker database

# Where things look worst

Terrorism risk index\*

August 2021

■ Negligible   ■ Low   ■ Moderate   ■ Substantial   ■ Severe   ■ Extreme




Source: Dragonfly, SIAS Terrorism Risk Ratings Database

\*Risk ratings indicate likelihood, occurrence and impact of terrorist attacks on general security



Figure 3: Islamic State and Al-Qaeda Attacks, 2019<sup>19</sup>




**AQ Worldwide Enterprise –  
Wolff's Best Guess as of 16 March 22**  
 AQ – Central Afghanistan = 200-400 -> operating in 12/18/21 provinces  
**Up to 7 Branches**  
 AQIS (Indian Subcontinent) = 150-200  
 AQ in Syria (Hay'at al-Sham, 6-20K) & Hurras al Din, 1-5K) = 7-20K in Idlib P.  
 AQIM & JNIM (Sahel) = 500-1K+  
 Al Shabaab = 7-10K  
 AQAP (Yemen) = 7K operating in 7 provinces. Retains ExOps desire

- Seth Jones-3 Sets of Factors that Increase the Probability of an Insurgency (study of 200 insurgencies) including: 1) Grievances, 2) Weak Governance with incompetent police & military forces, 3) Greed – see WBG “Pathways for Peace” and USIP “Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States”
- Review the Arab Youth Survey 2020 at [https://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/about\\_the\\_survey.html](https://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/about_the_survey.html)
- Role of nation states in supporting proxy forces

U.S. DEFEAT ISIS INTEGRATED CAMPAIGN

Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS



**Global Counter-ISIS Coalition members not shown:**

- United States
- Canada
- Panama
- New Zealand
- Fiji

**International organization partner headquarters:**

- Arab League
- Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
- European Union, NATO
- INTERPOL

How We're Thinking About Global ISIS

- \* Disrupting the Transregional Flow and Generation of ISIS Financing & Weapons (IEDs, UAS, WMD)
- \* Address the Dispersal of ISIS Fighters & Families across Borders & Prevent Further Radicalization
- \* Disrupt External Operation & Movement of ISIS Operatives Globally
- \* Neutralize the Narrative
- \* Protect our Homelands – FTF Problem Set

Da'esh Branches and Affiliates – Wolff's Assessment

16 March 22

- ISIS – Core (Syria/Iraq) = 6-10K
- ISIS – Sinai = 500-1K -> Stalemate with GoE military on the Sinai
- ISIS – Libya = 50 - 200 (1.4K) -> Disbursed, but GNA/LNA stalemate offers sanctuary
- ISIS – Algeria = 30-50 -> Remnant cells remain
- ISIS – GS = 400-1K -> With JNIM (AQ) violence has created havoc in the Sahel – continued attacks on security forces in tri-border area BF-Mali-Niger
- ISIS-WAP = 3.5 to 5K -> With BH (1-2K) actions causing enormous challenges in NE Nigeria
- ISIS – CAP = Allied Democratic forces (ADF) & Medina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeem) 600-1.2K Locals & FtFs from Burundi, Chad, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,
- ISIS – Mozambique = 600-1.2K -> Rwanda, Somalia Tanzania & Uganda - on the upswing
- ISIS – Somalia = 300-500 mostly in the Puntland, but al-Shabab (5-7K) the key VEO
- ISIS – Yemen = 200-600 in 2/22 Provinces – 3<sup>rd</sup> in importance after the Houthis and AQAP
- ISIS-Saudi Arabia = less than 50
- ISIS – Caucasus = 100-400 but 2.5K-4.3K went to Syria & Iraq
- ISIS-K (Afghanistan) = 2-4K but up to 10K (mostly in the East)
- ISIS – East Asia = 300-500 in the Philippines & diversifying on Mindano & Sulu;
- ISIS – Balkans = 1-2K with over 1K known to have gone to Syria & Iraq
- ISIS – India = 500? Announced May 2019
- ISIS – Bangladesh = 100?
- ISIS – Indonesia = 20 (JAD linkage 1K?) with 1.5K known to have gone to Syria & Iraq / 600 rtn'd
- ISIS – Sri Lanka & Maldives = 100?
- ISIS – Turkey = unknown number in the 3.5M refugees
- ISIS – Europe Affiliates = 5K-5.5K mostly in Syria & Iraq - large self-attacks, serious releases

Bottom Line -- De'esh Comes From Existing VE Groups

- 50+ Group have pledged allegiance
- Few new “start ups”



# **Wolff's Take on the Evolving SPE/DSPE Mission Set**

- **When I joined the SPE Office, the Coalition was formed militarily – Da'esh w/b defeated – just a matter of time.**
- **Team McGurk/Wolff had to:**
  - **Maintain the Coalition and add African & Asian members**
  - **Build on the momentum generated by the Nov 15 Paris Attacks**
  - **Get the Coalition to work the non-military spaces (4 x LoEs)**
  - **Synchronize the USG Interagency Effort across the 9 x US LoEs**
  - **Build a USG Integrated Campaign Plan (ICP) which became the Defeat ISIS Integrated Campaign Plan (DISP) and led to \$9B in Supplemental Funding for DoD/DoS in FY17**
  - **Harmonize how the USG talked about the fight against ISIS**
  - **Prepare for the transition of Administrations in Jan '17**
  - **Plan for the defeat of Da'esh in Mosul & Raqqa and how to deal with the aftermath (HA, Deming/ERW Removal, Stabilization)**
  - **Lay the foundations for the defeat of Da'esh in the lower ERV**

# The Integrated Campaign Against ISIS – Feb 17 Case Study

**Goal:** With Coalition Partners develop an integrated effort which disrupts, degrades, and defeats ISIS across Iraq and Syria (Core), the Branches/Affiliates, and the Networks which maximizes the use of the instruments of national power while protecting U.S. National Interests and those of Coalition Partners. Expect this effort to take years.

## Key Tasks:

- Protect the Homeland and Prevent /Disrupt Attacks against U.S. persons and our Core Interests
- Stop ISIS's Expansion
- Disrupt the Connective Tissue between ISIS's Core & Branches

## US Lines of Effort (LoEs)

1. Effective Iraqi Governance (DoS)
  2. Deny ISIS Safe Haven (DoD)
  3. Build Partnership Capacity (DoD)
  4. Enhance Intel Collection (IC)
  5. Disrupt ISIS Finance (DoT/DoS)
  6. Expose ISIS's True Nature – Ideology (DoS/NCTC)
1. Disrupt Foreign Terrorist Fighter Flow (NCTC/DoS)
  2. Humanitarian Assistance (DoS/USAID)
  3. Protect the Homeland (DNI/DHS)

## Coalition LoEs

1. Support mil ops, cap bldg & tng
2. Stop flow of FtFs (Neth/TU/KUW)
3. Disrupt ISIS Finance (IT/KSA/US)
4. Stabilization Support (GER/UAE/US)
5. Counter Messaging (UAE/UK/US)

## Coalition Military Campaign LoEs

1. Degrade and Counter ISIS
2. Enable GoI Security & Governance
3. Enable Syrian Security
4. Spt Partner Nation Defense
5. Enable Broad Military Coalition

## CENTCOM / CJTF Campaign Effort

- Degrade -> Dismantle -> Defeat
- Secure & Stabilize Al Anbar
  - Seize Mosul
  - Reestablish the Iraqi Border
  - Isolate & Secure Raqqah
  - Clear Middle ERV
  - Disrupt Da'esh in SW Syria
  - Protect Baghdad

## Integrated Campaign (IC) Effort

### Core ISIS Fight

- Anbar, Jordan Border & S. Syrian Approach
- Seize Mosul
- Isolate & Seize Raqqah
- Syrian efforts
- Secure Border & N. Areas
- ISIS's Resources in I & S
- Iraq's Stability

### Branches

- ISIS-Libya
- Nigeria-BH
- ISIS-Yemen
- Emerging Branches & Affiliates


### Networks

- Disrupt ExOps
- FTFs
- Sever Financial Connections
- ISIS's Narrative

# Key Thoughts

- The Fight Against ISIS has been different every year & will be in 2022
- Fight Against ISIS is Far From Over-Da'esh has strategic depth
- We're in a Critical "Counter-Insurgency" Phase in Iraq & in Syria
- Coalition of 83 Remains Strong Enabled by the Guiding Principles Document & Coalition Meetings and Commitments
- Campaign Has Been Dominated via a "By - With - Through" Effort - This Must Continue (Military & Non-Military components)
- Focus on Right Approaches for Major ISIS Networks & Branches through Multiple Mechanisms – (Coalition, Multilateral, Bilateral)
- Baghdadi's & Abu Ibrahim's Death Isn't the End of Da'esh -> Amir Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (always have a succession plan)

## Islamic State's Caliphate Map




Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Sabi, the new Isis leader. Photograph: Twitter



# ISIS Organizational Structure is Resilient

## Islamic State organizational structure

## Indicators of Islamic State strength and weakness



### The Role & Legitimacy of the Islamic State Leader



Territorial and population control

It is all about the physical caliphate



Popular support



Global spread of wilayas and supporters

Via the use of Islamic State Media Warfare



Levels of violence

Clandestine ops, Guerilla Warfare, Conv Ops

# What ISIS tries to export to Branches and Affiliates

Military expertise is one of the most valued exports

Remote advising

Advise and assist

Advise, assist, accompany

Leadership training, safety

Media and financing

ideology

Attacking on global front

Adhocratic nature

Adapting to conditions: building, insurgency, consolidation

# **Lessons Learned from the ISIS Fight & Enduring Challenges**

- **Dealing with the “clandestine” ISIS threat** – a law enforcement (LE) and intelligence problem – *how to respond to threats to internal domestic security?*
- **ISIS is an Innovator & Learning Organization** - recognizing how they innovate & adapt across the domains – ground, sub-surface, air, and cyber – *adapt or else!*
- **Determining how to conduct Radical Information Sharing across key communities** incl. LE & Domestic Security, Intelligence (foreign & domestic), Military & National Leadership – *how are you organized for success?*
- **Combating Da’esh ‘s Use of Ideology and How to Prevent Violent Extremism** – *types of programs are key.*
- **ISIS & Social Media** – Counter Messaging vs. Messaging vs. Cyber efforts --*you must degrade Da’esh’s Brand & Destroy their Legacy!*



# Lessons Learned from the ISIS Fight & Enduring Challenges

- **PVE and / or CVE** – *Best programs?*
- **FtFs – Repatriate or not?** *How to Prosecute (lashup between LE & MoJ)? Punish and/or Re-educate? Rehabilitation & Reintegration?*
- **Prison Challenge** --*How to prevent Radicalization in Prisons?*
- **ISIS Women & Children** – *What to Do and When?*
- **Border Security & the Flow of FtFs** -- *Understanding how citizens move*
- **ISIS Financing – Stopping the Flow of Money via Informal Networks** -- they're a mafia that's diversified; supervise the CIFG financial sector & AML/CFT strategy & action plans to counter looting & antiquity smuggling; *Understand the lashup between crime & terror* – (FIU/LE/MoJ)
- **Da'esh Playbook** – they use a “clandestine / conventional set” of plays married with a propaganda / messaging / ideology component augmented with a social service provision effort.






**The FtF**  
**+**  
**Women & Children**  
**Challenge**

# ICSR July 18 Report – 41,490 IS Affiliates in Iraq & Syria



## Middle East and North Africa (MENA)



## Western Europe




## Americas, Australia, New Zealand



## Eastern Europe




## South-Eastern Asia



## Southern Asia




## Central Asia



## Eastern Asia



## Sub-Saharan Africa



# GCTF – Forum of 29 Countries & EU:

- Goal of reducing vulnerability of people worldwide to terrorism by preventing, combating, and prosecuting terrorist acts and counter incitement & recruitment to terrorism.
- Promote a strategic, long-term approach to CT & VE ideologies that underpin it
- Develop good practices to strengthen CT civ capacities, national strategies, action plans & training modules
- Morocco & Netherlands Co-Chair
- Tie-in with UN CT Strategy & UNSG’s Plan of Action-PVE


## GCTF Working Groups

	<a href="#"><u>Countering Violent Extremism</u></a>	Australia	Indonesia
	<a href="#"><u>Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law</u></a>	Nigeria	Switzerland
	<a href="#"><u>Foreign Terrorist Fighters</u></a>	Jordan	United States
	<a href="#"><u>Capacity-building in the East Africa Region</u></a>	Egypt	European Union
	<a href="#"><u>Capacity-building in the West Africa Region</u></a>	Algeria	Canada

# UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee est. post 9/11

- Guided by UNSCR 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), the CTC works to bolster the ability of UN Member States to prevent terrorist acts both w/i their borders & across regions.
- Assisted by the CTEExec Directorate (CTED) - carries out policy decisions of the Committee, conducts assessments of MS & facilitates ct technical assistance to countries.

United Nations CTED @UN\_CTED · Feb 10  
ICYMI, here's the link to our new report- "Identifying, exploring and addressing the nexus between #humantrafficking and #terrorism." un.org/sc/ctc/wp-cont...





## Hedayah

countering violent extremism



ABOUT US



THE COUNTER EXTREMISM HUB



MASAR



STRIVE GLOBAL  
CALL FOR  
PROPOSALS



## Several Approaches on – Building Resilience Against Terrorism

### Canada's Approach – Focusing On 4 Aspects – Prevent, Detect, Deny, and Respond

#### Cause for Engaging in Extremist Behavior:

- Threat to individual & collective identity
- Marginalization from mainstream society
- Ideological necessity
- Hatred of & looking for revenge
- Politically or religiously motivated stance
- Seeking the meaning of life: personal tragedy; boredom; VEO recruitment; SM fueling; underlying, enduring & systemic inequalities.
- Media stories & messaging
- Peer group pressure
- Promises of a better future & life

#### How Education Can Build Resiliency

- Promote values of citizenship & diversity
- Help understand history & power relations in society
- Develop religious literacy to promote knowledge of others
- Media literacy

#### Dealing with Need, Narrative, Networks & Ideology

Figure 1. The staircase to terrorism (Moghaddam 2005)



Source: Can education counter violent religious extremism?  
Ratna Ghosh, WY, Alice Chan, Ashley Manuel & Maihemuti Dilimulati

### BRAVE Model (Building Resiliency Against VE)

#### Whole of Community Approach – in Maryland


- Engage a wide range of stakeholders incl faith community ldrs, public officials, LE, educators, social service providers
  - Educate stakeholders w/the repertoire of solutions
  - Connect vulnerable indiv to professions for the intervention(s)
  - Professionals employ a multidisciplinary approach to counsel & provide services
- These approaches must be resourced; about more than religion and terrorism; integrated nationally-locally; incorporate diversion programs; use metrics to assess; offer access to services.*

## OSCE's Whole-of-Society Approach to P&CVE & Radicalism That Leads to Terrorism

### Key Recommendations

### Leads to Terrorism

- Identify Strength & Build Capacity for Partnership
- Build Trust & Avoid Instrumentalization
- Provide Political & Legal Space
- Reach Terminological Consensus
- Co-ordinate Efforts
- Obtain Adequate & Reliable Funding
- Review the Relevant UN and OSCE Instruments
- **Whole-of-government approach** — an approach to P/CVE that denotes public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues.
- **Whole-of-society approach** — an approach to P/CVERLT that envisions a role for civil society actors and other non-governmental actors, as well as relevant government actors across sectors, in the prevention of VE.



#### Key Partners Include:

- Government Actors** -> Police, Mol, MoSWelfare, MoEd, MoEmpl, CoWomen, CoYouth, Religious Affairs
- Non-Govt Actors** -> Youth, Women, Community & Cleaders, Educators & Mentors, Academics & Researchers, SM Companies & Experts, Media & Journalists, Former VEs

### P/ CVERLT Strategies incl PVE National Action Plans

Req partnership between Govt & Non-Govt Actors. Stages include:

- Situation analysis, knowledge creation, and research;
- Drafting objectives and activities;
- Implementation of projects;
- Monitoring and evaluation;
- Strategic communication; and
- Advocacy and feedback mechanisms.

## The EU's RAN Collection of Ideas

## RESOLVE NETWORK / ACTIVITIES AND METHOD


BETTER RESEARCH. INFORMED PRACTICE. IMPROVED POLICY ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM.





## Virtual Small Group FMs Met – 30 March 2021

- \* Continue the fight against Da'esh in Iraq/Syria & create the conditions for its enduring defeat worldwide via a comprehensive & collective effort through stabilization, political, military, communications, counter finance, and law enforcement lines of effort
- \* Allocate military & civilian resources to sustain Coalition and legitimate partner forces' efforts against Daesh/ISIS in Iraq and Syria, incl stabilization support to liberated areas, to safeguard Iraq & Syria's stability and our collective security interests.
- \* Unwavering commitment to continue close cooperation/spt of GOI
- \* Welcomed the incremental expansion of NATO's non-combat advisory & training mission in Iraq,
- \* Discussed Syria (UNSCR2254); Sahel Challenges; Al Hof Camp Issue







# Case Studies



# AFRICA'S ACTIVE MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS



**TRENDS IN MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUP ACTIVITY IN AFRICA**




Updated: February 2021

Note: Compiled by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, this graphic shows violent events involving the listed groups over the 12-month period ending December 31, 2020. Data on attacks or fatalities does not attempt to distinguish the perpetrators of the events. Group listings are intended for informational purposes only and should not be considered official designations. Due to the fluid nature of many groups, the listed affiliations may change.

Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Daniel Byman; HumAngle; Thomas Joscelyn; SITE Intelligence Group; The Soufan Group; Stanford University's Mapping Militants Project; Stratfor; Terrorism Research & Analysts Consortium (TRAC); and Aaron Y. Zelner.


## Terrorist attacks in the Sahel, 2007-2021

Most terrorist attacks occur away from major urban centers.




## Incidents and deaths from terrorism in the Sahel, 2007-2021

Both incidents and deaths increased by well over 1,000 per cent from 2007 to 2021.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations




## **Terrorism in the Sahel from GTI 2022 (Based on 2021 Data)**



- **Sahel has become increasingly more violent over the past 15 years, with deaths rising by over 1000% 2007-2021.** The increase in violence shows no sign of abating.
- **Underlying drivers are complex and systemic, including poor water utilization, lack of food, malnutrition, strong population growth, and weak governments.**
- **10% or more of young males suffer from food insecurity in 8/10 countries in the Sahel.**
- **In conflict areas VEOs prefer to target police, military and domestic government.** While water & utilities and/or infrast are pref. tgts of VEO gps in non-conflict environment.
- **ISGS is the most lethal group in the Sahel.** In Niger-23 attacks killing avg 15 per attack.
- **Increase in terrorist activity in Niger w/ similar surges seen in Mali & BF over past few yrs.**
- **Most terrorist activity is in border regions** where government activities are at a minimum.
- **Strong statistical relationship between criminal activity and terrorism in the Sahel.**
- **30+K killed in terrorist attacks in the region since 2007** w/ BF, Niger, Mali & DROC had the largest increase in the number of people killed in terrorist attacks. Niger 2x 2020 rate.

# The Sahel & VEOs, 2017 – 2021+

Violent incidents involving Jihadist groups  
 ● 2017 ● 2019-20\* → Possible expansion  
 ◆ G5 Sahel (joint force) ◆ Member country† ◆ United Nations  
 Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project; Africa Centre for Strategic Studies  
 \*To July 4th †Includes Chad



## Coups - Political Unrest?



The Economist


The Economist

- Sahelian governments cannot provide effective security-has led to increasing VEO increasing violence.
- Insecurity has also led to use of localized militias for security. (Exceptions Mauritania & Senegal)
- 2 Main Groups fighting – ISGS & JNIM (made up of 6 groups – AD, MLF/FLM, KS, AQIM Sahara, AM & AI)
- Jihadists now pushing in 3 directions-W to Senegal; E to Nigeria; S to Ivory Coast, Ghana, & Benin?
- HA Challenge: Population of Concern - 4.1M / 2.4M IDPs / 900K Refugees
- French & UN forces departing Mali – relocating to Niger.







# Somalia VEOs-AS & ISIS



**AS Objective** – vision of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia under Islamist government.






## Al-Shabaab (AS) led by Ahmed Diriye (designed FTO in 2008)

- **7-10K--largest and most kinetically active AQ network in the world. Most active group in Africa.**
  - **GEN Townsend** -- “greatest threat to US persons and interests in region & homeland as well as Somalia and neighboring countries”. AQAP ties. (Note- 5 Jan 20 attack on Manda Bay Kenya (3 US KIA) (10+))
  - **2021 kinetic activity increased by 16% = 2000 violent events to undermine FSG, AMSOM, partners .**
  - Maintains its foothold on the outskirts of Mogadishu and throughout southern and central Somalia, allowing it to conduct occasional complex attacks. Held at bay by 20K African Peacekeepers & US CT help
- Somalia’s Challenges** – 2020 elections postponed (Pres Mohamed); AMISOM’s tenure; 3 years of drought; 13M food insecure; IMP/WB waives \$5.3B in debt; EU funding suspended; security environment probably worsening. US CT support from Kenya.

# Nigeria – ISWAP Impacts – Violence & HA Challenges



ISWAP = 3.5-5K  
BH = 1-2K?



In NE over the years-35K killed by violence & 314K from war-induced disease and hunger

**Situation:** In NE BH Ldr Shekau killed May 2021 by **ISWAP** which dominates-brutal, competent & bigger danger to Nigeria; in NW--gangs of kidnapers are terrorizing; In oil rich SE **Biafran secessionism** has been rekindled. The violence threatens not just Nigeria's 200m people, but also the stability of the entire region that surrounds them.


**Economist Assessment:** "What has changed of late, though, is that jihadism, organized crime and political violence have grown so intense and widespread that most of the country is sliding towards ungovernability. **In 1<sup>st</sup> 9 mos 2021, 8K were directly killed in various conflicts.** Hundreds of thousands more have perished because of hunger and disease caused by fighting. **More than 2M have fled their homes.**"

**NE Strategy:** Unofficial strategy seems to be to contain ISWAP, rather than defeat them. GoN deployed enough force to control biggest towns & escort convoys on main roads-not to hold-cannot govern smaller towns and villages.

**IDP & Refugee Crisis-2.4M IDPs in LCB -> 2.1M in Nigeria and 778K in Cameroon (406K)/Chad (357K)/Niger. (83K). 331K Nigerian Refugees-> Niger (187K), Cameroon (124K), Chad (19K) (Source – UNDP)**



# ISIS (ASWJ) Mozambique



- **5 Year Insurgency (since 2017) in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. 3.3K Killed & 800K displaced out of 2.3M in the province.** (Historically neglected region during War of Independence (1964-72) & Civil War (77-92))
- **Attacks in March 2021 in Palma** (200 attackers over 4 days resulted in 90+ killed and \$1M seized) / March 2020 bold rebel attacks to take control of Mocimboa as Praia, Quissanga, and Pemba
- **GoM invited RDF (1K) and SADC forces (1500) to Mozambique. MDF/RDF/SADM have pushed ISIS (ASWJ) out of MdP (Aug) and destroyed bases, tng camps, and neutralized insurgents & leadership**
- **Violence has impacted Africa's largest-ever energy project** – Romuma basin gasfields (Africa's Qatar - \$100B energy firm investment by Total \$20B and ExxonMobil). Corruption in illicit economy (gem fields & other areas)
- One of few provinces with a Muslim majority; Sufi tradition which began to get challenged in 2000s. 2008 **Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama'a** (adherents of the prophetic tradition) established & influenced by Islamists from EAfrica with links to groups/cells in Kenya, Somalia, the Great Lakes, and Tanzania. 2017 attacks begin w/ members from north, Tanzania and Congo plus other places. Jul 2019 IS claims insurgents were part of ISIS-CAR. March 2020 attackers flew IS flag.


# Libya Situation – March 2022



- Oct 20 Ceasefire Agreement Holding between GNA & Haftar's LNA (loses by Haftar in West & SW in June 20).
- **Standoff Between Rival Governments (GNA-LNA). Struggle over Transitional Government and Elections roadmap.** UN–Dec 21 elections pushed to Summer 22. Legitimacy Issues! PM Dbeibeh or Bashagha (easterner)?
- **Oil Exports.** Remain 1.2MBD (June Revenue = \$2.1B)
- **Regional Power Dynamic – GNA (France/UK/IT/TU/Qatar) vs. LNA (Egypt, KSA, and UAE) – impact?**
- **Outside fighters-Turkish militia troops (7-14K); Chad (700) then Wagner Group (800-1400);Sudanese (1K)**
- Haftar's claim to have a mandate to rule Libya in April 20?
- **Post-Conflict Challenges: IDPs, ERW, ISIS dispersment, border security, FTF movement**
- **ISIS-Libya (50-200 down from 5K) in cities along the coast & in SW – Jan 22 atk 1<sup>st</sup> since Sep21**



# Yemen Situation - 2022




## Grim Snapshot

More than 90,000 people have been killed in Yemen's war since 2015.

UN estimates the War Has Killed 377,000\*

(\*60% indirect causes) (70% children)

4.6M Refugees




Note: Data as of July 28

Source: The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project

## Approximate Territorial Control

Situation as known October 12, 2019



- **Houthi Cross Border Attacks in KSA & UAE: 2021=325 & 2022=45 so far**
- **Civil War -- Houthis control most of Yemen (70% of 30M people) – Is fight for Marib over?**
- **Houthis unwilling to engage with the UN/KSA/US over ceasefire efforts.**
- **Three Groups** – Pres Hadi remains in KSA; STC controls Aden; Houthis supported by Iran (BM & other military support) & Numerous Other Warlords.
- **Saudi blockade has crippled the economy in the north while Houthis divert aid and sell it for profit.**
- **UN declared a Hum Crisis (the worst): 30+M population (20M in need / 12M acute need / 4M displaced)**
- **Yemen 2020 HRP needs \$4.2B – only \$1.3B pledged** (Note in CY21 on \$2.8/\$3.85B funded funded (73%): 2 of 3 need HA; 17M need food assist; amine conditions=16M/ **US committed \$585M (\$4.5B since 2015)**)




# Russia's Invasion of the Ukraine

## Culminating Points?



The Economist

## Enormous HA Challenge In the Ukraine!



The Economist

10M displaced (25% pop)  
3M refugees / 2M IDPs

## Thoughts on Russia's Invasion


- Putin's War of Choice
- This War is different than Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine 2014 & Syria.
- Russian Failure to understand Ukraine and the Ukrainians
- Must understand the Russian "Way of War".
- The US/NATO/EU's response has been different than Putin expected.
- Assess through the DIME lens – at the Strategic, Operational, Tactical Levels.
- Economic Impacts will grow – energy / food stuffs/commodities - look at what Russia & the Ukraine export.
- "Passive Deterrence versus Active Measures Challenge". Timidity & Window of Opportunity?

**Bottom Line - This War is far from over and will forever change Russia's relationship with the West – Much Bigger than the Ukraine!**





## Peak Troop Strength of Past Russian Military Incursions








## Short bread

### Wheat imports, 2020, \$bn






# Afghanistan




Source: Bill Roggio, FDD's Long War Journal \*At August 18th



## Afghanistan - September 2021 – Unknown Consequences


- Impacts from the fall of the Ghani Government and the fracturing of ANDSF
- Lessons learned from the Taliban's Rapid Victory?
- The New Taliban – Prove it! Can You Govern? Power Sharing? Movement of Citizens Allowed or not?
- Terrorist Central? Since 2015 ISIS-K has conducted 400+ attacks in Afgh/Pak
- Upcoming Economic and Humanitarian Challenges – how big of a Crisis?
- Impacts in the Neighborhood – Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, & "Stans"?
- Recognizing the Taliban & Establishing Diplomatic Relations
- US Policy on Afghanistan highlighted by SecState Blinken on 30 Aug and again at the Ministerial on Afghanistan on 8 Sept. Oslo Meetings 24 Jan 22

### ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS, 2002-2020




We were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan. We didn't know what we were doing. . . . We're going to do something in Afghanistan with \$10 billion? Haiti is a small country in our own backyard with no extremist insurgency and we can't develop it. And we expect to develop Afghanistan with \$10 billion? . . . What are we trying to do here? We didn't have the foggiest notion of what we were undertaking. . . . It's really much worse than you think. There [was] a fundamental gap of understanding on the front end, overstated objectives, an overreliance on the military, and a lack of understanding of the resources necessary.<sup>72</sup> LTG(Ret) Doug Lute

### U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002-2021




### REPORTED ANDSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH FROM APPS





AFGHANISTAN COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, ANNUAL AND CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS FY 2002 TO FY 2021 Q2 (\$ BILLIONS)

**U.S. ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN SINCE 2002 (\$ MILLIONS)**



2012-2016, there was a 63% drop in U.S. mil assistance and a 72% drop in U.S. civ assistance. The drawdown laid bare just how hollow the alleged progress had been. Contested territory that had been cleared by U.S. forces was hastily “transitioned” to Afghan officials who were not ready, allowing the Taliban to seize districts as U.S. forces vacated them.

